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SURVEY
OF THE
TURKISH EMPIRE.

IN WHICH ARE CONSIDERED,

I.
ITS GOVERNMENT,
FINANCES, MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE,
Religion, History, Arts, Sciences, Manners, Commerce, and Population.

II.
THE STATE OF THE PROVINCES,
Including the ancient Government of the **CRIM TATARS,**
The Subjection of the **GREEKS,**
THEIR EFFORTS TOWARD EMANCIPATION,
And the Interest of other Nations,
Particularly of **GREAT BRITAIN,** in their Success.

III.
THE CAUSES OF THE DECLINE OF TURKEY,
And those which tend to the **PROLONGATION** of its **EXISTENCE,**
With a Developement of the Political System of the late
EMPRESS OF RUSSIA.

IV.
THE BRITISH COMMERCE WITH TURKEY,
The Necessity of abolishing the **LEVANT COMPANY,**
And the Danger of our **QUARANTINE REGULATIONS.**
WITH MANY OTHER IMPORTANT PARTICULARS.

By W. ETON, Esq;

MANY YEARS RESIDENT IN TURKEY AND IN RUSSIA.

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FINANCES MILITARY AND NAVAL FORCE

RELIGION, MANNERS, AND CUSTOMS, AGRICULTURE, COMMERCE, AND POPULATION.

BY

JOSEPH W. BARKS

OF THE ARMY

AND OF THE NAVAL FORCE

IN

THE EAST OF THE MEDITERRANEAN

AND THE BLACK SEA

AND THE STRAITS OF THE BALKANS

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THE BRITISH COMMAND IN THE TURKISH

ARMY AND NAVAL FORCE

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THE EAST OF THE MEDITERRANEAN



PREFACE.

I Do not offer to the Public a complete Treatise; I have indeed materials, out of which I could have formed a much larger work; but these outlines will, I hope, represent in its true character the object to which I more immediately wish to fix the attention of my readers.

As I reason only from facts, I trust the impartial Reader will draw the same conclusions; and as I speak of countries in which I have been long resident, and of events, to many of which I was witness, I hope my testimony may have some weight. To show that I have had opportunities of being acquainted with the matters of which I treat, I will only observe, that in Turkey I have been a consul; that I have had indirect concerns in trade; and that, as a traveller, I have visited most parts of that empire; that in Russia I was, for several years, in the confidence of the late

late Prince Potemkin, and in a situation to know more of the secrets of the cabinet than most foreigners; and that for five years I did the business of secretary to his Majesty's mission at St. Petersburg: at the same time I am convinced that I expose myself to the censure of not being better informed, and, on the other hand, of incurring, though I am conscious of not meriting, the blame of betraying a confidence put in me; so far, however, from this being the case, I rather apprehend that the delicacy of my situation, with respect to the two countries, and particularly to my own, may have operated too restrictively on my pen.

Many writers and travellers have seen things in a different light; and I am sensible that I may be accused of treating the Turks too severely, and particularly by those who admire Lady Wortley Montagu's elegant descriptions, and similar productions of a warm imagination *. I draw conclusions from facts recorded

* The best authors who have written on this subject are, *Bisbee*, *Leunclav*, *Montecuculli*, *Marfigli*, and *Ricaut*; they show what the Turks were in their days. As to *Cantemir*, though he had found an asylum in the very heart of the

recorded in their own history. Indeed there cannot be a more horrible picture than that which they have, themselves, delineated. The sentiments expressed by the sultans and mustis, which will be found in the abridgement of their history, in their own words, are so repugnant to justice, to humanity, to every principle of virtue, and to those laws which all civilized nations have respected, that nothing can be said worse of them. The effects produced by this monstrous government in the provinces are shocking to behold. We seek in vain for a population, sufficient to compose those numerous kingdoms and states, which flourished when the Turks usurped their dominion; we find the country literally a desert; we find vast cities reduced to beggarly villages, and of many hundreds no traces remain.

The government of the Turks has undergone considerable revolutions, which

the Russian empire, he wrote as if he still had been at Constantinople. Other more modern authors are, *Boscovich*, *Businello*, *Guys*, *Le Bret*, *Sir James Porter*, *Riedesel* with *Dohm's* notes, *Ludeke*, *Stævers*, *Ferrieres*, and *Volney*, and their picture of the Turks is not more favourable than mine. There are others, who have composed in their closets excellent histories, &c. of this people.

it will be necessary to investigate. The empire, in its flourishing state, was one vast camp. The first sultans dated, and their feeble successors still date, their decrees from the imperial stirrup. The iron sceptre, imbrued in blood, could only be wielded by warlike sovereigns, the idol and the terror of the soldiery, whose discipline alone was their politics, and whose rapine alone their resources.

Achmet III. father of the late Abdul-hamid, first set the example of an effeminate reign; and by not going out himself at the head of his janizaries, he became so much the object of their contempt that they dethroned him.

Machmud, his nephew, terrified at the fate of his predecessor, and finding himself unable to govern, determined to destroy the whole body of janizaries. The army, dreaded by the sultan, found in him an enemy more powerful than all the hosts of Christendom; and he, without their co-operation, unable to wield his sceptre, found an enemy in the other slaves he called in to assist him, still more destructive of his own power. The present reigning sultan, Selim, has fallen on a more gentle

the method of abolishing the *janizaries*, but he still has the *ulema* to contend with.

The abstract of their history is mostly from Ricault, whose antiquated, though faithful relation, I have often quoted in his own language. I have only cited a few facts to prove the truth of my general assertions; to enumerate only all the instances of unprovoked aggression, breach of oaths, treaties, and capitulations, massacres, and acts of cruelty and oppression, to be found in the bloody pages of their history, would alone make a large volume.

The first part of these papers has been written some time; that which is political, about two years ago, on my return to my native country; but it was not then designed for the press. It may be objected, that there are matters in it which ought not to be made public, as it contains information which may benefit our enemies; I answer, that they being in possession of the information which the late government of France had procured, there is nothing essential in this book which will be new to them; nor had even that government, at any time, so many spies,

or such exact intelligence as the Directory now have.

With respect to the Greeks, there will be found much matter wholly new to the Public, but not to the Directory; for no one was better informed of the state of Greece than citizen (heretofore chevalier de) Truguet, lately minister of the marine department. He was for a long time employed in the Archipelago, under the direction of Mr. de Choisseul Gouffier, and was sent to Egypt to negotiate with the Beys for leave to trade to India through that country, and to counteract the Russian intrigues with them.

I have endeavoured to prove, that the interests of Great Britain and Russia are inseparable and reciprocal. This, indeed, has been generally granted; but when the aggrandizement of that empire at the expence of the Turks has been the subject of discussion, that case has generally been considered as an exception; on what grounds I shall examine, and, I hope, plainly prove that the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the re-establishment of the Greek empire, is more the advantage of

of Britain than even of Russia itself; that so far from being an usurpation, it is an act of justice; and that, according to the laws of nations, the Turks have not, by length of possession, acquired a right to the dominion of the countries they conquered. The importance of the alliance of Russia appears every day more strongly, and I risk now, much less than I did a few years ago, when I maintained, that the salvation of Europe depended on engaging that power as a principal in the war. The views of the French with regard to Greece now too plainly appear, and the Emperor of Russia is in danger of being attacked in the Black Sea by a French fleet.

If it be said that we ought, as much as may depend on us, to prevent the increase of naval power in every other nation, without denying the proposition, I affirm, that it is not applicable to the present case: Russia never can be formidable in the Baltic; nature has forbid it. In the Black Sea she may, and she will, in spite of all we can do to prevent it. The question then is, since we cannot prevent it, which is the mode of its existence which will be

be least hurtful to us? That the Greeks will emancipate themselves from the yoke of Turkey is equally certain. If this event take place by the assistance of the French, we shall *certainly* have an *enemy* in Greece; if through Russia, and with our concurrence, a friend. There is, indeed, a possibility, but not the least probability, that we may sometime or other quarrel with them, but not for a length of time, as there will exist a mutual interest in friendship. Why make a vain attempt, which will certainly create us enemies, when at least we stand a fair chance of procuring friends?

What I have said of Austria at that time, I leave as I wrote; I see no reason to think I was then wrong.

The consistency of the conduct of his Majesty's ministers, in first opposing the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and afterwards making a war with Russia a *casus fœderis*, in the treaty of alliance with the Empress, in 1795, is fully proved by the different circumstances of the times. They have evinced, that they uniformly pursued the interests of their country, and did not obstinately adhere to a system, when

it no longer accorded with them. Let their antagonists prove, that they themselves did not sacrifice the honour, as well as the interests of this country, in opposing, in an unprecedented manner, the measures adopted by its government; that they themselves are not the cause of those calamities which they attribute to misconduct in ministers.

I have added a few miscellaneous papers without order or digestion. They will show, in part, how far the Empress's vast views of aggrandizement extended—they went to the entire conquest of all European Turkey, a part of which was to be given to the House of Austria; the re-establishment of the Greek empire, and placing her grandson Constantine on the throne of Constantinople; of making Egypt an independent state; of giving to Poland a Russian for a sovereign, and ultimately incorporating it into her own empire; of making a conquest of Japan and a part of China, and establishing a naval power in those seas.

I have thought it necessary to say something of the character of the late Empress. Anecdotes of that Princess appear daily in all languages. There are doubtless

doubtless many truths in some of them, but they are generally so defectively related, and with circumstances which so totally mischaracterise the action, that few of them will serve as materials for the accurate Biographer. Those who wish to know her real character, and the character of the most considerable persons of her court, would do well to wait a little longer. As to the history of her reign, there are many circumstances which cannot yet be disclosed. These anecdotes have the appearance of having been learnt in Russia, but not committed to writing, and the memory of the authors, surcharged with abundance of materials, has confounded them; they appear like mutilated statues restored by unskilful artists; we find the trunk of a Hercules or a Jupiter with the head of an Apollo and the feet of a Satyr.

It is a difficult thing, at all times, to discover truth, amidst the misrepresentations of courts, of ministers, of commanders. Should any one write, for instance, the history of the last war between Russia and Turkey, he would take for his guide, in relating the first event, the siege of Ochakof, the accounts

counts published by the court of Petersburg, and the reports of the commanders. There he would find a brilliant victory gained by Prince Nassau over the Turkish fleet in the Liman; but if he could get the report made by Paul Jones to the Admiralty of Cherison, signed by all the commanders of the fleet, he would find that no engagement took place (except a distant cannonade); that the Turkish ships ran aground by their ignorance and bad manœuvres; and that Nassau with his *flotilla*, instead of taking possession of them, set them on fire. This journal, which I have read, and taken an extract from, was forbidden by Prince Potemkin to be sent to Petersburg, and the whole campaign, as it stands on record, is nearly a romance. The fortress might have been taken the 1st of July with more ease than the 6th of December, and the commander in chief knew it. I was at the opening of the trenches, and at the storming of the place, and therefore can speak of facts to which I was an eye-witness.

If, after all, I am mistaken, and have lost my way in the wilderness of politics, I have not erred intentionally; I have

have been guided by no motive but the interest of my country: and here I must make a digression, which, I hope, will be pardoned.

A man who has been twenty years absent from his native country may, I hope, be permitted to express his astonishment at the changes he finds on his return. Changes which seem not to strike so forcibly those who saw the face of things every day.

When I left England, no man would have dared to stand up to arraign his country, and publicly plead the cause of France, and its enmity then was friendship compared with its enmity now; he would have been deemed a traitor, and the people would have treated him as such.

I hear ministers accused of plunging the nation into a ruinous war, and persevering in it; I look to facts, and facts prove the contrary.

They are accused of not humiliating their country before the enemy, and procuring such a peace as must soon make England a province of France. I hope they are guilty.

I hear it publicly asserted, that the constitution is changed; that liberty is annihilated;

annihilated; that we are under a military government. I look to facts, and find a Hardy, a Thelwall, &c. &c. &c. cannot be punished. I see acquitted, at Haverford, men who were accused by five witnesses of high treason, because on their trial the witnesses cannot be *persuaded* to speak out; and because their first positive, clear, and unequivocal deposition before a magistrate cannot be admitted. Where is the military government? The circumstance of an invasion would have justified it. How did they proceed in France, where liberty, equality, and fraternity are established? they punished *en masse*. At Toulon, all those *suspected* of having favoured the English were collected and fired on; at Lyons and other places, the same. Where were the juries? the counsel for the prisoners? where was the book of laws? where was the judge, who durst not interpret them one syllable beyond the letter? How would they have proceeded here? Not only the two men in question, but the whole town of Fife-guard, would have been driven to the place where the French landed by invitation, and tried and executed by a regiment of soldiers, all *en masse*, or in a lump.

lump. They would have proceeded in the same manner with a Thelwall and his applauding audience. How did they proceed with their opposition? not an opposition to overturn the government it had sworn to maintain, but an opposition to stop the progress of despotic power. The members of it were all seized, and sent without trial to some place, nobody knows where, into exile, perhaps to the bottom of the ocean.

In what page of history, ancient or modern, is such moderation to be found as in this insulted government? I see here, *proved by facts*, men subject only to the law, and that law more powerful than men. I find no such liberty anywhere else, neither in practice at this day, nor in the records of history.

Nor are my ears less shocked to hear a foreign dialect spoken by a part of the people of Britain. Our demagogues have translated the French words *liberté, égalité, fraternité, philantropie, philosophie*, by the English words, liberty, equality, fraternity, philanthropy, philosophy, and because there is much resemblance in the sounds, they would persuade the people that there is also a resemblance in the ideas.

Facts

Facts teach us, that *liberté* signifies the most horrible tyranny, silencing all law, and violating all property; that *égalité* signifies, murdering sovereigns and the higher classes, and putting over the people men the most low, ignorant, and wicked, invested with power to insult, enslave, and drive them in flocks to be slaughtered, and placing them at a greater distance than there existed before between them and their superiors by birth and education. *Fraternité*, in France, signifies being a Frenchman; applied to other nations, it signifies, forcing on them a government, plundering their property, and taking their wives and daughters. *Philantropie*, is professing a general love to all mankind, and practising cruelty to every individual. *Philosophie*, (which was the mother of all the French virtues,) signifies the commission of every crime without remorse; the extinction of every sentiment religious and moral, of every generous and social feeling; the dissolution of every tie of kindred and affection; the annihilation of every quality which ornaments and distinguishes the gentleman, the scholar, and the man of taste; the banishment of chastity, modesty,

deity, sensibility, and decorum from the female sex.

Every nation has thought it necessary, in times of public danger, to punish crimes, when the common law was insufficient, by a tribunal erected for that purpose; in Athens, this tribunal was composed of the people assembled; in Rome, by judges appointed in consequence of a decree of the people. Have not the good people of Britain a right to look to their representatives for protection against those who *openly* and *secretly* attack their government, and who *establish schools to disseminate sedition* in the minds of their children, and yet defend the revolutionary tribunals in France, and the military despotism of the Directory, on the ground of public danger? In all offences against the nation, might not, (I ask, for I am not learned in the law) consistently with our sacred constitution, the representatives of the nation try and decide, rather than a jury of private persons? Such offences are not of a private nature between man and man: or might not that body which represents the party injured, the nation, be the accuser, and the House of Lords the tribunal? If this manner

manner of proceeding be unprecedented, the necessity of occurring to it is also unprecedented.

I feel it incumbent on me to apologize to the Public for the repetitions, foreign idioms, and other inaccuracies and defects, which may be found in this work, in consequence of its having been too hastily prepared for the press.

ERRATA.

Page 66. line 4, *for* volontiers, *read* volunteers.

— 128. last line note, *for* melice, *read* militia.

— 156. line 22, *for* of, *read* off.

— 343, — 1, } *for* Fenal, *read* Fenar.

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INTRODUCTION

A

S U R V E Y

OF THE

TURKISH EMPIRE.

INTRODUCTION.

IT is the aim of the following sheets to delineate the moral and political state of a great empire, less accurately known to us than its contiguity and relative importance demand. The study of human nature, under the various influences of peculiar situation, laws, and customs, can in no case be uninteresting either to the politician, the moralist, or the philosopher. If we consider mankind merely as acted upon by science, as elevated to unusual splendor by the energies of intellect, or depressed to a brutal degradation by gross ignorance, it must render our speculations more accurate, our judgment more distinct, to try the standard of theory by the test of experience, and to view the effect produced on a

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large community by the degree of knowledge which they possess. If from science we turn to morals, and would contemplate the efficacy of religious doctrines, of legal institutions, or of popular opinions, these cannot be fairly tried but by referring to their effect on the nation at large in which they exist. Should it again be our desire to estimate justly the political advantages of external and internal administration, these are best tried by an appeal to facts: despotism or licentiousness appearing in their true colours give the surest, because the most rational means, of appreciating the advantages of good government.

No one can doubt that these ends will be greatly promoted by a review of the state of Turkey, which must present a picture no less interesting, from the magnitude of its objects, than from the peculiarity of their features. It may indeed be objected, that this subject has been treated by many writers, apparently well qualified to deliver faithful and complete information; but it is not improbable that the testimony of an eye-witness, furnished with a multitude of particular facts, would even in that case be a desirable addition to the mass of evidence which is before the public. The truth, however, is, that the multitude
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of testimonies, or the accuracy of information, is by no means such as to render further accounts unnecessary: in many very interesting points the principal authors do not agree; some are swayed by personal or national interest, and some misled by superficial observation or unfounded caprice. We have proofs that even a long residence in that country, and in a capacity which would appear the best calculated to afford information, that of a public minister, is not sufficient. The numerous errors Sir James Porter has fallen into demonstrate this. As to merchants, their occupations seldom leave them leisure or curiosity to be informed of matters foreign to commerce, and distant from their places of abode. From travellers who run through a country less is to be expected. "*Till a man is capable of conversing with ease among the natives of a country, he can never be able to form an adequate idea of their policy and manners.*"

It is obvious, that a considerable portion of time and study is requisite to obtain a full acquaintance with the moral and political state of a nation: he who would observe it with accuracy should have resided a long time in the country; he should have possessed opportunities of penetrating

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into the councils of the government, as well as of noticing the manners and genius of the people ; he should have seen them in war and in peace, have noted their military skill and their commercial system ; finally and above all it is necessary that he should have an accurate knowledge of their language, so as to cut off one great and almost universal source of error in accounts of foreign countries, arising from the misapprehension of the relator himself.

In order to form a just standard for trying the comparative accuracy of different accounts, it will be necessary to know those prejudices which are most likely, in spite of integrity, to insinuate themselves into an author's work from motives of private or of public interest. With this view it will not be unacceptable to notice a few particulars relative to two or three preceding works of the best reputation, which have treated of the Turkish empire in general : (of earlier authors it is needless to speak.) I know of no book from which more may be learnt of the true character of that people, and state of knowledge among them, than from *M. De Tott*. He spoke their language perfectly, he enjoyed their confidence, and lived more intimately with them than any
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Christian has lately done. It does not appear that he has wilfully misrepresented any one circumstance. I never saw him, but what I have heard of him is much in his favour. His book disoblged the French court, which did not wish to see them exposed. He has spoken, perhaps, too much of himself, and made the most of what he did for the Turks, though the facts are indisputable. Had he said less of himself, we should have lost those little stories he tells, which give more insight into the true character of the people he was concerned with than volumes of dissertations.

The egotism of modern travellers in relating incidents and adventures which might happen in any country, and which convey no information peculiar to that they are travelling in, is truly disgusting; they are at best subjects for novels. The work of Baron De Tott is indisputably the best and most accurate account hitherto given of the general system, as well as the peculiar features of Turkish manners, and though it has been censured as a calumny, it is in fact a very moderate picture of real events.

To this testimony of De Tott is opposed that of M. Peyssonel, a man undoubtedly learned and scientific, whose resi-

dence in the empire and knowledge of its language render him deserving of great attention, though his opportunities of acquiring information were by no means equal to those of De Tott. Of M. Peyssonel two things are to be remarked, the suffrage which he gives in favour of Tott, and the prejudices which were likely to affect his own testimony. In speaking of the Baron, he readily admits "*his profound knowledge of the government, laws, manners, customs and character of the Turks, derived from a long residence in the country, a close attention to the language, and from being employed in affairs of the greatest importance.*" What he professes is only to point out, "*pulchro in opere nævos,*" some imperfections in a valuable work. After this suffrage in favour of Tott, we need only refer to him for a picture of Turkey, faithful enough to be relied on, and yet sufficiently forcible to excite our disgust at such monsters in human shape. The same M. Peyssonel quotes, as writers of greater accuracy, Du Pan and Montesquieu, who, he acknowledges, wrote in their closets accounts of a people whom they had never seen.

In page 88 of M. Peyssonel's letter we see the true reason of his defence of the

Turks:

Turks: "*It is (says he) to endeavour to justify a nation which has always been the ally of our own; with whom we carry on a commerce that is still the object of envy and the vexation of our rivals.*"

Mouragia (now Chevalier d'Orasson) is perfectly equal to the extensive work he has undertaken, which will contain more knowledge of Turkey than any book which was ever written; but he will not touch the subject of their decline and approaching fall: his object is to represent them in the most advantageous light, and he will not prove what they are, but what they possibly might have been: he is an Armenian, and Turkish is his mother tongue: he was once literally a *fans culotte*: his promising genius, when a boy, procured him the patronage of a rich Armenian merchant; intrigue, talents, and the protection of the French directory, raised him to the post of Swedish minister at Constantinople.

Other authors have only lightly touched on those matters which are the subject of this book, and which it is my intention to investigate more fully.

It is not a matter of course that a man who is a member of a political party is a member of a political party. It is not a matter of course that a man who is a member of a political party is a member of a political party.

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CHAPTER I.

On the Turkish Government.

TO point out those relations which a country bears to its neighbours, or to the general interests of society, is perhaps no very difficult task: the features are striking, the moral and physical differences are easily discernible, and the standard of general politics is, perhaps, accurate enough to determine, with sufficient nicety, the result of such an analysis; but if we carry our investigation into those more minute causes which affect the prosperity or decline of a nation from internal circumstances, we shall find the question more deep and intricate, the decision more vague and doubtful. Without such data, however, it is impossible to build up a moral or political speculation of any magnitude or importance; it is impossible to reason with accuracy on the great interests of nations, or to form grand and comprehensive plans embracing the general advantage of society. Nor is it less true, that internal causes are always
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the most immediate motors in national elevation or decay: as, on the one hand, no feeble state was ever elevated to extraordinary eminence by the mere aid of alliances, however powerful; so, on the other, scarcely any great nation ever perished by means of external violence, unless it had something within itself vicious and unsound. I shall, therefore, in a future chapter, take a view of the Turkish Empire from without, as it stands related both to the general system of Europe, and to the several European powers; and in the mean while I will proceed to discuss its internal situation.

From the nature of man, from the extent of his faculties and the variety of his powers, it is evident that he is at the same time operated upon by causes the most heterogeneous and dissimilar. With the progress of society new powers and new faculties are daily called forth; they continually modify each other, and produce that action and re-action which constitutes the complexity of the vast social machine. To abstract and generalize these various motions, to reduce them to their primary and elemental principles, is the business of science; but it unfortunately happens but too often, that the philosopher, who may with much care and observation have made this analysis, will build upon it speculations the most

most unsound and irrational. The error into which these dealers in system frequently fall (an error which has very unjustly thrown a general odium upon all the systematic labours of science) is to conceive that the divisions which they have themselves established in theory are strongly marked in fact, or, in other words, that the different habits and customs of mankind are less intimately interwoven than experience daily proves them to be. When, therefore, we trace the distinct sources from which the peculiar character and circumstances of the Turkish nation have originated, we must be careful at the same time to remember, that the events which have flowed from those sources have been so mixed and compounded together, and act at the present day with such an aggregate force, as to produce a far greater effect by combination than by their separate power. So much is necessary to be observed before we begin to delineate the peculiar features of Turkish policy: we now proceed to the task of discrimination.

The modern European, accustomed for the most part to consider all the subjects of one empire as alike entitled to the protecting care of government, alike invested with the political rights of citizens, can with difficulty accommodate his feelings to a state of manners

ners resulting from the division of the political body into conquerors and conquered, oppressors and oppressed. This is, however, the distinction most broadly marked in the Turkish Empire; a distinction supported by every kind of prejudice which can influence social manners, and confirmed by the inveterate habits of ages. To the celebrated governments of antiquity this exaltation of one part of the community upon the degradation of the other was by no means unknown; we see it instanced in the *Helots* of Sparta, and in the institutions of many of those nations who most loudly vaunted of their fancied liberty: happily for modern ages it has generally, in Europe, given place to political equality; but Turkey is the refuge of fanatical ignorance, the chosen seat where she has unfurled her bloody banner, and where, though torpid with age, she still grasps her iron sceptre. That happy union, and equality of right to the protection of laws, which tempers the variety of individual interests by the general utility, is the only basis of social happiness. How far the dereliction of these principles in the Turkish government weakens the power of the community, whilst it perpetuates the misery of the individual, will appear from a comparative view of the different sects in that country, and from a survey

vey of the state of its provinces. The *Turks*, properly so called, are the followers of Mahomet, descended from the Tatarian conquerors of these beautiful countries, who being now the actual masters of the empire, and the only persons who seem to have a real interest in its existence, their situation, moral and physical, first demands our notice. The great outline of their character, as distinguished from the other inhabitants of this extensive empire, is the superiority which they claim on the grounds of conquest and religion. To apply to a nation, barbarous as the *Turks*, any rule of rational policy drawn from the law of nations, would, perhaps, be deemed absurd; but the enlightened observer must ever remark, that the fancied right of conquest is nothing but the right of the sword, which is never legitimate but when sanctioned by justice. In the history of the world there have been frequent instances of mighty nations, who, after conquering their opponents by force of arms, have received from their captives the softer yoke of science. It was thus that, in the words of Horace :

“Græcia capta ferum victorem cepit, et artes

“Intulit agresti Latio.”

Nor have there been wanting examples of the introduction of arts by the conqueror himself,

himself, who has thus made amends, by the blessings of civilization, for the havock which he had caused by the sword. The Turks, however, like barbarians, invaded Greece, and swept before them the mighty monuments of ancient science; and, like barbarians, they hold their captives, to the present day, under the benumbing yoke of ignorance and slavery. Instead of promoting the mutual advantage of both nations, by an intercourse of knowledge and benevolence, they use the privilege of conquest only to the extinction of the common powers of intellect. A politic conqueror, in augmenting the happiness of his new subject, increases his own power; a barbarian invader weakens his own resources by the continued oppression of his captives. Abderahman (or Almanzor) who, in the middle of the eighth century, founded a kingdom in Spain of the provinces which had been subject to the kalifs, promoted intermarriages between Christians and Mahomedans. The Arabs, who had been as great enemies to the sciences as the Turks, now cultivated them with great success, and had acquired a considerable portion of knowledge and politeness, while the rest of Europe was degraded by ignorance and barbarism. But the haughty Turk is not merely exalted above his subject Greek as a conqueror;

queror; he considers himself still more highly elevated as the favorite of heaven, and the greater part of his ferocity as a tyrant is owing to the arrogant and barbarous dictates of his religion. It is in vain that the panegyrists of Turkey would assure us of the spirit of toleration, which, according to them, the disciple of the sanguinary Mahomet cherishes in his bosom. Every feature of the Turkish character, every circumstance of their public and private customs, contradicts the assertion. Mankind are not at the present day to learn, that the human character is formed by its education, and that a great and important branch of that education consists of political institutions. Were there any doubt of the truth of this principle, the strong exemplification of it afforded by Turkey would obviate every objection. There it is, more than in any other country, that the dogmas of the legislator and the priest are continually presented to the mind of youth as well as of age; that they occur in every rank and condition of life, and act with a force the more powerful, as they are united in one and the same code. Such are the observations which arise on the first view of the Turkish character: in proceeding to particularize its individual features, we have to contemplate the various causes, moral and physical, which have an influence,

influence, either immediate or remote, upon it; always remembering, that they are to be viewed, not merely as simple powers, but as acting with that mutual and reciprocal force which so greatly augments their aggregate effect. The local and material objects which contribute to the rise and fall, the importance or weakness of nations, are, *climate, situation, productions, and population*; but these are in part or altogether subject to the energies of mind, and mind takes its peculiar bent from *religious and political institutions, from historical events, from arts and sciences, and from those general manners* which are the result of all the other causes combined.

In the following sketch I shall endeavour to develop, first, the *moral* causes, and from their action it will not be difficult to account, in the second place, for the *natural* phenomena observable in the present state of Turkey.

The religion of the Turks is, perhaps, the predominating principle, which, above all others, stamps the character of their minds; but as its power in this respect is chiefly owing to its political authority, and as it is not my intention to enter into a metaphysical investigation of a system whose absurdity is obvious to all enlightened Europeans, I shall consider this part of the subject as dependant
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on the political institutions, which will therefore first demand attention.

Political institution is a spring always in action, a motor universally present, forming the character of the individual, and guiding the operations of the community. Would we then cast our eyes over the moral map of Turkey; would we justly estimate the internal powers of that nation, either as an enemy or ally, our notions must be regulated by the degree of purity or error observable in its political œconomy.

Much has been said in assertion and denial of the *despotism* of the Turkish government; and arguments the most abstruse and far-fetched have been employed, rather to confound the meaning of terms, than to establish the authenticity of facts. But if by despotism be meant a power originating in force, and upheld by the same means to which it owed its establishment; a power scorning the jurisdiction of reason, and forbidding the temerity of investigation; a power calculated to crush the growing energies of mind, and annihilating the faculties of man, in order to insure his dependence, the government of Turkey may be most faithfully characterized by that name. All permanent power, extended over a large community, must have something more than the mere force of arms

to rely on; or rather that very force must depend, in the ultimate resort, on popular opinion. It is a vain objection, therefore, that the despotism of the sultan cannot extend beyond the superstition of the people: that very superstition serves it as a basis, and the more firmly rooted are their religious prejudices, the more terrible is the despotism which springs from them.

Equally vain and fruitless are the contests concerning the particular character of this despotism. It has been called a *military* government, from the nature of its origin, and the means most frequently employed in its administration; and it has obtained the denomination of a *theocracy*, because its fundamental code is the Koran. Each of these statements contains something that is erroneous. A military government supposes the dictates of an arbitrary chief, requiring implicit obedience in every inferior, and prescribing a certain and inevitable punishment for neglect or transgression; it excludes all formality and delay, and it is enforced by military power. In theocracies, the will of the leader has not (or at least pretends not to have) the direction of the state: himself an instrument in the hands of a superior being, he communicates to the people, at various times and as occasion requires, the com-
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mands of the Divinity. The Turkish government bears evident traces of both these systems, derived from the character of its founder; but there are some points of difference which prove it to be, *sui generis*, an heteroclite monster among the various species of despotism. In the Mahometan system of policy we may trace three æras. The *first*, which was of that kind usually denominated a theocracy, continued during the life-time of the prophet himself, who, like Moses and Joshua among the Jews, appeared in the double character of a military chief and an inspired legislator. The *second* was the government of the Saracen kalifs, his immediate successors: they bore indeed the double sceptre of temporal and spiritual power; but as they pretended to no personal communications with the Almighty, all the sanctity of their character consisted in being the descendants of the prophet, and the guardians and expositors of his law. The present Turkish constitution forms the *third* gradation: like the preceding, it has an inviolable code in the sacred volume of its religion; like them also its reliance is on the power of the sword, and the modes of its administration are military; but it has a great essential difference in the separation of the temporal and spiritual authorities. This *division of power* originated

nated in the political error of the Ottoman princes, who, eager only for military glory, and perhaps wishing to cast a specious veil over their usurpation, when they finally suppressed the kalifat, did not assume to themselves all its functions, but resigned into the hands of the theological lawyers the spiritual supremacy. No despotism was ever more profoundly politic than that, which, wielding at once the temporal and spiritual sword, converted fanaticism itself into an instrument of sovereignty, and united in one person the voice and the arm of the Divinity. But it must be remembered, that when the power of the kalifs began to decline, other princes, besides those of the race of Othman, assumed an independent sovereignty; and it is probable that most of them, with a show of moderation, which they thought politic, invested the priests with the administration of all their spiritual affairs. Such was the origin of the authority given to the *ulema*, or body of lawyers, and their chief, the *musti*, or high priest, to whom is entrusted the exposition of the Mohammedan law in all its branches. These men possessing, like the priests under the Jewish theocracy, the oracles both of law and religion, not only unite in themselves the power of two great corporations, those of the

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law and of the church, but also share with the sovereign the direct exercise of the legislative, executive, and judicial powers. Previous to the Ottoman æra, there were indeed mustis; but their power was only of a judicial, not of a political nature, exactly resembling that of the mustis, who are now appointed in the several provinces, and whose office is somewhat similar to that of kadi or judge; for it must not be forgotten, that the judicial and sacerdotal characters are in Turkey the same. The chief engine of this hierarchy is the *fetwa* of the musti, a sort of manifesto, which, like the bulls of the Roman pontiff, originating in ecclesiastical power, has been applied to the most important political purposes.

The kalifs, with a view of ensuring the prompt obedience of their subjects, were accustomed to give to the principal acts of their government the sanction of religion, by affixing to their decrees (such as those of war and peace) the sacred seal, which assured to the true believers, acting under it, the honour of supporting their faith, if triumphant, or the palm of martyrdom in case of death. The Othman princes, in order to obtain a similar end, were obliged to require the aid of the priesthood, which they had established. They applied, therefore, to the musti, who,

by the advice of the heads of the ulema, published the sacred ordinance called *fetva*, which declares the act of government, to which it is affixed, consonant to the Koran, and obligatory on all true believers. The power which the priesthood thus acquired was at first inconsiderable; it resembled the enregistering of edicts by the French parliaments, which was a measure rather judicial than legislative; but they doubtless perceived in it the seeds of future greatness and authority. So long as the sceptre was swayed by warlike princes, the mufti was easily made to speak as the sultan directed, and the power of the ulema, under their warlike monarchs, was scarcely perceived. It does not appear that they attempted any resistance to the will of the sovereign before the reign of Amurath IV. That prince, one of the most ferocious that ever sat on the Ottoman throne, irritated at the opposition of a mufti, caused him to be thrown into a huge mortar, and pounded to death. He conceived this kind of punishment in order to obviate, by a cruel irony, the privilege which the ulema enjoyed, that no member of their body could have his blood shed as a punishment. This example sufficiently proves how little the men of the law were, at that time, able to oppose

oppose a sovereign whose despotism was supported by the scimitar.

But upon the decline of the military spirit of the sultans, that, which was only a political spring in the hands of the sovereign, has become a fundamental law of the empire, creating and confirming a power, which, if not in actual opposition, is always in balance against him. The utility of such a balance of power in the more enlightened governments has been strenuously supported on the grounds of a liberal policy; but, whatever we may think of such arguments, they cannot apply to the state of Turkey, where the balance is only a balance of intrigue and artifice, whilst there is, in both parties, a perfect accordance of despotism, a mutual defect both of the means and inclination to benefit the community. On the part of the sultan, it may be observed, that he would, long since, have become the mere creature and tool of the musti, but for the power which he has reserved to himself, of nominating and deposing the holder of that dignity. This it is which gives him a counterpoise against the musti, by creating for him, among the ulema, as many partisans as there are candidates aspiring to the pontificate. The ulema, on the other hand, are, in their collective capacity, jealous of preserving the influence

which they have thus obtained in the government; and that religion, which served the first sultans as a mean of administration, has become a source of terror and subjection to their feeble successors. The fetva is now so indispensable a preliminary to any political act, that the sultan, who should dare to omit it, would be declared an infidel by a fetva issued by the musti *motu proprio*; and such a proceeding would be sufficient to excite against him both the populace and soldiery, and to precipitate him at once from his throne. So far is this jealousy carried by the ulema, that they oppose, with all their power, the sultan's departure from the capital, lest, at a distance from their manœuvres, he should be able to conciliate the army to his interests, and assert his independence. The late sultan Mustafa, anxious to be at the head of his army, was prevented from taking the field only by the fear of a revolt, which the men of the law could easily have excited in his absence.

Another apparent check on the authority of the sultan, is formed by the *great council*, consisting of the great military officers, the heads of the ulema, and the principal ministers of the empire. No important act of government can be undertaken without a previous discussion in this assembly, at which the

the grand seignior, or his chief vizir, presides; but every question is decided by a plurality of votes. It is unnecessary to expatiate on this body, as forming a distinct political power, because, from the nature of its members, it must be swayed either by the party of the sultan, or by that of the priesthood, and it, therefore, serves rather to determine the relative power of those two distinct bodies.

That much political knowledge cannot be expected from the ministers of state, is evident from the manner in which they attain their situations. Rising from the meanest stations, they advance progressively to the highest posts; not by means of superior genius or knowledge, but by petty intrigue, and by flattering those on whom they depend. The vizir *Yusef*, who commanded in 1790 against the emperor, was raised by Gazi Hassan from a state of the merest indigence. He sold soap, in a basket on his head, in the streets, before he became the servant of Hassan, who, after employing him in that menial office, made him successively clerk in the treasury of the arsenal, his own agent at the porte, (*kapi kahia*) pasha of the Morea, and, lastly, grand vizir.

There is, indeed, a regular establishment for educating youth for the service of the sultan in a school at Pera, called *Galata Serai*:

Serai: when they come thither, they are placed in different classes, according to their abilities and the line to which they are destined. But this institution has so far degenerated, that few but the sons of persons belonging to the *seraglio* are sent thither, where their education is of small importance, as any one, whether he has passed through this college or not, may attain any office in the *seraglio* by means of intrigue and bribery. It may be worth while here to notice a singular error, which is generally entertained in Europe relative to the term *seraglio*, which is supposed to mean the apartments of the women: it literally means *palace*, and is, therefore, applied by way of eminence to the vast range of buildings inhabited by the grand seignior and all the officers and dependents of his court. Here is transacted all the business of government; the council itself is called the *divan*, and the place of public audience the *porte*, or the gate. Of the officers of the *seraglio* the *vizir* is chief (as being the prime minister of the sovereign); this is also a term given to him by way of eminence, as it signifies a counsellor in general; every *pascha* of three tails (that is of the first class) is a *vizir*: the *pascha* or *vizir* who resides at the *porte*, or with the sultan, is called the grand *vizir*, or *vizir azem*. Beside the *vizir*, all
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the other great public officers of the empire, resident at Constantinople, inhabit the seraglio, or, at least, have their offices there; all the ministers, pashas, &c. without exception, belong to it, and their possessions revert at their death to the sultan, their master and their heir, of whom they are stiled the *slaves* (*kul*, or *kool*) so that their descendants have no advantage over those of the meanest mechanics, except what they may casually derive from the notice of the sovereign, or from having been introduced by their parents into the school of the seraglio.

From the preceding observations it appears, that the legislative and executive powers are, in the higher acts of policy, divided among different bodies: the executive acts of an inferior order are such as regard *financial* and *military* operations, or matters of general *police*. The two former of these branches, though of small import in the individual acts, are, each in its aggregate, of sufficient importance to claim a separate consideration; to each of them, therefore, I shall devote a future chapter, and for the present pass on to a cursory view of the internal police. - However distinct the *principle* of the Turkish government, as it at present exists, may appear, its forms of administration, and all its internal police, are purely military.

military. This is so thoroughly the case, that the grand seignior is still supposed to reign, as formerly, in the midst of his camp; he even dates his public acts from his *imperial stirrup*, and similar instances are discoverable in all his other formalities. The government of distant provinces is committed to *passhas*; their dignity is military, and the whole despotic power of the sultan is delegated to them. A slight view of the history of the janizaries will show of what kind is the dependence placed on them, as well in the maintenance of the police as in the exercise of war. The force of arms first subjugated the countries which form their empire; the force of arms alone could retain them in submission; and it is owing to the decline of the military spirit of the Turks, that the members of so vast a body are, at the present day, so feeble and disunited.—To wield the iron sceptre with effect required a warlike sovereign stained with blood, the scourge of his people, and alone the idol and the terror of an obedient soldiery.

Such were a long while the characters of the sultans, and of the janizaries, the faithful ministers of their despotism. From the moment that the latter beheld their chief no longer animated with a brave and warlike spirit, the machine of government was thrown
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into disorder; the moving power was no longer the spring which should have directed, and the re-action of the exterior parts toward the centre was totally destroyed. The janizaries, then, seized themselves that power which a weak and cowardly sultan could not wield; they deposed their monarch, and placed upon the throne one in whose valour and abilities they had greater confidence; but a more refined policy on the part of the despot annihilated the power of these pretorian bands, by a system of corruption and enervation. The most eminent of their leaders were taken off, either by secret fraud or open accusation, and their places supplied by the meanest and most devoted creatures of the court. In the meanwhile the corps itself was bastardized and rendered contemptible by the introduction of a herd of the vilest of the people; men occupied in the lowest employments, and even stained with the most infamous crimes, who would have been formerly expelled from the service with the greatest indignation. The sultans have, indeed, succeeded in extinguishing every spark of that fire which they dreaded; they have annihilated all traces of a military spirit; but they have, at the same time, paralyzed their own hands, and left themselves
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without the powers necessary for the support of a despotic government. Many of the pashas, having little to fear from the vengeance of the grand seignior, proceed to the most violent abuses of their authority, and not unfrequently appear in open rebellion. The defection spreads from province to province, and little remains, in this vast empire, but the shadow of an union without real stability, and of an obedience which mocks the grasp of superiority. In the regular administration of government, however, the sultan is possessed of the most arbitrary power over the lives of his subjects, and executes criminal justice, either by himself or his vizirs, without process or formality.

In regard to property his power is more limited: over that of all his officers he has the fullest right; he is their lawful heir; but in regard to that of his other subjects he is restricted by the laws to greater moderation. It is, nevertheless, easy to avoid such restrictions; and we shall, in fact, see that the insecurity of property in Turkey is one very powerful cause of the ignorance and vices of its inhabitants. The sultan delegates his power in this respect to the vizirs and pashas in the provinces, and, in a less degree, to governors and officers of different ranks and denominations.

nominations. Pretexts and supposed crimes are always to be found to destroy or to ruin a subject. This part of the government is therefore truly despotic; and when the prince or his representatives are tyrants, it is despotism in a form the most cruel and insulting to the rights of mankind.

Having examined the legislative and executive branches of government, it remains to speak of the *judicial*. This branch is founded, like the others, on religion; but a division suited to the barbarous nature of its origin seems to obtain in it. The offences against the state, or such as affect the public peace, are wholly under the jurisdiction of the sovereign, and seem to be excluded from the judicial forms; whilst the dispensation of justice by formal process seems to be intended only for offences and disputes of a more private nature.

The excellence or defect of a judicial system depends upon the *code* of law; upon the *commentaries* or precedents which are received as possessing authority; upon the *persons* appointed to administer justice, and upon their *mode* of decision.* The fundamental law, civil and political, is the *koran*, whose respect is owing to its divine origin: from this is extracted a civil code, called the *multka*, to which are added certain commentaries called the

the *durâr* and *halebi*; and besides these there are various collections of *fetvâs*, or sentences, of the most celebrated mustis, all of which together form, it must be confessed, a collection of legal knowledge more than sufficient for the instruction of the judges. But as these judges are not bound by any preceding decrees, and have the application of the law in their own breasts, the more intricate it is rendered by the different compilations and commentaries, the more arbitrary is the power intrusted to them. Were the tribunals pure, and the mode of trial equitable, this laxity of interpretation would doubtless be an advantage to the cause of justice; but the contrary is so notorious in Turkey, that the iniquitous decisions of the judges are proverbial, and often furnish the subjects of their burlesque comedies. Peyssonel complains of the unfairness of Baron de Tott in citing different instances of Turkish injustice, and observes, that similar examples may be found in the history of every country; but it is not necessary in Turkey to recur to past ages, or to single out particular examples; it is the prominent feature in the character of their tribunals, and every day's experience confirms the censure of Tott, by repeated instances of corruption.

The dexterity of the Turkish kadis, or judges,

judges, to decide in favour of those who have paid them, is often very ingenious; many pleasant stories are told of them, and it is generally a subject for a kind of comedians, who act in coffee houses or in private houses, but without dress or scenery, one of them performing the part of a kadi, and two others the plaintiff and defendant.

An Arab who had hired out his camel to a man to travel to Damascus, complained to a kadi, on the road, that he had overloaded his camel; the other bribed the kadi. "What has he loaded it with?" asks the kadi—the Arab answers, "*with cahué (coffee) and mahué,*" i. e. *coffee et cetera* (changing the first letter into *m* makes a kind of gibberish word, which signifies *et cetera*) "*sugar and mugar, pots and mots, sacks and macks,*" &c. going through every article the camel was loaded with; "*he has loaded it twice as much as he ought;*" "then," says the kadi, "let him load the cahué and leave the mahué, the sugar and leave the mugar, the pots and leave the mots, the sacks and leave the macks," and so on to the end of all the articles enumerated, and as the poor Arab had told every article, and only added *et cetera*, according to the Arab custom, without there being any &c. he took up the same loading he had before.

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A christian subject of the Turks was carried before a judge at Aleppo, accused by a Sherif of having one evening in the bazar, or market place, knocked off his green turban, for which he would have been put to death—the judge was himself a Sherif (they have in most places the privilege of a judge of their own race.) The Christian sent secretly, bribed him, and informed him of the truth, which was, that the Sherif's turban was of so dark a green that he took it for a dark blue, a colour which a christian friend of his wore, and for whom he had taken him in the dark of the evening, and had knocked off his turban in a joke. The accused was brought before the judge, and the plaintiff came into the judge's hall with a great number of other Sherifs. The judge addressed them; "*Do you come here in such numbers to ask justice, or to take it yourselves; go out all but those who are witnesses, and you christian,*" said he, addressing himself to the accuser (who had been privately pointed out to him) "*go you out, I suppose you are a witness for the accused; you shall be called when you are wanted.*" The man exclaimed, that he was not only a Mahomedan, but a Sherif, and the accuser himself! "**What,**" says the judge, "**you a Sherif, and wear a turban of a colour that I myself in the day time took**
for

for that of an infidel ; how could the poor infidel in the dark distinguish it. You ought to wear the holy *grass* green of the prophet, and not be ashamed of it. He acquitted the Christian, and ordered the plaintiff to be bastinadoed for not wearing a proper green turban. It would, without this turn, have been difficult to have appeased the violence of the Sherifs assembled ; but he was well paid for it, and for money they will run any risks.

If the Turkish judges display great ingenuity in distorting the rules of equity, it must be owned that they sometimes show equal skill in the advancement of justice. When the famous Kuperly was grand-vizir, an old woman brought to an Armenian money-changer a casket, containing jewels of great apparent value, said they belonged to a sultana, and borrowed money on them, depositing the casket after she had sealed it. The money was to be paid again in a certain time. The woman not appearing a long while after the time was expired, he opened the casket, in the presence of several respectable persons, when the jewels were discovered to be false. The Armenian went to the vizir and related the story. The sultana had not sent any jewels to be pawned. He ordered him to remove from his shop, in a private manner, every thing valuable, and

on such a night to set it on fire; that he would be near with proper people to prevent it spreading; that then he should constantly sit before his shop, and lament to all who passed his having lost a casket of jewels of immense value in the fire. In a few days the old woman appeared, and demanded to release her jewels. She was carried to the vizir, who showed her her casket, and told her she should be immediately put to death by the most terrible torments, if she did not confess the whole. She discovered her accomplices; they were put to death, and the Armenian got back his money, deducting the vizir's share. This fact is known at Constantinople.

The panegyrist of Turkish jurisprudence adduce in its favour the custom which is called *burning the mat*, by which any individual, whether Mahometan, Jew, or Christian, may appeal to the justice of the grand seignior from the oppression or injustice of his officers. The petitioner, on these occasions, appears in the street, near the mosque to which the sultan is going, and has on his head a bit of burning mat, at the same time bearing aloft his petition, which is lifted up to the officer, whose business it is to receive and put it into a bag. The extreme of violence often produces a remedy no less violent

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in its nature ; it is thus with the burning of the mat, which is never practised but on great occasions, when a complaint is lodged, in a desperate manner, against a vizir, or other great person, and the sultan is thereby cautioned to take the suppliant under his protection. Such petitioners have, generally, a party of malcontents to support them ; and they adopt this mode to warn the sultan of the danger of not receiving their complaints, which, indeed, without some such precaution, seldom meet with any attention.

It appears from the preceding considerations, that the evils arising from the mode of government afford little hope of reform. Such an attempt would in vain be undertaken, even by a sovereign of the greatest abilities and most patriotic inclinations. Were a sultan, equal in military talents to Amurat the fourth, to sit on the Ottoman throne, it might be possible to rekindle that martial genius in his forces, which has been so long extinguished, and to reduce to submission those rebellious pashas, who have been so long independent. This indeed would be an herculean labour ; but even this would be rendered ineffectual by the prevalence of the ulema. A powerful priesthood, in opposition to the sovereign, must, in such a country as Turkey, thwart all his views, and render in-

effectual his most strenuous exertions. To introduce an unity into the government, this ambitious body should be wholly extirpated; but such a step as this scarcely any sultan who has sat on the throne, would have dared to have taken; how much less is it to be expected from the dastardly and enervated sovereigns who now spring from the seraglio.

Much stress has been laid by some authors on the limitation of the sultan's power by law, with respect to property of individuals, to prove that his government is not wholly despotic. The fact, however, is simply, that with regard to some kind of property, as houses which are possessed by inheritance, the sovereigns have sometimes thought it dangerous to violate the common law openly, by depriving the owner of their property by force; in such cases, when the object has been desirable, we have seen them take a shorter way, by putting the owner to death; and against this exercise of power no one objects; and sometimes they have submitted to the law to make their reign popular. This opposition to the will of the sultan, as has been observed, is not to be understood of the officers of the porte, for with these no ceremony is observed. The paschas in the provinces are, however, less delicate than the sultan in the capital,

CHAPTER II.

On the Turkish Finances.

THERE is no matter of internal policy which affords a wider scope for the display of abilities than finance; it is to a skilful application of its powers in this respect, that the rise and the continuance of a great empire is chiefly to be attributed; and from a failure here may be deduced most of the evils which bring on its decay and downfall. It would be a narrow view of this subject, which should regard only the debtor and creditor side of the account, the positive or the relative magnitude of the imposts; it is not so much the *sum* raised or expended, as the *mode* of its levy and application, which is to be regarded as the test of political ability. The following sketch will, therefore, embrace a view of the different public treasures, together with observations on the mode of raising them, on their application, and on their present situation.

The Turkish system of finance may be divided into two great branches, the public treasury or *miri*, and the sultan's treasury

or *hafni*, each of which has its peculiar sources of revenue, and its particular appropriation of expenditure.

There are, indeed, other treasures of considerable magnitude, which deserve the attention of the politician, though not properly included in the system of finance: these are the treasures of the *ulema* and those of the *mosques*, sums taken from the active and efficient capital of the nation, and either wholly unemployed, or appropriated to uses which cannot be supposed to have a very direct relation to the necessities of the state.

The public treasure or exchequer of the state first demands our attention, as that in which are to be expected the most methodical regularity, the greatest fairness in the imposition, and judgment in the application of the taxes. The revenues of this treasure are of two kinds, the fixed and the casual, the former of which may be divided into the *karach* or tribute paid by Christians, and the farms of the empire in general; the latter consist of certain articles, which will be mentioned in the subjoined detail.

The expenditure embraces a variety of objects, *viz.* the expences of the army and navy, in war as well as peace; the pay of all officers, civil and military; the erecting and repairing of fortifications, of public edifices,
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high-roads, bridges, &c. together with a great part of the expences of the sultan's household, and several other extraordinary disbursements.

The following detail will comprise the ordinary revenue and expenditure of the public treasury of the Ottoman empire, from the most authentic documents, together with a view of its debts and credits in the year 1776, at the conclusion of a ruinous war with *Russia*.

ANNUAL REVENUE of the MIRI.

This comprehends the different tributes, taxes, and customs, called the *karach*, *mukatá*, *bedeli-nōuzōul*, *avaragíhané*, *gebeluyan*, *gebeluyan-embak*, *gebi-humayun*, *havasi-humayun*, *eukaf-humayun*, *piskés-zaisé*, *meokuf*, *tarap-haneí*, *anciré*, *haremein hafincsi*, *sherifein hafinési*, &c.

I. FIXED REVENUE.

The first branch is the *karach*, a capitation tax, or annual redemption of the lives of all those males above 15 years of age, who do not profess the Mahometan religion.—It is farmed in the different districts as follows:

EUROPEAN CITIES and PASHALIKS.	Purſes Rumi of 500 dol- lars or piaſ- tres.	Piaſtres.
Constantinople and its environs - This karach was augmented to this sum in the year 1776, by the addition of 360 purſes (or 180,000 piaſtres) of which augmentation only 100 went to the public treasury.	2,916	
Adrianople and its environs -	1,750	
Sophia - - - - -	320	
Tattar-bazargik - - -	250	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
Philippopolis	280	
Salonico	530	
Uſkiup	260	
Kioſdential	226	
Terhale	450	
Yenitſher Kinar	270	
Avlonia	350	
Ohry	250	
Delviné	170	
Elbiſſan	160	
Bania	450	
Kiſria	250	
Ozi (now in the poſſeſſion of Ruſſia; called Oczakow by the Poles)	90	
Siliſtria	170	
Varaa	170	
Babadahg	100	
Paravadi	160	
Karinabad	180	
Egribozak	190	
Ruſchuk	220	
Shumna	170	
Hezargarad	90	
Niçeboli	390	
Harmen	260	
Viddin	300	
Iſlemie	150	
Uſunge abad Haſkioy	176	
Gallipoli	240	
Orſe	70	
Yenebanti	210	
Negroponte	500	
Iſdiu	96	
Belgrade	180	
Niſſa	196	
Alaſſonia	170	
Tif	45	
Kiordos	70	
Athens (Seitin, or land of olives)	90	
Yeniké	220	
Napoli di Romania	225	

	Purfes Rumi.	Piaftres.
Hatevmis - - - -	120	
Calamata - - - -	130	
Enghily Kafry - - - -	170	
Livadia - - - -	70	
Tancara - - - -	90	
Donigé - - - -	80	
Aleffandria - - - -	290	
Bofnia with its dependencies (Bender and Hotin are not included)	1,495	
Morea and its five jurisdictions -	3,560	
	20,015	
PROVINCES and CITIES of ANA-		
TOLIA.		
Hadé vendighiar Sangiaki - -	280	
The province of Kiatahie - -	480	
Gimis dizné of Efkishehir - -	120	
Sultan Ony - -	130	
Kara Hiffar - -	160	
The province of Angora - -	190	
The jurisdiction of Tuffia - -	180	
of Boli - -	90	
of Kiflin - -	75	
of Viran Shehir - -	75	
of Hiffar ony - -	120	
of Akthe-shehir - -	110	
of Cara-fu - -	55	
of Ghiul Bazar - -	80	
The government of Caffemony - -	190	
The jurisdiction of Sinop - -	150	
of Tyr - -	50	
of Sultatnony - -	70	
of Ghiufel Hiffar - -	90	
of Allafhehir - -	80	
of Metmen - -	90	
The government of Mentefhe - -	150	
of Smyrna - -	320	
The jurisdiction of Akthe Shehir - -	120	
of Sahri-hiffar - -	125	
The island Kufch-adafi - -	150	
The jurisdiction of Ghiul-hiffar - -	160	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
The juřiſdiction of Hamid	300	
of Yalli-keſſri	80	
of Sandughi	50	
The government of Breigha	160	
of Caraffi	40	
of Teké	27	
of Glayé	210	
of Iſenghemid	450	
of Ala	110	
of Sivas	490	
of Tokat	260	
of Nikdé	120	
of Yenitherry	210	
of Yenni-il	90	
of Amafia	180	
of Bozauk	70	
of Zurem	150	
of Diyunik	120	
of Dzanik	800	
of Arabkir	320	
The province of Caramania	200	
of Ahſhery	210	
of Kaiſarie	120	
of Akferai	120	
of Adana	200	
of Silis	110	
of Iz-il	300	
of Ekin	90	
Tripoly in Syria	120	
Damaſcus (or Sham Sherif)	400	
Aleppo (Haleb)	600	
Kelis	120	
Agras	70	
Meras	200	
Anitab	240	
The government of Malatia	120	
of Rica	200	
of Ahmed	110	
The government of Hiſni Manſur	80	
of Diarbekir	300	
of Muſſil	300	
of Etzerun	450	

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
The government of Trebiſond -	300	
of Gelder -	200	
of Van -	110	
of Karis -	150	
Bagdat, Baſſora, Merdin, and environs -	500	
The iſland of Tenedos -	45	
of Meteline -	180	
Shio (or Scio) -	380	
Stanchio -	150	
Candia -	560	
Kubrus (or Cyprus) -	850	
Tino -	45	
The iſlands dependent on the capitan paſha -	180	
Cairo (or Meſſir) -	1,350	
Several other revenues, of which is a ſeparate account -	1,455	
Total for the Karach for Romelia and Anatolia -	39,077	
	or	19,538,500

THE SECOND BRANCH of the FIXED REVENUE comprizes the following general TAXES or FARMS of the Empire.

Mukata, (farms regiſtered in the Baſh-muhaſſebé, &c.) -	4,791
The Ogialik of Bulgaria pays -	520
The Agalik of the Turkomani -	450
The body of Chingani (Gyphies or Bohemians) -	2,690
Gebeluyan lokaf humayun render -	280
Emlaki humayun - D° -	350
Gebeluyan of the Timar and Ziamet, poſſeſſed by aged or infirm perſons -	470
Bedeli Nuzul of the Timar and Ziamet of Romalia and Anatolia -	3,580
Avarigi Hané (per centage of immoveables) -	2,959

	Piastres Rumi.	Piastres.
Of tobacco, the mines of silver, &c. contributions of the admin- istrators - - -	2,300	
Mukata, mizan on silk, mastic, oil, &c. of the country of Brusa - -	790	
Duty paid by the dealers in sheep	780	
Salt pits or mines of Haslar - -	1,200	
Fish, woods, &c. of Metelino and its ports; tax on weight at Con- stantinople - - -	2,800	
Paid for the sultan's kitchen, by certain cities, towns, and vil- lages - - -	1,300	
By the company of butchers - -	600	
The custom house of Constanti- nople - - -	1,872	
*The duty on tobacco - - -	1,287	
* N. B. This duty is assigned in the following manner;		
855 purses to the proprietors of the Malikané.		
232 to the mufti.		
200 to the imperial mint.		
<u>1,287</u>		
Rent of the houses belonging to the arsenal - - -	1,280	
Duty on tobacco of Arabia and of Id - - -	700	
Of which is assigned 400 to the proprietors above mentioned 300 to the imperial mint.		
Revenues of the farms belonging to Mecca and Medina - - -	2,800	
Divers small farms destined for cha- rity - - -	2,995	
Annual Fixed Revenue - - -	75,871 or	37,935,500
Carried forward - - -	75,871 or	37,935,500

	Purſes Rumi.	Piaſtres.
Brought forward - -	75,871	37,935,500
II. UNFIXED REVENUE.		
From the Muagili and Mukata -	5,772	
Duty on tobacco - - -	3,065	
Cafual confifcations and inheri- tances - - -	1,327	
Farms of Cairo - - -	1,650	
On tobacco by a new regulation -	400	
The Zaëfé paid by the vizir and other miniſters for their offices -	1,800	
Befides what is paid on the creating of a vizir on making any other miniſter. - - -		
	89,885	
	or	44,942,500

Total of the Revenue of the Empire or public treasury, called the *Miri*, 44,942,500 piaſtres, or about £. 4,494,250. ſterling. Since this calculation was made, the exchange is ſtill more againſt Turkey, or, more properly ſpeaking, this money has been much debaſed.

The Revenues of Walachia and Moldavia are not included. They were to pay nothing during the three firſt years after the peace with Ruſſia was concluded.

ANNUAL EXPENDITURE of the MIRI.

	Purſes Di- vani.	Piaſtres.
Pay of the city guards or militia of Constantinople - - -	22,700	
Pay of the boſtangis and of the people belonging to the ſultan's kitchen - - -	700	
Pay of the agas and officers of the ſultan's palace - - -	1,700	
To the harem of the old palace - -	1,800	
To the ſultan's eunuchs - - -	800	
To the aga of the ſeraglio of Ga- lata - - -	501	
Expences of the kitchen (purſes rumi) - - -	1,800	
To the chief of the butchers - -	600	
Expences of the imperial ſtables - -	600	
Arbitrary aſſignments - - -	1,250	
A donation to Mecca and Medina -	9,000	
Pay of the failors of the fleet - -	2,700	
Proviſion for the fleet - - -	800	
Expences of the admiralty - - -	1,800	
Penſions of the ſultanas and of the depoſed khans of the Crim - -	1,372	
Pay of the garrifon of Viddin - -	1,250	
Pay of all the other fortrefſes of the Ottoman empire - - -	18,000	
Pay of thoſe of Boſnia - - -	1,970	
For maintaining recruits - - -	472	
Expences of the leſſer department called Kuchúk Kalem - - -	1,200	
Pay of thoſe who guard the Da- nube - - -	3,521	
Expences in maintaining the poſts -	1,700	
Total of the Expenditures of the Empire, } paid by the public treaſury or miri - - }	76,236	
		or 36,968,133

Equal to about £. 3,596,813 ſterling. { Revenue - £. 4,494,250 ſterling.
Expenditure - 3,696,813
Surplus - £. 797,437 ſterling.

An ACCOUNT of the DEBTS and CREDITS of the MIRI, in 1776, after the conclusion of the RUSSIAN WAR.

	Purſes Di- vani.	Piaſtra.
The Miri owed,		
To the treaſury of Mecca and Medina - - -	- - -	1,350,000
To the Haſnè - - -	- - -	45,550,000
To the arſenal - - -	- - -	6,500,000
To the Miri was owing,		53,400,000
From the tobacco cuſtoms -	3,786,000	
From ſeveral branches of the Revenue - - -	- - -	6,000,000
A balance on the Yearly Payments to the treaſury - - -	7,280,480	
		17,066,480
Balance, being the debt of the Miri, or } about £. 3,628,350 ſterling - - -	- - -	36,333,510

The *haſnè*, or private treaſure of the ſultan, next claims our notice : in amount, indeed, it is vaſtly ſuperior to the miri, but it contributes little to the exigencies of the ſtate, except in times of war, or other great emergency, and even then it is generally made a creditor of the public treaſury to the amount of its contribution.

The ordinary expenditure of this treaſury is chiefly confined to the ſeraglio; it is, how-

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ever, very considerable, though greatly diminished since the reform introduced by sultan Mustafa the third.

Its extraordinary expences have sometimes been very considerable, large sums being occasionally paid to secure the fidelity of the janizaries in times of popular commotion, or on the accession of a new sultan to the throne amidst the struggle of contending factions; it has also, in some instances, contributed larger sums toward the prosecution of a war, than those for which it has been made creditor by the miri.

The receipts may be divided (as those of the miri) into fixed and casual; the former, however, are very inconsiderable in comparison with the latter.

The fixed revenues of the hâsné consisted of the following tributes :

From Cairo	600,000 piaftres.
Wallachia	230,000
Moldavia	260,000
Ragusa	20,000
1,110,000 piaftres, or £. 111,000 sterling.	

These, however, have either ceased entirely, or are little to be relied on. The Ragusan tribute, which is the only one paid regularly, consists of 12,000 sequins, or £. 6,000 sterling

sterling every three years. Those of Moldavia and Wallachia are annihilated when there is a war with Russia; and Cairo is so little subject to the porte, that instead of receiving a regular contribution from thence, large sums are frequently sent thither to corrupt the begs, and to ensure their obedience to the porte, by fomenting quarrels amongst them.

The casual revenues of the hâsné, are

- 1st. The revenues of the mines, which have lately much diminished.
- 2d. The sale (for they are really sold) of all places and posts, which are also diminished, as they do not bring in so much as they did, owing to the wretchedness of the provinces. The pashalik of Cairo used to cost £. 75,000 sterling; that of a cadi in a great city 2 to £. 5000, and more.
- 3d. A duty of 10 per cent on all inheritances.
- 4th. The inheritances of the officers of the seraglio, and the porte (or empire,) the sultan being their heir, to the total exclusion of their children or relations. The ulema solely are exempted from this law.
- 5th. The confiscations of all officers disgraced or put to death.
- 6th. The property of those who die without heirs, inherited by the law of escheat.
- 7th. Penalties.
- 8th. Presents from great officers and foreign courts.

Nothing can be more uncertain than a guess (for a calculation is impossible) of the amount

of each of these branches of the private treasury ; many of them are in themselves highly fluctuating, and others are subject to immense embezzlements. That they greatly surpass the revenues of the miri cannot be doubted, since it is the principal occupation of every pasha to suck out the very vitals of his province ; and these men have no sooner amassed a great property, than they are cut off by the sultan to enrich his treasury.

Every sultan leaves what is called his treasure in the vaults of the seraglio, and every sultan thinks it a duty to leave as considerable a sum as he can—they attach even a vanity to it.

The personal hereditary wealth of the individuals of the ulema forms, in the aggregate, a very considerable fund, which, in the ordinary operations of government, cannot be applied to any uses of the state. The ulema, as we have seen, is the only body of men who hold offices in the Turkish empire, whose property is hereditary in their families ; it may therefore be naturally supposed that they will become objects of the sultan's avaricious jealousy : such, however, is their power, that any invasion of their treasure would be attended with the greatest danger. The mere existence of such a treasure is, however, a subject of great importance, both as affecting

affecting the ordinary and extraordinary circumstances of the state.

In the former, it serves to support a body of men invested with formidable power, in opposition to the sultan; but as these same men have little connection of interest with the people at large, their wealth seems to be taken from the general stock only to nourish an additional body of tyrants. In the event of any great convulsion, it cannot be doubted that even this treasure would be sacrificed to the preservation of the state; but it seems probable that this measure would not be adopted without some struggle on the part of the ulema, who will scarcely be willing to make such a sacrifice until it is, perhaps, too late.

The treasures in the mosques are very considerable: they arise from the revenues appropriated to them at their foundation, and by subsequent bequests; and as the superstition of the rich mussulmans frequently leads them to such acts of ostentatious charity, the aggregate of these sums throughout the whole empire must be immense. The whole of this property, being under the seal of religion, cannot be broken in upon with impunity. The ordinary revenues are, or ought to be, expended in the support of the mosque, and in works of piety and charity; but there are be-

fides, in some of their vaults, treasures which would be very considerable, were it not for constant malversation on the part of the guardians. The whole of these treasures, though strictly forbidden by law to be applied to any other uses than those of religion, may be resorted to when the seat of empire itself is in imminent danger, an event in which the interests of the Mahometan religion are supposed to be involved.

Such are the sources, and, as nearly as it can be calculated, the amount of the Turkish revenue and expenditure. The mode of its collection, and the probable consequences of its present situation, afford room for observations of the highest importance, which, indeed, are sufficiently obvious to the enlightened European, but which the ignorant Turk would with difficulty comprehend or arrogantly deride.

The want of clear and accurate views on the subject of finance gives the court that rapacity, which spreads to all the subordinate officers, and tends to the impoverishment of the people without augmenting (but on the contrary diminishing) the resources of the government. It has become a fixed source of revenue to set to public sale offices of every denomination; nor is it only to the treasury that these fees, sometimes to a very high amount,

amount, are paid: in the intrigues of the *se-raglio*, by which the disposal of all places is regulated, every thing is done by means of bribes; and if this is attended, as we have seen, with the worst consequences in the distribution of justice, it is no less pernicious in the department of finance.

Hence it is, that the *paschas* sent into the distant provinces exert to the utmost their power of extortion; but are always outdone by the officers immediately below them, who, in turn, leave room for the ingenuity of their subordinate agents; and the circle is only completed by the power of the despot, who, from time to time, squeezes into his own coffers the sponge, with which this herd of plunderers had absorbed the property of the people.

As the Mahomedans themselves pay no personal tax or capitation, and in general contribute very little to the revenues of the state, the *paschas* are obliged to find other methods of exacting money from them; but the Christians always suffer most.

The mildness of the Turkish government is argued from their permitting foreigners to pay lower duties than their own subjects; this circumstance is, however, only a proof of their ignorance in matters of commerce; for surely a wise and politic sovereign would, by

all means, cherish the commercial spirit in his own subjects rather than in strangers. The duty paid by foreigners is 3 per cent. whilst that paid by the natives varies in different places from 5 to 7 and 10 per cent. The lowest is a duty of 5 per cent. paid at Constantinople and Smyrna, on some articles of foreign produce; but in most parts of the empire the legal duty on merchandize in general is 10 per cent. Peyssonel, who corrects Tott on this subject, is himself so far from being accurate, that (contrary to his assertion) the common duty is called *asheria*, or the tenth (from the Arabic *ashir*.) But the legal imposts are but a small part of what the merchant pays: foreigners indeed are, in all countries, more liable to imposition than the natives; but that even the latter are subjected to heavy impositions is certain, from the instances cited by Tott, which are by no means uncommon.

From the total separation of the public treasury and that of the sultan, it results, that whilst the former is in the most impoverished state, and unable to pay for the most necessary expences of the empire, the latter abounds with money, which is lavished on the most frivolous objects. However the splendor of the sovereign may be supposed to be connected with the glory of the state, the necessities

necessities of the latter have surely a paramount claim; but in Turkey it is considered of more importance to provide diamonds for the sultan's harem, than to conduct the most useful operations, military or commercial. If the present state of the Turkish finances seems incompatible with the permanence or prosperity of the state, the future prospect is still less promising.

The debt of the miri, in 1776, cannot be considered as very enormous, if we take into the account how great had been the exertion, and how ruinous the expence, of the preceding war. The fleet, which had suffered so greatly from the disaster at Tcheshmé, was also re-established on a more formidable footing than it had been previously to that event, and the treasury seemed to have effected all its most burdensome operations. Nevertheless the expenditure has since increased, and it is not probable that the miri can discharge its debts without a donation from the treasury of the sultan, a measure which does not enter into the policy of the seraglio. Here then we are to consider the probable consequences of a deficiency in its treasury, to a government which knows nothing of the financial provisions of modern politics, and, consequently, will be totally unprepared for such a conjuncture.

The

The revenues of the empire are diminishing, and as the extortions of the pashas increase, and the means of satisfying them decrease in a degree alarming to the porte, oppressive even to the Mahomedans, and shockingly distressful to the poor Christian subjects, some great crisis cannot be very far off, when the sultan must (notwithstanding every reason he may have to the contrary) open the treasures of the seraglio, and, last of all, have recourse to the sacred deposits of the mosques, and the riches of the ulema. What disorder, confusion, and alarm, this will occasion, what revolutionary events it may produce in the provinces, from the distress and consequent weakness of the porte, may be easily foreseen; universal anarchy must prevail, and every pasha will aspire at being an independent sovereign.

That there would be resources in the empire no one can doubt; but to employ them would require another system of government—a system incompatible with the policy, the habits, and perhaps the fundamental laws of the Turkish government.

The revenues have lately been considerably augmented by improvements in the administration of the different branches, and particularly the farms.

The debasement of the current coin has
sometimes

sometimes been resorted to by sovereigns as a measure of finance. In this point of view the following observations on the Turkish money may not be unacceptable :

The alloy in the GOLD COIN is silver (not copper.)

The zumachbuh of Constantinople, a gold coin of Machmut, Osman, and Mustafa, weighs 13 karats, and is $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 22\frac{1}{2} \text{ carats fine} \\ 1\frac{1}{2} \text{ alloy silver.} \end{array} \right\}$ The mitcal, or 24 carats of pure gold, is worth $6\frac{1}{2}$ dollars. These pieces go for $3\frac{1}{2}$ dollars.

The zumahbuh of Abdulhamid and Selim are 19 carats fine, and go for $3\frac{1}{2}$ dollars.

Those of Cairo weigh 13 karats, and go in Turkey for $3\frac{1}{2}$ dollars; they are from 17, 18, to 19 carats fine.

The fundukli of Machmut and Mustafa weigh $17\frac{1}{2}$ carats, are 23 carats fine, and go for 5 dollars.

SILVER COIN.

1 pound of silver equals 100 drachms.

In the piaftres there are but 40 drachms pure in the pound.

Those of Abdulhamit 34 drachms—they cheat 2 carats at the mint, which the money is less than the standard.

That of sultan Selim, the present reigning sovereign, is still worse.

CHAPTER III.

Of the Turkish Military Force.

THE state of the Turkish military forms a very interesting branch of enquiry, since it is that by which their empire has risen, and upon which it seems to depend. In developing the weakness of this disorganized mass, I shall first recur to the causes which formerly gave it power, and which, having ceased to operate, leave it, at the present day, only the semblance of its ancient greatness. From this survey we shall turn to a delineation of its present state, and after giving a detail of the land forces, shall consider their present military character, their tactics, and laws of warfare; from the united consideration of which will be seen, what estimation the Turkish armies justly deserve. The naval force will merit a separate attention; and here we shall notice those attempts at its amelioration, from which, if effectual improvement could be at all hoped in Turkey, it might have been, with some probability, expected. Lastly, I shall notice the state of the Turkish fortifications, particularly of those which are, or are supposed to be, of the last importance to the defence of the empire.

It

It is undeniable that the power of the Turks was once formidable to their neighbour not by their numbers only, but by their military and civil institutions, far surpassing those of their opponents, who were never united in a rational system; governed often by courtiers, priests, or women; possessing no rational system of finance, no great resources in cases of exigency, no system of war even comparable to the Turks, a feudal government, internal dissensions, no wise or solid alliances amongst each other; and yet they all trembled at the name of the Turks, who, with a confidence procured by their constant successes, held the Christians no less in contempt as warriors than they did on account of their religion. Proud and vain-glorious, conquest was to them a passion, a gratification, and even a mean of salvation, a sure way of immediately attaining a delicious paradise. Hence their zeal for the extension of their empire, or rather a wild enthusiasm, even beyond the pure patriotism of the heroes of antiquity; hence their profound respect for the military profession, and their glory even in being obedient and submissive to discipline.

The Ottoman empire was governed by great men from Othman I. to Mahomed IV. The

The exceptions, if any, were always so short, that the military genius of the people did not decline, but was like a fire smothered, and always broke out in the next reign with redoubled fury. To sultan Amurath I. is owing the rise of a permanent military among the Turks ; he it was, who, after extending the sphere of his conquests from the Hellespont to the Danube, formed the more politic project of preserving his empire by a body of militia, accustomed to discipline and attached by peculiar privileges to the service.

For this purpose he took every *fifth child of the Christians* in his power, above fifteen years old, and committed them to the care of husbandmen for two or three years, to be inured to hard labour, and instructed in the Mahometan religion. They were then taught the use of arms, and to accustom them to slaughter they were made to practise the use of their sabres on their prisoners or criminals. When every movement of compassion was worn out, they were inrolled in the body of *yenisheri* (new troops) or janizaries, and formed the flower of the Turkish army. The institution of the janizaries gave at that time a decisive superiority to the Turkish arms, as they presented a system of discipline, and a permanency of organization, till then

then unknown in Europe. These haughty and celebrated legions were long the terror of surrounding nations, and continued to be looked upon as formidable until the middle of the seventeenth century. At that time the Turkish power ceased to aggrandize itself; it made a pause in its conquests, a pause prophetic of that downfall toward which it has since so rapidly verged, and which seems now to threaten a speedy approach. The steps which led to this degradation are easily discernible. The discipline of this ferocious soldiery could only be upheld by sovereigns equally ferocious: no sooner did the sultans quit the fatigues of the camp for the debaucheries of the harem, than the janizaries, disdainful of their command, broke out into sedition, and dethroned the monarch who appeared unworthy of empire. It was the policy of sultan Mahmud, who dreaded their military and turbulent spirit, to debase this corps; he therefore permitted the lowest and most infamous of the people to enrol themselves as janizaries; hence their number has been greatly swelled, but their character has been more than proportionally degraded, and many of them are notoriously stigmatised for cowardice, theft, and the vilest crimes, whilst others, enervated by a city life, and the practice of the lowest trades, have
nothing

nothing military but the name of janizary. In the abstracts of their history will be seen the attempts that were made to cut them off entirely.

Peyssonel makes a pompous enumeration of the distinctions which take place in the army, and of the military canons of sultan Soliman, which determine its regulation and discipline.

That there are such distinctions follows from the very nature of an army, as the *sag kol* and *sol kol* (right wing and left wing) the *ortas*, *buluks*, and *seymens* (different names for corps) as also the titles of the officers, as *janizar aga*, *seymen bashi*, *koul kiaiaffi*, &c.; but these forms prove nothing with regard to the minutiae of tactics. It is the general characteristic of the Turkish government to be loaded with forms and regulations, which are of no effectual service; thus the canons of sultan Soliman indeed exist, but no one studies them, and to attempt enforcing them would be absurd.

I shall therefore proceed to state the following

CALCULATION of the TURKISH ARMY,

As far as its utmost extension at present admits, from the concurring testimony of several

veral persons who had the most intimate acquaintance with it, from an application of many years, and with means of acquiring the best information.

INFANTRY.

	Men.
1. Janizaries - - - - -	113,400
2. Topgees, artillery men; according to the ancient institutions there should be 18,000, but there never existed more than -	15,000
3. Gumbaragees, bombardiers - - -	2,000
4. Bostangees, guards of the gardens; they now guard the palace - - -	12,000
5. Mehtergees, who erect the tents and place the camp - - - - -	6,000
6. Messirilis, sent from Egypt—infantry and cavalry	3,000
7. Soldiers, from Walachia and Moldavia - -	6,000
8. Leventis, marines; few in peace, in war at most - - - - -	50,000
Infantry -	207,400

CAVALRY.

	Men.
1. Spahis—paid regulated - - -	10,000
2. Serragis, for the service of the infantry and their baggage, enrolled by the pashas in the provinces. They are a corps de reserve in great necessities - - -	6,000
3. Zaims and timariots, feudal troops - -	132,000
4. Gebegis, armourers, who guard the powder, arms, and magazines, occasionally serve as a corps de reserve of cavalry; they should be, according to the canons of the empire, 30,000, they now are scarcely - -	13,000
Carried over -	161,000
F 5. Miklagis,	

CAVALRY.

	Men.
Brought forward -	161,000
5. Miklagis, who attend on the spahis -	6,000
6. Segbans, who guard the baggage of the cavalry -	4,000
7. Volontiers, with their horses, never more than	10,000
Cavalry -	181,000
Infantry -	207,400
Total -	388,400

From these should be deducted,

1. The leventis, who belong to the fleet, and can only be employed near the coast where the fleet is -	50,000
2. For the garrison of Constantinople, though so many in time of war, are not always kept there -	20,000
3. Garrisons of the fortresses and frontiers in Europe and Asia -	100,000
4. The bostangees, when the grand seignior does not go into the field -	12,000
	182,000

Troops to take the field -	206,400
The miklagis, and such as serve the vizir, the beglerbegs, and paschas, never go into the battle, and only increase the number; these may be computed nearly at -	20,000
Total -	186,400

The remainder of effective men will therefore amount only to 186,400 men.

As

As it will soon appear how little the Turkish arms are strengthened by discipline, the consideration of numbers becomes doubly important, and indeed it is upon them that the porte at present entirely relies. Yet even here its power evidently fails to an alarming degree: it has often found it difficult to assemble 100,000 men; and in 1774, with its utmost efforts, it could only bring into the field 142,000.

These numbers too are greatly lessened by desertion. In 1773, the porte sent 60,000 janizaries toward Trebisonde, to be embarked for the Crimea, where not 10,000 arrived, the rest having dispersed themselves on their route. Besides these regular troops, the Turks were formerly assisted by numerous hordes of Tatars, whose mode of warfare exceeded even their own in barbarity: this supply is now cut off by their cession of the Tatar provinces to the empress, so that they will not in future be able to cope with Russia even in the number of their troops.

The last reliance of the porte is upon the volunteers; but a few observations will suffice to shew how little confidence can be placed in such forces.

Formerly, when the whole nation was in some manner inflamed with the warlike genius of the janizaries, when the people were

inflated by success, and every one knew more or less the use of arms, these were often found useful and valiant troops; but at present they consist chiefly of an undisciplined rabble, instigated either by a momentary rashness or a desire of plunder. Some go, because they are ashamed to stay at home, on account of the ridicule of their neighbours; others, to secure the privileges and pecuniary advantage which they derive from being attached to a chamber (or company) of janizaries; another part of these volunteers are robbers, and the outcast of the Turks, who go to plunder on their march, as well going as coming, under the sanction of their military profession.

The mollahs and mouhazim cry from the minarets of the mosques, in time of war, that all good muselmans must go to fight against the infidels, with a long enumeration of the obligations on all true believers to take the field.

Hence, a young man is often seized with a fit of enthusiasm, (I have personally known many such in Asia) he takes a pair of richly furnished pistols (if he can afford it, for in the richness of their armour is their pride) a sabre covered with silver, and a carabine, and mounts his horse to conquer the infidels, and make them become muselmans, and to bring
back

back with him young girls for his harem. If he does not repent and turn back before he sees the camp, nor when arrived at the army, he soon learns from others the danger there is, and the difficulty of vanquishing the infidels; and when he has been a witness of it, and seen that there are only hard blows to be gotten, he generally sets spurs to his horse, and rides off. Thus by whole troops, in every war, these volunteers return, plundering the poor peasants, and often murdering them, particularly if they are Christians, to be able to swear, when they return home, how many infidels they have killed. The Asiatic foot soldiers desert in the same manner, and by thousands, though they are most of them janizaries.

There is, it is true, a considerable difference in the soldiery: the Turks of Europe are the best soldiers; but far above all, those of Bosnia, Albania, Croatia, and towards the emperor's frontier; they are a very robust and warlike people, accustomed from their infancy to arms, and are almost continually fighting with one another, or against the porte, or plundering on the roads. The emperor had to do with a much worse enemy than the Russians; and besides, they had to defend their families and homes, and conse-

quently had an interest in the war, which the Asiatic troops have not.

Many authors have contended, that it is possible to inspire the Turks anew with their ancient military spirit, and to elevate their forces to their former superiority, by instructing them in European tactics. The attempts which have so frequently been made by French officers to this purpose, without the least success, are convincing proofs against such a supposition. The celebrated Bonnevall, whose adventures were matter of much notoriety in the beginning of this century, laboured at this undertaking, as did the Baron de Tott since his time; yet, notwithstanding the ability and perseverance of the latter, all his pains were rendered fruitless by the unconquerable bigotry of the Turks themselves. An attempt is now making on a better principle; not by endeavouring to discipline the old soldiery, but by raising a new corps, of which notice shall hereafter be taken. If these instances were not sufficient to show the impracticability of such an attempt, a very slight view of the real state of their force would suffice to set it in the clearest point of view.

Their force lies in their attack, but for that they must be prepared; taken unawares

the smallest number puts them to flight. The Russians always conquer when they attack them, and therefore avoid being attacked, which is generally very easy. At present the attack of the Turks (terrible indeed as it appears to those who see it the first time) is no longer new to the Russians; they know how to receive it, and therefore do not dread it. Had the emperor followed the Russian system, he would have been equally successful, in the beginning of the last war, as he was when he changed his plan of operation.

Besides that the Turks refuse all melioration, they are seditious and mutinous; their armies are incumbered with immense baggage, and their camp has all the conveniencies of a town, shops, &c. for such was their ancient custom when they wandered with their hordes. When their sudden fury is abated, which is at the least obstinate resistance, they are seized with a panic, and have no rallying as formerly. In proportion as the march of the army, advancing in the field, was slow, so is it rapid in its retreat. They leave their baggage, abandon every thing to the enemy, and do not even nail up their cannon. The cavalry (which is the only part of their army that deserves the name of troops) is as much afraid of their own foot as of the enemy; for in a defeat

F 4

they

they fire at them to get their horses to escape quicker. In short, it is a mob assembled rather than an army levied. None of those numerous details of a well-organized body, necessary to give quickness, strength, and regularity to its actions, to avoid confusion, to repair damages, to apply every part to some use; nothing, as with us, the result of reasoning and combination; no systematic attack, defence, or retreat; no accident foreseen, or provided for.

To these reasons might be added the opinion of Gazi Hassan, the celebrated captain-pasha (of whom I shall have occasion to say much hereafter) who, after repeated endeavours to improve the army, found all his attempts ineffectual. He saw it was impossible to discipline the Turkish army, and gave up all hopes of it, but proposed a new order of battle.

He would have divided an army of 100,000 men into ten different corps, which were to attack separately, and so arranged that the retreat of the repulsed corps should not overwhelm and put in disorder those which had not attacked. He affirmed, that though the artillery of an European army would make great slaughter, yet no army could withstand ten Turkish attacks, which are furious, but short if they do not succeed, and the attack
of

of 10,000 is as dangerous as of 100,000 in one body, for the first repulsed, the rest, on whom they fall back, immediately take to flight. But any one who knows the Turks would see the impossibility of leading on the other corps after a defeat of the first, as the spirit of their army now is. The old janizaries are no more; besides, the Christian army, encouraged by success, would have time to recover from any disorder. Hassan himself was as brave as a lion, but he could not inspire into the troops his own spirit; he tried nineteen years, and had all the time unlimited power. If he therefore performed nothing in a reign, where he virtually was sovereign, what is to be expected now, or hereafter? Centuries may pass away before another such man arises with such means.

The Turkish weapons require some notice. The artillery which they have, and which is chiefly brass, comprehends many fine pieces of cannon; but notwithstanding the reiterated instruction of so many French engineers, they are profoundly ignorant of its management*.

Their

* In speaking of their artillery I ought not to omit mentioning an Englishman in the service of the porte; his name is Campbell, and he is related to a great Scotch family. When very young, he came to Constantinople (the cause of his quitting Scotland is said to be a duel) and, without making himself known to any European, he went

Their musket-barrels are much esteemed; but they are too heavy; nor do they possess any quality superior to common iron barrels, which have been much hammered, and are of very soft Swedish iron. They are thus made: round a rod of iron they twist soft old iron wire, and forge it; then they bore out the rod, part of which often remains, according as the wire was thick or thin, and the bore large or small.

The art of tempering their sabres is now lost, and all the blades of great value are ancient; however, their sabre is superior to any of ours in its form and lightness. It is a great error in all the cavalry in Europe to have heavy sabres; I have often heard old

to the porte and turned Turk. He advanced by slow degrees till he became general of the bombardiers (the place which Bonneval had) and then only he became acquainted with his countrymen, and other Europeans. He was many years at the head of the foundery of ordnance; and though at home he knew nothing of the art of casting cannon, he soon far surpassed Mr. de Tott, over whom he had great advantages, as he is a Mahomedan. He is a good classical scholar, and speaks the modern languages with correctness. He is perfectly a gentleman, and is universally respected by Europeans for the honour, integrity, prudence, and humanity of his character. The Turks know little how to esteem a man of so much worth; for after rendering the most important services to the porte, he was treated with ingratitude, and now, being advanced in years, is wholly neglected.

German

German soldiers complain of it, and an old soldier is a good judge. It seems preposterous indeed to make all the sabres in a regiment of equal weight, without regard to the strength of the arm to use it; besides, a *sharp light* sabre will make a deeper cut than our heavy sabres now in use. Among the Turks, every soldier chooses his own sabre, and takes such a one as he can manage with ease; thus, if he misses his stroke he can recover his guard, whilst a man with a heavy sabre is lost. The part grasped by the fingers in European sabres is much too thick, and weakens the hold. Much is talked in Europe of the balance of a sabre by making it heavy in the hand*; this cannot be the case in any degree, except the knob or pommel project out of the hand towards the elbow, which will enable him to raise up the point quick by the force of the wrist, after he has given a blow; but the weight of the fall of the blow is diminished in both cases. Let any man strike a blow with a

* The fulcrum is the fore-finger, and the back part of the hand presses down the pommel; but a man in battle does not keep his hand at one height; he lifts up his arm, and consequently has the weight of the handle of his sabre to lift up, and the power is in the elbow and shoulder, not in the wrist alone. It cannot be expected that men in action, particularly new troops, will use their sabres in the same manner they do on field days.

fabre heavy in the hand, and then take out the blade, and put on it a light small handle, and strike another blow with it, and he will find the difference. Let him strike with each fifty blows as quick as he can, and observe the difference of time, and the fatigue, and he will be convinced. The sharpness of the edge of the Turkish fabre, and the velocity which the arm gives to a light weapon, compensates for the weight of the fabre. All their attention has been paid to the fabre *for ages* (~~with~~ it they conquered their empire) and it certainly deserves some attention for cavalry. The edge of our fabres is never sharp enough, and the angle of the edge is too acute. In regard to its crookedness it has an advantage, as a blow straight down gives a drawing cut; and it is a good defence, for the arm being held out horizontally with the fabre upright in the hand, a small motion of the wrist turning the edge to the right or left, covers the body by the crook of the fabre; the shoulder of the edge, not the edge itself, forms the parry. Fencing with the crooked fabre was formerly taught to the janizaries. The push with the fabre is also a good attack. If, however, the push only is preferred for cavalry, the lighter and longer the fabre is the better, and the nearer it is to a spear or lance. The blow upwards
is

is esteemed the most dangerous by the Turks, as it is the most difficult to parry.

Many of their cavalry make use of the spear, which, for a close regular front, is perhaps the best weapon; but as the Turkish horse wheel round in full speed, and are never in a regular straight line, perhaps no weapon is so advantageous as their light sharp crooked sabre. No body of cavalry that keeps together, and makes its evolutions without being broken (that is keeping a close front in a line) can give a shock to the Turkish cavalry; they wheel about and retreat much faster than regular cavalry can advance, and this not in a body, but each man turns his horse round in his place. Much might be said for and against their cavalry; it is foreign to my present purpose, and would require a long dissertation to put them and our cavalry in a comparative view. Only let it be remembered, that though their infantry can neither be opposed to European cavalry or infantry, nor their cavalry to European infantry, yet their cavalry is generally superior to all the cavalry they have been opposed to hitherto; I mean the better kind of their cavalry, which is now not very numerous, and can make no effectual opposition to an European army of good infantry with cannon.

Their

Their best Turkish sabres have one great defect, brittleness; they are apt to fly like glass by a blow given injudiciously, though a person used to cut with them will, without any danger of breaking a sabre or turning its edge, cut through an iron nail as thick as a man's finger. Few accidents happen in consequence of sabres breaking among the Turkish cavalry, but very frequently amongst the infantry, from ignorance of their use. In regard to this I will cite a fact which fell under my particular knowledge. At the storming of Oczakow, a lieutenant of the fleet of the Black Sea, a Mr. Fox, an Englishman, served as a volunteer, and marching at the head of a column of 200 Russian grenadiers, was opposed by a body of Turks: he was a man of prodigious bodily strength and great courage; he fought at the head of the column in the line, with a Turkish sabre; it was soon broken, and the soldiers supplied him with others they picked up from the ground, belonging to the Turks that were killed, most of which, from his want of skill, he broke, till the Turks retreated. He killed a number of Turks, and escaped without a wound, defending himself with the remainder of one sabre till he was supplied with another. None of these Turks had the least notion of parrying the blows.

This

This Mr. Fox was a volunteer afterwards at the storming of Ismail, where he was killed. He is remembered in the Russian army to this day as a great hero. As soldiers, even the best taught to use the crooked sabre, are not always so calm in action as to make the best use of it, a blade tempered in the manner of the best blades in Europe is preferable, provided the edge be *perfectly sharp*, and the angle of it *not too acute*; and as to the crooked form, it also requires coolness and knowledge to use it, for if the part which bends most forward and the point do not descend in a straight line, the point will turn the sabre sideways by its weight, as soon as the crooked part strikes, and prevent its cutting; for this reason a straighter blade, in an ignorant or timid hand, is preferable; but a light blade and thin hilt is absolutely necessary for the safety of the soldier. It may be remembered that the Romans, with their short swords, had a great advantage over the Gauls, whose long heavy swords soon tired them. A Turk, with his light short sabre proportioned to his strength (for they are not long taking the chord of the segment) will not tire so soon as an European with his long heavy sabre. I speak of cavalry, for the sabre, after the invention of the bayonet, is a bad weapon for infantry.

Their

Their laws of war are those of the most ferocious barbarians: believing, from the prejudices of their religion, that they have a right to carry fire and sword at pleasure among the infidels, they are checked in their bloody career by no ideas of mercy. They have a right, as they imagine, to put to death all their prisoners, of whatever age or sex, whether they throw down their arms, capitulate, or by whatever method they are taken, and this right extends, not only to the moment of capture, but for ever afterward, unless the captive embrace the Mahometan religion. The heads of the enemy's subjects are valued by the government at a certain price, and for every one that is brought in five sequins are paid out of the treasury. This is frequently a source of the greatest crimes, as it is impossible to distinguish the head of an enemy from that of a wretched peasant or unfortunate traveller, who has been assassinated for the sake of the reward. It is the common custom after an action, when the grand vizir returns to his tent, for the soldiers to line the path with heads which have been thus chopped off.

The barbarous law of Turkish warfare, which condemns all their prisoners to death, is not indeed always practised; but it is not humanity which prevents it; avarice or brutal desire

desire are the causes of prolonging to the slave a miserable existence. At other times the ferocious conqueror butchers in cold blood his captive, or drags him along loaded with injury and insult. Such is the faithful picture drawn by Count Ferrieres and others of the treatment of the Austrian prisoners (many of them officers of distinction) in their way to Constantinople. Those who fell sick on the road, or appeared incapable of being converted to the purposes of labour, were cruelly mangled by the *common waggoners*, who chopped off the heads of some, and maimed others from the impulse of mere barbarity; and the proceeding of the common waggoners was *lawful*, and conformable to custom.

The naval force of the Turks is by no means considerable. Their *grand fleet* consisted of not more than 17 or 18 sail of the line in the last war, and those not in very good condition; at present their number is lessened. Their *gallies* are now of no use as ships of war; but there are about twenty large vessels called *caravellas*, which belong to merchants, and in time of war are frequently taken into the service of the porte, and carry forty guns. These were the vessels, of which several were lost, during the last war, in the Liman, and between Kilburon and Ochakof. Their ships in general are roomy, and larger, for the num-

ber of guns, than ours. In regard to their construction, they are built of good oak wood, but the timbers being too far asunder, they are very weak. From the slightrness of their make they are liable soon to become hogged; to prevent which, they build them with their decks curved up, so that when the two ends settle, the vessels become straight. Such ships do not last long, and are subject to be leaky. In 1778, the finest ship in the fleet foundered in the Black Sea; being too weak, she worked her caulking out, and leaked between all her planks. The famous captain pasha, Hassan, attributed it to the bad caulking, and when the fleet came back into the port of Constantinople, he ordered all the captains of the ships of war to attend in person the caulking of their own ships all the time, on pain of death. One of them, being one day tired of sitting by his ship, went home to his house, not above a quarter of a mile off. The captain pasha happened to go himself to the arsenal to see the work, examined the caulking, found fault, and asked for the captain; the truth was obliged to be told him; he sat down on a small carpet, sent one man for his blunderbuss, and another to call the captain; as soon as the unfortunate man came near him, he took up his blunderbuss and shot him dead without speaking a word to him. "Take and

“bury him,” he said, “and let the other captains attend him to the grave, and the caulking be suspended till they return.”

The shape of their ships bottoms is considered by all those who are judges (such as French ship-builders and English seamen, whose opinions I have heard) as the most perfect. It is certain they are very fast sailors, but their upper works are very inferior to the ships of other nations. It is for the sake of strength, and the improvement of their upper works, that they have sometimes employed French ship-builders. I was acquainted with Mr. Le Roy, who built them some ships at Constantinople; he assured me, that he took as models for the bottoms, Turkish vessels.

They build their ships at Meteline, Stanchio, Sinope, or at Constantinople. Those at Sinope cost (a ship of the line) only £. 9,000, without their guns and rigging. Their guns are always of brass. It appears therefore that the Turks might easily have ships of the best construction; but they have no nursery for seamen. The Greeks navigate their vessels, together with a few Maltese and other slaves, and these are very timorous, for on the smallest accident the captain hangs them. The Turks fight the guns, and some of the lowest class assist in getting up the anchors, pulling at the end of a rope, &c. They, however, row

and manage their narrow sharp boats in the channel of Constantinople better than any other people. They get their best sailors from the coast of Barbary, but not in great numbers; those employed in the trade of the Black Sea, and who belong to the coast of Anatolia, are wretchedly bad; they navigate vessels of the worst construction possible, which can never sail but before the wind; when the wind changes they run into port; this is the reason so many mercantile vessels are lost in the Black Sea, and not from the dangerous navigation of that sea.

The famous captain pasha (before mentioned) collected all the good sailors he could engage from Barbary, the Adriatic gulph, Idrea (famous for a fast sailing kind of cutters) and other parts, but still his fleet was badly manned, and without the Greeks never could have put to sea in 1778.

As the establishment of the navy has been mostly taken from the Christians, and has not the authority of their ancient institutions to plead for its abuses, there would be a great possibility of its improvement, were it not for that habitual indolence which leads the Turk quickly to abandon any arduous undertaking.

Never was there so great a prospect of improvement in the Turkish marine, as that afforded

forded by the exertions of the celebrated Hassan, captain pasha or high admiral, who was promoted to that important office for his military talents, and the bravery which he displayed at Tcheshmé. He employed all the influence which his official and personal character both gave him, and which, under sultan Abdul Hamid, was almost unlimited, to introduce various reforms into the Turkish navy, and, had he been properly seconded, would have certainly raised it to considerable importance, though not to an equality with the Russian fleet now in the Black Sea.

I cannot avoid making a short digression relative to him. The name of Hassan being very common among the Turks, there have been several Hassan Pashas, who have borne the supreme command in their marine; it will therefore be proper to distinguish this illustrious man by his surname *Gazi*; or Conqueror, given him by the sultan—this appellation exactly answers to Emperor during the Roman republic. Two reasons particularly induce me to delineate his character; the aspersions which have been cast upon it, and the striking instances which it displays of the inefficacy even of the greatest talents under such a government as that of Turkey. It is uncertain what country gave him birth. He was brought up at Algiers, where he raised himself to a considera-

ble office in the service of the dey. M. de Peyssonel, who is interested in presenting the best pictures of Turkish manners, eagerly seizes the opportunity of mentioning this great man, and though in some instances rather too partially, he upon the whole gives a much more just impression of his character than what we gather from Baron de Tott, who had a personal enmity to him. The natural abilities of Gazi Hassan Pasha were great; his defects were those of education. In person strong and vigorous, he improved his constitution by temperance, and hardened it by the fatigues of a military life. The acts of bravery, which deservedly elevated the name of Gazi Hassan above that of any modern Turk, are too numerous and striking to need repetition; they bordered indeed sometimes upon rashness; and it is upon this account that Tott censures his daring attempt at Lemnos. His conduct, however, on that occasion, well deserves the applause given to it by Peyssonel; it was one of those daring enterprises, which by their audacity seem to ensure success. The Russians were surprised, unarmed and unprepared, and were forced to embark with the most disgraceful precipitation; it seems however a mystery, why their fleet, formidable as it was, should set sail, and it can only be accounted for from the
panic

panic with which the bold exploit of Hassan had filled them. It has been insinuated that he was addicted to the unnatural vices too frequent among his countrymen; but this aspersión is altogether unfounded: he had one wife only, and no other amour *of any kind*.

The ridicule which Tott has thrown upon him for a want of scientific knowledge is no more than applies to his countrymen universally; but though possessing little science himself, he by no means despised it in others, and the improvements which he suggested in the Turkish marine display, if not an extensive acquaintance with first principles, at least a bold and vigorous grasp of native genius. Cruelty also has been laid to his charge, but without sufficient allowance for the state of things in which he was placed. The command of an undisciplined and tumultuous force is not always to be preserved by lenient measures; his discipline therefore was severe, his punishments striking, and often sanguinary, but never wantonly cruel; he put suddenly to death, but never tortured.

Where a similar severity was not called for, he displayed a clemency unusual in a Turk. Though strictly religious, he was mild and equitable to Christians in general; the inhabitants of the Greek islands under his dominion, ever found in him a protector, and

the Greeks of the Morea, through his influence, were preserved from total extirpation. His respect for Europeans, proceeding from his acuteness and liberality, was known to all those resident at Constantinople, and to none more than to the British ambassador *, who possessed his particular friendship, and had great influence over him. The reforms and improvements which this great man introduced, and which he would have carried much farther, were very comprehensive, including both the construction of the vessels, the education of officers, and the supply of seamen.

As to the vessels themselves, he entirely altered their rigging, and lowered the high poops, which held a great deal of wind, and were very unwieldy and inconvenient in battle; these improvements were conducted by an Englishman, who rigged the vessels in the English manner.

He also gave them regular tiers of guns: formerly there were guns of all sizes on the same deck; they now only keep on the lower tier, two, four, or six of their large brass guns, some of which carry a shot of one hundred pounds, and are placed in the middle of

* I cannot help observing, that Sir Robert Ainslie possessed, in general, a greater influence at the porte than any British ambassador before him.

the tier. What was of infinitely more importance to the Turkish marine, was the reform which he endeavoured to introduce in the mode of collecting sailors, and keeping them at all times ready for service. It is usual, as soon as the fleet enters the port of Constantinople in autumn, to lay up the ships in the harbour, and dismiss the sailors, who all go to their homes till St. George's day, O. S. (4th May, N. S.); for in most maritime matters they follow the Greek calendar, their own year being composed of lunar months, and its periods subject to much variation. Before this day the fleet never sails, so that during the winter it lies quite defenceless, and the Russians might come down the Black Sea, and destroy it in the port of Constantinople without opposition.

Hassan, foreseeing this, proposed building a large edifice at Constantinople for the sailors to live in, as in barracks, that they might be always at hand. The porte not furnishing the sums necessary, he built one on a smaller scale at his own expence; but it is little used since his death, as the sailors go to their own homes in different parts of the empire as before.

It is said that the vizir, and other great officers of the porte, were fearful of seeing the grand admiral with so great a force constantly at his disposal in the city. He, indeed,

deed, very probably had in view, to have a body of men at his command capable of keeping the janizaries in awe; though without this he was dreaded by them, and no riots happened, in his time, of consequence; the few that did, he quelled in an instant, and flew without mercy all the ring-leaders. In 1776 (or thereabouts) he established a feminary and an academy at Constantinople, for giving a regular education to young men for officers for the navy; but it came to nothing, as all innovations in Turkey ever must, from prejudice, from envy, jealousy, and fear of some unforeseen and imaginary baneful consequence to the porte. Since that another fruitless attempt has been made.

The best mode of estimating the importance of the Turkish navy will be by a comparison of its conduct with that of its opponents. For this purpose I shall subjoin a few observations on some of the most memorable naval transactions of the last and preceding wars.

Gazi Hassan Pasha, who so much distinguished himself in the memorable affair of Tcheshmé, was at that time the Turkish admiral's captain, or *capitana*, called also vice admiral by the Europeans, but improperly. That the conduct of Gazi Hassan on this occasion displayed equal judgment and resolution

tion cannot be doubted; he would probably have succeeded in boarding and taking admiral Spiritoff's ship, but for the taking fire and blowing up of both vessels. This event has been attributed to the desperation of the Russians; but as I was informed by admiral Kruse (who was then captain of Spiritoff's ship) it arose accidentally from the wadding of the Russian guns, which set fire to the Turkish vessel. (See Peyssonel, 101.) The event of the contest at Tcheshmé is well known: the Turkish fleet was totally destroyed, owing to the ill conduct of the captains, the cowardice of the men, and to the ignorance of Jaffer Bey, who was afterwards degraded from the post of captain pasha, and his place supplied by Gazi Hassan.

In the subsequent war, Gazi Hassan himself commanded in the Black Sea; yet notwithstanding his exertions, his talents, and the great powers with which he was invested (more than any of his predecessors ever possessed) the Turkish fleet remained in a state of impotence. During the whole of the summer of 1788, the captain pasha lay with seventeen sail of the line off the island of Berizan. The Russian fleet, consisting of three sail of the line (with only their lower tier of guns in) and a number of small vessels, lay at a little distance from him, between

tween Kilburon and Ochakof, to protect the siege, and block up the port of the latter place. The captain pasha knew very well that the guns from Kilburon Point could not hurt him, as they were masked by the Russian fleet; he was also well acquainted with the channel, and possessed undoubted bravery himself; yet he never dared to sail in and attack the enemy, because he could not rely on his own ships doing their duty, and manœuvring properly. The Russians expected an attack, and thought the event dubious. The remainder of their fleet lay in the port of Sebastopolis, under the command of admiral Wainowitz, and though not one fourth as strong as the Turks, it failed to attack the captain pasha, who went out to meet it, and a running fight ensued, which ended to the advantage of the Russians, though they put back to Sebastopolis; and even for this measure the admiral was censured.

In the last campaign of the war, the whole Turkish and Russian fleets met, and fought at sea; and notwithstanding the very great inferiority of the latter, they were victorious, and pursued the Turks, who were flying ignominiously before them into the Bosphorus of Constantinople. The Russians were already in sight of the entrance, when a frigate reached their admiral with news of the conclusion

clusion of peace, which put an end to the pursuit.

I might have mentioned the action in the Liman the same year, in which the Turks lost the greatest part of their vessels; but that was owing more to accident than any other cause. If such was the event of a contest, when the superiority was greatly in favour of Turkey, what is not now to be expected, when the Russian fleet at Sebastopolis is so considerably augmented? It is now strong enough to risk the loss of one half of its numbers in an attack on Constantinople, and the remainder alone will be more than a match for the sultan's navy.

As the last hope of the Turks lies in their fortresses, particularly in those of the Dardanelles, which they believe impregnable, I shall add the following observations on this subject.

They are ignorant of the art either of fortifying or defending, and, above all, of attacking places. They have not one fortress in the empire well fortified by art; a few are strong by nature, but none so much so that the Russians could not now take them either by a regular siege or by assault. Prince Potemkin, had he chosen, could as easily have taken Ochákof on the 1st of July, when he appeared before it, as on the 17th of December,

ber, when he stormed it under augmented difficulties. It was a political siege.

The Dardanelles, said to be so formidable, may be easily passed by a fleet; or the castles may be beaten down by batteries erected on shore, or by sea, from situations on which the great artillery cannot bear on ships. There are, on each side the water, fourteen great guns, which fire granite balls; these guns are of brass, with chambers like mortars, twenty-two English feet long, and twenty-eight inches diameter of the bore*; they are very near the level of the surface of the water, in arched port-holes or embrasures with iron doors, which are opened only when they are to be fired; the balls cross the water from side to side, as they are a little elevated. These monstrous cannon are not mounted on carriages, but lie on the paved floor, with their breech against a wall; they cannot be pointed, but the gunner must wait till the vessel he intends to fire at is opposite the mouth, and they are at least half an hour in loading one of these guns. All vessels coming from Constantinople are obliged to stop at these castles, and show their firman, or order from the porte, to let them pass; but there are examples of

* A gentleman, who has measured them since me, says, they are only twenty-three inches; one of us must have made a mistake.

vessels in bad weather sailing through the channel without receiving any harm, though the Turks have fired at them. It is true, that in going with the stream, which with a northerly wind runs strong, it is easier for a vessel to pass them, yet with a southerly wind the current runs up, though not so strong, and I believe an English fleet with a brisk gale would pay little attention to these terrible batteries, the guardians of the Turkish capital; they are, like the Turks themselves, formidable only in appearance*. There are other batteries of good cannon, but by no means dangerous; some of them at such a distance, and on such high hills, that they are quite useless. The following circumstance proves that the batteries in the channel of Constantinople, and at the entrance from the Black Sea, cannot hurt a fleet sailing in with a fair wind. In the first campaign, one of the Russian vessels (a 64 gun ship) was separated from the fleet cruising in the Black Sea, and being dismasted in a gale of wind, was forced into the channel of Constantino-

* There is in the arsenal of Constantinople the breech of a cannon which was melted in a fire a century ago, of a most enormous size (I am sorry I have not the measure of it) but those of the Dardanelles are diminutive in comparison to it. It was one of those used at the siege of Constantinople.

ple; though only under jury-masts, and moving slowly, the Turks, by an incessant fire from all their batteries, were not able to sink, nor even to hurt her; she cast anchor in the bay of Buyukderé, after having passed all the most dangerous batteries, and then surrendered herself. The captain was an Englishman; he was blamed for not continuing his course, and sailing quite through to the Archipelago.

Another fortress, whose importance has been the subject of much discussion, is Ochakof (spelt by the Poles Oczakow, and called by the Turks Ozi). I shall therefore take occasion to rectify a common mistake respecting it.

It is asserted by some, and denied by others, that this fortress defends the entrance into the Liman. The report of masters of merchant vessels has been insisted on, on one side, and that of those who have observed the course ships of war take on the other side. They were both in the right.

Merchant ships, if they are small, as those in the Black Sea generally are, may sail out of the channel, and go within reach of the guns of Ochakof, but the channel for ships of war is at least four miles from Ochakof, and within fifty fathoms of the point of Killiburon (not the castle) on which the Russians have

have erected strong batteries, the platforms of which are only two feet above the level of the sea. These batteries were erected after the Turkish fleet entered the Liman, in June 1788, and before all the remainder of it got out again after their defeat. The consequence was, that not one large ship did, after that, get out. Six of them attempted to force the passage, and were sunk (though they were not large vessels) opposite the batteries of the point. This obliged the remainder in the Liman, which were smaller vessels, to take shelter under the guns of Ochakof, in a small port on the opposite side, within the Liman, where they were burnt by the Russian fleet the 1st of July. That small vessels may sail out of the channel, and out of the reach of the guns at Killburn Point, and even of the fleet in the channel, the captain pasha proved. On the 22d of August, he sent twenty-two small vessels (having 2,500 men on board, and provisions for the garrison) from his fleet (with a wind which prevented the Russian fleet going out to sea to meet them) between the channel and the shore of Ochakof; they arrived safe without the Russian fleet having fired one gun at them; two of them run ashore near the town, the rest sailed out again as they came, the same night.

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Had the Russian batteries been constructed on the point of Killburn before the Turkish fleet entered the Liman, it could not have passed them till the Turks had made themselves masters of them : it follows that the point of Killburn, and not of Ochakof, is the key of the Boristhenes *.

The present reigning sultan, Selim, has made an attempt to introduce the European discipline into the Turkish army, and to abolish the body of janizaries ; an attempt, which, whatever success it may ultimately be attended with, will form a memorable epocha in the history of the empire.

A trifling circumstance gave rise to it. The grand vizir, Yusef Pasha, in the late Russian war, had a prisoner who was by birth a Turk, but being carried early in his youth to Moscow, he had become a Christian, and found in a Russian nobleman a patron who gave him a good education, and placed him in the army. He was a lieutenant when he was taken prisoner, and had the reputation of being a good officer. The vizir took pleasure in conversing with him, for he had not wholly forgotten his mother tongue. He

* This place is often called Kinburn ; its proper name in Turkish is Kill or Küll-buron ; that is, Hair-point, from its shape. The Russians write it Kilburn.

represented the advantages of the European discipline, not only in battle, but in every other point of view, and particularly in securing the army from mutiny. By his persuasion the vizir formed a small corps, composed of renegadoes and a few indigent Turks, to whom the prisoner taught the European exercise, which they used to perform before the vizir's tent to divert him.

Peace being concluded, the vizir returned to Constantinople, and conducted this corps with him. They were left at a village a few leagues from the capital. The sultan hearing of them, went to see *how the infidels fought battles*, as he would have gone to a puppet-show; but he was so struck with the superiority of their fire, that from that instant he resolved to introduce the European discipline into his army, and to abolish the janizaries; he therefore caused the corps to be recruited, set apart a branch of the revenue for their maintenance, and finally declared his intention of abolishing the institution of janizaries. This step, as might be expected, produced a mutiny, which was only appeased by the sultan's consenting to continue them their pay during their life-times; but he at the same time ordered that no recruits should be received into their corps.

The new soldiery are taught their exercise

with the musket and bayonet, and a few manœuvres. When they are held to be sufficiently disciplined, they are sent to garrison the fortresses on the frontiers. Their officers are all Turks, and are chosen out of those who perform their exercise the best.

What they may become in time it is difficult to foretel; at present there is no other knowledge in the army than is possessed by a drill serjeant; nor indeed can more be expected from them, till they have gained experience in actual war; and it must be remembered that they are still Turks, a very different people from those whom Peter the Great taught to conquer the Swedes. Their ignorance of those manœuvres, which, more than numbers or personal bravery, decide the fate of battles, will make their defeat easy to the Russians, should ever they become numerous enough to form an army, the first time they meet in the field: it will then be seen whether they can make a retreat, or are to be rallied, and whether the new discipline will not all at once be abandoned. They have hitherto no confidence in it; and they are devoid of the enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* of the janizaries. In the first campaign, however, they probably will be driven out of Europe.

Merely the institution of this melice is an
important

important event; and Selim may, perhaps, effect by policy, what several of his ancestors have attempted by force. Could he put himself at the head of a disciplined army, he would conquer the ulema as easily as the janizaries, and the Turkish power, though it would never again be formidable to Europe, might be respectable in Asia. The ulema see their danger, and oppose these changes with all their might. The whole is too new, has too many difficulties to encounter, and has made too small a progress for us to form an opinion how far the sultan will ultimately succeed.

The man who was the cause of this revolution in the military system, the Russian prisoner, and who had again become a Mahomedan, was rewarded for his services in the Turkish manner; for some misdemeanour, real or imputed, his head was struck off,

CHAPTER IV.

Of the Turkish Religion—Its Effect upon the Law, upon the Transactions of the Government, and upon the People at large. The Character, Learning, and Distinctions of the Ulema.

THE philosophic observer of mankind regards, as a chief object of his speculation, the manners of a nation ; it is from them, in general, that political institutions emanate, and it is to them that they always owe their efficacy. But manners themselves will be found to be marked with the character of previous institutions, and of the historical events of the people among whom they predominate. Thus there is a continual action and re-action of causes ; and the human character is alike formed by general manners and by particular incidents. The connection between these is so intimate, that we may almost with certainty determine the state of the one from a knowledge of the other. The beauteous fabric of political liberty cannot be upheld by a corrupt, an effeminate, or a dastardly

tardly people; nor can despotism give birth to a noble and ingenuous frame of mind.

The most striking, as well as the most disgusting feature of Turkish manners, is that haughty conceit of superiority, arising from the most narrow and intolerant bigotry. There have been but too many instances in history, of nations who, having proudly arrogated to themselves the title of favourites of the Almighty, have on that account exercised an insolent disdain toward all who were without the pale of their religion. In no instance, however, has this folly appeared more disgustingly conspicuous than in the Turkish nation; it marks the public and the private character; it appears in the solemnity of their legal acts, in the ceremonies of the court, and in the coarse rusticity of vulgar manners. As it is not my intention to enter into a metaphysical discussion of the Mahomedan dogmas, I shall, under the head of religion, only enquire into the various operations of the extensive principle throughout the different orders of society.

If we listen to the dictates of their law, dictates which ought to have been conceived with caution and uttered with calmness, we hear nothing but the accents of intolerance breathed forth with all the insolence of despotism.

Every *raya* (that is, every subject who is not of the Mahomedan religion) is allowed only the cruel alternative of death or tribute; and even this is arbitrary in the breast of the conqueror. The very words of the formula, given to their Christian subjects on paying the capitation tax, import, that the sum of money received, is taken as a compensation for being permitted to *wear their heads that year*.

The insulting distinction of Christian and Mohamedan is carried to so great a length, that even the minutiae of dress are rendered subjects of restriction. A Christian must wear only clothes and head-dresses of dark colours, and such as Turks never wear, with slippers of black leather, and must paint his house black, or dark brown. The least violation of these frivolous and disgusting regulations is punished with death. Nor is it at all uncommon for a Christian to have his head struck off in the street for indulging in a little more foppery of dress than the sultan or vizir, whom he may meet incognito, approves.

If a Christian strikes a Mahomedan, he is most commonly put to death on the spot, or, at least, ruined by fines, and severely bastinadoed; if he strikes, though by accident, a *sherif* (or *emir* as they are called in Turkish,

i. e. a descendant of Mahomed, who wear green turbands) of which there are thousands in some cities, it is death without remission.

The testimony of Christians is little regarded in courts of justice; at best, two testimonies are but considered as one, and are even overborne by that of a single Mahomedan, if reputed at all an honest man.

The Christians can build no new church, and not without great sums obtain a licence even to repair old ones. If a Mahomedan kills a Christian, he is generally only fined. At Constantinople indeed they are (on account of the police necessary in the capital) sometimes punished with death, according to the circumstances of the case, but always if attended with robbery, or by secret assassination in his house or on the highway, or in any manner so as to disturb the police, which is properly the crime that is punished.

Sultan Mustafa, father of Selim, the present grand seignior, when he mounted the throne, proposed to put to death all the Christians in the whole empire; and was with difficulty dissuaded from doing it, on the ground of the loss of capitation. This prince, however, in the course of his reign, appeared to be actuated by a love of the strictest justice. What must that religion and those principles
be,

be, which could induce a just, at least a well-intentioned man, to massacre whole provinces of defenceless subjects!

It is scarcely credible how far the littleness of pride is carried by the porte in all their transactions with the Christian princes. Whenever they conclude any treaty, the instrument which remains in the hands of the Turks represents the other contracting powers as prostrated at the foot of the sultan's throne, and supplicating his favour and protection. The presents which are made to the sultan, on the arrival of an ambassador, or on any other occasion, are registered in the archives of the empire, as tributes paid by such and such *infidel karols* (the Polish or Slavonian name for king or prince, never given by the Turks but to infidels) to the sublime porte for its protection. These treaties, such as they are, amount only to a temporary remission of that implacable enmity with which their religion inspires them against every thing which is not Mahomedan. To support their faith, and to extend their empire, are the only law of nations which they acknowledge; and in support of these principles they must be ever ready to direct the whole of their force against the arms of the infidels. It is indeed permitted them, whenever their own security is threatened,

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to conclude a *truce*, for the sake of renovating their strength, and enabling themselves more effectually to serve the cause of Mahomed ; and this is the explanation which they give to their own most solemn treaties of peace. In this they are much assisted by the nature of the Arabic language, which they mix with the Turkish in their public acts, and which, by the various application of its terms, literal and metaphorical, enables them to give whatever interpretation they please to any contract. Thus, *fulch ebedy* properly signifies a perpetual peace, while *däim*, the term synonymous to *ebedy*, signifies the same thing, but less forcibly : nevertheless it cost the court of Vienna, within this century, a long and difficult negotiation to substitute the first for the other in a treaty which was, not long after, broken by open hostilities.

It has been contended by some writers with apparent probability, that the Turks, restless and distracted as they are at home, would be unwilling to augment their confusion by engaging in foreign contests ; but there are two observations which may be made in answer to this argument ; first, that the government itself is too ignorant and incautious to be swayed by such considerations. We must not look on the porte as a cabinet under the guidance of enlightened politicians, but

but of a set of wretches continually fluctuating between the hope of amassing plunder by means of war, and enjoying it in the tranquillity of peace; or of hot-headed fanatics, who consider the destruction of infidels as the most meritorious duty of a muselman. Secondly, it may be doubted whether policy would not lead the ministers of the porte frequently to encourage wars, which would divert the turbulent spirits from domestic sedition to the hope of obtaining glory and plunder in a foreign contest.

I shall adduce but one instance from history in support of my opinion; it is the conduct of Turkey in the conquest of Cyprus, as described by the faithful and eloquent pen of the bishop of Amelia,

Sultan Selim II. who at that period sat on the throne, neither endeavoured to extend by conquest the empire his grandfather left him, nor to make it flourish by policy. He left all the management of affairs to his vizir, and gave himself up to excess in every kind of the most beastly debauchery. The people, discontented at his unambitious reign, murmured so loudly, that it was deemed necessary by the vizir to satisfy them: *they affirmed, that sultans were not set up to enjoy peaceably what their predecessors had left them; but to enlarge their empire by new conquests,*
and

and finally reduce the universe to the Mahomedan law; for this spirit of conquest and pillage is the spirit of the whole Turkish nation, from the vizir to the peasant. It was resolved to make war on the Venetians, and to take Cyprus, though without any just pretence whatever.

The powers of Christendom were at variance among themselves, and differences of religion had caused domestic wars. France was allied with the porte; Venice was in great confusion by the blowing up of its arsenal, supposed to be done by Turkish emissaries; there was a great scarcity of corn also in Europe; so that the sultan, awoken from his lethargy, thought now of nothing less than conquering all Europe, and began with Cyprus. *They solemnly assured the Venetians*, that the preparations they were making at Constantinople were destined to assist the Moors in Spain; for oaths, and solemn assurances and protestations of public faith had always been, and is to this day, with them state policy. The vizir, who for personal reasons did not desire this war (he being bribed also by the Venetians) objected to the violation of a treaty which the sultan had so solemnly sworn to observe. The ulema were hereupon consulted, and unanimously answered "*that a treaty made with the enemies of God and his prophet*

prophet might be broken, there being nothing so worthy a Mahomedan as to undertake the entire destruction of Christians." This sentence stands on record, with thousands more of the same kind.

The manners of the court itself, tinged as those of all courts are with deceit, are not sufficiently polished to avoid a conduct, not merely haughty, but indecent, to the representatives of christian sovereigns. The stupid and incorrigible ignorance of the Turk makes him treat his most favoured allies only as dependents; hence their ambassadors are received merely as deputies from tributary states. Every solemnity at which the foreign ministers assist in Turkey, occasions them a new species of humiliation, in which they are led from indignity to indignity, a spectacle to the stupid populace, who insult them with the coarsest language as they pass, and measure by this scale the greatness of their sovereign. The minister, who is to obtain an audience of the sultan, must present himself at the porte by four o'clock in the morning, where, after three or four tedious hours occupied in unmeaning ceremonies, he is informed that he may be permitted to see the resplendent face of the emperor of the world (*Gehan Padisha*) who among his other pompous titles bears that of *Alemum pennati*, *refuge of the*

the world; after which he is seated in a solitary corner of the divan, on the left, near the door, and the vizir sends to the sultan a short note called *talkish*, which is in substance, "that the infidel (*ghiaur*) of such a court, after having been sufficiently fed, and decently clothed, by the special grace of his sublime majesty, humbly supplicates leave to come and lick the dust beneath his illustrious throne." The talkishgee (or billet bearer) having returned with the answer of the emperor, the vizir and all his assistants rise with respect at the sight of the *sacred* writing (*khat-issherif*), and the ambassador is conducted to the audience, the ceremonies of which are too well known to need repetition. It may not, however, be amiss to notice, that the ministers and their suite, who go into the audience chamber, are invested with a *kaftan* or Turkish garment, which covers entirely their own dress, and reaches to the ground; and that some writers have absurdly represented this robe as a mark of honour shown to them; the truth is, that the Turks wishing them to appear in every thing as vassals of their empire, obliged them formerly to be habited entirely in the Turkish dress, except the head, which was covered with a hat, and to let their beards grow previously to admission into the sultan's presence, as their tributaries

tributaries, the Raguseans, do at the present day. This humiliating masquerade was abolished by means of the ambassadors of England and Holland, who acted as mediators in the treaty of Passarowitz (in 1718) and who took advantage of the dejected state of Turkey to establish the custom, that the European ministers should appear in their national dresses. The investiture of the kaftan is only a remains of the ancient usage, and is no more to be considered as an honour than the custom of wearing a hat at the audience, which is so far from being a matter of favour, that no European minister would be permitted to appear otherwise before the sultan or vizir. The Turks consider a European's pulling off his hat exactly as we do a man's pulling off his wig.

Particular instances of Turkish insolence, even to the representatives of their most powerful allies, are frequent and striking.

It is not fifty years since the grand vizir, Gin-Ali-Pasha, advised the divan to confine all the ambassadors to a small island near Constantinople, as lepers, or other infectious and unclean persons.

In 1756, the Sieur Du Val, drogoman to the French ambassador, Mr. de Vergennes, having announced the double bond of alliance and marriage, which had united his court

court with the house of Austria, received from the reis-effendi no other answer, than “ that *the sublime porte did not trouble itself about the union of one hog with another.*”

This marriage was not very agreeable news to the porte. A similar answer was given by the vizir Kiuperli to the French ambassador, Monsieur de la Haye, even in the brilliant æra of Louis XIV. : when that minister announced the splendid successes of his sovereign over the Spaniards, the vizir replied, with the barbarous insolence of an Ottoman satrap, “ *What care I whether the dog eat the hog, or the hog eat the dog, so that the interests of my sovereign prosper.*” The same vizir offered a more atrocious insult to the ancient ally of the porte, in the person of the son of Monsieur de la Haye, whom he caused to be thrown into a dungeon, after receiving publicly a blow, which broke one of his teeth. The sole cause of this outrage was the refusal of young De la Haye to explain a letter, which he had written in cypher to a friend at Venice.

It is not to be denied, that these degradations are frequently increased by the servility of the ministers themselves, who, by a manly resistance, might generally avoid such indignities ; for the barbarous insolence of the Turks, which is augmented by timidity,

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shrinks

shrinks into nothing before a resolute and dignified firmness. Such was the conduct of Monsieur de Ferioles, ambassador from France in the last century, who having taken his sword, either inadvertently or by design, to the audience of the grand seignior, not only refused to lay it aside, but gave a kick in the belly to an officer of the seraglio who attempted to take it from him by force; and finding that he was denied admission, thus armed, to the imperial audience, he returned with his suite to his house at Pera, after casting off the kaftan with which he had been invested. Yet this ambassador remained a dozen years longer at Constantinople, and transacted the business of his office with credit to himself and advantage to his country.

In 1766, the porte, wishing to show some mark of contempt to Poland, required the Polish envoy to appear at the audience of the vizir without a sabre; with this demand he refused to comply, declaring that the sabre was part of the Polish dress, and that as other ministers wore their swords, he would not appear at any audience in a manner contrary to the ancient etiquette. The consequence of his firmness was a compliance on the part of the vizir, who received him with all the usual ceremonies.

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In the last war, it was offered to some Turkish prisoners to serve as volunteers in the Russian flotilla against Sweden. On account of the pay, they accepted the offer with gladness, and behaved very well in several actions. On their return they were asked, in my presence, why they fought against their friends? their answer was, "*They are all hogs alike to us, whether they wear green or blue coats.*" The conformity of this answer with those of the great officers of the porte is truly striking.

It is not only in the formalities of the law, or in the etiquette of the court, that a barbarous insolence is displayed. The peasant, no less than the sultan, thinks it unworthy of him to dissemble the contempt which he bears towards all unbelievers. The very porter employed by a christian merchant will return his address with insult; and so degrading is any connection with infidels esteemed, that the janizaries employed as guards to a European have the general appellation of hog-drivers. No Turk of the lowest condition will rise from his seat to receive even an ambassador: to avoid this incivility in visits from foreign ministers, the vizir, or other person, comes into the audience chamber after the minister, and they both sit down at the same time.

As a proof of the contempt in which the Turks hold all foreigners, and their persuasion of their own superiority, which they even imagine is granted by other nations, I shall mention one or two anecdotes, of which I myself was a witness.

A Turkish prisoner of Ochakof, meeting at Cherson, where he had liberty to walk about the town without restraint, a Russian officer on a narrow pavement where only one person could pass, and the streets being exceedingly dirty (over the shoes) when he was within a few yards of him, the Turk, as if he had been in the streets of Constantinople, made a sign with his hand to the officer to descend from the pavement into the dirt. This appeared to the officer so exceedingly ridiculous, that he burst out into a fit of laughter, upon which the Turk abused him in the grossest language, such as is used to infidels in Turkey, and still insisted on the officer's going out of his way; he, not being a violent man, only beckoned to a soldier, who pushed him headlong off the pavement; to this the Turk submitted with silent resignation; but, unluckily for him, it was near the house of the governor, who had seen and heard the whole; he reprimanded the fellow for his insolence, and was threatened with the same treatment as the
Russian

Russian prisoners endure at Constantinople. The Turk's answer was, "*They are infidels, but I am a Mahomedan.*" This procured him a good drubbing, but he all the while hollowed out, that it was not lawful to strike a muselman; and as soon as he was set at liberty, he went away swearing vengeance against the first infidel he should meet when he got back to Turkey.

Some of the Turkish prisoners, who were saved from the fury of the Russian soldiers at the storming of Ochakof, were put the next day, out of compassion, promiscuously, into a warm subterraneous room among the Russian wounded. When afterwards an officer came to remove them, and distribute them to other different parts, some Turks stood up, and with an authoritative voice objected to the company being separated, except in such parties as they dictated. Had their language been that of entreaty they would have been listened to, for they wanted to put relations and acquaintances together. Nothing certainly is more cruel than in such circumstances to separate friends and relations when it can be avoided. Prince Potemkin, who was a very humane man, had ordered expressly to alleviate in this respect the hard destiny of the captives. They were reminded of their own savage conduct on simi-

lar occasions, where wives and daughters were separated from husbands and fathers, and how otherwise they were treated. The answer was, "*They were not Mahomedans.*" Several of the women said to the Turks, "LET THEM *do as they will, they are our masters now.*" In the two first words they expressed the same notion of their superiority as the men had done, but the remainder of the sentence is not uncharacteristic of Turkish women in general.

I have often been surprised, at different extremities of the empire, and from different classes of people, to receive answers in exactly the same words; for example, every Turk will tell you, vizir or porter, at Belgrade or Bagdad, that they gained the empire by the sabre, and by the sabre they will defend it; and centuries ago they said the same.

The enervation of mind, so common among the Turks, makes them at once superstitious and disinclined to bear up against the evil which advances with giant strides against their state. In the moment of popular apprehension, prodigies and predictions are easily forged; to these the credulous Turks eagerly listen; the lower orders are at the present day persuaded that the Russian standard will enter Constantinople through a certain

tain gate, said to be pointed out by an ancient prophecy, and the great men are so far from opposing this weakness by superior energy, that they look to the Asiatic shore as a secure retreat from the fury of the conquerors.

It seems a kind of moral paradox, that the same people, who are thus averse to taking the necessary precautions against evils of such magnitude, should nevertheless bear them, when they arrive, with a fortitude and resignation bordering upon apathy. The cause of this extraordinary conduct is to be found in the predestinarian dogmas of their religion operating upon their minds, disposed by habitual inactivity and incessant examples of the instability of fortune under their despotic government, to acquiescence in what appears to be the will of providence. An instance which occurred to me is too remarkable not to deserve notice.

The Turkish women and children (in number about 400) who were brought out of Ochakof, when the city was taken, to the head-quarters of the Russian army, were put all together the first night under a tent. No better accommodations could, under the pressure of the circumstances, be made for them, though it froze exceedingly hard, and they suffered dreadfully from cold and nakedness,

and many from wounds. As I spoke Turkish, I had the guard of that post, and the superintendence of them that night. I observed that there reigned a perfect silence among them, not one woman weeping or lamenting, at least loudly, though every one, perhaps, had lost a parent, a child, or a husband. They spoke with a calm and firm voice, and answered the questions I put to them apparently without agitation. I was astonished, and knew not whether to impute it to insensibility, to the habit of seeing and hearing of great vicissitudes of fortune, or to a patience and resignation inculcated by their religion; and at this day I am equally unable to account for it. One woman sat in a silent but remarkably melancholy posture, inasmuch that I was induced to offer her some consolation. I asked her why she did not take courage, and bear misfortunes like a muselman, as her companions did? She answered in these striking words, "*I have seen killed my father, my husband, and my children; I have only one child left.*" "Where is it?" I asked her with precipitation. "*Here!*" she calmly said, and pointed to a child by her side, which had just expired. I and those with me burst into tears, but she did not weep at all. I took that night into my warm subterranean room as many of these miserable

miserable women, perishing with cold, as it would contain; they staid with me twelve days, during all which time none of them either complained aloud, or showed any signs of excessive internal grief, but each told me her story (both old and young women) as of an indifferent person, without exclamation, without sighs, without tears.

Patriotism and public spirit are not to be sought for in the Turkish character. It is a spirit of ostentation and superstition which has led to the foundation of so many mosques, colleges, and caravanfaries, and in those who have lesser means, to the erection of numerous praying places for the use of travellers, called *namas-ghiah*, which point out the direction of Mecca, as well as of fountains, in the public roads and streets.

Having viewed the effects of the religion itself on the manners of the different ranks, it remains only to make some observations on the teachers of that religion, especially as, combining in Turkey the offices of priest and lawyer, they form a body of so much importance in the state.

The institutions of the clergy cannot but have great influence on the manners of a nation, and this influence is so much the greater, by how much the superstition on which

which it is founded is stupidly gross and universally prevalent. In Turkey, their political power, it has been seen, is firmly rooted; nor have they omitted any means of perpetuating it, which could be founded on the ignorance of the people. To found mosques, and endow them with treasures, is held to be one of the most meritorious works of a muselman; and further provision is made for the education of youth destined to the service of religion and law, by the establishment of *medressés* or colleges.

These medressés are usually endowed, at the time of founding a mosque, for the instruction of youth in the elements of science. They have *professors*, and they confer degrees, from the *sohta* or student to the *muderris* or principal of a college; but in fact this is a mere parade of terms. Children are admitted from the *mektebs* or common schools, where they learn their alphabet, to seminaries which, far from resembling the colleges of Eaton or Westminster, much less of Oxford or Cambridge, are scarcely equal to the lowest of our village schools. A professor, for the most part ignorant of the first principles of science, superintends the instruction; and it is supposed to be necessary for the members of the *ulema* to go through all the *rutbés*
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or degrees of office, both in the colleges and in the higher departments, which gradually lead to the station of *musti* or high-priest. These degrees are *sohta* or student, *muderris* or principal of the college, *naib* or judge's secretary, *kadi* or judge, *molah* or supreme judge, *kiabé-molahsi* or judge of Mecca, *istambol-effendi* or chief magistrate of Constantinople, and *kadilaskir* or military judge, of which there are two (one for Europe and one for Asia).

Intrigue and party connections, however, render it easy for the most ignorant and inexperienced to attain the rank of *musti*. Peyssonel asserts, that the pontificate has become a sort of heritage in some great families; but there are no families which may properly be called great; it is true there are a few families who have, by means of cabal, had some of the great offices of the ulema in their families for two or three generations. Though this corps has acquired a degree of stability, the members of it are far from resembling families in Europe, whose estates are hereditary. The sultan is continually detaching members of the *ulema*, by tempting them to accept offices of the porte, when they become his *kouls* or slaves, and he their heir at law. Nor is it only the sons of the ulema who enter into that corps by a regular progression through the offices: vizirs and
paschas

paschas often get their relations into the ulema, to secure an inheritance for their families after their death, of what they have given them in their life-times.

In the colleges, indeed, there is a pompous detail of sciences, which are professed to be taught, but which scarcely any one understands. The pupils are few; those of the law have the greatest pretension to learning, but even they are grossly ignorant. In their libraries, indeed, exist some valuable books, but they are unnoticed, except perhaps now and then by a man of a singularly studious turn.

As to the particular sciences, their jurisprudence and theology consists only of commentaries on the Koran; their astronomy is astrology, and their chemistry alchemy; of the history and geography of other countries they are perfectly ignorant. Metaphysics, rhetoric, and grammar, are indeed taught, but not upon rational principles. It is scarcely possible for an European not to over-rate their learning, by reading these details of institutions, and the names of sciences taught.

Were I, in short, to describe the learning of a musti, a kadi, or other regularly educated man of the law, in terms corresponding to his knowledge, when compared with English literature, the picture would be nearly

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as follows: he has, perhaps, read the Bible, and learnt enough of Greek to construe the Greek Testament, without, however, knowing the grammar of the language, or being able to read the other authors. He has not learnt Latin, or pursued any classical studies; but has merely consulted some old commentaries on select parts of the scriptures, and is either a thorough despiser of religion altogether, or a bigotted enemy to freedom of enquiry respecting any of its articles. Besides these, he has probably met with tales of ghosts, genii, and the like, all which he implicitly believes; he has met with some old fabulous historian, like Geoffrey of Monmouth, to whom also he gives credit; and as well in history, as in every other science, believes all the absurdities which the people at large receive, and which I shall hereafter delineate.

Of monks, which exist in Turkey, the great line of division is into those who reside in monasteries and those who have no fixed habitation; the former, called *mewliahs*, the latter *bektachis*, and each divided into different orders, with their peculiar customs and laws. The *mewliahs* are chiefly distinguished by the different ceremonies which they perform, some howling until they spit blood with the great exertions of their lungs, and others

others turning round to the sound of music until they become delirious with the motion. Some perform hocus-pocus tricks with knives, hot irons, &c.

Of the *bektashis*, some attach themselves to the service of the pashas, some to the different *artas* or companies of janisaries, and some are mere strollers, denominated *shehhs* (or *fantons*), who pretend to miracles, prophecies, &c. and, roaming about the country, commit the greatest enormities under the cloak of religion. These *shehhs* are more highly esteemed in Asia than in Europe, and most of all in Egypt. They pretend to be inspired, or frantic, and in those circumstances they seize on any woman in the streets in Egypt, and oblige her to submit to their embraces; indeed they never make any opposition. The people cover the couple with mats for the sake of decency, and this conduct is looked on with reverence; the woman, so far from being dishonoured, is complimented on the occasion, and even by her husband. In Constantinople this would not be permitted; the *shehh* would be privately put to death; but they never are seized with these frenzies in Europe; the utmost liberties they take there is to feign madness, and madmen (if they are not so bad as to be obliged to be confined) are considered as holy and inspired;

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in this state they often tell the truth with great freedom to the vizir, and sometimes even to the sultan; but as there is still some risk in that, they generally confine their liberties to those who have less power over their heads.

The toleration of the Mahomedans has been much vaunted. Historians have said: "*The prudent policy of the Mahomedans, the only enthusiasts that ever united the spirit of toleration with the zeal for making proselytes, offered the inhabitants of the countries they conquered, their religion and laws on condition that they paid the established capitation; and such as embraced the religion of the conquerors were entitled to all their privileges, &c.*" A simple statement of their conduct, as it appears proved by historical facts, will show whether their religion is tolerant or intolerant.

They pretend to the right of sovereignty over the whole earth, and to convert mankind to their religion.

Regardless of treaties, oaths, and all other obligations, without provocation they attack every country, when they see a prospect of success.

When they have conquered, they put to death all ages, ranks, and sex; or they spare a few, who are reduced to a state of slavery, and

annually obliged to ransom their lives; they are deprived of the rights of citizens of the country they were born in; their property is taken from them; they are marked with infamy, are debarred all friendly intercourse with the conquerors, and are continually persecuted and maltreated if they do not deny their God and become apostates; they take their children *, and bring them up in the Mahomedan faith, and make them fight against their fathers and their fathers religion; for many imaginary or real crimes, some of which, in Mahomedans, are not punishable at all, they have the option only of death or apostacy.

It has frequently been debated at the porte, to cut off all the Christians in the empire, who will not embrace Mahomedanism. Every honour and advantage is offered to those who change their religion, and every species of misery and humiliation attends them and their posterity who do not. Is this toleration?

* At present, however, they do not take children born in the country from their parents, to recruit the corps of janizaries. This custom ceased, when the sultans wished to weaken that melice.

CHAPTER V.

An Historical View of the Turkish Power.

IN the detail of causes which modify the character of nations, it will frequently be found necessary to trace back the pages of history, and pursue the chain of events through successive ages, presenting those striking events, whose operations continue when their records are scarcely to be found.

If the Ottoman empire is still vast and extensive; if it still attracts the fear or the admiration of its neighbours, and swells with stupid vanity its subjects, these effects are not surely to be attributed to the wisdom of its counsels, or to the valour of its forces, as they now exist, but arise from the splendor of its former exploits, and the merited celebrity of its ancient character. It is true that these exploits were disgraced by perfidy and treachery, and stained by violence and rapine; and while their crimes exhibited an energy in pursuit, and a brilliancy in success, the claim of the Turks to national pre-eminence stood undisputed; but in the enervating lap of sloth, the ferocious conqueror

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has degenerated into a torpid barbarian, whose only marks of former prowess are to be traced in the insolence of his present demeanour, and the fullen affectation of his fancied dignity.

The Ottoman power and name originated in *Othman* (according to the Arabic pronunciation, or *Osman* according to the Persian) who, about the year 1300, assumed the title of *sultan*, and established his empire at Prusa in Bithynia: but in order to take a view of the progress of the Turks, we must trace their history still higher up, and consider not only their own origin, but that of the Saracen kalifs, whom they supplanted.

The vast extent of continent, which, spreading from the eastern parts of Europe and the north of Africa, comprehends the greater part of Asia, has been the source of many populous nations, and the seat of many extensive empires, which have arisen with a rapidity only to fall as quickly into ruins. In the early history of these countries, new irruptions and new conquerors continually succeeded each other, and the power of founding an empire seems seldom to have been attended with the skill requisite for maintaining it. Some, however, among the numerous hordes which then successively prevailed, arose to a greater height, and established a more lasting name than others.

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The different branches of Tartars (or Tatars) from the north, and the Arabians from the south, carried their arms over extensive regions, and founded great and permanent empires.

It will not here be requisite to follow the victorious prophet Mahomed, who, by the fascination of his religion, as much as by the terror of his sword, subjected so many nations; suffice it to say, that his empire, so founded, was, within 200 years after his death, extended by his successors, the kalifs or commanders of the faithful, over the north of Africa and great part of Asia; besides which they had made great progress in the south of Europe, having overrun almost all Spain, and entered Sicily, Italy, and France. The seat of their government was established at Bagdad, whence issued the mandates of their spiritual despotism over this wide extent of territory; but as an empire so hastily raised, and so unconnected in its parts, was not easily held together, and as the commander of the faithful with the increase of power acquired also habits of luxury ill adapted to the art of governing, their power was soon destined to fall under the sword of more hardy competitors.

Such competitors were found in the Tartar (more properly Tatar) nations, by whom

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they

they were surrounded. The most ancient records of this part of the world describe the Scythian or Tatar tribes as the invaders of their less ferocious neighbours. Their name has been very generally applied to the inhabitants of those vast deserts and mountains spreading from China to the Danube, and who, whether of similar or different origin, have at various times poured out their swarms on all the surrounding countries. The Turkmen, or Turks, were a tribe of these Tatars, whose original seat was beyond the Caspian sea, from whence, incited by the desire of plunder, they descended about the year 800, and seized upon Armenia, from them called Turcomania.

At this time the Persian empire was ruled by governors, who were nominally subject to the Saracen kalifs, but Mahmud, the Gaznevide, one of these governors, having extended his empire * from Transoxiana to Isfahan, and from the Caspian sea to the Indus, was invested by the kalif with the title of sultan. Upon the succession of his son Massud † to this dignity, a body of Turks under Tongrul Beg (known in some of our histories by the name of Tangrolipix) either invited by the Persians as auxiliaries, or at-

* A. D. 997.

† A. 1038.

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tacking them as invaders (for the historical accounts differ) obtained possession of that kingdom. It is supposed to be about this time that the Turks embraced the religion of Mahomed, and the *kalif* having called them to his assistance against the rebellious *emirs*, constituted the victorious Tongrul *temporal lieutenant of the commander of the faithful* *. From this dignity the step was short to the attainment of the whole power of the *kalifat*, to which a descendant of Gengis-khan finally put an end, in the person of the *kalif* Mustazem †.

Meanwhile new opponents were rising against the Turks, who, scarce settled in their new conquests, were obliged to yield them to fresh hordes of invaders. The more northern Tatars pressing upon the Turks, as one swarm of those barbarians incessantly protruded another, harassed them in their newly acquired Persian empire, and finally obliged them to relinquish it in pursuit of fresh conquests to the south. It was about the year 1200 that the Turks yielded the kingdom of Persia to the Tatars; but previously to this they had themselves extended their arms over the greater part of Asia Minor, whither they now retreated, and fixed the seat of their empire at Iconium, in Ci-

* A. D. 1055.

† A. D. 1239.

licia, since Karamania. Here too they were pressed by the Tatars, and it was at this time that the European mania of the crusades having a second time broken out, the Turks found themselves obliged to cede the whole of Palestine to the Christians*. It was not long before they regained this country, taking Jerusalem†, and putting to the sword, without distinction or mercy, man, woman, and child.

The government which the celebrated Salah-uddin, (or Saladin) had established, was also about this time overthrown by the Mamluks (who retained the independent possession of that country till the beginning of the 16th century) and various other contests arising in the Turkish empire, it fell for a time into small independent sovereignties, and remained without a head until the rise of Othman, who first assumed the name of sultan, and from whom therefore our account of the Ottoman race properly begins.

Before we proceed to an historical detail of the acts of the several sultans, I shall briefly notice the causes of the former greatness of the Turks; which may be reduced to the following heads:

1st. Their constant thirst after universal

* A. D. 1229.

† A. D. 1234.

monarchy,

monarchy, looking on the whole world as their property; and the propagation of their religion, excited by spiritual as well as temporal motives, never neglecting to seize on an advantage, as they were unrestrained by any scruples of injustice, or of breach of faith, oaths, or treaties.

2dly. Their concord in matters of religion and state.

3dly. Their personal courage in war, still increased by success, and by the enthusiasm of religion.

4thly. Their general devotion to their sovereign, and the obedience of the soldiery and people to their superiors and commanders, to a degree hitherto unknown in history.

5thly. Their strict observance of their ancient military discipline, their military education, and the early acquaintance with arms, not of the soldiery only, but of the whole people.

6thly. Their great temperance, and consequent health and vigour of body.

7thly. The plunder of their enemies, the great rewards attending extraordinary valour, the crown of martyrdom waiting for those who died in battle, and the road of honour and power being open to every common soldier, who might hope to become grand

vizir, and even to be allied to his sovereign.

8thly. The severe and never failing instantaneous punishment inflicted on disobedience, disloyalty, disorder, or cowardice.

9thly. The military genius of their sovereigns, who always were at the head of their armies, and their power unrestrained either by civil or religious laws.

10thly. Their great resources for recruiting their armies, every Mahomedan thinking himself obliged, when called upon, to take the field, at the same time that they had a continual supply of troops in the children of their Christian captives, whom they educated in the Mahomedan religion, and trained to the use of arms.

Hence it is very easy to account for the wide extent of their victories; nor ought we to be astonished, that they conquered the whole dominions of the kalifs, the Greek empire, Macedonia, Epirus, Peloponnesus, Servia, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Syria, Palestine, Egypt, &c. particularly when we recollect that their opponents were mostly very inferior to them in all the requisites for military excellence.

In those barbarous ages, when the Christian states, governed by courtiers, priests,

or women, displayed no traces of intellectual energy; when their feudal government, their ignorance of political œconomy, and their want of system in financial and military arrangements, rendered them individually weak and contemptible; and when extended views of general politics, of mutual alliances, and of a balance of power, being unknown, they could not be consolidated into one powerful confederacy; it was then that the Turks exhibited a superior brilliancy of character, and built up a mighty and extensive empire. Their civil and military institutions were far superior to those of their cotemporaries; their temperament of mind and body, naturally ardent, was inflamed by the precepts of a sanguinary religion, which incited them to conquest by the most flattering promises of sensual gratification; and they were led against enemies they despised by chiefs of singular skill, bravery, and ambition. The Ottoman empire, governed by a succession of great men, from Othman I. to Mahmoud IV. (with scarcely a single exception) thus obtained an eminent reputation, whilst it widely extended the limits of its territory.

It must be owned that their fame, however great as conquerors, has never entitled them to any other homage, has never ranked them among the benefactors or instructors of mankind;

mankind; they scarcely deserve even to be reckoned among the species. Intent upon victory, *they have stopt at no means to prosecute their plan of universal monarchy; violating every principle of justice and national faith; attacking their neighbours without provocation, without claim, without even alledging a reason for their conduct; massacring the vanquished without pity, or sparing their lives only to force them to a slavery the most degrading; seizing on their wives and daughters, selling or dishonouring them, regardless of the domestic misery of the unhappy sufferers.*

We have seen, in other countries, particular reigns or epochas marked with actions as disgraceful; but that period or that reign was ever beheld by the nation itself, at least by the virtuous part of it, with the indignation it deserved; *but here is a system of wickedness and abomination transferred from the origin of the nation to its posterity to this very day, confirmed by their religion, and approved by those who call themselves the priests of God.* Wherever the Turks have established their dominion, science and commerce, the comforts and the knowledge of mankind, have alike decayed. Not only have they exemplified barbarism and intolerance in their own conduct, but they have extinguished the flame of genius and knowledge in others, breaking
and

and defacing even the monuments of ancient art with a kind of savage exultation, and proving themselves the real scourges of the human race.

We now proceed to an historical survey of the usurpations of their sovereigns, beginning with

OTHMAN I.

It was by degrees that this prince (a descendent of the celebrated Gengis-Khan) reduced under his subjection the different toparchies, or petty sovereignties, into which the Turkman empire of Karamania had fallen. When he first assumed the title of sultan, he possessed the sovereignty of a small district, the capital of which was *Kara-chisar*. Here he established his government, and, pursuing his conquests, took *Prusa* in Bithynia, and made it the seat of the Ottoman empire or kingdom (for not till the taking of Constantinople did the sultans assume the title of emperor) which now extended over the greatest part of Asia Minor. He died in 1328, and was succeeded by

ORKHAN.

This prince having taken Niké by surprise, and made slaves of all its inhabitants, removed his court thither. When he had extended

tended his conquests to the Hellespont, his ambition and zeal to propagate Mahomedanism would not suffer him to stop there; he crossed it, and took Gallipoli. He died in 1359, having been a most unjust and inveterate enemy to the Christians.

AMURAT I.

Succeeded to his predecessor's projects of usurpation of the country, and extirpation of the religion of the Christians.

He took Adrianople in 1362, and made it the seat of his empire, as most conveniently seated to extend his conquests on the Christians. Amurat, as has been before observed, formed the celebrated body of soldiers called *yenikari* (or janisaries) which afterwards became the strength of the Turkish army. He took Servia, and its capital Nissa, and Apollonia near Mount Athos. Having a quarrel with the sultan of Karamania, he subdued his country, but did not dethrone him, as he was his son in law, but thus laid the foundation of the extensive empire of the Ottomans in Asia.

Amurat was stabbed, in 1390, by a wounded Christian soldier, after he had gained a great battle, in which he gave no pardon, and *massacred afterwards an incredible number of Christians*. Ever since this event, all Christian

tian ambassadors and their suite, admitted to the sultan's presence, are held by both their arms by two chamberlains during the time they are in the audience room. He subdued a great part of Thrace, (or Romania) leaving to the Greek emperor little more than the city of Constantinople.

BAYAZET I.

On his accession to the throne he immediately *strangled his younger brother Jacob*. This was the first instance of the sanguinary custom, afterwards so frequent, of putting to death princes of the royal blood.

In the first year of his reign he took Cratova in Servia, which was yielded to him on condition that the Christian inhabitants should depart with life and liberty; but he sent soldiers after them, and *murdered them all without mercy*. He entered into Bosnia, and brought away all the inhabitants whom he judged useful, and made slaves of them. He crossed the Danube (the first time the Turks passed it) and committed horrid cruelties in Walachia, from which he afterwards exacted a yearly tribute. He besieged Constantinople twice, and had nearly taken it; but the great Tamerlane came to its relief, and overcame Bayazet in the greatest battle that was ever fought. Being taken prisoner,
he

he was put into an iron cage (as he told Tamerlane he would have done by him had he been his prisoner) against the bars of which he beat out his brains in 1399. Nature has not produced many more cruel and merciless tyrants, nor ever a more inveterate enemy to Christians, or to all countries he thought he could conquer. The Turks were now arrived at the height of cruelty, treachery, and thirst of conquest.

MAHOMET I.

Soon after his accession he killed his brothers; some of them not till after a long civil war. He regained all his father had lost, but had not time to augment it much, as he died in 1422.

AMURAT II.

Eldest son of Mahomet. He strangled his brother Mustafa. In 1432, he took Thessalonica (or Salonica) and put men, women, and children to the sword, except those reserved for lust or hard labour. The cruelties here committed cannot be described, any more than the horrid ravages which he committed in Hungary. He invaded and subdued Servia (contrary to his league with the prince of it, his father-in-law) destroying all before him. He entered into Transilvania,
* and

and killed men, women, and children, as far as he penetrated; he did the same in Walachia, and burnt the villages and towns; all kinds of tortures and cruelty, in its most dreadful shape, was practised on the Christians. The famous Scanderbeg, a native of Epirus, greatly checked him.

In 1445, Amurat took Peloponnesus and all Greece; he sacrificed 600 prisoners to the soul of his father, ravaged the country, and destroyed every thing pleasant, beautiful, and grand, and repeated his accustomed cruelties. He greatly enlarged the Turkish dominions, augmented the body of janizaries, and made them more formidable than they had been before. This cruel tyrant and invader of Christian states died of age, and grief at his ill success against Scanderbeg, in August 1450; he was, however, more faithful in observing treaties than any of his predecessors, or even than his opponent the king of Hungary; but he never made treaties but in distress, and when he despaired of conquering.

MAHOMET II.

The greatest warrior of all the Turkish sultans, and the greatest monster that ever sat on the throne of the Ottomans, or any other throne. Mahomet II. eldest son of the late Amurat,

Amurat, began his infamous reign by the murder of his two brothers. His next act was to offer a league with the emperor of Constantinople and the despot of Servia, his grandfather by the mother's side, and at the same time to make preparation for the siege of Constantinople. He never kept his word, his promises, his leagues, or even his most solemn oaths on the Koran, longer than suited his purpose. He was a monster of perfidy, of cruelty, and injustice, and he is "*the glory of the annals of the Ottoman race.*"

He took Constantinople the 29th of May, 1453. "The emperor was, happily for him, killed in defending it. The barbarians entered the city, howling more horribly than the beasts of the forest with thirst of blood; they slew defenceless men, women, and children, by thousands, without the least respect to dignity or beauty, to age or youth, to sex or condition. All who could fled to the church of St. Sophia, hoping that the sacredness of the place would inspire respect for the duties of man, of whatever religion he be; they were there all slain, except a very few, reserved for purposes worse than death; and the church was converted into a stable. Every common soldier had permission, for three days, to massacre, to violate, and to pillage without restraint. Riches were

were worse than poverty, and beauty worse than deformity. A hundred thousand barbarians satisfied their avarice, their savage cruelty, and their brutal lust, or all. No tongue can describe their misery. Three long days and three long nights the air was shaken with their cries. The sultan heard it in his camp, and it lulled him to sleep. The dogs ran into the fields howling with compassion, or leaped into the sea.

“ After three days, the few Christians, spared for the cruel purposes of the conquerors, were driven like hogs into the fields. The sultan entered the city; his horse was stopped sometimes by heaps of the slaughtered, and sometimes waded through pools of blood. He made in the holy temple of St. Sophia a sumptuous feast for his pashas and officers, and as he sat banquetting he caused to be killed, for his diversion and that of his guests, great numbers of his prisoners of the first distinction for birth, eminence, and learning, among whom were many of the late emperor's relations; and these feasts he repeated daily till he had destroyed all the Grecian nobility, priests, and persons of learning or note, who had fallen into his hands, of both sexes and all ages. Many Venetian senators, and Genoese nobles, and rich merchants, were

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among

among the prisoners; they were in like manner murdered for his diversion while he was feasting, and to entertain his court."

Thus ended the Greek empire!

Thus was founded the seat of the Turkish empire, which Christian princes have since thought it justice to defend from the attacks of other Christian princes, and from the struggles of the wretched remainder of an injured and unhappy people, ever since living in miserable bondage!

Unprovoked, the Turks attacked them, and never ceased till they had usurped the throne of their empire, as they had done those of so many other states and kingdoms, murdering millions in cold blood, and by tortures of the most unheard of barbarity.

He took Servia, and the empire of Trapizonde, putting all the family of the emperor to death. After triumphing over the Venetians, he took Otranto in Italy, and murdered all the inhabitants, according to the Turkish custom, except a few he chose out to make slaves of.

He died (by poison as supposed) in the year 1481, after having put to death above 800,000 Christians of both sexes.

BAYAZET

BAYAZET II.

Eldest son of the late sultan, had a long civil war to sustain against his brothers, whom he had not an opportunity of seizing and putting to death when he succeeded to the throne. He formed a project of putting to death the whole corps of janizaries, but, as it was discovered, it became impracticable. He attacked without provocation the Venetians, and committed horrid massacres: he also attacked the Egyptians. After a troublesome reign, he was deposed by his son, and poisoned, in 1512.

SELIM I.

The greatest monster of this monstrous race. After poisoning his father, he strangled his elder brother, and murdered his five sons; he caught another brother, and strangled him also. He made great conquests over the Persians, and in Asia, and took Cairo after a hard struggle with the Mamaluks. After a bloody reign, he died a lamentable death of a cancer in his reins, as he was planning an attack on Italy and Rhodes, in September 1520. He commanded his son to turn his arms against the Christians, and left him many bloody precepts.

SOLIMAN II.

Having freed himself from apprehension on the side of Persia and Egypt, he directed his attempts against the Christians, and soon took Rhodes from the knights of St. John, who had held it for two hundred years. The sentiments of the Turks may be gathered from his speeches to the grand master, after he had signed, and sworn to observe, the capitulation.

“Although I might *justly* and *worthily*
 “infringe the articles I have prescribed
 “with such an enemy (*that is, a Christian*)
 “from whose deserved punishment *neither*
 “*faith nor oath ought to stay* a most just con-
 “queror; yet I have determined to be gra-
 “cious and liberal to thee if thou wilt, by
 “well-doings, amend thy life, and I will
 “give thee great preferment in my service,”
 &c. The grand master in a noble speech
 answered, “that he preferred death;” which
 so astonished Soliman, that he promised to
 observe the articles of the capitulation. On
 the grand master’s departure from Rhodes,
 Soliman told him, “What I have done unto
 “thee was not for hatred, but desire of so-
 “vereignty.”—“I need not war for riches”
 (in that he spoke not truth, as the Turkish
 history proves by facts) “but for honour,
 “fame,

"fame, and immortality, and the extension
"of my empire; for it is the property of a
"sovereign, royally descended, by strong hand
"to take from others, and to invade others,
"not from a covetous mind, but from the
"honourable desire of rule and sovereignty;
"for whilst my neighbour standeth I count
"it just by force of arms to remove him."

He then attacked Hungary, took Buda, and murdered the garrison, which had capitulated. He entered into Austria with fire and sword: "*The old were slain, the young led into captivity, women ravished before their husband's faces, and then slain with their children, infants ript out of their mother's wombs, others taken from their breasts, cut in pieces, or thrust upon pointed stakes, and other incredible cruelties.*" He laid siege to Vienna, but finding a most desperate resistance raised the siege, and before he withdrew massacred all his prisoners, men, women, and children. This siege cost him 80,000 men. He made John king of Hungary tributary to him, entered again into Austria, and repeated his cruelties, killing at one time 4,000 prisoners. He took, in 1534, Bagdad, all Assyria, and Mesopotamia, formerly separate kingdoms, but then belonging to Persia. He sent 200,000 men into Macedonia, to be transported into Italy, and actually landed a

part of this army in Apulia, and took Castrum. Turning his forces, however, from Italy against the Venetians, he besieged Corfu, but not succeeding, he carried away 16,000 young people of the island into perpetual slavery, yet made other conquests on them during a long war. He again came to Buda, and converted Hungary into a Turkish province, making an alliance with the French to attack the Emperor. He made a fruitless attempt on Malta, but carried off from Goza 6,300 young people into slavery. The Turks then attacked and took Tripoly, belonging to the order of Malta, but did not keep the capitulations, as they said *no faith was to be kept with dogs*. Ali Pasha of Buda invaded Upper Hungary, and took Temeswar, and, *contrary to the capitulation, murdered the garrison*.

Soliman, being suspicious of his son Mustafa, caused him to be strangled in his presence, but afterwards found he was innocent; he strangled also Mustafa's son. Chihangar, another son of Soliman, killed himself in despair. He caused a third son Bayazet, together with five of his children, to be strangled. He sent a fleet and army against Malta, attacked it a second time, and took the fort of St. Elmo; but meeting with great loss raised the siege. In short, after doing in various
parts

parts of the world much mischief to the Christians, and committing every where great cruelties, he died of a bloody flux, the 4th of September, 1566.

SELIM II.

Set the ruinous example to his successors of not going himself to the wars, but carried them on by his lieutenants. He soon sought a pretence to declare war against the Venetians, who, in this bloody contest, lost Cyprus and a part of Dalmatia. He sent an army into Moldavia against the waywode. At last a peace was made, to which the Turks swore *seven times*; yet the waywode was murdered by the pasha, unmindful of his oaths. They then overran all Moldavia, putting all the nobility, and many thousands of others, to the sword; and all Walachia fell into the hands of the Turks, in 1574. The 9th of December this same year Selim died.

AMURAT III.

Eldest son of the late sultan, whose death was concealed, as was usual, till the new sultan was arrived. The janizaries, who had a custom in interregnums to plunder and even massacre their fellow-citizens, Christians and Jews, were disappointed and murmured; he was obliged to give them large sums to

appease them. He, on his accession, caused five of his brethren to be strangled in his presence. Though he was of a peaceful temper, he continued his father's wars, because he feared to be thought to degenerate from the Ottoman princes, but went not himself into the field. In October 1575, he penetrated into Russia and Poland, and made great slaughter. It was debated in the divan, whether the league with the Christians or Persians should be broken; for they hold it lawful, when it is the interest of the empire, to break all oaths and treaties with those of a different faith with themselves. It was determined to make war against Persia. The event of this war was favourable to him. It was attended with their usual cruelties. The janizaries having now lost their submission, and in a great part their discipline, began to kill their commanders whenever they were dissatisfied with them. Amurat had permitted their children to be enrolled in their corps. He made war on the emperor of Germany, and, as usual, caused much desolation. He died the 18th of January 1595.

MAHOMED III.

Eldest son of the late sultan. He put to death all his brothers (in number nineteen) and ten of his father's wives, whom he supposed might

might be with child. The janizaries, notwithstanding the new sultan's presence, plundered the city, and had nearly killed their sultan and plundered the palace. He carried on his wars against the German emperor by his pashas, but not being successful, he went himself to Buda with 200,000 men, and having taken Agria, returned to Constantinople. This war was carried on with various success, but with great fury. When the Turks took Alba-regalis, by capitulation, the Christians were to march out in safety with their arms, but the Turks put them all to death, as well inhabitants as 3,000 soldiers. The insolence of the janizaries became very great, and they were continually mutinying and fighting with the other soldiers. The pashas in many provinces rebelled, and the sultan through fear made peace with them, pardoned them, and confirmed them in their offices; but he put to death other pashas who were in his power, which caused those who had any thing to apprehend to rebel again. He put to death his own son and his son's mother, on suspicion of a design to dethrone him. The janizaries attempted to depose him. Whilst treating with the emperor of Germany for peace, the sultan died at Constantinople, in January 1604.

ACHMET

ACHMET I.

The second son (the eldest having been strangled by his father) succeeded to the throne at the age of fifteen. The Turks were not earnest with the negotiation for peace, but wanted to deceive and fall on the Germans; the war therefore continued, but at length peace was concluded in 1607. There was nothing very remarkable in his other wars with different nations. He died 15th November 1617*.

MUSTAFA I.

The brother of the late sultan, who had been preserved, but with such secrecy that it was scarcely known whether he was alive or dead. During his brother's reign, the council had determined he should be preserved, as Achmet was but fifteen years old, and there were only these two heirs to the throne, but that he should be kept in close confinement. Mus-

* In his 23d year, he beat his sultana, who was mother of a daughter, and wounded and trod on her, because she had strangled one of his sisters slaves, of whom he had become enamoured. The sultana, having heard of this amour, sent for her, strangled her, and put her clothes on one of her own slaves, whom she sent to the sultan, and on her return strangled her also, as she had done many others, who appeared to be with child of the sultan.—*This anecdote shews the despotism of this government, even among the women of the seraglio.*

tafa,

tafa, being twenty-five years of age, was drawn out of a cell, and proclaimed sultan. He became uncommonly cruel; he caused young Osman, eldest son of Achmet, to be confined under a strong guard, and put to death the other sons of Achmet. He offered many indignities to the Christian ambassadors—indeed, in the last reign, the Europeans in Constantinople were all ordered to be slain, but the vizir and other great officers dissuaded the sultan from this step. When Achmet had children of his own, it was determined to put Mustafa, his brother, to death; and though it was concluded in the council of the divan, yet Achmet was diverted from it by omens.

When an emperor mounted the throne, it was usual to put to death his brothers and nephews; but when he had children grown up, he entrusted them with governments and the command of armies; this custom had now ceased. When the father died, the vizir kept his death, if possible, secret till the new sultan arrived, who generally contrived to seize his brothers and put them to death; sometimes they fled, but they were generally caught sooner or later, and put to death. It is for this reason, that the sultan always goes to some mosque in the city to public prayers every Friday, or shows himself in public, for otherwise the people

people imagine he is dead, and make a rebellion.

When the late sultan, Achmet, found death approach, his counsellors advised him to settle the succession. His own children were young. He sent for his brother, and told him his resolution of making choice of him to succeed to the throne, which much amazed him, as the empire belonged to his own son. He recommended to him the children he had by the sultana, entreating him to use them as he had done him, leaving the children he had by concubines to his discretion.

Mustafa, by his cruelties, became so odious, that the grand-vizir, who was gone against the Persians, returned with his army, deposed him, not having reigned a year, and sent him to his prison again, and placed Osman on the throne.

OSMAN I.

He sent a fleet into the Mediterranean, landed at Manfredonia, and carried off 1,600 slaves. He made war against Poland, and marched himself at the head of 300,000 men, with 300 field pieces and 100 double cannon, but he had no success, and was reduced to sue for peace.

Contrary to the will and advice of his ministers, the sultan married, without any pomp,

pomp, the grandchild of a sultana who had been married to a pasha, only for her beauty, which was ill-interpreted, his ancestors of late years not usually taking wives, especially of a Turkish race, on account of their relations.

The sultan, who had been discontented with the janizaries ever since his disgrace in Poland, meditated revenge against them, and the abolition of a corps now grown too formidable, mutinous, and meddling with the government, and having lost their ancient discipline and subordination. The janizaries had, contrary to their institution, married, and entered into trades; their children were also janizaries, a privilege conceded them in a former reign, and they were more pleased to stay at home, than to face the dangers of a foreign campaign. His vizir promised to provide him a new soldiery of the Kurds (who inhabit the mountains between Smyrna and Mount Lebanon,) 40,000 of whom were to be enrolled as his body guards; that the pashas of the provinces should train up to arms a certain number of the inhabitants, to be ready to serve in foreign wars, and to constitute a greater army than any of his predecessors, and enable him to make greater conquests at far less expence. It was agreed between the sultan and vizir, that the former should

should go into Asia on some pretence, as that of going to visit Mecca, or to reduce Sidon, which had rebelled; but the sultan was not cautious enough in his preparations, melting metals, conveying away all his treasures, and using imprudent expressions and threats to the janizaries. In the mean time the vizir had provided 20,000 men in Asia to be depended upon, besides the emir of Sidon, whom he had gained, under pretence of a war against Persia. At Damascus, the sultan was to cut off all his guards, and stay there till he had regulated his new army, then to return to Constantinople, and root out the janizaries, spahies, tamariots, and all their officers, to settle a new government, and change the name of the city. He then hoped to conquer all Christendom, in the mean time he was to live in friendship with all powers.

Certainly this was a well-grounded design, and the reformation of the army had become necessary; the empire languished under insolent and lazy slaves, and the sultan found himself dependent on the janizaries for life or death, peace or war. A civil contest, however, would have been produced; for the soldiery in Europe would have set up another sultan; but he had all the treasure, and if he succeeded, he would have saved an immense expence;

expence; for the janizaries consumed all the revenues of the empire.

The soldiery, however, opposed the departure of the sultan, and threatened to set up another in his place. They ran to the seraglio, but without arms, and demanded that he should remain in the city of Constantinople; that he should deliver up the vizir and other great officers accused by them of conspiring against the state. The sultan consented not to go to Asia, but refused to deliver up those whom they demanded, and persuaded them to stay till Saturday, which was council day—this happened on Wednesday, 7th May, 1622. The next day the tumult began again, and the vizir advised the sultan to go to Asia in his own boats, but he refused. The vizir appeared to appease them, but they cut him in pieces. The emperor then endeavoured to get over to Asia, but not succeeding, he hid himself in a private place. The rebels demanded their sultan and more sacrifices, and said they must have a sultan, and if he would not appear, they would make another: having waited some time, they resolved to enter the palace, but took a solemn oath not to plunder it; they there killed the kishlar-aga, and not finding sultan Osman, they demanded Mustafa, who had been dethroned; they found

found him in a vault, where Osman had put him, with two negro women. They carried Mustafa to the old seraglio, and there left him; Osman came out after their departure, and having consulted with some of his friends, it was resolved to send to the women of the old seraglio to put Mustafa to death; but he had a party among these women, and the noise alarmed the guard, who rescued him. The next day the sultan went to the college of the janizaries, and by intreaties had nearly prevailed, but for the indiscretion of the janizary aga, who, being too zealous for him, began to threaten the janizaries, who thereupon slew him and others who came with Osman. Him they carried to the new sultan, who only nodded consent to what they proposed, and he was sent as a prisoner to the Seven Towers. The new vizir made by Mustafa knew the storm might pass over if Osman lived; a consultation therefore was held by the chief officers, and it was determined to search how many of the blood royal were left alive, that if two remained Osman should be put to death. Two of his brothers were found; one about twelve the other about seven years of age, and the vizir then went with executioners to the prison, and strangled Osman. The soldiers, who did not intend to go so far, soon repented. The pasha of Erzerun

zerün broke out in open rebellion, and declared himself the avenger of his prince's blood.

MUSTAFA I. (*re-enthroned.*)

On Saturday, 1st June 1622, the capi-aga or major-domo having received a secret order to remove the brothers of the late sultan Osman from their lodgings, and in the night to strangle them; as he was performing his command, aided with a few of his executioners to carry away the princes, they cried out; the pages running to the noise, and encouraged by the kishlar-agá, who had some suspicion, without further examination killed the capi-agá, almost every order of men having now risen against their own chief. That night they sent secretly to the janizaries and spahies. The soldiers returned in fury to the court in favour of the pages, and demanded justice against those who thus would have made an end of the Ottoman race, only this Mustafa being left alive, who was so holy a saint that he would not people the world with sinners, nor endure any woman near him. The innocent sultan protested he knew nothing of the matter; and that if such command was procured, it was obtained fraudulently. He was easily believed himself, but his mother (another Livia) and Daout M Pasha,

Pascha, who had married her daughter, were vehemently suspected. This tumult was however appeased. The state of the empire was deplorable: the sovereign an idiot, the next heir a child, and all the great men and soldiers either destroyed, or mutinous, or corrupted.

The Persians seized this opportunity to recover the province and city of Bagdad. Had the Christian princes opened their eyes, they might also have regained much that they had lost.

The vizir took occasion to blame the janizar-aga, and to have him exiled to be strangled, and some other paschas, to make room for deposing Mustafa, and placing on the throne Murat, a child and brother of Osman's, many being of his party. The janizaries rose and rescued their aga. A new faction now arose between the reigning sultan Mustafa and Murat. No security was left for any man; the rebellious soldiers had the government in their hands. The vizir retired. The soldiers adhered to the sultan of their own creating; but the lawyers and churchmen (the ulema) planned a revolution, and affirmed publicly, that the constitution was subverted, the foundation of the state dissolved, the sultan unlawful, and all those who adhered to him guilty of heresy, in having despised the institution of Mahomed.

This

This spread all over the empire by correspondence with their own body, and the whole nation was divided in sentiment.

The soldiers still continued in their mutinous disposition even in Constantinople, and their insolence grew to such a height, that going in troops to the court, they demanded all offices of profit, insisted on being stewards to the revenues of the mosques, (which are great) demanded the farms of the customs, and committed insufferable outrages. The vizir durst deny them nothing; they drank wine in the streets, contrary to their law, and stood in companies in the open day, exacting money of all Christians who passed, to pay for their wine, and stabbed without mercy those who refused to submit to their extortions. None durst meddle with men who had killed their own sovereign. At Smyrna the janizaries assaulted the Christian consuls, and took money from them; nor did they without difficulty escape with their lives. Rebellion appeared in several provinces. The treasures were exhausted by the immense sums given to the janizaries at each new accession to the throne, and by the burden of several expensive wars.

The spahies demanded justice for the death of the late sultan, and the punishment of the vizir who had murdered him, but who had

since abdicated that office. The janizaries protected him, but at length consented to his punishment, and he was carried to the same chamber where the sultan was strangled, and there met his fate; he even pointed out the corner where the regicide was performed, and desired to die there, which was granted.

On 20th January, 1622, a peace with Poland was signed by the mediation of the English ambassador.

The soldiers now openly plundered people when they wanted money, so that it was thought prudent to remove the royal mint into the seraglio, and coin all the metal they could find to satisfy the soldiery.

The pasha of Erzerun, with some others, raised a great army, and marched towards Constantinople, declaring his intention to reduce the janizaries of the city to obedience and discipline; to punish those who had murdered the late sultan Osman, and to settle a new sultan lawfully, who should be able to govern; asserting at the same time that Mustafa was an idiot, governed by a woman and by his vizir. The army at Constantinople refused to march against the pasha of Erzerun, and the empire was from one end to the other in confusion.

The chief cause of this evil was, that their three last emperors had not gone into the field

field themselves, excepting once, when Mahomet III. for the maintenance of his credit with the soldiery, went to Hungary, and took Agria. The people and ministers were desirous of deposing Mustafa, and placing on the throne Murat, brother of Osman; but they feared that the vizir, who was in effect emperor, assisted by the janizaries, would maintain the sovereign they had placed on the throne; they also feared the low state of the finances, which would not allow of giving the usual sums to the janizaries at the accession of a new sultan; but the report that the pasha of Erzerun had declared himself the avenger of the late sultan, had put to death all the janizaries that fell in his hands, with their wives and children; that he was advancing with an army; and that the soldiers sent against him had disbanded, struck them with such fear, that they joined the civil power to depose Mustafa, and place Amurat on the throne, and consented to relinquish their usual donations on a sultan's mounting the throne. Mustafa was therefore re-conducted quietly to his prison, and

SULTAN AMURAT IV. (or MURAT)

In 1623, ascended the throne, being only fourteen years of age. The vizir sent against the pasha of Erzerun could or would do nothing; for the beglarbeg of Anatolia had joined the pasha and the spahies were on his side.

The Cossaks at this period entered the Bosphorus with 150 small ships and boats, and destroyed Buyukderé and Yenikoi, within about twelve or fifteen miles of Constantinople, on the European, and Stania on the Asiatic side. They returned the next night quietly, having alarmed the capital. The pasha of Erzerun and the king of Persia ravaged the countries in Asia. Algiers and Tunis began to cast off their allegiance to the porte, and to become independent states. The pasha of Erzerun, however, was pardoned, and admitted to another pashelik, that of Bosnia; for the porte thought it dangerous to bring matters to the utmost extremity, so low was it fallen; besides, they did not wish the janizaries to triumph, and the grand seignior, secretly, was not displeased at the pasha's conduct.

A. D. 1630. The government of the empire was chiefly in the hands of four pashas, who

who had married sisters of the sultan. The sultan was much given to wine, and often showed himself abroad, unlike a prince, with debauched young men, so that conspiracies were formed against him. The people were discontented with burthenfome taxes, and the soldiery disorderly, and without discipline, and insolent at receiving no pay. The pashas in the provinces were almost independent sovereigns, and the empire shook on its weak foundation.

The head of the spahilar-agasi (general of the spahies) being cut off, the spahies rebelled, and the janizaries joined them; they threw stones at and wounded the vizier, whom they with threats obliged the sultan to depose, and deliver up to them, when they cut him in pieces. They next caused the musti to be deposed, and demanded to see the brother of the grand seignior, which was granted; they then charged the new vizir and musti to become security for his life. The sedition was not appeased till the soldiery had slain more victims. The sultan, in the mean time, was contriving how he could get rid of them, and wished to have killed his brother, but the guarantee of the vizir and musti prevented it. He made another vizir, and consulted with him how to weaken the soldiery; and he really cut off a great number of spahies and janizaries secretly,

sending them on various pretences to divers parts, and assassinating them by night.

A. D. 1631. Being become now more manly, he went out on horseback often, with a martial appearance, exercised his soldiers, and reduced them to more obedience. In Asia and in Hungary there were still seditions amongst the janizaries, who, for want of their pay, killed their commanders.

A. D. 1632. Amurat had now borne him a seventh daughter; and though he was much troubled that he had no son of his favourite slave, yet he was so much in love with her, that he resolved to create her sultana, had not his mother declared against it, as a thing not usual for any woman to be honoured with that title before she had secured the inheritance by the birth of a male child.

He put to death two chiefs of the spahies, and eight principal janizaries, thinking to extinguish the spirit of sedition; but fearing another insurrection, he retired to Scutari, to the old seraglio, and fortified himself there.

He was so little regardful of the laws of nations, that he caused to be impaled a French interpreter, and put the ambassador into prison, and committed other violences. Soon after he made peace with the Persians, but broke it again immediately. He also made peace with the emperor of Germany.

A. D. 1633. A singular fight was maintained between two English merchant ships loading corn (which was then prohibited) in the gulph of Vola, against the whole fleet of the captain pasha's gallies. They killed 1,200 slaves and a great number of Turks, with the captain pasha himself, and when they could maintain the fight no longer, they blew themselves up. They sunk three gallies, and forced the fleet into port to repair. This action is remembered, and talked of to this very day in Turkey. The matter was compromised at the porte on paying 40,000 dollars; but the English only paid one third of it, the French and Venetians paid the other two-thirds, and why is not known.

A. D. 1634. Murat, growing now in years, took the government entirely on himself, and determined to make himself feared. He was severe with his officers, and extremely so with the soldiers, declaring that he expected implicit obedience. The people mutinied at some taxes, but he cut off the heads of fifty ringleaders. He hanged a kadi, to the great displeasure of the ulema; he went then to Prusa; he dispatched a boat to Constantinople to bring to him the musti and his son, both of whom he immediately strangled. This tyranny struck terror into the whole empire;
for

for former emperors but rarely used to put to death the muftis. The particular death allotted for muftis is, by braying them in a mortar used only for that purpose; but it is seldom practised. Murat reflecting on the ill effect that wine had on him, and the dangers that it might produce on the people, ordered all the wine in the town to be staved out in the streets, on pain of death.

He hanged a Venetian merchant for having on the top of his house a high gallery, because he supposed he might look into the gardens of the seraglio, and imprisoned all the European merchants, who were not released till they paid 40,000 dollars. He searched all the houses of the foreign ministers for arms, and took away even the sword of the English ambassador. He attacked the Poles without declaring war. An ambassador was sent from Poland; Murat, contrary to custom, spoke himself, and told him, "*that all Christian kings ought either to receive the Ottoman laws, or pay him tribute, or try the sharpness of his sword.*" He then ordered war to be declared against Poland, though his war with Persia was not finished; but the Poles beat the Turks, and made them sue for peace, which the Poles refused, till the pasha who entered their country was put to death, and some others. Peace was then

then concluded. The captain pasha meeting the new French ambassador at sea, going to Constantinople, insulted him, and caused him to go on board his ship. After his arrival at Constantinople, the French drogoman, who had brought complaints against the captain pasha, was hanged by order of the sultan, and the ambassador forced suddenly and unexpectedly on board a ship, and obliged to depart.

Murat set out himself for the war in Persia, at the head of 100,000 men, in April 1634, and when he reached Erzerun, he mustered his army, 300,000 fighting men, well disciplined, and rendered obedient by his severity: he set them also examples of frugality and patience, and became more temperate. He took Rivan, but entering further into Persia, lost a vast number of horses. He utterly destroyed Tauris by fire and sword, and returned, leaving his army at Aleppo and Damascus, in December 1635. After his departure, the Persians recovered what they had lost, and the people murmured again at Constantinople. The janizaries were displeased at seeing the Bostangees take their places as guards of the grand seignior; the ulema were enraged, because several of their corps, kadis and others, had been beheaded on pretext of faction.

Having

Having now established his authority over the military and the ulema, he gave loose to the utmost violence and severity on the most trifling occasions. He punished the use of tobacco with death, and inflicted the same punishment on his cook, for not seasoning a dish according to his palate. To destroy his subjects formed his daily amusement, either by shooting them with arrows, as he sat in his kiosk, on the shore of the Bosphorus, or by firing a carbine at any one who looked out of a window at him when sailing in his boat. To these crimes were added the lowest debaucheries, and his chief companions in drunkenness were the revolted Persian general, who had delivered up Revan, and an Italian of the seraglio. Murat's uncontrollable violence now prompted him to attack at once Russia and Persia. Raising, therefore, a vast army, he set out on an expedition against the latter country, but previously caused one of his brothers to be strangled, leaving alive only Ibrahim, the sole survivor of the Ottoman race, but weak both in mind and body.

It was now that the vigour of Murat's disposition appeared in its best light. He took the field in May 1638, reviewed his forces with care, dismissed the invalids on half pay, heard and determined all disputes in the army, and preserved so strict discipline, that

that the countries through which he passed suffered none of the hardships usually attending the march of a large army. The result of this campaign was the capture of Bagdat, the ancient Babylon, which event was soon succeeded by a peace, and Murat returned in triumph to Constantinople, on the 10th June 1639.

The Venetians having greatly suffered by the piracies of the Algerines and Tunifines, ventured to make some reprisals, which so much offended Murat, that he issued an immediate order to put to death the Venetian ambassador, and all his countrymen in Turkey; and though this order was by the prudent management of the vizir recalled, yet Venice was threatened with a war, which they could only avert by paying 250,000 sequins. The language of the *kaimakan*, on this occasion, was, "we know that the
" other powers of Christendom are too weak
" to assist you, take your choice therefore :
" we sell you peace at this price ; if you
" think it not worth your money, refuse it." Whilst Murat was intent on new hostilities, and raising forces, though he had not determined whom to attack, he returned to his former debaucheries, and was suddenly carried off by them, on the 8th of February 1640, in the 17th year of his reign, and 31st of his age.

Thus

Thus perished one of the most ferocious despots that ever insulted and disgraced humanity. Breathing vengeance against whole nations, he threatened to subdue all Christendom, and impose on it the yoke of Mahomedanism, and this not from motives of superstition, since he despised the dictates of that religion, and seldom fasted in Ramadan, or kept any other of its ordinances. So entirely was he a stranger to family affection, that he not only murdered his uncle and two of his brothers, but often expressed a wish to be the last of his race, and actually destined the crown for the khan of the Crim Tatars. The activity and energy of his mind had enabled him to suppress all sedition, and to render himself completely absolute; but this power he used only to the gratification of his own avarice, dying possessed of fifteen millions of gold, though the country was in a state of poverty.

IBRAHIM. (A. D. 1640.)

Notwithstanding a donation of the crown to the Tatar khan, made by Murat, in one of his fits of drunkenness, Ibrahim was unanimously raised by the pashas to the throne. This prince, who was deformed and weak in body, had his natural imbecility augmented by the long confinement which he had undergone

dergone in a small room, with only a single window at the top. Coming thus unexpectedly to liberty and empire, he was intoxicated by the new pleasures which they presented, and giving up the administration of government to the former ministers, he devoted himself entirely to the luxuries of the harem. The vizir, thirsting for military glory, projected an attack on the Russian fortrefs of Asac (or Azof) but this ended only in disgrace. The following year, however, (1642) re-animated the Turks by the birth of an heir to the Ottoman throne. A peace was concluded with the German emperor, and a league with Persia. The German peace was soon broken by the Turks, who made an unsuccessful attempt to surprise the fortrefs of Rab (now called Giavanne.) The fears for the extinction of the Ottoman race were still further removed in 1643, by the birth of two more sons to Ibrahim, who daily devoted himself, with renewed avidity, to sensual excesses, exceeding whatever is related of Sardanapalus and Heliogabalus. The restless disposition of the divan led them, in 1644, to plan an attack on the island of Candia, but being then at peace with the Venetians, they concealed their design under the semblance of amity, until their fleet was fitted out, and had sailed toward that island.

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The Turks then threw off the mask, and, in June 1645, landed 74,000 men in Candia, where, in their first campaign, they took the strong city of Cauca with their usual violence and slaughter, and thus began in injustice a long and bloody contest, which lasted until the end of that century.

The sultan, in the mean time, regardless of every thing but his pleasures, continued to give a loose to the most unbounded sensuality; and carrying his desires beyond the bounds of the harem, went at length so far as to seize the daughter of the musti. This outrage was the cause of his downfall. The great officers of state and the soldiery embraced the cause of the venerable divine, and his ecclesiastical power was made the instrument of vengeance against the tyrant. A fetva was issued by the musti, charging the sultan to appear, and administer justice to his people; and this being treated with contempt, was followed by another, declaring, "that he who obeyed not the law of God was no true muselman; and though the person were the emperor himself, yet being become by his filthy actions an infidel, he was, *ipso facto*, fallen from his throne." Upon the authority of this fetva, the janizaries quickly deposed Ibrahim, and sent him to his former prison, where, after some days, he was strangled, and his son Mahomet exalted

alted to the throne. The weight and efficacy which, in this transaction, appeared to be given to the fetva, was in fact owing to the previous concurrence of the great officers of state, and to the general contempt into which the sultan, by his sensuality and cowardice, had fallen.

MAHOMET IV. (A.D. 1650.)

This emperor being but seven years old at the deposition of his father, it was determined that his minority should continue ten years longer, during which time his mother, assisted by the principal pashas, undertook the government. The Venetian war was resolutely pursued abroad; but at home great dissensions took place between the different factions. Murat, the predecessor of Ibrahim, a warlike prince himself, had promoted only brave and fiery spirits to command in the distant pashaliks; but these, during the reign of his weak and timid successor, had assumed so much power as to become almost independent. To this source of division was added the mutual jealousy of the spahies and janizaries, the former asserting themselves as avengers of the death of sultan Ibrahim, and claiming a precedence over the latter in affairs of government. The seraglio itself was farther divided by different

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parties,

parties, supporting the opposite claims of the mother and grandmother of the young sultan to his guardianship; and all these causes together concurred to render in a great measure useless the mighty preparations of the Turks to pursue the war in Candia. The minority of the sultan was one continued scene of discord and revolt.

In 1651, the spahies of Asia marched toward Constantinople, demanding the heads of the vizir and janizar aga; and this affair was compromised by the discharge of these officers from their employments.

In 1652, a rebellion broke out in Egypt and at Damascus, but was soon quelled; and the following year the pasha of Aleppo marched with a great body of insurgents against Constantinople. This pasha, after causing great terror in the capital, settled the business by treaty, and though a rebel, was so highly esteemed for his abilities, that on the death of the vizir, in 1655, he was elevated to that important post.

The ill successes of the Turkish arms in the Venetian war so much irritated the inhabitants of Constantinople, that they came in a body to the gates of the seraglio, tumultuously demanding peace; nor was this rebellion subdued by the divan without great difficulty, and by the sacrifice of the new vizir.

In

In the year 1656, whilst new preparations were making for war, a sedition, more terrible than any of the preceding, broke out at Constantinople. The spahies and janizaries uniting, with the pretence of reforming the abuses of the state, ran in arms to the divan, and deposed the grand vizir and other officers. They entered the imperial palace, plundered the treasury of two millions of gold, and even threatened to depose the sultan. The city was for several days given up to all the horrors of pillage, until the rebellion beginning to abate, through a want of union and of settled views among the ringleaders, authority returned to its former channel; the celebrated Kiuperli, pasha of Damascus, was called, at the age of eighty, to the post of vizir, and the grand seignior himself, attended by his chief officers, rode through the city to put to death the rioters, and to restore public tranquillity.

1657. The grand seignior from this time took the government into his own hands, and employed himself in forwarding the military preparations; but finding the janizaries mutinous on account of the non-payment of their arrears, he attempted to quell them, by punishing the ringleaders with death. The discontents at Constantinople, however, were augmented by the successes of the Ve-

netians, until the vizir, going himself at the head of a very great force, took the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos, which success elevating the grand seignior, he went with great pomp to Adrianople, where he offered peace to the Venetian envoys on condition of their surrendering Candia and Clissia, in Dalmatia, and paying 3,000,000 crowns of gold; but this offer was too unreasonable to be accepted.

1658. The grand seignior was for a while diverted from his intended invasion of Dalmatia by the defection of the pasha of Aleppo, who having revolted, and marched toward Constantinople, which was at that time afflicted with the plague, proclaimed a youth that was with him sultan, as son of sultan Murat, and refused to listen to any terms of accommodation.

1659. The power of the pasha increasing rapidly, the vizir marched at the head of a large army to give him battle, but was defeated with great loss, and the grand seignior himself being obliged to take the field, the pasha offered to treat with him, which the sultan accepting, sent one of his creatures, who, under pretence of negotiating, assassinated the pasha. Some others, who afterwards attempted to prosecute the plans of the deceased pasha, were artfully disunited
and

and reduced by the management of the vizir.

1660. The porte now turned their efforts against the Venetians; but they being assisted by a supply of French forces, prosecuted the war with vigour.

1661. Meanwhile having, under pretence of the rebellion of Ragotski in Transilvania, reduced the important fortress of Varadin, contrary to the general peace concluded between the emperor and the grand seignior, a cause of war arose between Turkey and the German empire. This did not immediately break out, though the pasha of Buda, entering Transilvania, raised a faction there in favour of Turkey, and overthrew the leader of the opposite party. The old vizir Kiuperli now advised the grand seignior to remove his court to Adrianople, where he himself soon died, but not till after he had procured the nomination of his son to succeed him, who was no sooner elevated, than he began to remove his most potent enemies by death or banishment. During these commotions the Venetian war was but faintly carried on.

1662. The revolt of the pasha of Magnatia and of the Georgians occupied the porte for some time, and the vizir being also employed in establishing his own influence more securely, the views of hostility against the

German empire were not prosecuted with much ardour, until at the latter part of the year, the commotions being mostly terminated, the vizir prepared for war, and the pasha of Buda laid waste great part of Transylvania, though it was subject to the porte.

In 1663, after deceiving the Germans for some time with a show of pacific intentions, the sultan openly declared hostilities, by marching at the head of his forces from Constantinople; and though the Germans made fair offers of peace, they were haughtily rejected by Mahomet. The sultan proceeded with the army as far as Adrianople, and then the vizir taking the command, marched toward the confines of Hungary. An instance of his cruelty on this expedition deserves notice.

A chosen body of 8,000 Germans having attacked the Turks by night, and committed great slaughter, were at length repulsed, with the loss of 400 killed and 1,800 prisoners. These latter the sanguinary vizir condemned to death, and remained himself a spectator of their murder on the scaffold, until the murmurs of his army obliged him to desist, after having struck off 1,400 heads.

The Turkish forces, continuing to advance, struck such terror into the emperor, that he retreated from Vienna with the records and

other

other articles of importance; and by this timidity, no less than by the distracted state of his councils, contributed much to exalt the arrogance of the Turks; but at length the valour of the German generals, and of their confederates the French, having turned the tide of war, and the vizir being beaten with great loss, a peace was concluded, by which the Turks reduced their former insolent proposals to the cession of the fortress of Nieu Hausel.

This affair being fully settled, in 1665, the sultan began to turn his thoughts to the possession of the Isle of Candia, and returned to Constantinople, to prepare for the prosecution of his design. Hostilities proceeded in the following year with great vigour on both sides, and the vizir with a great force landed on the Isle of Candia.

The year 1667 opened with an embassy from Poland, to complain that the Tatars, subject to the sultan, had invaded that country, and carried off *an hundred thousand* persons into slavery; but of these complaints no notice was taken.

On the 11th of May, in this year, began the famous siege of Candia by an army of 70,000 Turks, provided with every necessary for the attack of such a place, and furnished with cannon, some of which carried balls of

120 pounds weight. So certain were the Turks of speedy success, that great preparations were made at Constantinople for rejoicing and illuminations on the capture of Candia; but that place resisted the most furious and repeated attacks with heroic firmness, and the vizir was obliged to continue the whole of the winter in the trenches. A second year passed in a repetition of the same furious attacks, and the same obstinate resistance. In two assaults, the Turks lost 30,000 men; but by continual supplies of men and ammunition, they were still enabled to press forward, and at length carried the outworks of the Christians.

The sultan finding, in the year 1669, that the great expence and exertion fruitlessly made in this siege produced nothing but disgrace, began to apprehend the elevation of his brothers to his throne, and therefore sent orders to have them strangled; but the people of Constantinople taking up arms in their favour, for the present prevented his designs from being put in execution. From these fears he was at length released by the surrender of Candia by a capitulation, which formed the basis of a treaty of peace with the Venetians. In this celebrated siege it was computed that 40,000 Christians, and nearly 120,000 Turks, were destroyed.

In

In 1670, the vizir returned home in triumph, and joined the grand seignior in taking steps for the removal of his brothers. To this end it was judged necessary to dispatch the most turbulent of the janizaries on an expedition against the Polish frontiers, and during their absence prince Orkhan was privately strangled.

The year 1672 was signalized by the Polish war. The sultan, levying a great force, and being joined by numerous bands of Tatars, entered Poland, speedily conquered the Ukraine, and obliged the Poles * to pay a yearly tribute of 22,000 ducats. The divan was, however, dissatisfied with this peace, and obliged the sultan to recommence the war, notwithstanding the menaces of the czar of Russia, who endeavoured to interest all the sovereigns of Europe in the defence of Poland. Owing to domestic disturbances, the Turkish army was very formidable. The Poles repelled this second irruption more bravely than the former; but in the succeeding campaign, the Turks again gaining the advantage, swept away all the inhabitants of the countries they invaded, distributing

* The Turks and Tatars had killed or carried into slavery more than 300,000 Polish subjects.

the captives of both sexes as slaves among the soldiery *.

In 1676 died the vizir *Achmet Kiuperli*, to whom was chiefly to be attributed whatever success had attended the reign of Mahomet, and whose merits were most admirably exemplified by being contrasted with the vices of his successor *Kara Mustafa*. This new vizir practised every species of rapine and fraud to enrich and strengthen himself, and thinking war most favourable to his influence (that with Poland being ended) in 1680, he called together a most solemn council, in which he used every argument to prove, that a war would highly conduce to "the honour and advantage of the state," this being the only standard of political morality in Turkey. Though he was unsuccessful at this council, he prevailed better with the grand seignior the following year; persuading him that the situation of circumstances enabled him to fall on the emperor of Germany with advantage, and that the French court would favour his views. This may be called the crisis of the Othman power, when having attained the acme of its fame and

* The fine country of the Ukraine was rendered a desert. The Turks took Human, and of above 100,000 men, who were in it, very few escaped.

splendor, its own inordinate ambition, and the prevalence of evil councils, pushed it onward to its decline.

The porte and the emperor were united by a league or truce of twenty years, three years of which remained yet unexpired, and the infraction of this treaty was the first step toward that state of degradation, in which the present age beholds this once mighty empire.

As the present historical sketch is intended principally to exhibit the means of violence and blood, by which the Turkish sceptre has been sustained; and as we have now reached the point of its widest extension, the remaining part of its history will require but slight notice; it will be sufficient to point out those leading events in the reign of the succeeding sovereigns, which most immediately affected the political state of the empire.

The imperial war was long and bloody; the Turks, at first successful, penetrated to Vienna, and laid siege to that capital, but were forced to raise it by Sobieski. The tide of their fortune now turning, Mahomet was deposed by the janizaries, and the war was continued, though with no better success, by the two following sultans, Achmet II. and Mustapha II. The latter, indeed, attempted to reanimate the military spirit of his

his subjects by taking the field in person, but being defeated by the famous Prince Eugene, concluded the peace of Carlowitz in 1699, by which Transilvania was ceded to the emperor.

These circumstances conspiring with others to render Mustapha unpopular, he was deposed, and succeeded by his brother Achmet III. who forced the Russians to cede, at the peace of Pruth, many important fortresses. The inordinate ambition of this prince next led him to attack the Venetians and other Christian powers; but his success herein was widely different, being reduced, by repeated defeats, to conclude, at Passarowitz, in 1718, a peace highly disgraceful to the Turkish empire.

His war with Kouli Khan, the Persian usurper, proved no less unsuccessful; and the event of all these disgraces was, at length, a revolt, in which he was deposed, and succeeded by Mahomet V.

The year 1730, which produced the rebellion of the janizaries, the deposition of *Achmet*, and the elevation of his nephew *Mahomet*, in its consequences was also productive of a considerable alteration in the mode of carrying on the government.

From the time of Mahomet II. it had been usual to delegate the whole administration

tion to the vizir, but as this and the preceding rebellion had originated in the overgrown power and ambition of these officers, Mahomet, by the advice of his *kislar-aga*, an experienced man, took the power into his own hands and determined to change his vizirs frequently.

Mahomet, however, afterwards confided much in the successor of this *kislar-aga*, a man of the utmost rapacity and insolence, who, extending his attacks both against the janizaries and the ulema, those bodies conspired his overthrow, and began to show their intentions, by setting fire to Constantinople. The frequent repetition of these fires at length arousing the sultan, he consulted with the musti, and by his advice sacrificed the *kislar-aga* and all his dependents, and seized on their ill gotten treasures, including a vast quantity of precious stones, and above 30,500 purses (£.1,900,000) which was paid to the hafné.

The death of the *kislar aga* gave another change to the interior government. His successor entered into a close connection with the vizir, which lasted till 1754, when, on the death of Mahomet, his brother Osman came from confinement to the throne; and the *kislar aga* and his secretary, the *jazigi efendi*,

fendi, gained the confidence of the new sovereign, and assumed their former power.

On the death of Osman, in 1757, Mustafa, the son of Achmet (before-mentioned) succeeded, and he having an intimate connection with the vizir *Ragib Mehemet*, followed his counsel, and deprived the *kissar aga* of his place and influence, and attached to the vizirat great part of the emoluments formerly given to the *kissar aga*; such as the management of the revenues of the harem, arising from large districts in Asia and Europe, and the appointment of all the officers. Since that time vizirs have been removed less frequently *.

From this digression to the subject of administrative government we return to notice the military affairs of the empire. Mahomet V. succeeding to the contest against Kouli Khan, carried it on with no better success than his predecessor, and was forced to an inglorious peace. Being afterwards en-

* The deposition of a vizir or effendi does not much affect the progress of public business; for the different departments are very minutely subdivided, and the subordinate officers continue in most of them unaffected by a change of the superior. These subordinate officers of the seraglio amount to some hundreds, and as they always pretend to follow precedent, they can expedite or procrastinate business at will, by means of this subdivision.

gaged in a war with the Germans and Russians, the latter advanced so rapidly against him as to threaten his capital itself, and thus forced him to conclude a hasty peace.

Osman III. dying in 1757, was succeeded by Mustapha III. who, in the beginning of 1769, determining to attack the Russians, ordered the Tatars, under Krim Gueraï, to invade their territory. The ravages committed by these barbarian hordes I have elsewhere described; they were such as the late empress, who then sat on the throne, could not but view with indignation, and avenge with power.

A bloody war commenced with the exploits of Prince Gallitzin, who attacking the Turks at Choczim, in their intrenchments, gained a complete victory, on the 30th of April 1769. The same general gained another important victory, near the same place, on the 13th of July following; but was prevented from carrying the fortress of Choczim itself by the prudent and cautious measures of the vizir. The undisciplined and turbulent state of the Turkish forces, however, agreeing ill with such prudence, this great officer was sacrificed to the clamours of the janizaries, and succeeded by a man no ways his equal in military skill.

The new vizir attempting to cross the
Niester

Niefter in the face of the enemy, on the 9th of September, was defeated by Prince Gallitzin, with the loss of 7,000 men killed on the spot. A similar attempt, renewed on the 17th of the same month, met with similar fortune; the Turks were defeated, and obliged to abandon Choczim; and it was supposed that these two defeats cost them 28,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, besides nearly 50,000, who deserted the army in its tumultuous retreat.

Prince Gallitzin retiring with honour, resigned the command to General Romanzoff, who, having speedily over-run Moldavia and Walachia, and received the oaths of allegiance, readily offered by its inhabitants, gained two splendid victories over the Turkish forces, on the 18th of July and the 2d of August, 1770.

The enterprising spirit of the empress led her to adopt the more striking and novel measure of sending a fleet into the Mediterranean, and thus attacking the Turkish empire on both sides; and this measure was crowned with success. The inhabitants of the Morea flew to arms on the approach of the Russians. But the most brilliant action of this naval campaign was the victory of Tcheshmé, an harbour on the coast of Natolia, into which the Turkish fleet being driven, were all destroyed

stroyed by fireships. These, and other successes of the Russians, forced the Turks to conclude a dishonourable peace on the 21st of July, 1774, shortly after the death of Mustapha, and the accession of his brother Abdulhamid.

We have thus brought down our view of the Turkish history to our own times: the peace of 1774 was the first great step toward the limitation of an empire, which, as we have seen, was originally founded on rapine and injustice. This blow was effectually followed up by the succeeding war, which was terminated so favourably to Russia, in 1790; and it is scarcely to be doubted, that another war, conducted on similar principles, must totally extinguish the Turkish power in Europe; an event desirable to most Christian nations, and particularly to Great Britain.

I have ceased enumerating all the massacres and breaches of faith the Turks have committed for this last century and a half. Their conduct has been uniform. Cyprus and Candia would furnish a volume.

CHAPTER VI.

Of Arts and Sciences, Commerce, and General Manners.

HAVING traced the outline of those grand leading causes of national importance or decline, which arise from religious and political institutions, and from the events of past ages, it may not be amiss to turn our view to the more domestic circumstances or prejudices of a people, their knowledge or prejudices relative to commerce and the arts, and their habits of mutual intercourse and association.

From what has already been said of the causes affecting the Turkish character, it must be evident that it affords but a sterile soil for the culture of the arts. All their habits tend to an indolence little favourable to the emanations of genius; hence results a want of curiosity for the objects of science in general; and to these must be added the restraints of their religion and government.

A religion abounding in the grossest ignorance and superstition, and which, at the same time, teaches its followers that they
alone

alone are the favoured of God; that as their faith is the purest, so are they, themselves, the wisest of mankind, precludes them from copying their more enlightened neighbours, and even leads them to conclude that the pursuits of infidels must be at least frivolous, if not immoral.

The superstitions of this religion have not, like the splendid mythology of ancient Greece, or the religious pomp of modern Rome, any medium of communication with the arts, such as would be supplied by the decoration of temples, or the pageantry of public games and processions: Mahomed strenuously and successfully combated the idolatry of his countrymen, and through fear of their relapse, strictly forbade any appeal to the senses by statuary or painting. However, the Persians, and some of the Arab kalifs, only considered this prohibition as relating to the representation of figures as the object of worship.

It is true, that this religion has not universally acted with so much force to the extinction of intellect. Under the splendid reign of Abdurrahman, the founder of the Arabian monarchy in Spain, it assumed a more civilized form. That political sovereign promoted intermarriages between his Mahomedan and Christian subjects, and favoured the

natural propensity of the Arabs to literature and science, at a time when the rest of mankind were sunk in ignorance and barbarism; but in all these proceedings he departed widely from the spirit of intolerance and bigotry, which the Turks have uniformly attached to their religion, and he is to be viewed more in the light of a liberal politician than of a religious enthusiast. The lively manners and ardent minds of the Arabs tempered the influence of a religion fundamentally barbarous and gloomy; but the Turks have not only given to superstition its full sway, but have even augmented its influence by circumstances of additional barbarism.

The suspicions of despotism must ever tend to degrade and brutalize its unhappy subjects. Few are the inducements which the torpid Turk has to apply himself to science, and those few are annihilated by the fear of exciting distrust in the government. Traveling, that great source of expansion and improvement to the mind, is entirely checked by the arrogant spirit of his religion; and intercourse with foreigners among them, further than those immediately in their service, by the jealousy with which such intercourse is viewed in a person not invested with an official character.

General

General knowledge is, from these causes, little if at all cultivated; every man is supposed to know his own business or profession, with which it is esteemed foolish and improper for any other person to interfere. The man of general science, a character so frequent and so useful in Christian Europe, is unknown; and any one, but a mere artificer, who should concern himself with the founding of cannon; the building of ships, or the like, would be esteemed little better than a madman. The natural consequence of these narrow views is, that the professors of any art or science are themselves profoundly ignorant, and that the greatest absurdities are mixed with all their speculations.

I shall elucidate this by detailing the opinions received, not only by the populace, but even by the pretended *literati*, in various branches of knowledge.

ASTRONOMY.—From the mufti to the peasant it is generally believed that there are seven heavens, from which the earth is immoveably suspended by a large chain; that the sun is an immense ball of fire, at least as big as a whole Ottoman province, formed for the sole purpose of giving light and heat to the earth; that eclipses of the moon are occasioned by a great dragon attempting to devour that luminary; that the fixed stars

hang by chains from the highest heaven, &c. &c. These absurdities are in part supported by the testimony of the Koran; and the astronomers, as they are called, themselves all pretend to astrology, a profession so much esteemed, that an astrologer is kept in the pay of the court, as well as of most great men.

GEOGRAPHY.—Of the relative situation of countries they are ridiculously ignorant, and all their accounts of foreign nations are mixed with superstitious fables. They distinguish different Christian states by different appellations of contempt,

EPITHETS which the Turks apply to those who are not Osmanlis, and which they often use to denominate their nation.

<i>Albanians</i>	-	-	gut-sellers	-	-	(giguirgee)
<i>Armenians</i>	-	-	t-rd-eaters, dirt-eaters	-	-	(bokchee)
<i>Bosniaks and</i>	}	-	vagabonds	-	-	(potur)
<i>Bulgarians</i>						
<i>Christians</i>	-	-	idolaters	-	-	(purpurest)
<i>Dutch</i>	-	-	cheese-mongers	-	-	(penirgee)
<i>English</i>	-	-	atheists	-	-	(dinsis) i. e. having no religion.
<i>Flemmings</i>	-	-	panders	-	-	(felamink, pezevink)
<i>French</i>	-	-	faithless	-	-	(fransis, imanfis)
<i>Georgians</i>	-	-	louse-eaters	-	-	(bityeyedfi)
<i>Germans</i>	-	-	infidel blasphemers	-	-	(gurur kiafer)
<i>Greeks of the islands</i>	-	-	hares	-	-	(tawshan)
<i>Italians or Franks</i>	-	-	many-coloured	-	-	(frenki, bassarrenki)
						<i>Jews</i>

<i>Jews</i>	-	-	mangy dogs	-	-	(<i>chefut</i>)
<i>Moldavians</i>	-	-	drones	-	-	(<i>bogdan, nadan</i>)
<i>Poles</i>	-	-	insolent infidels	-	-	(<i>fudul guiaur</i>)
<i>Russians</i>	-	-	mad infidels	-	-	(<i>rufs, menkius</i>)
<i>Spaniards</i>	-	-	lazy	-	-	(<i>tembel</i>)
<i>Tatars</i>	-	-	carrion-eaters	-	-	(<i>lastbyedgee</i>)
<i>Walachians</i>	-	-	gyflies	-	-	(<i>chingami</i>)

Before the Russian fleet came into the Mediterranean, the ministers of the porté would not believe it possible for them to approach Constantinople but from the Black Sea. The captain pasha (great admiral) affirmed, that their fleet might come by the way of Venice. From this, and a thousand similar and authentic anecdotes, their ignorance of the situation of countries is evident; and as to the stories which they universally believe, they are such as the following: that India is a country far distant, where there are diamonds, fine muslins, and other stuffs, and great riches; but that the people are little known; that they are Mahomedans mostly, but do not acknowledge the kalifat of their sultan; that the Persians are a very wicked people, and will be all damned, and changed into asses in hell, and that the Jews will ride on them; that the European nations are all wicked infidels, knowing an art of war, which is sometimes dangerous, but will all be conquered in time, and reduced to

the obedience of the sultan, that their women and children ought to be carried into captivity, that no faith is to be kept with them, and that they ought all to be massacred, which is highly meritorious, if they refuse to become Mahomedans; yet they have among them a prophecy, that the *sons of yellowness*, which they interpret to be the Russians, are to take Constantinople; that the English are powerful by sea, and the French and Germans by land; that the Russians are the most powerful, and they call them the *great infidels*; but they are acquainted with no details of these countries.

ANCIENT HISTORY.—They have heard of an Alexander, who was the greatest monarch and conqueror, and the greatest hero in the world. The sultans often compare themselves to him in their writings. Sultan Mahomed IV, in his letter to the Russian czar, Alexis Michaelovitz, calls himself “*master of all the universe, and equal in power to Alexander the Great.*” They talk of him always as the model of heroism to be imitated, but they know not who he was. Solomon, they say, was the wisest man, and the greatest magician, that ever existed. Palmyra and Balbek, they say, were built by spirits at the command of Solomon.

POETRY

POETRY and GENERAL LITERATURE.—

They have a few poets, as they are called, whose compositions are mostly little songs and ballads; but in these, as well as their prose writings, they differ widely from the simplicity of the Arabs, as they abound with false conceits; and the language is a barbarous mixture of the Turkish with Persian and Arabic, not unlike that "*Babylonish dialect*" of our puritans, which Butler compares to "*fustian cut on satin*."

Of the general taste of the Turks, Tott has given a just description, when he says, "*a double meaning, or a literal transposition, forms the extent of their studies and literature, and every thing that can be invented by false taste, to fatigue the mind, constitutes their delight, and excites their admiration*."

This leads me to a consideration of the Turkish language, a point on which I shall make some observations rather more at length, as it has not been hitherto treated with any degree of accuracy. The origin of the Turkish language was the *Zagutai*, a dialect of that Tatarian tongue, which has been spread so widely by the hostile incursions of different barbarians.

The conjectures of Tott on this subject are justly corrected by Peyssonel, whose observations on the different origin of these languages are deserving attention. Among
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the barbarous hordes that have at different periods overflowed Europe and Asia from the north and west, he distinguishes three great and distinct nations, differing in origin and in language, the Celts or Teutons, the Fens or Slavonians, and the Huns or Tatars. It may be doubted, whether in the first class he does not confound two very different tribes, as the remains of the Celtic and Teutonic languages still existing in Europe certainly bear a marked difference. These, however, he thinks (with justice) were the first of the barbarian invaders, including the Vandals, Goths, Ostrogoths, Visigoths, &c. who all issued from the countries between the Northern Ocean and the Baltic Sea. The second in order of time were the Fens, Venni, or Slavonians, who inhabited the borders of the Danube and the Euxine, and from whose language the Slavonian, Russian, and Polish of the present day are derived. The latest of all were the Huns or Tatars, who, proceeding from what has been called the Platform of Tatory, have spread from the sea of Japan to the frontiers of Poland, and have at different periods seized upon the Chinese, Indian, Persian, and Turkish empires.

The Zagatai language, as must necessarily be the case with a tongue spoken by such barbarians,

barbarians, was poor and confined, and its deficiencies have been supplied by the adoption of terms from the Arabic and Persian.

The Turkish language is the easiest of any one we are acquainted with, because it is the most regular. It has only one conjugation of the verbs (excepting a difference of *ek* and *ak* in the infinitive, which the ear soon learns to distinguish) and but one declension of the nouns. There is no exception, nor any irregular verb or noun, in the language. The cases and persons are determined by the termination, as in Latin, but the phraseology is much more easy, and the transposition is not carried to so difficult a length. They have compound words, as in Greek, though they are more limited in their use. It is true, the Turkish language is not very copious, yet it is manly, energetic, and sonorous. To supply the want of words, or more frequently, from a desire of appearing learned, their writers introduced Arabic and Persian, and these languages are now considerably mixed with the dialects spoken at the seraglio (or court,) and at the bar (or makami). The Arabic is mostly intermixed in topics of ethics, religion, or law; and the Persian, in subjects of gallantry, poetry, and at the seraglio. Had they only naturalized foreign words, and adapted them to the grammar

mar of their own language, as we do in English, they would have enriched it, without making it more difficult, and have preserved its character; but these words and phrases preserve the grammar of the language they belong to, which creates a real difficulty, and renders it necessary, in order to read a *firman*, or a piece of poetry, to know something of the Arabic and Persian grammars. This will best be demonstrated by an example: Supposing the Latin to be Arabic, and the Persian French, a Turk would write, if English were his language, in the following manner;

Language of a Musti or Doctor,

I do not love *deplorare vitam*, as many, and *ii docti, sæpe fecerunt*; nor do I repent that I have lived at all, because I have *ainsi vecu*, as not *frustra me natum existimem*; I do not assert that *tædium vitæ* proceeds more from want of steadiness in our true religion, than from *atra bilis*. If a man destroys himself, he is either *insanus*, and a holy fool, or one possessed *demonis*, or he is *un athée*—an infidel, or a Frank. Pray *deum* that he may preserve you against those who blow on *podos funum*, and whisper in the ear.

Language

Language of a Turkish Poet.

The eyes of *l'abbreuveuse* * inebriate me more than *le vin*, and *ses fleches* penetrate *la moëlle de mes os* quicker than those from the bow.

This is the first couplet of a song in pure Arabic, (composed by an Arabian,) which I have thus written, to shew how a Turk would express the same sentiment with respect to the language; the genuine Turkish compositions are ridiculously hyperbolical.

It must be observed, that very few of those, who lard their writings or discourses with Arabic or Persian phrases, are much acquainted with those languages; but they have learnt the phrases and terminations most in use, and know the meaning of a sentence, without understanding each word separately, or having much idea of the grammar.

It is astonishing that they have not perfected their alphabet. They write generally without points, and it is then impossible to read their writing without knowing the language well. When they read foreign words or names, two people seldom read them alike. If the perfection of a written character be to represent words in a clear

* She who pours out the wine.

and

and unambiguous manner to the eye, they certainly are farther from it than any other nation, and they have remained in this state of imperfection, without making the least attempt to improvement, so long, that no effort is now to be expected from them. Many of the letters have each three different forms, when they begin, are in the middle, or end a word. The Arabic printed in Christian countries, and on Mount Libanus by the Maronites, is more distinct and easier read than the written, though this is more elegant in its appearance, which is but a secondary quality. It requires great practice to be able to read the Arabic character quick.

Upon these different circumstances relating to the Turkish language are grounded the different opinions of the Baron de Tott and M. de Peyssonel, the former of whom justly ranks, among the obstructions to science in Turkey, the difficulty of writing and reading the language. To this Peyssonel opposes the facility with which the Baron himself acquired a knowledge of the Turkish language, without observing that this knowledge only extended to *speaking* it, a task which was comparatively easy. Mr. de Tott never acquired skill enough to read it readily. Peyssonel also adduces, as an additional argument, the ability of several European

pean interpreters, whose names he mentions; but this eulogium was only applicable to the celebrated M. Muragia, and not even to him in its full extent; nor does this prove any thing in favour of the Turks themselves, since the advantage which they possess as natives is more than counterbalanced by their habits of apathy and indolence. Peyssonel is equally incorrect in comparing the different characters of the Turks to the different hands, the italic, running hand, engrossing, &c. used in other parts of Europe.

In those countries, the different hands have all such a degree of similarity, that few are at a loss to write, and none to read them at all, and a person who had only seen one hand, in a few hours might learn the others; but in Turkey, scarcely any person is versed in the different characters, except the *professed writers*, and even among them these characters are employed each for its distinct and peculiar purpose: the *neskhi* is used in works of science; the *tealik*, for poetry; the *divani*, for state papers, commissions, and epistolary correspondence; and the *salus*, for inscriptions, devises, &c. If the difficulty presented by these various characters seems at first view light, it must be remembered, that a slight obstacle, thrown in the way of an indolent

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Turk,

Turk, becomes insuperable from his general disregard of science.

The art of *printing*, though often attempted, has never been introduced among the Turks; and this not owing to the difficulty of forming Arabic types, as has been by some alledged, for the Christians of Mount Lebanon, as well as we, print books with Arabic characters: if they require the beauty of the written character, they might engrave on copper; but the true cause of this neglect, is the Turkish indolence and contempt for all innovations.

Is it not matter of astonishment, that since the first establishment of their manufactory of carpets, they have not improved the designs, and particularly as they are not forbidden to imitate flowers? The same may be said of their embroidery, and of the stuffs made at Prusa, Aleppo, and Damascus. Their carpets owe their excellency only to the materials they are made of.

In all the Turkish arts, the traces of superstition are observable. Their *architecture* does not imitate that of ancient Greece, nor have they corrected one fault, or conceived any idea of proportion, from the perfect models they have daily before their eyes. In short, they have never studied architecture; and as to the practice of Europeans, it would

be derogatory to the Muselman dignity to copy infidels. They have taken their notions of general forms from the Arabs, and have added nothing of their own. The church of St. Sophia, after it became a mosque, however, is the model by which most of the other mosques in Constantinople have been built; and this perhaps was owing to the architects being Greeks or Armenians. Though many of them have some notion of the rules of their own art, they are not permitted to pursue them beyond what the Turks conceive to be the *mahomedan* form; they look indeed with a kind of reverence on the noble ruins of Greece, believing them to have been built by devils or genii; they are also jealous of Europeans, who wish to obtain possession of any parts of those remains; but the only use they themselves make of them, is to pull in pieces the marble edifices to burn them into lime. The plaster of their walls, made of this lime, is very fine and beautiful; but who does not lament, that to produce it, perhaps the divine works of Phidias and Praxiteles have been consigned to the furnace. This marble lime, mixed with pounded marble unburnt, forms a plaster superior in whiteness to the Indian chinam, but unequal to it in polish and hardness. Among the mosques and public buildings at

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Constantinople are to be found many fine edifices ; but they are copied from the Arabian buildings in Asia, where there are much grander structures than at Constantinople, though of as late a date *.

* On the origin of the moresque and gothic architecture many learned dissertations have been written. It is not to my present purpose to make extracts from them, for I should have nothing new to say on the subject. With respect to the general form of the mosques, baths, caravansaries, bazars, and kiosks, in the different parts of the empire, the mass is, notwithstanding many striking defects, grand and imposing ; the particular parts are devoid of all proportion ; their columns have nothing of their true character, being often twenty and thirty diameters high, and the intercolumniation frequently equal to the height of the column. The capitals and entablatures are the most whimsical and ridiculous.

St. Sophia, at Constantinople, there is little doubt, was the model which the European architects copied, when they introduced the cupola upon four arches, than which nothing can be more preposterous. Those who chuse to see the false principles of these buildings exposed, and how far they differ from the grandeur and simplicity of the ancients, may read *Frise's Saggio sull' Architettura Gottica, Livorno*, and in an excellent little German treatise annexed to the translation of it, the peculiar excellencies of the gothic pointed out, exclusively of its defects.

It is worthy, however, of observation, that the interior of St. Sophia appears much larger, and that St. Peter's, at Rome, appears infinitely smaller than it really is. The cupola of this latter church is of the same size as the Pantheon ; the members of the entablature, which runs round the lower part of the cupola or lanthorn, are marked on the pavement below by different coloured marbles ; but no one can, without actual measurement, be persuaded of this truth.

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The noble productions of *statuary* and *painting* are still more fully suppressed. These arts are anathematized as irreligious; because a blind and stupid fanaticism has declared that it is impious to emulate the works of God. Hence the incitements to virtue and animation, which we experience in viewing the statues or portraits of the benefactors of mankind, are wholly lost; hence too, the Turk can never be aroused by those flashes of genius, those glowing energies of mind, which the historic pencil, in describing some important scene, arrests and renders immortal. So far is this bigotry carried, that neither the effigy of the sovereign, nor the representation of any imaginary being (as in the ancient medals) is permitted to be imprinted on their money.

The only use of these arts which is allowed, is the imitation of inanimate nature, in carving or painting the interior of a room. Even here they frequently use as ornaments passages from the Koran; but they generally paint the walls with flowers or landscapes. Their ingenuity is, however, merely mechanical; and of scientific rules they are perfectly ignorant: perspective is totally unknown to the painters themselves.

The science of the Turks in making aqueducts, has been vaunted by some authors; but

lest it should thence be concluded that they have a knowledge of hydraulics, I will here state in what this science consists. When water is to be conducted, they begin by laying pipes of burnt clay underground, to the distance of about a quarter of a mile, more or less; they then erect a square pillar, and continue the pipe up till they find how high the water will rise; then they carry the pipe down the other side, (leaving the top open) and continue it underground to the next pillar; and so on till they have brought the water to the place intended to be supplied with it. It sometimes happens that all their labour has been in vain; and they find by experience that the place to be supplied is higher than the place whence they wanted to bring the water.

The principles of levelling are unknown to them. It would be in vain to tell them that the surface of water is not perfectly flat; that there is such a thing as refraction; and that a levelling instrument alone will not tell them the height to which water will rise. The most learned man among the ulema does not know, that as the whole sine is to the angle of refraction, so is the distance of the object to its apparent elevation by refraction. They have no means of calculating the lateral pressure of arches or of cupolas; though they

they generally err on the right side, yet accidents sometimes have happened. I once succeeded in making a Turkish mathematician understand the principle of a catenarian arch, by suspending a chain; but when he endeavoured to explain it to an architect, who was erecting a considerable building for the late captain pasha, Gazi-Hassan, he received for answer, that the figure described by a chain hung up by the two ends might be applicable to the construction of the bottom of a ship, but not to that of an arch of masonry.

It is a certain fact, that a few years ago a learned man of the law having lost an eye, and being informed that there was then at Constantinople a European who made false eyes, not to be distinguished from the natural, he immediately procured one; but when it was placed in the socket, he flew into a violent passion with the eye-maker, abusing him as an impostor, because he could not see with it. The man, fearing he should lose his pay, assured him that in time he would see as well with that eye as with the other. The effendi was appeased, and the artist liberally rewarded, who having soon disposed of the remainder of his eyes, left the Turks in expectation of seeing with them.

The use of wheel carriages is almost un-

known in Turkey. There is a kind of cart, used at Constantinople, and in some few other parts, mostly for women to travel in. In most parts of the Asiatic provinces they have no idea of a wheel. All their merchandize is carried by horses, mules, or camels, in every part of the empire.

The sultan has a coach or carriage, exactly of the shape of a hearse in England, but without any springs; it was, when I saw it, drawn by six mules. The pole was of an enormous thickness, as well as every other part. I enquired the reason; the answer was, that if the pole, the axletree, &c. broke, the man who made it would lose his head. The sultan never uses a carriage as any kind of state; it is only in excursions into the country that it follows him.

The people in Moldavia and Walachia, on the contrary, construct waggons for carrying merchandize on very just principles of mechanics. Casks too are not in use, except among the Greeks.

It may be inferred from Peyssonel, that the science of medicine has made considerable advances, and commands a high degree of respect in Turkey, when we find that the dignity of first physician to the grand seignior is marked by the title of *hakim bachi effendi*; that he wears the large round turban called

called *eurf*, the same as that borne by men of the highest rank in the law; and that the Mahometan who attains this dignity must have passed through the *médreßes*, and have reached the order of the *muderris*; but the fact is, that the state physician is a mere nominal dignity, enjoyed by men of no skill in this science, whilst the man to whom the care of the sultan's health is intrusted is always a Greek, a Jew, or an European, and it is merely for form sake that the consent and presence of the *hakim bachi* must be obtained for the administration of remedies, of whose medical properties he is in general profoundly ignorant. When the Turks take a purgative medicine, they never commend it except it be most violently cathartic. They have no notion of the salutary effects of a gentle laxative.

Navigation, and the use of the magnet, none have the least idea of but the people of the navy, and they know so little, that their compasses are made to point to the true north with the variation allowed, and by the same compasses they steer their ships in all seas. Very few in the navy can take a meridian observation.

The only people who have the smallest idea of navigation, are the Algerines in their service; and even theirs is chiefly practical

knowledge. They rely on the Greeks to navigate their ships of war. Their merchant ships take care not to lose sight of land; and this is the principal reason why so many of them are lost in the Black Sea.

The want of field-pieces among the Turks, which induced Baron de Tott to undertake a new foundry, is a complete proof of the inactivity of this people. It is true that they had foundries of large brass cannon; but they had not even attempted to cast those of a smaller kind, or of a different metal, although their furnaces are of *usine*, which is particularly adapted to the casting of iron. To the present day they are ignorant of the art of casting iron, even for bomb shells; and this is the reason why all the Turkish cannon, both for land and sea service, are of brass.

Though they have many fine large cannons at present, they are defective in the make of the carriages, particularly for field-pieces; and whilst other nations are making daily improvements in this respect (by the construction of flying artillery, &c.) the Turks, from their ignorance of mechanics, employ artillery the most awkward and inefficacious.

The defective state of general science in Turkey is owing to that want of union amongst its branches, and to that deficiency
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of combination, both in theory and practice, whose causes I have already traced out; but in every country individual exertion will do much, and insulated facts will be everywhere discoverable, like the casual flowers of the desert, which show what the human mind is capable of attaining, even in despite of accumulated obstacles. The great advantage which a highly civilized country possesses, is in the quick and ready combination of these facts, and in forming out of them general principles, which abridge the labour and facilitate the progress of the artist and the philosopher. It frequently happens, however, that the most barbarous people possess, in particular branches of art, an accuracy of principle, or a dexterity of operation, even superior to their more polished neighbours; and hence it will be found of use to collect detached information of this kind from every part of the globe. In the intercourse of mind, something is to be gleaned from a soil the most unpromising; I shall, therefore, make no further apology for the introduction of some unconnected remarks on detached instances of skill among the Turks in various arts and sciences.

It might reasonably be expected that a nation of warriors should have expert surgeons at least, and that they should have paid attention to the improvements and discoveries
made

made by other nations. Nothing of this, however, is the case. They perform no operations, nor will they consent to an European's making an amputation, though the loss of life be a certain consequence of omitting it. Their art is simply confined to healing, and at most extracting a ball and a splinter of a bone. It must be confessed that, as their habit of body is generally healthy, nature performs often wonderful cures. They rely much on balsams, mummy, &c. There is in Constantinople a Persian extraordinarily expert in the art of healing. The Arabs bury a person, who has received a wound in his body, up to the neck in hot sand for twenty-four hours.

I saw in the eastern parts of the empire a method of setting bones practised, which appears to me worthy of the attention of surgeons in Europe. It is by inclosing the broken limb, after the bones are put in their places, in a case of plaster of Paris (or gypsum) which takes exactly the form of the limb, without any pressure, and in a few minutes the mass is solid and strong. If it be a compound fracture, the place where the wound is, and out of which an exfoliated bone is to come, may be left uncovered, without any injury to the strength of the plaster encasement. This substance may be easily cut with a knife, and removed, and replaced

with another. If, when the swelling subsides the cavity is too large for the limb, a hole or holes being left, liquid gypsum plaster may be poured in, which will perfectly fill up the void, and exactly fit the limb. A hole may be made at first by placing an oiled cork or bit of wood against any part where it is required, and when the plaster is set, it is to be removed. There is nothing in gypsum injurious, if it be free from lime; it will soon become very dry and light, and the limb may be bathed with spirits, which will penetrate through the covering. Spirits may be used instead of water, or mixed with it (or vinegar) at the first making of the plaster.

I saw a case of a most terrible compound fracture of the leg and thigh, by the fall of a cannon, cured in this manner. The person was seated on the ground, and the plaster case extended from below his heel to the upper part of his thigh, whence a bandage, fastened into the plaster, went round his body. He reclined back when he slept, as he could not lie down. During the cure, where they saw matter or moisture appear through the plaster coating, they cut a hole with a knife to dress the wound, or let out the matter more freely.

On this occasion I cannot help mentioning the treatment of parts frozen in Russia,
not

not by the surgeons, but by the common people, the success of which I was an eye-witness to in several cases, as well as to the failure of the common mode of treating frozen parts by the most able surgeons of the army. I shall simply state the facts I relate to.

After Ochakof was taken, I received into my subterranean lodging as many prisoners as it would receive, all of which were either wounded or had a limb frozen. Among them were two children, one about six and the other about fourteen years of age; the latter had one of her feet frozen to the ankle, the other all the toes, and the sole of one of her feet. The second day the parts appeared black (the first day they were not much observed.) The French surgeon whom Prince Potemkin had sent for purposely from Paris, and who was a man of note, ordered them to be constantly bathed with warm camphorated spirits; the elder was removed to the hospital, when a mortification began; the younger I kept with me, and as we removed into winter quarters, I carried the child with me. The mortified parts separated, the bones of the toes came off, and, after a long time, the sores healed. I should have said, the surgeon was for immediately amputating both the limbs.

Near

Near to me were several women, whose feet had been in like manner frozen ; but as no surgeon attended them, the Russian soldiers and waggoners undertook the cure. It was also the second day when they applied their remedy, and the parts were perfectly black. This remedy was goose-grease, with which the parts were smeared, warm, and the operation often repeated : their directions were, never to let the parts be dry, but always covered with grease. The consequence was, that by degrees the circulation extended lower down, and the blackness decreased, till, last of all, the toes were only discoloured, and at length circulation was restored to them.

I can account for this no otherwise, than that the fat kept the pores shut, and prevented the air from promoting putrefaction ; in the meantime the vessels were continually absorbing part of the stagnated blood, till by degrees the whole circulation was restored. It is known that extravasated and stagnated blood will remain a long time in the body without putrifying, if it be not exposed to the air. I conclude also, that in these cases of frost, the mortification first begins on the surface, which is in contact with the air.

I only relate facts however, and leave it to others to account for them.

This

This is a general practice of the peasants throughout all Russia. If a part is discovered to be frozen, *before the person comes into a warm room*, the frost may be extracted by plunging the part into cold water, or rubbing it with snow till the circulation returns.

The wherries or boats of Constantinople are constructed much on the principle of the Deal boats, but they are more sharp and curved, not so light, but very apt to overset if people shift their places in them unwarily. Their shape is very elegant. The boatmen have a large marble weight for ballast, which they place after the passengers are seated. Though they are large, they row exceedingly fast, and were always esteemed the quickest going boats in Europe ; but I saw a gondola, brought to Constantinople by a Venetian ambassador, keep pace with them. The gondolas, every body knows, are built on a contrary construction, being quite flat at bottom. The bostangi-bashee (master of the police) has a boat of twelve oars, which rows with surprising velocity ; but no one is permitted to build on that construction : this boat goes nearly twice as fast as the common ones, and consequently as the gondolas. They are dangerous sea boats, though they sail fast. It is not many years since they were brought to such perfection, as may be seen by a boat
now

now preserved (I think, of sultan Achmet III.) the merit, however, is their own. The Turks row in general better than the Christian or Jew boatmen.

The Turks use copper vessels for their kitchen utensils, which are tinned with pure tin, and not, as in most parts of Europe, with solder composed of tin and lead, which is much sooner corroded by acids and fat; and though it has not been observed that any violent disorders have been produced by the vessels in common use (except from the copper itself) as the quantity of lead dissolved is small (the admixture of tin rendering lead more difficult of solution) yet many chronic maladies may be owing to this baneful metal getting into the habit in small quantities, and particularly of the nervous kind. There is no country in Europe where the quantity of lead used in tinning is so great as in this island; an abuse which certainly merits the attention of this government, as it did some years ago that of France, who prohibited at the same time, under pain of death, the use of all preparations of lead in wine, or other liquors; a regulation very necessary in England, as is also the establishment of some means to prevent such part of the tea being sold which comes in immediate contact with the

the lead, in chests where it happens to be corroded, as is frequently the case.

Nothing can be more clumsy than the door-locks in Turkey, but their mechanism to prevent picking is admirable. It is a curious thing to see wooden locks upon iron doors, particularly in Asia, and on their caravansaries, and other great buildings, as well as on house doors. The key goes into the back part of the bolt, and is composed of a square stick with five or six iron or wooden pins about half an inch long, towards the end of it, placed at irregular distances, and answering to holes in the upper part of the bolt, which is pierced with a square hole to receive the key. The key, being put in as far as it will go, is then lifted up, and the pins entering the corresponding holes raise other pins, which had dropt into these holes from the part of the lock immediately above, and which have heads to prevent them falling lower than is necessary; the bolt, being thus freed from the upper pins, is drawn back by means of the key; the key is then lowered, and may be drawn out of the bolt: to lock it again, the bolt is only pushed in, and the upper pins fall into the holes in the bolt by their own weight. This idea might be improved on, but the Turks never think of improving.

The

The Greeks have a very curious manner of painting in fresco, which has many advantages. I also saw the ancient method of painting with wax, and fixing the colours by heat, practised by a Greek, and at a place I least expected it, at the Dardanelles; for at Constantinople it is unknown. Whether this be exactly the encaustic painting of the ancients it is hazardous to affirm, though I myself have not the least doubt respecting it. Thus much is certain, that it has, with regard to facility, very considerable advantages over the oil painting now in use; it has all its freedom, and the vivacity of its colours, added to solidity, and the durability which the experience of twenty centuries has proved wax painting to be possessed of. It was my intention to have treated on it in this place; but as it does not regard Turkey, the immediate subject of this work, and would be a dissertation of considerable length, I intend shortly to print it separately, with the Greek manner of fresco painting, in which all colours may be used on a lime-wall.

The Armenian jewellers set precious stones, particularly diamonds, to much advantage, with a foil, which, under roses, or half-brilliants, is remarkably beautiful, and is not subject to tarnish. Their method is as follows: an agate is cut, and highly polished,

lished, of the shape desired; in a block of lead is formed a cavity of about its own size; over this is placed a bit of tin of the thickness of strong brown paper scraped bright. The agate is then placed on the tin, over the cavity, and struck with a mallet. The beautiful polish the tin receives is scarcely to be imagined. This is in general kept a secret, and such foils sell for half and three quarters of a dollar each.

The jewellers, who are mostly Armenians, have a curious method of ornamenting watch cases, and similar things, with diamonds and other stones, by simply glueing them on.

The stone is set in silver or gold, and the lower part of the metal made flat, or to correspond with the part to which it is to be fixed; it is then warmed gently, and the glue applied, which is so very strong that the parts never separate.

This glue, which may be applied to many purposes, as it will strongly join bits of glass or polished steel, is thus made:

Dissolve five or six bits of mastic, as large as peas, in as much spirit of wine as will suffice to render it liquid; in another vessel dissolve as much isinglass (which has been previously soaked in water till it is swollen and soft) in French brandy or rum, as will make two ounces, by measure, of strong glue, and

and add two small bits of gum galbanum or ammoniacum, which must be rubbed or ground till they are dissolved; then mix the whole with a sufficient heat; keep it in a phial stoppt, and when it is to be used set it in hot water.

Cotton at Smyrna is dyed with madder in the following manner:—The cotton is boiled in mild alkali, and then in common olive oil; being cleaned, it will then take the madder dye: and this is the fine colour we see in Smyrna cotton-yarn. I have heard five thousand pounds was given, in England, for this secret*.

A remarkable instance occurred to my knowledge of an individual fact, which might have been of the utmost use to society, but which, owing to the state of knowledge and government in Turkey, was wholly lost to the world. An Arabian, at Constantinople, had discovered the secret of casting iron, which, when it came out of the mould, was as malleable as hammered iron; some of his fabrication was accidentally shown to Mr. de Gaffron, the Prussian chargé d'affaires, and Mr. Franzaroli (men of mineralogical science) who were struck with the fact, and

* I communicated these two processes to a friend, who printed them in the *Bee* four or five years ago.

immediately instituted an enquiry for its author. This man, whose art in Christendom would have insured him a splendid fortune, had died poor and unknown, and his secret had perished with him ! His utensils were found, and several pieces of his casting, all perfectly malleable. Mr. Franzaroli analyzed them, and found that there was no admixture of any other metal. Mr. de Gaffron has since been made superintendant of the iron manufactory at Spandau, where he has in vain attempted to discover the process of the Arabian.

Europeans are much struck to see the Turks work sitting at every art or handicraft where there is a possibility of it ; carpenters, for instance, perform the greatest part of their labour sitting. It is deserving of remark, that their toes acquire such a degree of strength by using them, and by their not being cramped up in tight shoes, that they hold a board upright and firmly with their toes, while with their two hands they guide a saw, sitting all the while. These people are able to stand on the end of their toes, which will support the whole weight of their body.

We have, in Europe, certainly false ideas with respect to the utility of shoes, in preventing the feet of children from becoming

too

too broad. The Arabs, who when children wear no shoes, and when they are grown up, only sandals or slippers, have the most beautiful feet.

In some parts of Asia, I have seen cupolas of a considerable size, built without any kind of timber support. They fix firmly in the middle a post about the height of the perpendicular wall, more or less, as the cupola is to be a larger or smaller portion of a sphere; to the top of this is fastened a strong pole, so as to move in all directions, and the end of it describes the outer part of the cupola; lower down is fixed to the post another pole, which reaches to the top of the inner part of the perpendicular wall, and describes the inside of the cupola, giving the difference of thickness of the masonry at top and bottom, and every intermediate part, with the greatest possible exactness. As they build their cupolas with bricks, and instead of lime use gypsum, finishing one layer all round before they begin another, only scaffolding for the workmen is required to close the cupola at top.

At Bassora, where they have no timber but the wood of the date tree, which is like a cabbage stalk, they make arches without any frame. The mason with a nail and a bit of string describes a semicircle on the ground,

lays his bricks, fastened together by a gypsum cement, on the lines thus traced, and having thus formed his arch, except the crown brick, it is carefully raised, and in two parts placed on the wall. They proceed thus till the whole arch is finished. This part is only half a brick thick; but it serves them to turn a stronger arch over it.

The cities of Bagdad and Bassora are mostly built of bricks dried in the sun, which stand ages if kept tolerably dry. The clay is used in almost a dry state, and beaten into the moulds with mallets. This gives them a wonderful degree of hardness.

At the entrance of the desert, coming from Aleppo, I found a village built in a very singular manner; each room was a cupola, and resembled a hay stack, some of them a sugar loaf. The whole was of earth, as they have no wood. The inhabitants said their town had been built by Abraham; that is, they did not remember when the oldest houses were built. They said they were never out of repair, but that they sometimes plastered the upper part, or rather beat earth on it. The walls were composed of clay and gravel, and were exceedingly hard. The method they use is, to beat each layer of earth till it is very hard.

Such a method is used in the province of
Lyons

Lyons in France, where they build houses of several stories, and very spacious. The walls are always plastered with lime and sand, and stand some centuries. These are very superior to the mud walls of cottages in some parts of England, where the earth is used very moist, and mixed with straw. The ancient Romans built in the same manner as in France. The excellence of the Venetian plaster floors, so much admired for their hardness and beautiful polish, depends entirely on their being strongly beaten. The composition is only fresh lime and sand, with pieces of marble, used almost dry, and beaten till they are quite hard, then ground even and polished. Common earth as well as lime mortar acquires an incredible degree of hardness by compression, if it contains no more moisture than is necessary to make its parts unite. A kind of artificial stone may be made of gravel with a little lime strongly pressed, or beaten into moulds.

I have seen practised a method of *filtering water* by ascension, which is much superior to our filtering stones, or other methods by descent, in which, in time, particles of the stone, or the finer sand, make a passage along with the water.

They make two wells, from five to ten feet, or any depth, at a small distance, which

have a communication at bottom. The separation must be of clay well beaten, or of other substances impervious to water. The two wells are then filled with sand and gravel. The opening of that into which the water to be filtered is to run, must be somewhat higher than that into which the water is to ascend, and this must not have sand quite up to its brim, that there may be room for the filtered water, or it may, by a spout, run into a vessel placed for that purpose. The greater the difference is between the height of the two wells, the faster the water will filter; but the less it is the better, provided a sufficient quantity of water be supplied by it.

This may be practised in a cask, tub, jar, or other vessel. The water may be conveyed to the bottom by a pipe, the lower end having a sponge in it, or the pipe may be filled with coarse sand.

It is evident that all such particles, which by their gravity are carried down in filtration by descent, will not rise with the water in filtration by ascension. This might be practised on board ships at little expence.

The Arabians and the Turks have a preparation of milk, which has similar qualities to the kumiss of the Kalmuks: by the first it is called leban, by the Turks *yaourt*.

To

Leaven Levaïn

To make it, they put to new milk made hot over the fire some old leban (or yaourt.) In a few hours, more or less, according to the temperature of the air, it becomes curdled of an uniform consistence, and a most pleasant acid; the cream is in great part separated, leaving the curd light and semitransparent. The whey is much less subject to separate than in curds made with rennet with us, for the purpose of making cheese.

Yaourt has this singular quality, that left to stand it becomes daily sourer, and at last dries, without having entered into the putrid fermentation. In this state it is preserved in bags, and in appearance resembles pressed curds after they have been broken by the hand. This dry yaourt, mixed with water, becomes a fine cooling food or drink, of excellent service in fevers of the inflammatory or putrid kind. It seems to have none of those qualities which make milk improper in fevers. Fresh yaourt is a great article of food among the natives, and Europeans soon become fond of it.

No other acid will make the same kind of curd: all that have been tried, after the acid fermentation is over, become putrid. In Russia they put their milk in pots in an oven, and let it stand till it becomes sour, and this they use as an article of food in that state,

or make cheese of it, but it has none of the qualities of yaourt, though, when it is new, it has much of the taste. Perhaps new milk curdled with sour milk, and that again used as a ferment, and the same process continued, might, in time, acquire the qualities of yaourt, which never can be made in Turkey without some old yaourt.

They give no rational account how it was first made; some of them told me an angel taught Abraham how to make it, and others, that an angel brought a pot of it to Hagar, which was the first yaourt (or leban.)

It merits attention as a delicious article of food, and as a medicine.

I will here relate the manner the Tatars and Kalmuks make their kumis, or fermented mare's milk.

“ Take of mare's milk of one day any quantity, add to it a sixth part of water, an eighth part of the sourest cow's milk that can be got, but at a future period a smaller portion of old kumis will better answer the purpose of souring; cover the vessel with a thick cloth, and set it in a place of moderate warmth; leave it to rest for twenty-four hours, at the end of which the milk will have become sour, and a thick substance gathered at top; then with a stick, made at the lower end in the manner of a churn staff, beat it
till

till the thick substance above-mentioned be blended intimately with the subjacent fluid; let it rest twenty-four hours in a high narrow vessel like a churn. The agitation must be repeated as before, till the liquor appears to be perfectly homogenous, and in this state it is called kumis (or koumis) of which the taste ought to be a pleasant mixture of sweet and sour. Agitation must be employed every time before it is used. When well prepared in close vessels, and kept in a cold place, it will keep three months or more without any injury to its quality.

“It serves both as drink and food; is a restorative to the stomach and a cure for nervous disorders, phthisis, &c.”

The Tatars distil this fermented milk, and obtain from it a spirituous liquor, which they drink instead of brandy.

The butter, which is mostly used in Constantinople, comes from the Crim and the Kuban. They do not salt it, but melt it in large copper pans over a very slow fire, and scum off what rises; it will then preserve sweet a long time if the butter was fresh when it was melted. We preserve butter mostly by salting. I have had butter, which when fresh was melted and scum'd in the Tatar manner, and then salted in our manner, which kept two years good and fine tasted. Washing
does

does not so effectually free butter from the curd and butter-milk, which it is necessary to do, in order to preserve it, as boiling or melting; when then salt is added to prevent the pure butyrous part from growing rancid, we certainly have the best process for preserving butter. The melting or boiling, if done with care, does not discolour or injure the taste.

To the lovers of coffee, a few remarks on the Turkish manner of making it, in the best way, may not be unacceptable.

Coffee, to be good, must either be ground to an almost impalpable powder, or it must be pounded as the Turks do, in an iron mortar, with a heavy pestle. The Turks first put the coffee dry into the coffee pot, and set it over a very slow fire, or embers, till it is warm, and sends forth a fragrant smell, shaking it often; then from another pot they pour on it boiling water (or rather water in which the grounds of the last made coffee had been boiled, and set to become clear); they then hold it a little longer over the fire, till there is on its top a white froth like cream, but it must not boil, but only rise gently; it is then poured backwards and forwards two or three times, from one pot into another, and it soon becomes clear; they, however, often drink it quite thick. Some put in a spoon full of cold water to make it clear sooner, or lay a cloth

cloth dipt in cold water on the top of the pot.

The reason why our West India coffee is not so good as the Yemen coffee is, that on account of the climate it is never suffered to hang on the trees till it is perfectly ripe ; and in the voyage it acquires a taste from the bad air in the hold of the ship. This may be remedied in Italy, by exposing it to the sun two or three months : with us, boiling water should be poured on it, and let to stand till it is cold, then it must be washed with other cold water, and, lastly, dried in an oven. Thus prepared, it will be nearly as good as the best Turkey coffee. It should be roasted in an open earthen or iron pan, and the flower it is roasted the better. As often as it crackles it must be taken off the fire. The Turks often roast it in a baker's oven while it is heating.

The preservation of yeast having been a subject of much research in this country, the following particulars may perhaps deserve attention. On the coast of Persia my bread was made, in the English manner, of good wheat flower, and with the yeast generally used there. It is thus prepared ; take a small tea cup or wine glass full of split or bruised pease, pour on it a pint of boiling water, and set the whole in a vessel all night

night, on the hearth, or any other warm place; the water will have a froth on its top next morning, and will be good yeast. In this cold climate, especially at a cold season, it should stand longer to ferment, perhaps twenty-four or forty-eight hours. The above quantity made me as much bread as two sixpenny loaves, the quality of which was very good and light.

A spring, which operates both on the individual and national character of the modern European with a force second only to that of political institution, is commerce. Upon the views entertained on this subject by a people; upon the extent and modes of their practice, and upon the character which they maintain with respect to it, depends much of their importance as a nation.

With regard to the general ideas entertained by all ranks in Turkey relative to commerce, they are no less narrow and absurd than all their other opinions. "We should not trade," say they, "with those beggarly nations, who come to buy of us rich articles of merchandize, and rare commodities, which we ought not to sell to them, but with those who bring to us such articles, without the labour of manufacturing, or the trouble of importing them on our part." Upon this principle it is that

that Mocha coffee is prohibited to be sold to infidels. It is therefore no wonder that the foreign commerce of the Turks is comparatively trifling; their trade is mostly from province to province, and even this is inconceivably narrowed by the want of mutual confidence, and the ignorance and short-sightedness of their views. They have few bills of exchange, or any of those modes of transacting business which the ingenuity and enterprise of commercial nations have invented for the facilitation of commercial intercourse.

The effects which the insecurity of property, and the watchful avarice of the government produce upon commerce, are still more striking. In an extensive trade capital and credit must be alike great, but from both of these the Turk is cut off; he dares not make a display of wealth; and if he has been so fortunate as to accumulate a large sum of money, his first care is to conceal it from view, lest it should attract the blood-suckers of power. The necessary consequence of this is, that credit, that vital spring of commerce, cannot be created, and instead of those commercial connections which in this part of Europe ramify so widely, and render commercial operations so easy, all business is transacted either by principals

cipals themselves, or their immediate factors, in a way little different from the barter of the rude ages.

Nor is it only the insecurity of property while living which renders the Turk so averse to engage in undertakings of great extent and contingent advantage; the disposition of it by will affords them little means of self gratification in viewing their inheritance transmitted to posterity. The merchants, and others of inferior rank, know, that a splendid fortune, at the same time that it renders their children objects of suspicion, will not raise them to posts of honour and respect, without putting them in a situation not to be able to transmit it another generation to their posterity; those who hold any office of the porte know that they have the sultan for their heir, and his pashas or other officers for their executors; hence it is that posterity is of so little consequence in the eyes of the Turk, that he is seldom induced to consult much their welfare, and the hospitals, caravanseries, fountains, bridges, &c. built for charitable purposes, only originate in the ostentation or superstitious fears of their founders, who build them for the repose of their souls, or to perpetuate the reputation of their piety.

The natural result of this combination of circumstances is, that commerce is every where

where checked ; no emulation takes place, no communication of discoveries, no firm and solid association of interest ; their mechanical arts are in many instances worse cultivated now than they were a century ago, particularly the tempering of fabres ; and some of their manufactures have gone entirely to decay.

It remains only to speak of the moral character which they maintain as traders ; and this has been variously represented. All ranks of people have some flight kind of commerce, or rather a sort of peddling trade among themselves, and consequently the distinctive character of the different ranks will appear in this as well as in other circumstances. Amongst all of them a certain degree of artifice is common, and is scarcely thought dishonourable, such as the corrupting of brokers and all those who are concerned in making bargains ; but the officers and dependents of the porte are universally remarked as the most venal and cheating set of men on the face of the earth.

Honesty, however, it is said, in some measure distinguishes the Turkish merchant : this may perhaps be true, if we compare him with the crafty Greek, or still more subtle Armenian, who, from the unjust oppressions under which they labour, are induced to re-

R

taliate

tialiate by artifice, on their imperious masters, the source of half that tricking and deception commonly laid to the charge of the lower orders of society.

Much of the civilization of modern Europe has been with justice attributed to the influence of female society; to this are owing the high and noble passions which excite mankind to deeds of active patriotism and benevolence, and the softer pleasures which ornament and endear the social circle. It will be worth while to consider how far then woman, "*last and best of all God's works*," made to soften the ferocity of man, was made in vain for these barbarians; whose love is sensuality without friendship or esteem.

Polygamy is generally found to be destructive to the finer feelings; it is so in Turkey. The rich man (who alone is enabled to support several females) regards them only as the instruments of his pleasures, and seeks their society with no other view; hence the women themselves have no cultivation of mind, but live a stupid solitary life, surrounded by slaves, or by women as ignorant and spiritless as themselves. Moral virtue and intellectual eminence are alike uncultivated by them, and the descriptions of elegance and taste discoverable in their amusements,

ments, their gardens, and apartments, exist only in the imagination of travellers, who, like Lady Montague, aim rather to astonish than instruct.

The women in general only want an opportunity to become unfaithful to their husbands, and the proposition generally comes from them; but it is attended with great danger. If a common Mahomedan prostitute even be caught with a Christian, she is put into a sack and drowned, and the man put to death, except he become a Mahomedan, which will not always save both their lives. Christians of the country have often preferred death.

Marriage is with the Mahomedans merely a civil contract; the wife brings no portion to the husband, but the husband stipulates in the marriage contract, which is executed before a judge, to allow a certain portion to the wife. The contracts are of two kinds, the *nikiah* and the *kapin*; the former is the proper legal marriage, and every Mahomedan is restrained by the koran to four wives of this description. This contract specifies a certain sum, which is to be given to the wife in case of repudiation, or of her husband's death. The other contract is only an agreement to live together for a certain period, at the expiration of which a specified sum is to be

given to the woman. It is a just observation of Baron de Tott, that the kapin or temporary marriage is a necessary consequence of the general institution of polygamy. A separation may be demanded by either party; if it be by the woman, she goes before the judge, and pronounces the following formula: "*Nikia-hum khalal, bashum uzad,*" i. e. "My dowry given up, my head is free." The husband, who repudiates his wife, must repeat it either three several times, or three times together, after which he cannot take her back until he has submitted to a peculiar indecent and immoral ceremony.

In conversation the Turks sometimes display good natural sense; but the wit for which they have been celebrated is no where to be found. This is sufficiently evident from the existence of the *musahibs*, or professed speakers, who are indeed little better than buffoons, but who are hired by the opulent to amuse their company. Can there possibly be a greater imputation on the social powers of a people, than their adoption of such a practice? They cannot or dare not speak so as to keep up amusing or instructive conversation, and they therefore call in the aid of hired talkers. Dervishes, particularly those who have the reputation of being mad, but who generally are more rogues than fools, often

often attach themselves to the great, and amuse the company. These people sometimes take very great liberties in their speeches, which is excused in them on account of their holy frenzy.

A free people are a social people, fond of friendly intercourse. Cheerful converse and unreserved communication of sentiment soften the nature, refine the manners, expand the heart, and enlarge the understanding. Freedom of speaking and acting is the source of civilization.

A nation of slaves is a nation disunited; no social ties, no unbosoming of friendship; suspicion and fear is in every breast; conversation is uninteresting, and consequently not sought after; hired buffoons and low jesters are the speakers to the gloomy audience, or they sit in sad and stupid solitude, smoking a narcotic herb, or taking lethargic opium; insulting haughtiness and ridiculous pomp take the place of that elevation of sentiment, and dignity of character, which alone exalts the man of high birth or office above his fellow-citizen; disgust and gloom hang over their countenances, and innocent mirth is deemed indecent.

When a Turk drinks wine, it is with an intention of being intoxicated; he therefore

swallows a large portion at one draught, or repeats it till he is beastly drunk ; or if he is fearful of the consequences of being in that state in the place he happens to be, at least the quantity he prescribes to himself to make him *contented* (as they express themselves) he drinks off all at once. Such a method of drinking wine, and with such a view, certainly entitles drinkers to the contempt they are held in in Turkey.

From these circumstances, which may be considered as forming the more ornamental part of the manners of a nation, we pass to those more important points which constitute the basis of their moral character.

And here it must be observed, that so wide and various an empire as Turkey cannot but have striking varieties in the morals of its inhabitants ; they, however, mostly agree in the great leading points, and the variations are to be accounted for from peculiar circumstances of situation, origin, and habits. I shall therefore first notice generally those vices and virtues which belong to the Turks as a nation, and then point out a few of the most striking differences observable in the various provinces of the empire.

The moral character of the Turks has been represented in a favourable light by some authors upon two principles ; the one,
a con-

a connection of interest between the Turks and their own country (which is the case of most of the French writers except Volney) and the other, from a wish to expose the vices and follies of other European nations by the contrast. Of the writers themselves I shall hereafter have occasion to speak; the chief points of their description will be included in the following observations.

Much has been said of the equity of the Turks. If we look to the example of their sultans, viziers, pashas, and judges, selling justice, can it be supposed that these examples have not corrupted the people, though they were naturally good. The truth is, that they have so little idea of justice themselves, that when they go to law (that is, appeal to a kadi) they rely more on bribes and cabal than on impartial judgment. Where the judge is not influenced, he is naturally just; no man scarcely was ever so corrupted but he would be so. The European merchants, who have a better opportunity of knowing them than foreign ministers, confined almost wholly to their residence, and ignorant of the country, or than travellers passing hastily through the country, unanimously assure us, that they find them very cunning in their dealings, and full of deceit.

The people are said to be humane: the peaceable citizen may be so, as in other parts, or as man naturally is; but the dictates of their religion, and the examples they see, must blunt their feelings; and this citizen, in regard to an enemy, is as savage as a tiger. There is, after all (from whatever cause) a ferocity in them which may easily be awoken, and when they strike, it is with a dagger to the heart.

The temperance of the Turks, which is owing in a great measure to their religion, produces its usual good effect in rendering their intellects clear; their gross ignorance is not to be attributed to their want of natural sense; the soil must not only be in itself rich, it must be cultivated. The Turk has indeed a good capacity, and an habitual prudence, but his government and religion are eternal bars to his improvement. Openness of mind and benevolence cannot exist where despotism renders every man suspicious, nor can the votary of an intolerant and sanguinary religion cultivate liberality and science.

As to the politeness ascribed to the Turks by some authors, I never could discover it: the Turkish ferocity, perhaps, excited fear in them, and produced respect: if a man
found

found himself alone with a tiger, and escaped unhurt, he would say it was a good-natured animal. The assuming superiority of the meanest Turk, the deference which is paid to him by all infidels who approach him, and by your own interpreters, impose and create respect; if the beast then only growls, but does not bite, he is praised for his civility. If you know their language, you will observe the difference of their expressions and their manners from those they use to their brother Mahomedans; you will observe, at best, an insulting condescendence, which plainly bespeaks their contempt of you: they are ignorant of, and above practising the true principles of politeness. Madame de Genlis says, politeness consists in making others appear every thing, yourself nothing; a Turk makes himself every thing, you nothing. We have only to observe the ambassadors they send to foreign courts (who are all people very low in office;) they neither learn the language, or gain any more knowledge of the country than the post-horses which draw them through it: when they return, they represent the men as monkies, because they are active, and the women as prostitutes, because they are unveiled, and live in society with men. Not one word of this is exaggerated. The language and the address
of

of the politest minister of the porte to a foreign ambassador very much resembles the civility of a polite German baron to his vassal.

Even their most strenuous admirer, Peyssonel, acknowledges that Turkey remains two centuries behind the rest of Europe in respect to science; that it has neglected naval and military tactics and discipline; and that it allows vices in many parts of its administration to go uncorrected.

That there is a considerable difference of character and morals in the different parts of the empire has been before observed: the worst are the people of Anatolia, particularly those bordering on the Black Sea; they are cowardly, treacherous, robbers, assassins, and indecent; those of Constantinople are softened by a city life; those of Aleppo are the most refined and civil among themselves, and remarkably decent, but, like all the Asiatics, hold Europeans in great contempt, and even hatred; at Damascus they are furious zealots; the people of Smyrna are savage and dangerous; in European Turkey they have fewer prejudices against Christians, because they know more of them, or rather because they are less bigoted enthusiasts than at Damascus, or in Egypt; at Bagdad they are less prejudiced by their religion, and more open

open to instruction, than in other parts of Asia; the people of Bassora, a mixture of Arabs, Persians, and a few Turks, are mild and docile. It is singular, that these people, from their communication with India and with Europeans, know infinitely more of our manners, arts, and arms, and are more inclined to adopt them, than those in the frontier towns in Europe, who are prejudiced, insolent, and proud. The Arabians of the desert generally pay nearly as much respect to a European as to one of their own country, and more than to a Turk, whom they mortally hate.

CHAPTER VII.

On the State of Population in the Turkish Empire.

THE aim of all rational politics is to augment the numbers, and increase the happiness of mankind; and hence the state of population is generally the most accurate standard of political error or improvement. From the preceding pages we shall have seen sufficient reason to apprehend that the population of the Turkish empire cannot be, in the present day, at all proportioned to the extent of its territory. The religious distinctions which depress into so abject a state of slavery one great part of the community, and the insecurity of property, which affects every rank and condition, are both causes, whose combined operation must greatly subtract from the numbers of a people, which form the vital strength of a state. Where the cultivator is not sure of reaping the corn which he sows, he will sow only what the immediate necessity of subsistence requires; the political state of the country prevents

prevents his accumulation of capital, and even that small portion which he may chance to possess, he will not hazard in speculations of so very uncertain profit. In this languishing state of domestic agriculture, Constantinople looks for a supply of corn to foreign channels, particularly Egypt, Moldavia, Walachia, the Crimea, and Poland.

From a view of the state of Egypt, it will appear that little dependence can be placed on the permanence of this supply; still less would a wise government look to markets, which, like the others which I have enumerated, are either immediately under the direction of a hostile state, or perpetually liable to its incursions. The Russians are, indeed, wise enough, in time of peace, to invigorate their own agriculture, by supplying Constantinople with corn from their provinces. The Crimea, on which the porte used greatly to depend, has been deserted by most of its Tatar inhabitants since it fell under the imperial dominion; but the Russian and other adventurers, who now occupy it, are making great endeavours to revive its commerce and agriculture; these, however, as well as the supplies of Poland, are in the hands of Russia, and in the event of a war she can not only withhold them, but perhaps cut off the supplies of Moldavia and Walachia, thus exposing

posing the Turkish capital to the utmost distress. Notwithstanding these evident consequences of their present system of policy, the divan pursue those methods of supply which give them the least immediate trouble, totally regardless both of the decay of their own agriculture and of the future destruction which this system threatens to their very existence as a nation. It is not only in theory that these evils are to be apprehended; a comparison of the present and past states of the Turkish population will evince the truth of the foregoing propositions.

We know not what was the population of this vast empire in very remote ages; from the evidence of history it appears to have been very considerable; at present it is far from being so. Without going farther back than the memory of persons now living, it is easy to prove that depopulation has been, at least in latter times, astonishingly rapid.

The great causes of this depopulation are, doubtless, the following:

1st. The plague, of which the empire is never entirely free.

2dly. Those terrible disorders which almost always follow it, at least in Asia.

3dly. Epidemic and endemic maladies in Asia, which make as dreadful ravages as the plague

plague itself, and which frequently visit that part of the empire.

4thly. Famine, owing to the want of precaution in the government, when a crop of corn fails, and to the avarice and villany of the pashas, who generally endeavour to profit by this dreadful calamity.

5th and lastly, the sicknesses which always follow a famine, and which occasion a much greater mortality.

The plague is more mortal in proportion as it visits a country seldom. At Constantinople it is often a great number of years together: it is scarcely perceived in winter, and frequently ships sail to Europe with *clean bills of health*, though it is lurking in infected clothes, and in distant and little frequented parts of the city. In spring it breaks out again. No calculation can be formed of the numbers that die of it in the capital; for their want is never long perceived, there being a constant influx of people from the country to the capital. Some years the mortality does not appear to be considerable, but at other times they have what is called a *great sickness*, which carries off an astonishing number. The consumption of provisions has been reduced, during such a plague, to three-fourths of what it was when it began to rage.

It

It visits most parts of Asia every ten or twelve years, and carries off an eighth or tenth of the inhabitants, and sometimes a fourth or more. The farther east a country is situated, the less frequently it is visited. It is said, it never goes where the olive tree does not grow. It reaches Bassora about every ninetyeth year; but then this scourge is most dreadful. The last plague carried off nintenths of the inhabitants, and that city had been ninety-six years free of it. Farther east it has not been known to go.

The plague, like the small pox, is a disorder never generated by foul air, or the like, but always produced by contagion. It, doubtless, comes from Egypt, though in Egypt it is frequently received back from Constantinople.

Dr. Ruffel says, the plague which afflicted Egypt in 1736, and of which it was said that 10,000 died in one day at Cairo, "*was the only one that happened in this century, which was believed by the people of Cairo to have been brought from Upper Egypt; the others were always thought to have been imported from Constantinople or Candia, but never from Syria or Barbary.*"

How easily would not a regular *quarantine* and *shutting up* deliver Turkey from this terrible scourge!—but what is to be expected but

but devastation from the Turks? No city has better local situations for lazarettoes than Constantinople—I allude to the Princes Islands. When the capital has been really free of it, it always is brought thither either directly or indirectly from Egypt (generally by the way of Smyrna.) Many people, not attending to this circumstance, have concluded that it was generated in Constantinople, and talk much of the bad air produced by the nastiness of the streets, which is without foundation. The air of Constantinople is exceedingly pure and healthy; but no infected or impure air, loaded with the miasma of putrefaction, &c. will produce the plague, though it may fevers, both contagious and mortal, in a high degree.

It does not appear from Plutarch's account of the plague at Athens, that it really was this disorder which afflicted that city in Pericles time. The true plague is never in the air, perhaps (for I say this with some doubt) not in the breath of a pestiferous person, at least the breath cannot convey it above a few feet, as the Russian surgeons have sufficiently proved, when the plague was at Mosqua (Moscow) and at Cherfon more particularly, where those surgeons, who touched nothing in the hospitals, and pulled off their shoes on going out, all escaped.

The physicians at Constantinople say, the more they study the plague the less they know of it; and as it is there almost every year, they have more opportunities of seeing this disorder than any others of the profession. We learn nothing from the Russian physicians, who exposed themselves very much in the plague at Moscow, in 1771, and in that which broke out in 1783 at Cherson (see Mertens's *Observ.* and Orreus's *Descriptio Pestis*; also Samoillovits's *Memoire sur la Peste*;) nor is there any thing very satisfactory with respect to the cure to be learned from Dr. Russel's elaborate treatise on the plague, nor from the more ancient authors. It is said that friction with oil has lately been discovered, in Egypt, to be a preservative; so much is certain, that the plague is unknown to those nations whose custom it is to rub their bodies with oil. It has been observed at Constantinople, that those who used mercurial frictions never caught the plague, how much soever they were exposed to the contagion. May this not have been owing to the grease rather than the mercury?

Mr. Matra (who is now agent at Morocco) gave James's powders to an Armenian family, about twenty years ago, at Constantinople, and they recovered. I also thought I had performed cures with this famous medicine;

cine; but it has had a fair trial in Russia, without producing any salutary effect; farther than what was to be expected from an emetic. There is, however, some reason to believe that it may prevent the plague, if administered *immediately after the infection*, though perhaps any other sudorific would be equally serviceable.

There is one circumstance, of which it is of importance to determine the truth, as it is of consequence with respect to quarantine; this is, whether the plague communicated *per fomitem*, (that is, by substances which, having imbibed the pestiferous effluvia or miasma, retain them in an active state for some time,) be of a more mortal kind than that by immediate contact with a diseased body; and particularly whether the *fomes* become of a more deadly quality by its being long retained in the substance, than when newly imbibed by it.

Dr. Cullen says, "*It appears to me probable that contagions, as they arise from fomites, are more powerful than as they arise immediately from the human body.*"

Dr. Lind says, "*From a fixt attention to this subject for many years, I say these last (wearing apparel, dirty linen, &c. long retained in that impure state) contain a more concentrated and contagious poison than the newly emitted*
S 2 "effluvia

"effluvia or excretions from the sick." Van Swieten was of the same opinion.

On the other hand, Doctor Ruffel (*Treatise of the Plague*) whose opinion with respect to the plague is a great authority, thinks differently; he says, (page 205) *"I should be inclined to doubt that the pestiferous effluvia of a person labouring under the plague, after the having been shut up some time in a substance fitted to imbibe and confine them, would act more powerfully on a person disposed to infection, than the same effluvia would have done at the instant of their emanation from the morbid body."*

It certainly would be a ridiculous presumption in one, who is not a medical man, to decide between such great professional authorities; but do not facts, mentioned by Dr. Ruffel himself, decide the question? Page 97. speaking of the first of the six classes, under which he arranged the cases which fell under his immediate observation, he says, *"None of the sick recovered, and most of them died the second or third day; a very few lived to the fifth."*—*"These destructive forms of the disease prevailed most at the RISE of the plague in 1760, and its RESUSCITATION in the spring of the two subsequent years, DECREASING ALWAYS AS THE DISTEMPER SPREAD: and though they were*
"found

"found dispersed in every stage of the pestilential season, yet the number of subjects of this class was proportionably very small, compared with that of others." Again (page 209.) *"But a greater difficulty than that of persons not being equally susceptible of infection, arises from the cessation of the plague at a period when the supposed contagious effluvia, preserved in apparel, furniture, and other fomites, at the end of a pestilential season, must be allowed not only to exist in a much greater quantity than can be supposed to be at once accidentally imported by commerce, but in a state also of universal dispersion over the city."*

It is an incontrovertible fact, in which every author agrees, relative to the plague, which, having ceased in summer or in autumn, breaks out again in the spring, or at any other time of the year, whether communicated by infectious fomites remaining in apparel, &c. in the same city, or brought in merchandize, &c. from other parts, that in the beginning scarcely any one recovers of the plague, that the disorder gradually becomes less mortal, and lastly, that it entirely ceases.

Quere? May it not be thence concluded, that the reason of the mortality in the beginning of the plague is owing to the fo-

mites having been confined a longer time, and become thereby more poisonous; that when the plague has raged some time, and the infection taken from pestiferous bodies, or effects lately impregnated with *fresh* fomites, this is the reason why it is less malignant; that the disorder thus becomes milder, and at length ceases to be infectious, till the fomites have again acquired an increased degree of malignity by time; that the examples mentioned by Dr. Ruffel, (page 97.) of cases of the first and mortal class, which sometimes were found at every season, were cases where the sick had caught infection from old fomites. This cannot be affirmed, but it cannot, I believe, be contradicted, and it would appear, from the gradual decline in malignity of the plague, to be probable.

It would appear that the plague, when it first breaks out, and is very mortal, not one in ten, and sometimes in forty, recovering, is not so catching as when it is spread over the whole city. Perhaps later in the year, when the pores are more open by the warmth of the season, people are more liable to be infected. Mertens (*Histoire de la Peste de Moscow en 1771*) says, "*The great cold which reigned during the last two months of the year so enervated the pestilential miasma, that those who assisted the sick, and buried the*
" *dead,*

"dead, were less easily attacked by the contagion, &c." It appears also from him, that frost will in a very short time entirely destroy the fomites: he says, "*Dr. Poparetsky, told me, that the carriers of the dead clothed themselves with sheep skins, which had been worn by those who had had the plague, after having been exposed to a severe frost forty-eight hours, and not one of them caught the plague.*"

It is natural to conclude, that the plague should be more mortal in hot weather than in cold; but it would seem as if the degrees of its poison depended not so much on the state of the air as on the old or recent state of the fomites; and that the power of the poison was diminished by propagation, till it became at last little if at all mortal; at least experience in all places where the plague has raged seems to prove this.

It also appears, that the fomites may be preserved a long time in infected things, which are not exposed to the air. Dr. Russel quotes a singular instance of this from Dr. Mackenzie of Constantinople; it is too interesting not to be repeated: "*Count Castil-*

mites having been confined a longer time, and become thereby more poisonous; that when the plague has raged some time, and the infection taken from pestiferous bodies, or effects lately impregnated with *fresh* fomites, this is the reason why it is less malignant; that the disorder thus becomes milder, and at length ceases to be infectious, till the fomites have again acquired an increased degree of malignity by time; that the examples mentioned by Dr. Russel, (page 97.) of cases of the first and mortal class, which sometimes were found at every season, were cases where the sick had caught infection from old fomites. This cannot be affirmed, but it cannot, I believe, be contradicted, and it would appear, from the gradual decline in malignity of the plague, to be probable.

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*“ even white-washing it. At last, by my own
“ advice to his excellency, he built a slight coun-
“ ter-wall, since which there has been no ac-
“ cident in that room, now five years ago.*
It has never been determined how long the miasma or effluvia of the plague, when shut up in merchandize or effects, may remain active; there is reason to believe that it may many months; there are, indeed, proofs of it in every lazaretto in the Mediterranean, (as well as the contagion brought so far as Holland and England in former times) where there are often accidents happen to those who open cotton bales and other packages; and this fomes, probably, was only the perspiration or effluvia from infected persons, who laboured at the packing, or perhaps have lain down on such merchandize, or fomes attached to their clothes, though they themselves were not infected; but if by some accident cotton embued with the pus of pestiferous buboes or carbuncles should be by some accident (which is not impossible) packed into the cotton sent to Europe, how long such dried pus would retain its infectious quality is not known, but it is to be feared that it might be very long, though it is to be hoped that, like the matter of the small pox, it may lose its contagious quality of itself in a certain time without airing.

It

It is, however, evident that exposure to the air will destroy this infectious quality; that great cold (as has been seen in the instances quoted from Mertens) will destroy it very suddenly; and it would seem also, that the rays of the sun and a drying wind will also, though not so rapidly, arrest its poison, and destroy it: on this is grounded quarantine, the utility of which no rational man can now doubt, though formerly such doubts have existed. But all quarantines are of no effect where the merchandize are not *opened and aired*; and as that is not the case in England nor in Holland, those lazarettoes are of no kind of use; they retard trade without securing the country from infection. The quarantines in the Mediterranean only are efficient.

In a separate chapter, treating on the Levant trade, I shall have occasion to speak more at large on quarantine, and the necessity of making other regulations in this country, than those which at present exist. Dr. Ruffel, indeed, has collected every thing that has been said by others, and has turned this matter so ably and so fully himself, it may seem superfluous to say more on that head; but it appears to me, that he has not represented the danger so strongly as he saw it; there

there now exists a necessity of speaking out more plainly.

We may add another cause of depopulation, the tyranny of the pashas, who, in some parts of Asia, so much impoverish the people, that they prevent marriages being so frequent as they are where there is less danger of being unable to maintain a family; and this gives rise to an abominable vice, which brings sterility with it, and when men are so degraded as to become habituated to it, they lose the natural instinct in man for the fair sex.

Polygamy itself is an institution experience proves to be so little favourable to population, that the Christian families are generally observed to be more prolific than the Mahomedans.

Depopulation is first perceived in the country. Cities are filled up with new recruits of inhabitants from the country; but when the cities become desert, and that not merely by the decay of a particular branch of commerce or manufacture, or any other similar cause, but for want of people to emigrate from the country, we may easily believe that depopulation has reached nearly its last stage. This is the case even in those parts of the Turkish empire where manufactures exist; where

where there is bread for those who will seek employment; even in these places the country is also desert, villages uninhabited, and fields, and gardens, and orchards lying waste.

Let us take a view of the present state of some of the most considerable cities of Asia.

Aleppo (Haleb) is the best built city in the Turkish dominions, and the people are reputed the most polite. The late Dr. Ruffel (in his *Natural History of Aleppo*) calculated the number of inhabitants, in his time, at about 230,000; at present there are not above 40 or 50,000. This depopulation has chiefly taken place since 1770. As this city is built of a kind of marble, and the houses are vaulted, they are not subject to decay and fall in ruins, though they remain uninhabited; they stand a monument of the destruction of the human race: whole streets are uninhabited and bazars abandoned. Fifty or sixty years ago were counted forty large villages in the neighbourhood, all built of stone; their ruins remain, but not a single peasant dwells in them. The plague visits Aleppo every ten or twelve years. About four years ago there was at Aleppo one of the most dreadful famines ever known any where.

The whole coast of Syria, which a few years ago was tolerably populous, is now almost a desert. Tripoli, Sidon, Laodécia, are insignificant

insignificant places, and the country around them almost abandoned. Maundrell, about a century ago, complained of the rapid depopulation of Syria; but from his account it was then in a flourishing condition compared with its present state.

Mosul has lost half its inhabitants, and is in a ruinous state.

Diarbekir was the most populous city in the Turkish empire but a few years ago; it might still have been counted among the first cities in the world for magnitude, and, notwithstanding the exaggerated accounts of Cairo and Constantinople, it contained more people in its walls than either of these cities. In 1756, there were 400,000 inhabitants, at present there are only 50,000. In 1757, swarms of locusts devoured all the vegetation of the surrounding country, and occasioned a famine; an epidemic sickness followed, which carried off 300,000 souls in the city of Diarbekir, besides those who perished in the adjacent villages. The plague visits this country every thirty or forty years.

At *Merdin* there are about 1,000 souls. The sickness of 1757 was fatal to this city and its environs: the greatest part of the town is uninhabited; it is subject to endemical sicknesses.

Bagdat contained from 125 to 130,000 inhabitants; at present there are scarcely 20,000.

20,000. The plague of 1773 carried off two-thirds of the people. Here likewise are seen whole streets and bazars desolate.

Bassora (or Balfora, i. e. Bi-al-fura, called by the Arabs often Al-fura) contained, twenty years ago, nearly 100,000 inhabitants; the last accounts from there mention only 7 or 8,000.

Between *Angora* and Constantinople there is a constant communication by caravans: there are old people at Constantinople who remember forty or fifty villages in the road, of which no vestiges now remain. (In these parts the buildings are not durable, being chiefly timber frames filled with brick or earth, and plastered over.) An English merchant of my acquaintance, whose trade as well as his father's was between these two cities and Smyrna, has a list in his books of all the towns or villages in the road, of which about fifty are not known, even by name, to the present conductors of caravans. No longer ago than 1768, it was asserted, that upwards of two hundred villages in this part of the country had been forsaken, on account of the oppressions exercised over the inhabitants.

Though we should admit that the people in Turkey multiply as much as it is possible for the human species to do (which is however very far from being the case) yet still it
is

is impossible that the fruitfulness of the women can keep pace with the mortality of the plague, and the other sicknesses which afflict this empire, particularly in Asia. If still there be a considerable number of people dispersed over this vast tract of country, what must not the population have been a few centuries ago? Collectively indeed the number is somewhat considerable, but each district, considered separately, is a desert compared with the most thinly inhabited region in Europe.

If we proceed to a regular calculation, and take for a datum the greatest number of inhabitants these countries could maintain four centuries ago, and allow the greatest number of births experience of the most prolific nations will justify; and, on the other hand, deduct at every period they are visited by the plague and other sicknesses the number of deaths which then take place, the result will be a much smaller number of inhabitants than there now really exists; if we reason *a posteriori*, we shall find that four centuries ago there were a much greater number than it is possible there could have been in fact.

It is therefore reasonable to conclude, that depopulation could not formerly have made so rapid a progress as at present; and that in
a century

a century more, things remaining in their present situation, the Turkish empire will be nearly extinct.

Smyrna is the only city in Turkey where depopulation does not appear; but how often are not its inhabitants renewed? It is the only place of considerable trade in Turkey, and from the resort of foreign ships, as it is the centre of export and import trade, must long continue to flourish.

It is worthy of remark, that the Curds in the mountains, and other independent or rebellious tribes, who do not mix with the Turks, are exempt from the mortality occasioned by all the calamities which afflict the countries more immediately under the iron sceptre of the porte.

I should have mentioned a part of Bulgaria, and a great part of European Turkey, except the countries towards the Adriatic and Hungary, as almost destitute of inhabitants. This state of the country is particularly striking on the road from Belgrade through *Sophia*, *Phillippopolis*, and *Adrianople*, to *Constantinople*. The north or north-eastern part of Bulgaria is populous.

In taking a separate view of European Turkey, of Greece, and of Egypt, we shall find similar traces of that devastation, occasioned by the complicated evils under which
this

this empire has so long groaned ; at present I shall pay a particular consideration to the state of the capital itself.

Constantinople is the more deserving of our enquiry, because, erroneous as calculations of the number of inhabitants in great cities usually are, none have been more exaggerated than the population of this city.

The causes of this error were probably various, as, first, the situation of the city on the ascent of a hill, which, shewing every house in it, and hiding the voids between them, makes it appear to the greatest advantage.

Secondly, the crowd of people appears to be prodigious in the streets leading to the custom-house, to the harbour (to cross which the boats are all stationed at a very few landing places or *scales*) to the great bazars or markets, to the porte, to the baths, and to the principal mosques ; but it should be observed, that these are all situated in the same part of the city, and that every one who goes out, either for business or pleasure, passes through these streets, and travellers very rarely go farther into the city, where they would find streets nearly deserted, and grass growing in many of them, notwithstanding their narrowness.

Thirdly, strangers (and I include most foreign

reign ministers, who are grossly imposed on by the ignorance of their drogomans or interpreters) are misled by the accounts they receive of the number of janizaries, of bostangees, of boatmen, of artisans, of shopkeepers, &c. without knowing that one and the same person is commonly in two or three of these capacities; for instance, almost every boatman is a bostangee or a janizary, and the greatest part of the shopkeepers and artisans are janizaries. We must rely on real calculation.

First calculation.—In Constantinople and its environs there are daily consumed from nine to eleven thousand kilos of corn. Experience has proved, that one person consumes nine kilos a year, one with another. One kilo of wheat is twenty-two okes, which renders eighteen okes of flour, of which they make twenty-seven okes of bread, as their bread is very moist, made into flat cakes seemingly half baked. An oke is about two pounds and three quarters English avoirdupois weight. (In France, one pound of wheat produces exactly one pound of bread. This was the rule observed by their government with respect to the price of bread.) According to this calculation, the medium number of inhabitants would be 426,000 souls; and this misled Sir James Porter, formerly
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English ambassador at the porte, as it has done many others, who rely on the information received from interpreters.

It is the policy of the porte, or rather of the vizirs, to keep the price of bread low at the capital; and it is generally cheaper there than at a day or two's journey distant. The *miri* solely distributes the corn, not to the city only, as people have concluded, but to all its suburbs, as *Pera*, *Galata*, the neighbouring villages, to the city of *Scutari* (*Efcudar*,) and all along the channel of Constantinople, which is bordered with large villages to *Kuchuk Chikmagi*, commonly called *Ponte-piccolo*, and thence in a line to *Borgos* and to *Domusderé*, on the coast of the Black Sea, to the *Princes Islands*, to nine large villages in Asia behind Scutari, and thence in a line north, to all the country as far as the Black Sea.

Some years, from 14 to 16,000 kilos of corn have been consumed. A considerable quantity must be allowed for the consumption of vessels of all denominations that frequent the port, and when corn is dearer in the country than the price at Constantinople fixed by the *miri*, it may reasonably be supposed that some little contraband is carried on.

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From all this it must appear, that not above one half of the corn is consumed in Constantinople, and consequently, that the number of inhabitants does not exceed 213,000; and if we take for our rule those years in which 16,000 kilos were consumed (and which by the by have always been those when corn was dear in the country) still the number will be but 292,000; the medium between the highest and the lowest year, when there was no remarkable plague, is 230,000, which I believe to be near the real number of inhabitants.

Sécond calculation.—The *kassab bashi* (or chief of the butchers) through whose office all cattle for slaughter must pass, distributes to Constantinople, Scutari, &c. from 2,500 to 3,000 sheep a week, or 130,000 to 156,000 a year. It must be observed, that the Turks eat very little beef; some fish indeed, and fowls, but the quantity is trifling to the mutton. At Paris they consumed 10,400 sheep a week, besides beef, and 630 hogs, salt-fish, &c. and one million pounds of bread daily. The annual consumption of Paris was about 12,800 muids of corn (36,864,000 pounds); 77,000 oxen; 120,000 calves; 32,000 barrels of herrings, 540,000 sheep, and 32,400 hogs, besides other articles.

Suppose the French to eat only the same quantity of bread as the Turks, (and I believe there is not much difference,) the calculation, applied to Paris, would make the number of inhabitants to be about one million.

There are, however, a few sheep killed by contraband, that have not passed through the hands of the *kāssab bashi*, and the butchers dependent on him, but their number is very small, as the practice is attended with dangerous consequences, and the profit arising from it inconsiderable.

This calculation of meat produces fewer inhabitants than that of corn, and we must take rice into the account to make it anywise adequate; but it at least proves the former not to have been too low.

Third calculation.—From about 1770 to 1777, there was no plague at Constantinople. The dead, which were carried out of the gates of the city, where a regular register is kept (except when, in time of the plague, they surpass one thousand a day, after which they are not counted) amounted only to 5,000 one year with another. This number, multiplied by 36, the largest number which possibly can be taken, though Constantinople is very healthy, and the Turks temperate, gives only 180,000 inhabitants. It must be observed,

observed, that some considerable people are buried in the city, in their gardens or private burial grounds, and some are carried to the cemeteries of Pera and Scutari, an account of all of which is not taken, as several on that side of the city do not pass the gates: if we allow 1,000 a year for these, which is certainly much beyond the truth, by this calculation there would appear to be 216,000 inhabitants. As to the suburbs of Pera and Galata, if they are to be included as making a part of Constantinople, they are not very considerable, consisting only of a few long streets. The number of souls they contain I have forgotten, and my memorandum is mislaid: I counted the houses.

Fourth calculation.—The ground on which Constantinople stands is not so extensive as Paris. Count Choisseul Gouffier, the French ambassador, had an exact plan made of it by a Mr. Kauffer, a very good geometrician, which proves this fact; and whoever walks across the city in different directions may convince himself of its accuracy. The streets in Paris are very narrow, the houses four and six stories high, and inhabited from top to bottom; the streets in Constantinople are also narrow. The churches, hotels, &c. of Paris, do not take up near so much ground as the mosques, baths, palaces, gardens, (of

which whole streets on the upper and back parts have one to each house), the seraglio, houses of the great, shops, and bazars, where people do not live, &c. The houses in Constantinople are spacious, except the very crowded quarter by the water side; they are composed of a ground-floor (*rez de chauffée*) which comprises the kitchen, a stable, wash-house, store rooms, &c. a room to receive strangers, and a yard in the centre, except in the above mentioned crowded quarter; over this there is but one story, where the family lives. This is the general construction of all the houses; they differ only in size and the number of apartments. It is a very unusual thing for two families to live in one house; it would be an indecency, and amount almost to a crime, except it be two brothers, or a father and a son, among the poorer people. Hence it follows demonstratively, that there cannot be above one fourth of the number of inhabitants in Constantinople, which there are in Paris, and whatever objection may be made to my other calculations, this cannot be confuted.

We may therefore conclude, that the population of Constantinople is less than 300,000 souls at present, and that it never could have been much more within the walls, with their mode of building houses.

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In the year 1777, there were 5,700 private and public boats of all sizes in the port of Constantinople, and in all the villages to the Black Sea. This number is great, but the situation of the city must be considered, and that every one must go in a boat who goes into the country, at least to the part frequented, which is across the water, or to the villages, all built by the water side, and almost inaccessible by land; that there are scarcely any kind of carriages; that the inhabitants of Constantinople take great pleasure in going on the water, and great numbers have boats of their own, almost all who can afford it; and that they make no use of carriages. In Paris, there were 12,500 coaches or carriages, and infinitely fewer people go in carriages in Paris, than they do in boats in Constantinople.

The Turks tell you indeed, and perhaps believe it, that there are 72,000 mosques in Constantinople. The Christians out of vanity, to make their sect appear considerable, magnify their own numbers, but no credit is to be given to them; these assertions cannot be opposed to calculations founded on facts.

Cairo is another city, the magnitude of which has been much exaggerated. Volney says, the number of inhabitants are 250,000 souls. I had an account of the population of

Cairo from a very sensible Armenian, who had lived twelve years there, which agreed nearly with Volney's; he made the number to be 230,000. Volney further says (on what foundation he does not mention) that all Egypt contains 2,300,000 souls—however, the population is there better known than in other parts of Turkey.

The people of the country tell us of 300,000 dying in a year of the plague, in Cairo, but no reliance is to be placed on their calculations.

Various are the opinions of writers and travellers with respect to the number of inhabitants in the Turkish empire, and difficult, certainly it is, to make a calculation with any degree of accuracy, in a country where there are no registers kept of births and burials, (except at Constantinople,) or other events which concern the general Mahomedan population of the cities, and where, in the country, not only the size, but the number of villages is unknown; there are, besides, wandering tribes and independent districts, such as the mountains inhabited by the Curds, as wholly unknown in Turkey as in Europe.

With respect to Christians and Jews the case is different; they keep regular registers of their births and burials; but as they remain

main in the several places they are made, and no account of them is transmitted to the government, it is impossible for any individual to collect them; nor indeed can one always rely on the affirmation of the bishops or other persons, who have the registers, without actual inspection of the books; for sometimes out of vanity they augment the statement of their population, and sometimes out of policy with regard to the Turks, they diminish the account of their numbers, as they are often taxed or fined *in a body*, to pay certain sums to a pasha (such unjust demands are called *avantias*,) and the smaller their numbers appear, they hope the less will be the sum imposed on them; it therefore requires address even to get at these registers, which, after all, have not the accuracy of similar documents in Christian countries.

The only datum which we can in anywise form a calculation upon, is the karatch, or capitation tax, on all male Christians and Jews above the age of fourteen or fifteen. By knowing the sum this tax is farmed at (which is less than the sum the collectors receive, and therefore not very accurate) and, more or less, the sum each male pays, we have some kind of data to reason from. This calculation gives nine million of souls; but it is
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to be remembered, that there is a part of the empire in which the inhabitants are independent, and consequently pay no capitation, as will be seen in the next chapter. The Greeks calculate their numbers to be seven millions in all parts of the empire, and there are not many in the distant provinces far from Greece.

The only method of calculating the Mahomedan inhabitants would be, the proportion they bear to the Christians in the different cities and provinces, and of which there are some vague accounts. In many places there are ten Christians to one Mahomedan, and in others ten Mahomedans to one Christian; in some, their numbers are nearly equal. Were I to make a guess (for a calculation I could not call it) my opinion with respect to the whole population of the Mahomedans in the empire would as widely differ from the generally received notions, as it does with respect to the particular population of Constantinople.

If their numbers have greatly decreased, we need seek no other cause to account for it than the plague; though there are many others co-operating with great destruction.

If we take for granted, that there were fifty millions of people on the continent two centuries ago; that the births are to the
burials

burials as twelve to ten, or that one in thirty-six die every year, in the common course of mortality, or that the number of births to the living are as one to 26, 27, or 28, or any calculation more favourable to the increase of population, we shall still find that the mortality occasioned by the plague, taken on an average (as its ravages are stated in these pages) would reduce these fifty millions to little more than ten at this day.

CHAPTER VIII.

On the State of the Turkish Provinces.

IT is not enough to confine our view to the metropolis, in order to form an accurate judgment of a great empire; there, indeed, is the centre of government and of opulence, there are placed the springs which guide the whole, and thither are brought the products of the general exertion; but it is not from the apparent tranquillity and greatness of the capital that we can form a just idea of the state of the provinces. Lulled into a fatal security within the recesses of his palace, the tyrant frequently knows not the scenes of ruin and devastation which, under sanction of his name, are acted at a distance by his creatures; he perceives not the increasing uneasiness and disaffection of his oppressed subjects, until the tempest of rebellion, rolling rapidly forward, breaks over his astonished head.

The relaxation of the bands of power has gone too far in the Turkish empire not to be,

be, in some degree, perceived by the porte; they cannot but feel the weakness of their authority over most of the distant *pashaliks*; but as ignorance is always confident, they, perhaps, over-rate their remaining power, and trust to the shadow of a name whose terror has long since passed away.

Still, it must be acknowledged, that there are circumstances which counteract the tendency of their political system to fall in ruins; there are prejudices, habits, and local peculiarities, which serve to hold together the barbarous inhabitants of those extensive regions. In order to judge of their importance, it will be necessary to consider, in detail, the situation of the different provinces, moral and physical; to trace "*mores hominum multorum et urbes*," not merely the strength and extent of the countries, but the spirit, manners, and dispositions of the people.

Of the dependent provinces of the Turkish empire, the first rank in the eye of an enlightened European will be held by the descendants of that people from whom emanated the science and the refinement of our hemisphere; of the Grecians, therefore, I shall treat at large in another part of this work; and I propose to consider them separately, because the distinctions, religious and political, existing between them and their Mahomedan

homedan conquerors, together with the relations they bear to the Christian states in general, will furnish ample matter for a separate discussion; I shall here only remark, that the captain pasha, or grand admiral, is pasha of the Archipelago, and the fleet, or a division, goes annually to collect the tribute: it is then that the poor Greeks most feel the weight of the iron sceptre that governs them, and all the insults and oppression of the vile satraps of the tyrant. When a ship of the fleet arrives in a port, all the people who can, fly to the mountains or into the country, others shut themselves up in their houses, without daring to stir out. Every one on the roads are plundered by the soldiers and sailors of the ships, and if they are not cut, or wounded with a pistol ball, or killed outright, they esteem themselves happy; even in the streets it is the same. Thus the poor Greeks pay another contribution to the fleet, which is heavier to those on whom it unhappily falls than that to the sultan.

If a woman or a girl, or even a boy, is met by them in any place not immediately under the eye of their officers, or where they might be exposed to resistance, they are infallibly victims to their brutality. In weak towns and villages this sometimes happens in the streets. The officers cannot always, and of-

ten will not restrain them, except where the crime is too public, and complaint might be made to the porte. The captains and officers raise contributions for themselves on the principal inhabitants under various pretences. The Greeks are generally prevented from complaining, out of fear that the next ship which comes will take revenge. When the ships of war are met at sea, they are little better than pirates to the Greeks and Ragusans.

With regard to the other countries which are, or have recently been subjected to the Turkish yoke, I shall here give them a brief consideration, from which it will appear that their situation, relatively to subordination and internal management, is such as might reasonably be expected from the wretched system of policy which we have previously investigated.

Casting our view over the pashaliks or governments most immediately connected with the seat of empire, we shall find them distracted, disorganised, and scarcely yielding more than a nominal obedience to the sultan: such are the pashaliks of Asia Minor and Syria. With regard to the more distant provinces, they may be considered connected with the porte rather by treaty than as integral parts of the empire. In this light I
view

view Moldavia and Walachia on the north, and Egypt on the south. These unfortunate countries (unfortunate in their political regulation, however blest by the bounty of nature) suffer, though in different degrees, from the harpy touch of Turkish despotism. I shall consider them singly, and add to these observations a review of the state of the Crimea, with some remarks on those Tatar hordes, whose ferocity has either been soothed or subdued by a subjection to Russia.

A slight sketch of the state of rebellion or independence of the chief pashaliks will easily demonstrate the weakness and inefficacy of the present political system of Turkey.

The great pashalik of Bagdad has been in reality independent, except at very short intervals, ever since Achmet Pasha, who defended it against Nadir Shah (the famous usurper of Persia.) The sultan only confirms the pasha the people, and principally the soldiery of Bagdad, have appointed to govern them with despotic power; the firman, however, sent on these occasions, always mentions the pasha as being nominated by the sublime porte to this high and trusty office, in consideration of his virtues, and some signal service he has rendered to the empire; and this farce is kept up by a new firman sent every year to continue him in office, as
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if the porte really had the power to remove him. The porte draws no revenue from this extensive province. The pasha, who has always a large army in his pay, and entirely devoted to him, sends regularly an account of the revenue of his government, which he always proves is entirely absorbed by the expences of the army, which he states as necessary to be kept on a formidable footing, to serve the empire against any attacks of the Persians or Arabs, and by the reparation of fortresses, which formerly existed, and of which no vestige now remains, &c. Whenever there is a war with an European power, and the pasha of Bagdad is called on to furnish his quota of troops, he pretends the necessity of keeping them all at home, to defend the province against the attacks of the Arabs, and finds means to provoke some Arab nation to war; or, in connivance with the prince of the Montefiks (an Arab nation on the banks of the Euphrates) carries on a sham war. In short, the sultan is the nominal sovereign of Bagdad, but the pasha has the real sovereign independent power in his hands.

In Armenia Major, and all the neighbouring countries, there are whole nations or tribes of independent people, who do not

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even acknowledge the porte, or any of its pashas.

The three Arabias do not acknowledge the sovereignty of the sultan, who only possesses, in these countries, a few unimportant towns.

The pasha of Ahiska cares very little for the porte; and the famous Haggi-Ali-Yenikli-Pasha, of Trabisonde, was the master of all that country; he could bring a large army into the field, and often set the porte at defiance.

In the country about Smyrna, there are great *agas*, who are independent lords, and maintain armies, and often lay that city under contribution. The porte never gains but a temporary influence, by sometimes intermeddling in their quarrels.

All the inhabitants of the mountains, from Smyrna to Palestine, are perfectly independent, and are considered by the porte as enemies, whom they attack whenever there is an opportunity. They are composed of different nations, who have their own sovereigns or lords, and are even of different religions. Those near Smyrna are Mahomedans; farther down come the Cordes, a very ferocious and faithless people. In the neighbourhood of Aleppo there are various sects of religion. The mountains of Antilibanus are inhabited
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by Drufes and Christians, and have, at times, been formidable to the porte; they have more than once taken Damafcus, and plundered it.

The nation of Drufes would here deferve particular mention; but as there are accounts of them already publifhed, which appeared to me, when I was in that country, very exact, I fhall forbear faying more about them; I cannot, however, avoid taking notice of a great miftake the Ruffians made in the laft war but one, in attacking thofe people in conjunction with Shech Omar al Daher, of Acri, between whom there never exifted much harmony. Had they reconciled their difference, which they might have done, they would have had for allies all the countries from Egypt to the Curdes, who, probably, would have joined the league, and the army they could have brought into the field would have been more numerous than that of the fultan; they would have been mafters of Damafcus, Aleppo, and all that part of the empire.

The very confiderable country, which was for fo many years under the jurifdiction of the fhech of Acri, never paid any revenue to the porte, and was by it even confidered as an independent ftate. Shech Dahar was befieged in his capital, after the conclufion of

the war, by the famous great-admiral, Hafsan Pasha; he himself was killed, and the country reduced to obedience. The porte appointed a pasha to govern it, and he has now become as independent, and more formidable, even than was Dahar himself.

Between the country of the Druses and that of Acrida there is a nation inhabiting the mountains on the back of Tyre, (which also belongs to them, though there are no houses now standing on that once famous spot,) called *Metuali*; they are of the sect of Ali, and are such inveterate enemies to the Turks, that they murder every one who comes into their country, or that they can surprize.

On the coast of Syria, the sultan only virtually possesses the ports of Latachia (Laodicea) a small shallow harbour and a ruined town; Alexandretta (or Scanderon) the port of Aleppo, a miserable village, the air of which is so bad, that it, perhaps, has not its equal in the world for insalubrity; Tripoli and Sidon, Jaffa, and a few very insignificant places. The caravans, which go from Scanderon to Aleppo, are obliged to go by the way of Antioch, as all the country, through which the direct road leads, belongs to the Kurds, who will not suffer the Turks to pass it.

All Egypt is independent. The pasha sent
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to Cairo is in effect a prisoner during his government, which is only nominal; the porte draws little or no revenue from it, and no troops, except a few fanatics in time of war with the Christians. The Turks have at different times got possession of Cairo, but never could maintain themselves in the government. The last instance of their subjecting the capital was by the late Hassan, captain pasha, but it was soon lost again; yet Constantinople depends very much on Egypt for provisions, and above all for rice. The Russians, when they had a fleet in the Mediterranean, very much distressed the porte, by cutting off the communication with Egypt, and might have done it much more, had they not permitted many neutral vessels to supply them.

In Europe, the Morea, Albania, Epirus, and Scutari, are more or less in a state of rebellion; Bosnia, Croatia, &c. obey the porte only as long as it suits them, and the sultan reaps little benefit from them. These latter countries afford the most robust and warlike soldiers in the empire; they are accustomed to arms from their infancy, as they are continually fighting among themselves, district against district, and often even village against village, besides individual quarrels of families. These troops would be

of great use to the sultan in his wars, but they will not go far from their houses, and serve only when it is to defend their own country: the emperor of Germany has had to contend with them, while only the enervated and dastardly soldiery of Asia has been opposed to Russia.

Lately we have seen almost all European Turkey in arms against the porte, Adrianople in imminent danger, and even Constantinople itself trembling for its safety.

I have said that Egypt is independent: a few words on the peculiar relation of that country to Turkey will not be improper, perhaps. The division of the spiritual dignities of the Mahomedans took place, A. D. 970, in an early period of their religion, and the Fatimite kalifs established themselves in Egypt, claiming to themselves the title of *commander of the faithful*, heretofore borne by the kalifs of Bagdad.

Both these kalifs successively yielded to the force or policy of the Turkish princes. The last of the Egyptian kalifs called in the Turks to his assistance against the Christian crusaders, which service being accomplished, the new allies *turned against the kalif himself, and strangled him*, A. D. 1171, when a new dynasty commenced in the person of Salah-ud-din.

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The Egyptian princes long maintained an independent power by the assistance of their Mamaluk troops, until, in 1518, they were reduced to subjection by Selim the son of Bayazet, and have ever since remained attached, nominally at least, to the porte; but as their beys were not deprived of their power, and to this day each is governor, or rather sovereign of a district, these in fact exercise a tyranny of the worst kind over a country, which would be one of the most productive in the universe, were property protected, while they render little either of tribute or submission to the port.

This corps of *Mamaluks* is kept up, to this day, by *slaves* bought from the same countries, viz. Geòrgia, Circassia, Abassá, and Mingrelia, and mostly purchased at Constantinople, for their children, born in the country, are not admitted into the corps; indeed it is affirmed, and it is very remarkable, that they have but few children, and their families never extend beyond two generation. This is accounted for by their being greatly addicted to an unnatural vice.

The actual power resides in the Mamaluks, and the bey who has most of them in his suite is consequently the most powerful. As to the pasha sent by the porte, he has at

different times had more or less influence, but is in general a mere cypher, obliged to submit to the will of the beys, who dismiss him when they please. They have sometimes entirely thrown off all appearance of submission to the porte; and at present, as well as generally, their obedience is only nominal, and the pasha is in reality a prisoner in the castle of Cairo, which is the place fixed for his residence.

The tribute which Egypt ought to send the porte is frequently withheld, or, if transmitted, it is diminished by deductions for the reparation of canals, fortresses, &c. at the will of the beys. Yet a long procession of mules and camels sets out annually from Egypt, with the pretended revenue for the sultan, which, instead of silver, consists mostly of bags of rice, and, not unfrequently, stones.

The janizaries and Arab soldiers in the service of the porte are but little able to enforce its authority, as they are few in number, and mostly composed of artizans and persons unaccustomed to arms. The Mamaluks, on the contrary, must be allowed to be most excellent cavalry.

In the beautiful country and climate of Egypt, it is distressing to consider how little the advantages of nature are cultivated, and
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how much its evils are augmented by the ignorance and unaccountably gross superstition of its inhabitants.

From a survey of Egypt I turn to the northern part of the empire, to contemplate the provinces of Walachia and Moldavia, which, like the last mentioned country, are rather attached to the empire by treaty than by absolute subjection, and who retain at least independence as to matters of internal regulation; their inhabitants are, however, more oppressed than perhaps any people in the empire; nor could they possibly bear such exactions, were it not for the wonderful fertility of their soil.

Their waywodes (or princes as they are generally still called) are Greeks, who purchase their offices for large sums of money, the porte generally receiving about 80,000 pounds sterling for every nomination, and who are obliged to maintain themselves in their posts, by continually seeing those who can serve or hurt, them at Constantinople; for besides the complaints which frequently are made against them, other Greeks are continually caballing at the porte to get them removed, and to obtain their places. The waywodes must, besides raising large sums to defray all these expences, enrich themselves, in order to live in affluence with a large train of dependents,

pendents, who follow them from Constantinople, and to secure a safe and splendid retreat to themselves when recalled from their waywodings to their former homes, where, though the fear of punishment is ever hanging over them, and destroying their repose, they maintain within their own houses a weak and ostentatious magnificence. It is easy to conceive how much the miserable subjects of their despotism, while in office, must suffer from the impositions necessary to answer such calls of rapacity.

The boyars are obliged to furnish money to the waywode, and they in return oppress the people by all kinds of exactions, exclusively of the public taxes, which go immediately into the waywode's purse, and which are multiplied ad infinitum, and exacted with the utmost severity: these taxes, which are not in proportion to the property of the people, aggravate them beyond description; they murmur, but must submit and pay.

Among the hardships of the Moldavians may be reckoned their being obliged to furnish a supply of corn to Constantinople, at a certain price fixed when they first came under the Turkish yoke: this was originally established as a favour to those countries, but has now become an intolerable burthen,

as the price now bears no proportion to the present value.

Another great cause of complaint is the passage through their country, or residence in it, of a Turkish army in time of war. The excesses which these undisciplined hordes commit are beyond description, plundering and laying waste the country, and often destroying whole villages, and massacring their defenceless inhabitants; hence it is not unusual for the inhabitants to flee with their most valuable effects to the woods and mountains for concealment, as soon as they hear of the approach of an army: I was myself a witness of the terror of the Moldavians for a similar event. Being a prisoner, in 1778, at Galaz (when hostilities had taken place in some parts, between Russia and the Turks, which had nearly ended in a war) I was awakened one night by the cries of women, and the noise of the preparations made by the whole town to flee, on a rumour (which proved groundless) of the approach of a Turkish army. I then learnt that every family was provided with a waggon, and one or more horses, to escape in case of danger.

The Turkish soldiery, if they stay but a short time in a place, cause so much havock, that the unfortunate Moldavians and Wallachians,

lachsians, returning to their homes after these monsters have withdrawn, are for a considerable time unable to rebuild their houses, and procure seed and other requisites for the cultivation of their corn fields and vineyards, which the Turks have rooted up.

The following circumstances will prove how much reason the Moldavians in particular have to prefer the dominion of Russia to that of Turkey.

At the peace of Kainargi it was stipulated, that the waywode should not be removed without the consent of the court of Russia, in order to deliver the people from the oppression necessarily attendant on a frequent change of their rulers. The porte, however, in 1777, sent to the waywode Gica a particular friend of his, who, pretending illness, requested Gica to pay him a visit, under pretence of communicating to him affairs of secrecy; the attendants of the waywode were sent out of the room, when a band of russians rushed into the apartment from a private door, and murdered this unhappy credulous man. A successor was immediately appointed, without consulting the court of Russia, or its minister at Constantinople. This is the nation whose scrupulous observance of treaties is so much vaunted by some writers.

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While Moldavia was in the hands of the Russians, during the last war, Prince Potemkin treated the inhabitants with the utmost indulgence, and exempted them from all kind of taxes, so that they returned with great reluctance under the Turkish yoke. It is little consolation to them to be governed by princes or governors of their own religion, for their situation, if not their inclination, makes them as rapacious as Turks. The contemptuous and humiliating treatment all ranks meet with from the Turks is impatiently borne by a race of people naturally haughty, and aspiring for liberty and independence, and particularly the Boyars, who are treated by the Russians as equals and as gentlemen, and, if they emigrate, are admitted into the civil or military service.

If there were any deficiency of proof to establish the miserable debility of the Turkish government, with regard to its distant provinces, and the horrible devastation to which those provinces are subject, we should find it in the eulogist of Turkey, Mr. Peyssonel. He was French consul in the Crimea, in 1758, when a rebellion broke out, occasioned by the extortions of the officers of the porte, relative to the *ichetirah*, or transporting of corn. The rebellious Tatars, to the number of eighty thousand, pillaged and
 overrun,

overrun, in seven days, the province of Moldavia, carried off forty thousand slaves, spread terror and desolation on all sides, and the porte had no other means of settling this disturbance than by deposing the reigning khan, Alim Guerrai, and placing in his room Krim Guerrai, the rebel chief. At this time, says Mr. Peyssonel, we saw the plains of Kichela, covered, as far as the eye could reach, with male and female slaves of all ages, cattle, camels, horses, sheep, and all kinds of plunder, heaped together. The whole of this booty was taken from a Christian province subject to the porte. Krim Guerrai, in return for his exaltation, endeavoured to cause the effects to be restored to their proprietors, and the prisoners to be set at liberty; but, notwithstanding the vigorous and determined measures of this prince, he could only wrest from the rapacious banditti under his command a small part of their plunder. Of the slaves, many were secreted or sold, and many dead from brutal treatment, so that only half the number of the prisoners returned to their country. This is the account of Peyssonel, the friend of Krim Guerrai; but it is well known, that he himself had a part of the plunder, and that only such were sent back, whose age rendered them unfit for their purposes. I was informed, in Moldavia, from the

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the registers, that there were above thirty thousand souls, the flower of their youth, who never returned. Surely this picture of desolating barbarity sufficiently marks the character of the Tatar hordes; and if we add, that they were constantly making incursions into Russia, Poland, Circassia, &c. to carry off the inhabitants, plunder and burn the villages, it sufficiently justifies the court of Russia in taking possession of this nest of thieves and murderers, and reducing them to something like social order and subordination. Instead of being blamed, as the empress has been, by these Christians, who always sympathise with Turks, and by those politicians who think the duration of their usurped empire a desirable object, she ought to receive the thanks of all men, of whatever nation, and particularly of Christians, who are not degraded by prejudices, or corrupted by the practice of similar enormities. The whole reign of the Tatars has been an insult to mankind, and a disgrace to human nature, not inferior to that of the Ottoman sultans. Was it to be expected that a power like Russia should suffer itself to be thus insulted by a horde of savages, when she could redress the grievance? and had she not a *right* as sovereign, as a Christian, and as a friend to humanity, to protect her feeble neighbours, who

who had no other support to look to, and whose plunder and depopulation strengthen her enemy as well as theirs? She had a sacred right, and the mouth is unholy which dares to arraign it.

The connection of the Tatar hordes with the Turks, both in origin and religion, induces me to review the state of their most celebrated feat, the Crimea (or Krim) though it has now passed under the dominion of Russia, and has been abandoned by a great part of its former inhabitants. To this I am the more prompted by the erroneous ideas which have been propagated in Europe relative to that measure, to the country in general, and to the nature of their ancient government, hitherto so little known. To explain all this, it may be necessary to present a sketch of the Tatar modes of warfare, and their small degree of civilization, and to notice the improved state of manners and commerce which is arising under the fostering care of Russia.

The name of Tattar or Tatar, not Tartar, is common to a vast number of those roving and uncultivated tribes, who inhabit the wide extent of country from the northern frontier of China to the borders of Hungary, and from among whom have arisen, in darker ages, the conquerors and the founders of
many

many mighty empires. The tribes on the north of the Euxine had, like many other countries bordering on the Turkish empire, been subjected to a kind of dependence; they yielded little in time of peace, and in war supplied only a predatory banditti, little less terrible to their friendly neighbours than to the hostile power.

In very early ages the empire of the Crimea (the ancient Chersonesus Taurica) arose out of the ruins of the still more ancient and extensive dominion of the khans of Kaptchak. It took its name from the town of Krim, of which little vestiges now remain, and is at present called Eski-Krim (or Old-Krim) but which was a place of great trade in the year 1237, when the Mongul Tatars established their dominion in this peninsula. These princes were wholly independent, until the Genoese, having established themselves there in the 15th century for the sake of commerce, obtained such an ascendancy as to depose or elect the native khans at pleasure. Over the principal gate of Kaffa there still exists a Genoese inscription and the arms of the republic. The Turks having expelled the Genoese, began in like manner by respecting the independence of the khans, especially as they had embraced the Mahomedan religion; but they soon assumed the

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right

right of confirming their election, and finally, of nominating them to office. Under the hands of Turkey, the Black Sea, which had formerly been the scene of a very active commerce, was shut up by the narrow policy of the divan, and the ports of the Krim gradually lost that splendor and magnificence now attested only by their ruins. No friend of humanity can do otherwise than rejoice that such masters have, by the events of war, been dispossessed of this important country, and that it has fallen under the control of a power, whose more liberal and enlightened views tend to revive a decayed commerce, to polish barbarian ferocity, and to render a portion of the globe, which had been almost a desert, again fertile and productive.

Immediately as the empress got possession of the Krim, she projected the recal of trade and manufactures to a spot so well situated for them; she immediately, and at a great expence, formed new establishments for that purpose, sent a number of troops to protect her new dominions, and allowed the reigning khan to retire on a liberal pension.

The following account of the former government of that country, which I had, in 1781, from Seid-Effendi, vizir to Shaheen Guerrai, the reigning khan, and which I found

found by other information to be perfectly accurate, I present as the more deserving notice, as no just account of that government has hitherto appeared. To compare it with the ancient feudal governments, and to offer a number of conjectures which would arise from an investigation of that subject, would be foreign to my present purpose, and a task I am not qualified to undertake, but it may furnish matter for the speculations of others.

The khan was always the eldest male of the *Guerrai* family, descended from *Gengis Khan*, except there was some natural incapacity which excluded him from the succession, or that the country, which sometimes happened, interfered, and elected another, but always one of the *Guerrai* family, and the eldest and nearest to the right line of descent. Afterwards this family became very numerous, and it was difficult to determine who had the best claim, so that the khans were latterly wholly elective. Those most concerned in the election were the beys and the *murfas*; but the general opinion of the nation was also considered, as the nomination of an unwarlike or unpopular khan would occasion an opposition on the part of the people.

After the Turks became formidable to the *Krim Tatars*, the porte established a right of approving the election, and afterwards of

appointing the khan solely. The beys and principal mufas (or myrfas) sometimes wrote to Constantinople to solicit the sovereignty for the prince whom they preferred, and sometimes the candidates bribed the porte.

The khan retained his sovereignty only during the pleasure of the Ottoman sultan, and annually a capugee-bashi was sent from Constantinople with a firman confirming him for the year to come. By the peace of Kainargi, in 1774, the Krim was declared independent, and the Tatars restored to their privilege of electing their own sovereign.

If the khan was deposed, it was by a firman (or hatti-shef) of the sultan, brought from Constantinople by a capugee-bashi. His deposition was often the consequence of complaints against him by the principal people of the Krim, or of dissatisfaction on the part of the porte of his conduct in time of war, or tardiness in supplying the capital with corn; but he was never put to death.

The last unfortunate khan, who reigned when I received this information, was an exception. He quitted Russia, and retired to Constantinople, where he was at first received with great distinction, then exiled, and afterwards put to death.

The deposed khans were sometimes exiled to Siberia, and sometimes to the Crimea.

to a distant part of the empire, or one of the Greek islands, but generally the porte gave them a *chiftlik*, or kind of farm, consisting of a country-house and cultivated lands, between Constantinople and Adrianople, whither they carried with them their domestics, and such as were attached to their fortunes. There are at present nearly three hundred princes of the family residing in those parts, who sometimes render the roads unsafe, as they or their people cannot entirely abandon their old custom of plundering. They are the next heirs to the Ottoman throne, and the reigning family has often been nearly extinct. At present there are, besides the sultan, only two sons, still very young, of his late uncle Abd-ul-hamid. Selim himself has no children: he is much addicted to a vice which generally carries with it this punishment.

When the sultan appointed a khan, he wrote to the four beys, informing them that he had named such a prince for their sovereign.

The khan was as despotic as the Ottoman sultan in the execution of the law, which in common cases was that of the koran; in extraordinary cases, or where he did not choose to appeal to the law, there was no restraint on his power, except with respect to the beys families, as shall be hereafter mentioned,

tioned, and in affairs which concerned the nation at large.

The khans had no land of their own, except a very little about Baghiserrai.

All the sons of the Guerrai family are stiled *sultans*.

There was a council, or rather a state (*état*) composed of the four eldest persons of four families who have the title of bey (the same as the Arabic beg) or prince. The names of these families are Sherin, Barin (or Baron,) Mansur, and Sigevut.

The first family is very numerous; of the second, two persons only were living in 1782; of the Mansurs there are also many, but of the Sigevuts few. The Sherins, who are esteemed the most noble, and to whom the sovereignty would devolve, were the Guerrai family extinct, frequently marry daughters of the Guerrais, and sometimes, though not often, out of the most considerable Myrsas families.

The khan was, by the constitution of the government, obliged to consult them in matters of peace and war, and all matters which concerned the nation in general, and to confirm all matters of importance written by the khan to Constantinople, or any other courts, by their signature.

The khan could not put to death any one of the families of the beys, without permission

sion from Constantinople; he could only imprison them. Formerly they were judged by the other beys and the khan, and if the other beys were implicated in his crime, by the mürfas, or body of landholders,

Neither the beys, nor any of their family, could serve the khan in any office whatever.

A bey could not sell, or otherwise alienate the family lands and possessions, which were inherited, not by his children, but by his successor in office or dignity. The money and moveable effects the beys could leave to whom they pleased, and it was in this manner that they provided for their children. All the individuals of the beys families were called mürfas, except the person invested with the dignity of bey.

In criminal cases, the beys as well as the mürfas, on whose lands the crime was committed, seized the offender, and sent him to the khan or other officer of justice. This is to be understood of capital offences; in cases of less importance they might punish by beating.

There was another state, composed of the mürfas or proprietors of land, and who considered themselves as a separate class from the people; their ideas of distinction on this head exactly correspond with those received

ceived in Europe, of *gentlemen* or *nobles*. The word *murfa* (in Persian *mirsa*) signifies lord, or seigneur, and we should translate it *esquire*, *lord of the manor*, or *lesser baron*, while the beys are the *great barons* or *peers*.

The eldest sons of the *murfas* inherited their father's lands, and not the eldest males of the family, as was the case with the beys. Of their money or other effects they disposed as they pleased to their younger children. They had the same jurisdiction as the beys in cases of offences committed on their lands, that is, beating or imprisoning, and sending the offenders to the khan or other tribunals.

The khan could put to death a *murfa*, but he always, when the nature of the case admitted delay, judged the offender before the beys, or an assembly of the *murfas*, or such of his friends who insisted on seeing justice done to him according to the koran.

In matters of national concern, or which might occasion a general discontent, the khan assembled the *murfas* as well as the *four beys*; the latter acting always as a check on the great power of the khan, and restraining the power an union of the *murfas* sometimes had rendered too dictating. In former times the beys and the *murfas* deposed their sovereign, when his conduct had occasioned a general discontent; but this was considered as so dangerous

dangerous a step, that it was never recurred to, except in very urgent necessities,

The peasants or country people, who formed the body of the nation, were free,

The peasant, who farmed a piece of land for agriculture or pasture, paid to the bey or murfa, who was the owner, twenty per cent of the produce for rent,

If the land was his own, he paid only ten per cent, to the bey or murfa, in whose district it lay.

The peasant disposed of his property as he pleased; if he died intestate, the law of the koran decided the succession,

When the khan raised an army for war, he sent a summons to the beys and murfas to furnish their quota, which was fixed in proportion to the number of people who dwelt on their possessions. Every bey or murfa commanded the body he brought into the field. The khan gives the soldiers neither pay nor provisions; their officers or themselves provided what was necessary till they passed their frontier, when they subsisted on plunder, whether the country belonged to a friendly or an inimical power. Almost every Tatar had a horse and arms of his own.

A part of the booty, which they always made whenever they passed their frontier, belonged to the khan, a part to their bey or murfa,

murfa, and the remainder to themselves, which was generally the most considerable.

The beys nor the murfa were permitted to make war with one another; and the people were forbid to take a share in their personal quarrels.

There was another class of the people, who dwelt in cities and towns, and who paid no rent to the beys or murfas for the ground their houses stood on, or their gardens or fields, which belonged to themselves, or they hired of other proprietors, as these lands or grounds belonged to the city or town; nor were they subject to be called out to war; they often, for the sake of plunder, voluntarily joined the corps of some bey or murfa.

There were some other persons in the Krim, who had the title of bey, but they did not belong to the *state* or *état*, and were in effect only common murfas.

There was a class of people also called *courtiers*, *kapu-khalki*, people of the *porte* or gate, that is, the court, because justice was anciently administered by the judge sitting at his gate; they consisted of the vizir, khuznadar-bashi, desterdar, akhtagibey, kapigi-bashi, &c. The khan appointed any person he pleased to these offices, as murfas or their sons, merchants, Turks, &c. and when they had an office, if they were of an insignificant

cant family, they were called aga, and their sons took the title of murfa. The beys and great murfas sometimes gave their daughters in marriage to the courtiers if they were become persons of consequence, but, however, this was rare, and generally by the solicitation of the khan.

The great officers of the state were

1. GALGA-SULTAN. He was governor of the city of Akmedschit, and its district, where he always resided. He was always of the Guerrai family, and had in his district power of life and death, as the khan himself. No person older than the reigning khan could be appointed to this office. He had a court, and officers of the same denomination as the khan, viz. a vizir, khaznadar, &c. It has been always understood by those who have treated of the Krim, that galga-sultan was the khan's eldest son; this is never the case.

2. NURUDDIN-SULTAN. He also could be of no other family but of the Guerrai. He had the same privileges as galga-sultan, but could not put to death; he resided always with the khan, but had no part in the administration of justice, or any other department, farther than giving his advice, or transacting for the khan in his name such business as he entrusted him with. His office
seems

seems to have been a kind of occasional lieutenant to the khan, always at hand.

3. OR-BEY (or ore-bey as it is pronounced) lived at Perekop, called Or. His privileges were the same as those of galga-sultan; except that he could not put to death; he was not always of the *Guerrai* family, but sometimes a *Sherin*, in which case he had no *vizir*, but he had all the other officers of his court the same as a sultan.

4. AK-KIRMAN-SERASKIR was always a sultan, and had power of life and death. He resided at *Akkirman*, before the Turks took possession of *Besarabi*; he was also governor of the *Nogai-Tatars* before they emigrated from the plains to the north of Perekop to the Kuban; he had the same officers as *galga-sultan*.

5. KUBAN-SERASKIR had the same power and privileges as *galga-sultan*, being always a sultan of the *Guerrai* family. Besides, every tribe of the *Kuban-Tatars* had a *seraskir*, who administered justice in the tribe, but was under *kuban-seraskir*, and could not put to death.

Besides these there were,

1. The MUFTI in the Krim, appointed by the khan, and who resided with him at *Bagchiserrai*, but there was no body of *ulema* to check

check

check the power of the government, as at Constantinople. When the Turks were in possession of Caffa, they had a musti there, but he never was consulted by the Tatars, or suffered to meddle in their affairs.

2. A kadilaskir (or kaziaskir) in like manner appointed by, and residing with the khan.

3. Twenty-four kadis (or kazis) one in every considerable district, besides kadis in the Kuban, where every kadi had a district of several villages or encampments of tents.

Thus this singular government seems originally to have been feudal, but was afterwards, when the Tatars became Mahomedans, modified by the adoption of the laws of the koran. The Tatars acknowledged the sultan of Constantinople as kalif and head of their religion. They never could be persuaded to leave off eating horseflesh, which is forbidden by the Mahomedan law to Muselmans. The Turkish mustis wisely decided, that horseflesh was forbidden to all other Mahomedans to eat, but not to the Tatars, as they had been accustomed to it, and that thereby it ceased to be a sin.

The REVENUES of the reigning Khans were,
1st. TEN PER CENT. of the corn the Nogais grew.

2. The

2. The produce of the SALT LAKES—very little salt was the property of individuals—they rendered him about one hundred thousand dollars a year, that is, about twelve thousand five hundred pounds sterling.

3. The DUTY on imports and exports, which usually amounted to the same sum of one hundred thousand dollars, or twelve thousand five hundred pounds sterling.

4. SUBSIDIES, which the Ottoman *porte* paid to the *khan* in time of war, and frequently other sums, to assist in armaments, and to keep the Tatars in good humour.

5. The sums annually sent by the Ottoman sultan to defray the expences of Galgasultan's court, and to pay the officers of the khan's court, as vizir, khafnader, &c. with a view to render them more dependent.

6. The pay of the *seimans*, a body of troops of about 1,600, who served as guards to the khan, was always sent from Constantinople.

The Turks, in return, could always rely on a body of auxiliary cavalry from the Krim and the Kuban.

The Christians and Jews paid a capitation tax, as in Turkey, to the beys or mufas; but they were infinitely less vexed than in Turkey, enjoyed more protection, and were treated with less insolence and indignity.

The

The revenue of Shaheen-Guerrai-Khan, in 1781, amounted to 900,000 dollars, without calculating the sums usually sent from Constantinople; this sum makes about £.112,500 sterling.

The number of inhabitants was then reduced to about 100,000 souls in the Krim, and 600,000 souls in the Kuban; two thirds of the inhabitants had emigrated to Turkey since the beginning of that khan's reign, which was the last. In the autumn of 1777, the Tatars of the Krim alone met the Russian army, under Prince Proserofsky, in the plains of Salguir, with forty thousand men, all well mounted and armed. In 1782, the large city of Kaffa consisted only of 450 houses inhabited.

It may not be inapposite to say a few words on the reign of the last khan of the Tatars, and the final extinction of the Tatar dominion in the Krim.

In the treaty of peace of Kainargi, concluded in July 1774, the independence of the Krim was stipulated in these words. Art. III.
*"All the Tatar people, those of Crimea, of
 "Budgiac, of the Kuban, the Edissans, Geam-
 "bouiluks and Edischkuls, shall, without any
 "exception, be acknowledged by the two empires
 "as free nations, and entirely independent of any
 "foreign power, and shall be governed by their
 "own*

" own sovereign of the race of *Gingis-Khan*,
" elected and raised to the throne by all the
" Tatar people; who shall govern them accord-
" ing to their ancient laws and usages, render-
" ing no account whatever to any foreign power;
" it is for this reason that neither the court of
" Russia nor the Ottoman porte ought not to
" meddle, under any pretext whatever, in the
" election of the said khan, nor in their affairs,
" domestic, politic, civil, and interior, but, on
" the contrary, acknowledge and consider the
" said Tatar nation in its political and civil
" state, on the same footing as other powers,
" which govern by themselves, and are depen-
" dent on God alone. With respect to the cere-
" monies of religion, as the Tatars profess the
" same worship as the Muselmans, they shall
" regulate themselves with regard to his high-
" ness, as grand kalif of Mahometanism, accord-
" ing to the precepts which their law prescribes
" to them, without, however, any prejudice to
" the confirmation of their civil and religious
" liberty, &c."—"Russia engages to withdraw
" its troops, &c. and the sublime porte to re-
" linquish all right whatever, which he might
" have to the fortresses, cities, habitations, &c.
" in Crimea, the Kuban, or in the island of Ta-
" man, nor to keep in any of these places, gar-
" risons, nor other armed people, &c. &c."

In consequence of this stipulation, *Shaheen*
Guerrai

Guerrai was elected khan by the beys and mürsas, with the approbation of the people, as it seemed, for no discontent appeared among them.

The new khan, however, did not long keep his popularity. He wished to civilize his people, and introduce the European discipline among his troops. He would have succeeded, had he paid more respect to the deep rooted prejudices of the people. He began by entirely abolishing the old form of government; he raised new soldiers and paid them, and appointed mürsas for their officers. They had no standing army before, but every man was a soldier. He diminished the rent paid by the people to the mürsas for their land, and appropriated it to his own use, allowing such mürsas as would serve in the army handsome salaries. He affected too much the manner of the Christians or Russians, though he observed with punctuality all the ceremonies of his religion. His expences were thus increased beyond his income, and he could not, like his predecessors, apply for pecuniary assistance to the Ottoman Porte, which had ceased to pay the salaries of the officers of his court. He struck a new coin at an enormous expence; the mint was conducted by a German. He farmed out the different branches of the revenue to people
Y who

who exacted the payment with a rigour hitherto unknown. He established a corps of artillery, and endeavoured to form a marine; but want of revenue prevented him succeeding in any one undertaking.

The Turks saw with jealousy the independence of the Tatars, and lamented being deprived, in all probability, of their assistance in any future war, as the khan declared his intention of remaining neutral, as the only means of making his people formidable, and maintaining his independence. The Turks laboured incessantly by their emissaries, who were mostly religious enthusiasts, to stir up the people to rebellion. They succeeded in raising such a spirit of discontent, that the khan, fearful of his personal safety, called in a body of Russians, and placed small corps in different parts of the country. The Turks had, previously to this, sent a body of troops to Taman, and beheaded one of the khan's commanders.

I arrived at the Russian fortress of Janikali, in October 1777, and was setting out for Bagthirai, when news arrived that the Tatars had suddenly fallen on the dispersed Russians in every part of the Krim and the Kuban at the same time, and had cut them all off; the khan himself luckily escaped to the Russian head-quarters. The Ottoman
Porte,

Porte, at the same time, had appointed a new khan, and sent him to the port now called Sebastopolis, with five ships of the line. A Russian army soon entered the Crimea; the Tatars were defeated, and during the winter reduced again to obedience to their khan. The Russians are accused of committing some cruelties on this occasion. If they cannot be justified as Christians for following the law of retaliation, they are, as men, somewhat excusable.

The Tatars, though reduced to obedience, could not be kept in that state by the few troops the khan could rely on; he was therefore obliged to have an auxiliary army from Russia, and the porte made several attempts to excite a fresh rebellion. The empress, at last tired out by the continual alarms they occasioned, and determined no longer to suffer her subjects to be exposed to the calamities the incursions of these barbarians occasioned, seized on the Krim and Kuban in 1783. The khan retired to Kaluga, in Russia Minor, where he was allowed a very large pension by the empress, and treated in every respect as a sovereign; but, unaccustomed to a quiet and inactive life, he quitted Russia, and went to Constantinople, where at first he was received with great distinction, but was soon sent into exile to a Greek island, and one day,

as he was in his bath, he was seized and strangled, and his head sent to Constantinople.

I beg the reader will excuse a short digression respecting myself, as it may throw some light on the character or morals of the people I was among. The $\frac{1}{11}$ th December, 1777, I sailed from Janicali, in a small vessel, for Kaffa, (the road by land being unsafe) which had just been taken by the Russians, under General Balmaine, by storm, and many Turks, who were at Kaffa, had been put to the sword by a Greek corps from Janicali, who also robbed my servant of all my baggage, to a very considerable amount, and which I never recovered. Instead of making the port of Kaffa, we were driven by a storm along the coast, and after losing our bowsprit and all our anchors, we were in great distress for water, being eighty persons on board, all military men. We made several descents on the coast to procure water, but were always beaten off by the Tatars; at last we passed Belaklava, and lay to in the gulph of Gioslévé, opposite the port of Sebastopolis; where we saw the Turkish fleet at anchor. The master of a Turkish mercantile vessel came out to us, and we bargained with him, for about fifty pounds sterling, for a cask of water, which he promised to bring us off in the

the night; but as soon as he got on shore, we observed one of the Turkish frigates loosening her topsails to come out. It was nearly night, and we put to sea and bore away for the Danube, the only port we could reach with the wind we had, preferring to throw ourselves on the mercy of the Turks to perishing by thirst. I was the only person in the vessel who could navigate her out of sight of land. The captain, who was a Greek, had become mad. I found two Turkish charts of the Black Sea, which differed in the latitude of the Danube a degree. I examined the coast of Anatolia, which I had surveyed that summer from Constantinople to Kitros, and by that judged which was the best.

We arrived safe off Sulina-mouth, but the wind not permitting us to enter, a Turkish boat came out to us; and here I cannot enough commend the humanity we experienced from the crews of several Turkish merchant vessels. We had only a hawser and a boat anchor to hold the ship. The water was very smooth. It was already night. They sent out five large boats manned to tow us in, if there should be any danger, and they remained with us all night. We got safe into the river in the morning.

The next day I set off for Galatz, intending to go by land to Russia. In the river I found two new Turkish 50 gun ships, without their guns or crews. I had known the captains at Constantinople, and was received with kindness by them.

The 1st January, 1778, I went to the Greek governor, to pay him a complimentary visit: I found a very cold reception from him; he was seated on his sofa with a Turk, in appearance of some distinction, who immediately produced a warrant from the pasha of Ebrahim to cut off my head and those of 26 persons who were come with me from the vessel. The executioner was standing in the room, with a bag to put our heads in, and a heap of sawdust was laid in the court before the house to absorb the blood. My Greek interpreter was so terrified, that he could utter no other word than *quel sacco*, pointing to the bag in which his head was to be put. Luckily I was not intimidated; but I was obliged to speak for myself as well as I could, and with great difficulty persuaded the officer, who was filiktar (sword-bearer) to the pasha, that I was an Englishman, and came with no ill intentions; that were I an enemy, in the situation we came into the Danube the custom of all nations granted

granted us an asylum. He then told me, we were accused of coming into the Danube with a design to burn the two Turkish ships of war. In short my arguments, and a few thousand dollars in Russian bank notes, prevailed on him to go back to the pasha for fresh instructions, and to send to the captains of the Turkish ships of war, who engaged to answer with their heads that I was an Englishman, and a friend of the captain pasha's. It was a lucky circumstance that they had seen me with the captain pasha, and knew that I really was an Englishman.

I afterwards learnt that the Greek governor, who had at first received me with great civility, was our accuser.

We remained prisoners at large in the town three months, when an order from the captain pasha came to let us depart, and "*that we should be so little molested, that if a bird perched on the mast top it should be driven away.*"

While I was in the quarantine at the Russian frontier, in September 1778, there passed 75,000 Christians, obliged by the Russians to emigrate from the Crimea (35,769 males.) The Armenian women, who came from Kassa, were more beautiful, and, I think, approached nearer that perfect form which the

Grecians have left us in their statues, than the women of Tino. These people were sent to inhabit the country abandoned by the Nogai Tatars, near the west coast of the sea of Azof (Palus Mæotis) but the winter coming on before the houses built for them were ready, a great part of them had no other shelter from the cold than what was afforded them by holes dug in the ground, and covered with what they could procure; they were people who all came from comfortable homes, and the greatest part perished; seven thousand only were alive a few years ago. A colony from Italy to the banks of the Borysthenes, in 1783, had no better fate, owing to the bad management of those who were commissioned to provide for them, and not to the climate; nor have colonies of Germans been more fortunate in Russia—but this is a digression.

I shall here take the opportunity of correcting a few errors into which some writers of celebrity have fallen.

With respect to the title of sultan, borne by the Gengiskhan family, and to that of khan (written frequently by the French, who do not distinguish the sound of an *m* from an *n* when not followed by a vowel, *kam* and *cham*, as they write Edimbourg, &c.) Baron de Tott has made some observations

vations which require correction. His errors, which are not entirely cleared up by Peyssonel, arise from not having observed the different force which these words have in the different countries where they are used. They are both words of command, and (contrary to Tott's assertion) are used by the Turkish emperors to express sovereignty, as is evident from the Arabic inscription on the Ottoman money : *Sultan, ebn ul sultan, Abdulhamid khan, damé mulkhu. Sultan, son of a sultan, Abdulhamid the khan, whose reign be perpetual.* These terms, however, are used very differently in Persia ; *shah*, which among the Tatars is equivalent to *khan* or king, is the only title taken by the Persian monarch : in that country *khan* answers to the Turkish *pascha*, and is therefore taken by the governors of provinces, whilst *sultan*, which there signifies simply commander, is a title given to a captain of horse. In my time, a man was made *khan* or governor of Benderrik, and his son, who commanded a body of cavalry, was called *sultan*. I speak of the present acceptance of these words, not of their more ancient signification.

Tott is erroneous in stating, that the bey of the Sherins constantly represents the five other beys. In the *kingueshés*, or extraordinary assemblies, as well as in all the public convocations,

convocations, the bey of the Sherins, though first in rank, represents only his own family; the beys of the other houses are also present, and represent each their own family.

The *historical journal* of the affairs of the Crimea, which was kept at *Bagtshiferrai*, is probably a valuable document: Peyssonel seems to doubt of its existence, or at least to suppose, that it is little more than a compilation from general traditions, made by some Tatar of learning; it is, however, certain that such a journal was regularly kept there by a family, who have handed it down from father to son with the same regularity as a similar journal is kept at the porte at Constantinople: the khans often referred to it.

The caverns found in different parts of the Crimea, particularly at Tepekirman, half a league from Bagtshiferrai, have given rise to much curious speculations: from their situation on the sides of steep, and often perpendicular sides of rocky mountains, as well as from the regularity of their structure, it is evident that they have been excavated by human art, but whether as sepulchral monuments, as fortresses, or as places of refuge for cattle in time of invasion, or for whatever other use, is at the present day doubtful. The objection of Mr. Peyssonel, who thinks it impossible for cattle to have climbed to
such

such a height, is certainly erroneous as to its practicability, since the Tatars at present actually do put herds of goats every night into some of them, by means of steps cut in the rock, which, had he passed a night, as I did, in that beautifully romantic vale, he might have been an eye witness of; others, indeed, have no such access, and might serve as a refuge to the masters of the flocks themselves.

What has been said sufficiently illustrates the political state of the Tatars. In their education, there was little to supply the mind with knowledge, and whatever marks of sagacity are discoverable among them, are to be attributed to natural genius, and the effect of an active mode of life, which, even among savages, bestows a sharpness and accuracy of intellect. Their acquired information is very limited: reading and writing constitute their highest branches of education, and in the sciences in general they are less informed even than the Turks themselves. Like most barbarians, their own country is to them at once the pattern of excellence and the boundary of knowledge; and the chief officers of state themselves were ignorant of the geography or relative situation of every other country.

The Tatar mode of fighting has no resemblance

semblance to European tactics; it is one continued scene of confusion and tumult, though it gives occasion to the display of great agility, and no small portion of a barbarous kind of skill. Alternately flying and advancing in detached parties, many kinds of contest are carried on at once; the sabre, the pike, and fire arms, are all employed, and they fight alike on horseback or on foot, though the former is their most common mode. The regularity and discipline of the modern European battles has greatly contributed to produce a correspondent mildness towards the conquered; but in this desultory warfare the passions of the individuals are let loose, personal fury augments the savage horror of the scene, and the enemy is never spared, unless he be sufficiently unhurt to become valuable as a slave.

It is not surprizing, that on the empress's obtaining possession of the Krim, a great number of its Tatar inhabitants should emigrate from their country. Besides the religious prejudices of these people, their unsettled and turbulent habits rendered them little adapted to that industry and civilization, which it was her endeavour to introduce into her newly acquired dominions. Those who chose to leave the country, had
leave

leave to sell their lands and other property, which was protected by the Russians. She did not act with them as the Turks and Tatars ever did to the inhabitants of the countries they conquered; those who chose to remain, were left in the quiet possession of their property and their religion, and enjoyed every protection and privilege as a Russian Christian subject.

The Tatar hordes now no more swell the Turkish army, nor mark their road with smoking villages laid in ashes, and murdered inhabitants; those hordes, who penetrated even into Prussia and Silesia, ravaged Poland, Hungary, and Russia, destroying by fire and sword every habitation, every living creature they could not carry off, tying their prisoners to their horses tails, and those prisoners were the flower of their youth, led away, never more to return from slavery and violation to their friends or their country; those hordes are now either dispersed among their brother savages in Asia, or civilized by their conquerors.

CHAPTER IX.

The Political State of Greece.

THE political state of Greece has long announced to the attentive observer that explosion which late events seem to have rapidly promoted. Greece can no longer submit to the Turkish yoke; she pants for emancipation, and already aspires to be ranked among the independent states of Europe. The rise, or rather the renovation of her power will form an important æra in European politics: to appreciate its probable consequences we must consider the past and present circumstances of that famous country; we must recur to the eclipse of her former splendor by the Turkish conquest, to the long night of barbarism and oppression in which she has been whelmed, and to those struggles which of late years have shown that she is about to awake to the assertion of her native rights.

It is not here my intention to trace the details of classic story, to describe those heroic ages, when the splendor of genius and the illumination

illumination of science seemed to be concentrated within the narrow boundaries of Greece, and by their irradiation to communicate animation and improvement to surrounding nations; it will be sufficient for me to call to the remembrance of the scholar some of the brightest pages in the history of mankind; it will be sufficient to cite the names of those poets and orators, those statesmen and moralists, whose illustrious deeds and whose admirable precepts still extort the applauses of the universe. To Greece belonged an Homer and a Demosthenes, a Phocion and an Aristides, a Socrates, a Plato, an Aristotle, a Phidias, and an Apelles; in short, in whatever path the ardent and eccentric imagination of man has sought for fame, in that the Grecian name stands eminently conspicuous, if not arrogating to itself an unrivalled superiority.

India and Egypt had for many preceding ages cultivated the arts; but these countries were only the cradle of knowledge; when transmitted to the genial climate of Greece, fostered by her political freedom, and animated by her vivacity and enterprize, it quickly attained the sublimest heights, and invested the human character with a dignity before unknown. By what gradations their ancient simplicity, temperance, modesty, and

good faith sunk away, and how the decay of their virtues involved the ruin of their genius, their history will shew: let the philanthropist, perusing the instructive lesson, weep over the fall of human greatness, or rather let him collect from the fatal example, new incitements to energy and perseverance in the cause of private and public virtue.

Ancient Rome, the victorious rival of Greece in arms, caught from her captive the inspiration of genius; but she never reached a similar degree of sublimity; she imitated, but never equalled, the poets, the orators, the historians, the artists of Greece, according to the ingenuous acknowledgment of the first of Latin poets:

“Excudent alii spirantia mollius æra,

“Credo equidem: vivos ducent de marmore vultus;

“Orabunt causas melius, cœlique meatus

“Describent radio, &c.

Indeed no nation ever arrived so nearly at perfection in every branch of science. The genius of the ancient Grecians seems to have been endowed with as preternatural a strength as the bodies of Homer's heroes. Their poetical imagery was splendid and sublime, their oratorical tropes bold and energetic, their speculative philosophy manly and comprehensive. Of the effect of their paintings we can judge only from history, but
their

their statues have reached to the present times; they possess a dignity more than human; they seem the *ne plus ultra* of genius, taste, and execution, and though often imitated defy the hand of the copyist.

Such a nation could not have fallen under the yoke of a Turkish conqueror, had she not been prepared for that disgrace by a long period of debasement and superstition. When this last and most terrible catastrophe arrived, she saw her cities and palaces laid in ashes, and the magnificent monuments of her ancient glory levelled with the dust by the rude strokes of those ferocious barbarians; she saw her sons, a race who had graced and dignified society, slaughtered without distinction and without mercy, or subjected to a captivity still worse than slaughter; yet still her weeping genius seemed to linger among the melancholy ruins, and reluctantly to leave them, to carry with her the faint remnants of learning and taste into more fortunate regions, where she sowed the seeds of that civilization and science which at the present day so eminently flourish in Europe.

Conquered Greece polished Rome, but the conquerors were Romans. Conquered Greece did not polish Turkey, for the conquerors were Turks. The insensibility of these barbarians is astonishing: living amid the efful-

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gence of genius, they have not caught one spark; they gaze with unfeeling stupidity on the wonder and boast of art, on their glorious monuments, on their temples, and conclude they were built by genii, and then destroy them, to burn the marble for lime to make stucco for their own tasteless houses, whence the fine arts are banished; where ignorance, tyranny, superstition, and gross sensuality only dwell in sad and stupidly-solemn pomp, or issuing out with savage fury, lay waste the country round, and imbrue their hands in the blood of the helpless, murdering without remorse those they have conquered. Thus the finest countries in the world are become deserts; part inhabited by savage beasts, and part by more savage men; the poor aborigines skulking in hiding places like the timid hare (which epithet the Turks give them in derision) while those beasts of prey roam abroad.

Every object moral and physical, the fair face of nature and the intellectual energies of the inhabitants, have alike been blasted and defiled by the harpy-touch of Turkish tyranny. As an instance of those changes which the country has undergone, we need only consider the island of Cyprus, now an almost uninhabited desert, which was, not only in ancient times, but when it was taken
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by the Turks from the Venetians, populous and exceedingly rich. The gentry lived like princes in splendor, and even the peasants had each of them at least a silver cup, spoon, knife, and fork. The number and excellency of its productions were wonderful. At present only a little cotton, some silk and wine, and a few drugs, are its produce, all to no great amount. Even the salines (or salt-works) which were so great a branch of revenue and commerce to the Venetians, have produced nothing since the Turks possessed it.

Of the defects of the Grecian character some are doubtless owing to their ancient corruptions; but most of them take their rise in the humiliating state of depression in which they are held by the Turks. This degradation and servility of their situation has operated for centuries, and has consequently produced an accumulated effect on the mind; but were this weight taken off, the elasticity and vigour of the soul would have wide room for expansion; and though it cannot be expected that they would at once rise to the proud animation of their former heroes, they would doubtless display energies of mind, which the iron hand of despotism has long kept dormant and inert. It is rather astonishing that they have re-

tained so much energy of character, and are not more abased, for like noble coursers they champ the bit, and spurn indignantly the yoke ; when once freed from these, they will enter the course of glory. The truth of these observations will appear, whether we consider the Greeks in their common character as one people, or whether we consider them according to their local and peculiar distinctions.

When we view the Greeks in their more comprehensive character as a nation, their superiority over the Turks in knowledge is surprisngly great ; they possess a great degree of genius and invention, and are of so lively an imagination, that they cannot tell the same story twice without varying the embellishments of circumstance and diction ; added to this, both men and women speak much, and with wonderful volubility and boldness, and no people are such natural orators ; numbers of them speak Italian, but all have an activity and sprightliness which strongly contrasts with the stupid and pompous gravity of the Turks ; an European feels himself as it were at home with them, and amongst creatures of his own species, for with Mahomedans there is a distance, a non-assimilation, a total difference of ideas, and the more he knows their language the
more

more he perceives it; on the contrary, the more intimately he knows the Greeks, the more similar does he find them in habits and manners to other Europeans: their bad reputation is more owing to the slander of the French (their mortal enemies) than to so great a degree of demerit. In general, they are an agreeable and a serviceable people, but they are much given to levity, immoderately ambitious, and fond of honourable distinctions; but this very ambition, now a weakness, when they have nobler objects to pursue will lead them to greatness.

From the account given by Tott (vol. i. p. 118) of the disturbances excited by the patriarch *Kirilo*, it would appear that the Greeks have not yet entirely abandoned that spirit of superstition and bigotry, which was, perhaps, the main cause of their former downfall.

It must be observed, however, that these disputes are not so much fostered among themselves, as they are owing to the efforts of the Latin church, which was the case in the instance alluded to, where the foundation of the contest was a bull of the pope, directed against the Greek church.

They bear the Turkish yoke with greater impatience than other Christians (who have long ceased to struggle against it) and possess a

spirit of enterprize which, however ridiculed by some authors, often prompts them to noble achievements. Their ancient empire is fresh in their memory ; it is the subject of their popular songs, and they speak of it in common conversation as a recent event.

That they possess a firm and manly courage, notwithstanding the insinuations of their calumniators, has been too often testified to be in the least doubtful ; the instances which they have displayed in the Russian service have been truly striking. They are passionate, and sometimes given to assassination ; but, except in Zante and Cephalonia, the stiletto is not so frequent with them as with the Italians, whom they in general resemble, the best of them, if we add more energy, being very similar in character to the Venetians, and the worst to the Genoese.

The most observable difference in the Grecian character is between those of Constantinople and their countrymen of the islands. The merchants and lower orders of the Constantinopolitan Greeks have indeed no very marked character ; they are much the same as the trading Christians in all parts of the empire, that is to say, as crafty and fraudulent as the Jews, but less so than the Armenians, who are the most subtle of all usurers.

But

But there is (in a *suburb* called the Fenal) a race of Greeks who call themselves nobles, and affect to despise those of the islands; they are certain opulent families, from which are generally appointed the drogomans of the porte, and the waywodes of Walachia and Moldavia. They have kept these places amongst them, as they are mostly allied together, and keep up a constant connection with the officers of the porte. They are continually intriguing to get those in office removed, and obtain their places; even children cabal against their fathers, and brothers against brothers. They are all people of very good education, and are polite, but haughty, vain, and ambitious to a most ridiculous degree, considering the contempt they are treated with by the Turks. As to their noble extraction, it is a matter of great uncertainty; most of them bear the names of those families which were illustrious when the Turks took Constantinople, but they would find it difficult to prove their descent. They have in general all the vices of the Turks of the seraglio; treachery, ingratitude, cruelty, and intrigue, which stops at no means. While they are drogomans of the porte, they are obliged to behave with great caution and prudence, but when they

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become waywodes, they are in nothing different from Turkish pashas in tyranny; nor is it to be wondered at, when men are obliged to look up not only to tyrants, but to the very servants of tyrants, for honour and consequence; to flatter their ignorance and stupidity, their foibles and their vices, and to tremble for their lives at their frowns, that cunning takes the place of wisdom, vice of virtue, and treachery of fortitude. In such a situation the mind must lose its vigour, the heart its generosity; the abasement of man by such causes was never more strongly exemplified than in the instance of the Greeks of the Fenal; they do not weep over the ruins which they cannot restore, nor sigh to rear others of equal magnificence.

Strange as is the infatuation which induces these Greeks to aim at the post of waywodes, it is perhaps no less astonishing than many examples which daily occur in other nations of the power of ambition. Though styling themselves noble, and affecting a superiority over the other Greeks, they are the only part of their nation who have totally relinquished the ancient Grecian spirit; they seem not anxious, as the islanders are, for liberty, but delight in their false magnificence, and in the petty intrigues of the seraglio; and their
pride

pride is to appear in their dress like Turks; and yet the situation which they are thus eager to obtain is beset with perils, and scarcely one who holds it escapes deposition and punishment. No sooner is a waywode appointed, than he sets out in great state for his government, attended by a crowd of relations and dependents, for all of whom, as well as for his own splendor, he must provide by oppressing the unhappy subjects of his tyranny. Meanwhile his countrymen at Constantinople are engaged in continual plots for his removal, and it becomes necessary for him to accumulate a large sum to bribe the ministers and others on his return, and to avert the persecution, which continues for years afterward to hang over him.

Those of Macedonia, &c. are robust, courageous, and somewhat ferocious; those of Athens and Attica are still remarkably witty and sharp; all the islanders are lively and gay, fond of singing and dancing to an excess, affable, hospitable, and good natured; in short, they are the best; those of the Morea are much given to piracy; but it is not to be wondered at, considering the cruel treatment they have met with, and the struggles they are continually making against the Turks, Albania, Epirus, and in general the mountaineers, are a very warlike, brave people, but

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very

very savage, and make little scruple of killing and robbing travellers; a Turk cannot venture in their country alone; there is no man in the country but would make a merit of shooting him—and is this to be wondered at?

The Greeks of Zante and Cephalonia, subject to the Venetians, are famous for stabbing with knives.

In some islands the people are not handsome. In Metaline, the women are remarkable for very large breasts. In Tino, the women are almost all beauties, and there the true antique head is to be found.

In general, the people of the islands have grand and noble features. From different faces you may put together, in walking through a market place, the heads of Apollo and of the finest ancient statues.

It is scarcely possible for any person not to be mistaken in judging of the conduct of the porte towards its provinces, by any analogy from the political operations of other European nations. Amongst us, the unsuccessful revolt of a whole province would indeed give birth to some additional rigour, and to some striking example of punishment; but the ferocious Turk proposes nothing short of extermination, in order to free himself from the fear of future defection. It

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was thus that, when the inhabitants of the Morea, who, instigated by the desire of liberty, had taken up arms in favour of the Russians, returned again under their yoke, a deliberate proposal was made in the divan to slaughter them in cold blood; nor was this the first time that the massacre of all the Greeks had been seriously debated; it was, however, in the present instance, successfully opposed by Gazi Hassan, both on motives of humanity and policy *.

It has been said, that long possession of a country gives an indisputable right of dominion, and that the right of the Turks to their possessions has been acknowledged by all nations in their treaties. As to treaties between the Turks and other nations, who had no right to dispose of the countries usurped by the Turks, they cannot be binding to the Greeks, who never signed such treaties, nor were consulted, or consented to their signing.

* The chief argument which he used, and which alone carried conviction to his hearers, was, *if we kill all the Greeks, we shall lose all the capitation they pay.*

Even without such a provocation, sultan Mustafa, predecessor and brother of Abdulhamid, on his accession to the throne, proposed to cut off all the Christians in the empire, and was with difficulty persuaded to desist. Is this a nation which merits that Britain should enter into a war for its defence?

When

When one nation conquers another, and they become incorporated, by having the same rights, the same religion, the same language, and by being blended together by inter-marriages, a long series of years renders them one people. Who can in England distinguish the aborigines from the Romans, Saxons, Danes, Normans, and other foreigners? They are all Englishmen.

The Greeks were conquered by the Turks, but they were attacked (like all other nations they conquered) by them without provocation. It was not a war for injury or insult, for jealousy of power, or the support of an ally, contests which ought to end when satisfaction or submission is obtained; it was a war, having for its aim conquest, and for its principle a right to the dominion of the whole earth; a war which asserted that all other sovereigns were usurpers, and that the deposing and putting them to death was a sacred duty. Do the laws of nations establish that such a conquest gives right of possession? They, on the contrary, declare such conquest usurpation.

The conquered were never admitted by the Turks to the rights of citizens or fellow subjects, unless they abjured their religion and their country; they became slaves, and as, according to their cowardly law, the

Turks

Turks have a right at all times to put to death their prisoners, the conquered and their posterity for ever are obliged annually to *redeem their heads*, by paying the price set on them: they are excluded from all offices in the state. It is death for a conquered Greek to marry a Turkish woman, or even to cohabit with a common prostitute of that nation; they are in every respect treated as enemies; they are still called and distinguished by the name of their nation, and a Turk is never called a Greek, though his family should have been settled for generations in that country. The testimony of a Greek is not valid in a court of judicature, when contrasted with that of a Turk. They are distinguished by a different dress; it is death to wear the same apparel as a Turk; even their houses are painted of a different colour; in fine, they are in the same situation they were the day they were conquered; totally distinct as a nation; and they have, therefore, the same right now as they then had, to free themselves from the barbarous usurpers of their country, whose conduct to all the nations they have conquered merits the eternal execration of mankind.

In the war between Russia and Turkey, which continued from 1769 to 1774, wherever the Russians appeared the Greeks took
up

up arms and joined them. The history of this war, and the part which the Greeks took in it, is too well known for it to be necessary that I should enter here into any particulars. The progress that was made against the Turks was very considerable, and their fleet being destroyed at Chishmé, the capital might have been attacked by the victorious Russians. Had the Russian admiral been a man of any experience, or of an enterprising character, that war must have terminated in the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.

Nothing can place the Turks in a more despicable light, than the progress the Russians did make, notwithstanding the slowness of all their motions, their never profiting of any advantage, the opportunities they lost of striking decisive blows, the want of plan or combination in every enterprize, and the unmilitary conduct in the execution; the bravery of their troops indeed, when there was a possibility of success, always secured them victory. The Russians and Greeks, to this day, make reproaches to each other of misconduct; but as the accounts hitherto published are taken from the relation of Russians, we may safely conclude that justice has not been done to the Greeks. In this last war, when they acted alone, they fought like

true

true descendants of their heroic ancestors in the little diversion they made.

It was solemnly stipulated in the 17th article of the peace of Kainargi (signed $\frac{1}{11}$ July, 1774) that “*The empire of Russia restores*
 “*to the sublime porte all the islands of the*
 “*Archipelago, which are under its dependence;*
 “*and the sublime porte, on its part, promises,*
 “*1st. To observe SACREDLY, with respect to*
 “*the inhabitants of these islands, the conditions*
 “*stipulated in the first article, concerning a ge-*
 “*neral amnesty and eternal oblivion of all crimes*
 “*whatever, committed or suspected, to the pre-*
 “*judice of the sublime porte. 2dly. That*
 “*neither the Christian religion, nor its churches,*
 “*shall be exposed to the smallest oppression, and*
 “*that no hindrance shall be put to their con-*
 “*struction or reparation; nor shall those who*
 “*officiate in them be oppressed or insulted. 3dly.*
 “*That no payment shall be exacted from these*
 “*islands of the annual taxes to which they*
 “*were subjected, viz. since the time which*
 “*they have been under the dependence of the*
 “*Russian empire, and also, in consideration of*
 “*the great losses which they have suffered dur-*
 “*ing the war, for the time of two years to*
 “*come, to count from the time of their restora-*
 “*tion to the sublime porte. 4thly. To permit*
 “*those families which would quit their country,*
 “*and establish themselves elsewhere, to depart*
 “*freely with their goods; and to the end that*
 “*those*

*“ those families may put their affairs in order,
“ the term of one year is granted to them for
“ this free emigration, counting from the day of
“ the exchanging of the present treaty.”*

Notwithstanding this solemn engagement, the Turks, almost as soon as the Russians had evacuated their conquests, and, relying on the faith of treaties, had delivered up the inhabitants to their domination, fell upon their victims, unprepared to resist them, and massacred an incredible number, particularly in the Morea, where their vengeance fell with all its weight. Whole districts were left without a single inhabitant, and this fine country is now almost a desert. The Greeks upbraid the Russians with abandoning them; the Russians answer, they relied on the faith of treaties. They ought to have known, that the *setva* of the *musti* had often announced, that *no faith is to be kept with Christians*; history furnished them with numerous instances of their putting in practice this precept; indeed I know of no instance when they have not, if it appeared to them that it was their interest so to do; and yet we find writers who vaunt the scrupulousness of the Turks in observing their treaties; they should always have added, *when it was their interest*, and their statement would have been just.

So ardent was the wish of the Greeks to regain

regain their liberty and independence, that neither discouraged by the abandonment of the Russians, nor deterred by the apprehension of again incurring the dreadful vengeance of the Turks, as soon as a fresh war broke out between those powers they again took up arms.

A fleet was fitted out at Cronstad, and sailed for the Archipelago under the command of a brave, prudent, and experienced officer, Admiral Greig, an Englishman, who had served in the former war, and greatly distinguished himself under Count Orlow; who, from an officer in the guards, where he saw no other *honourable* service than quelling a riot at a brandy shop, was raised to the supreme command of a fleet and an army, and entrusted with an expedition which required the greatest experience and talents. The king of Sweden rendered to the empress the essential service of detaining her fleet in the Baltic, by attacking it in that sea, and thereby putting into her hand the naval superiority which, by its absence, would have passed into his. This ill-timed diversion of the king of Sweden retarded the fate of Turkey, and the interference of other courts saved it for this time; at least they obliged the empress to make peace; but that peace would have been but of a few months duration, had

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not the death of Prince Poteinkin and some other circumstances intervened, which shall be spoken of in this place.

In the mean time the empress sent manifestoes to all parts of Greece, as she had done in the former war, inviting the inhabitants to take up arms, and co-operate with her in expelling the enemies of Christianity from the countries they had usurped, and regaining them their ancient liberty and national independence.

A Greek of the name of Sottiri was sent to Epirus and Albania, to distribute manifestoes, and combine an insurrection with the chiefs. An army was soon raised; their headquarters were at Sulli. They marched against the pasha of Yánina (Janina) and completely defeated his army in a pitched battle, in which his son was killed, and despoiled of his rich armour, which they sent to the empress.

They collected a sum of money by voluntary subscription of individuals, and fitted out at Trieste an armament of twelve small ships, under the command of Lambro Canziani, a Greek, with which they sailed to the Archipelago. They were everywhere victorious, and the impression was so great and alarming to the porte, that it had nearly drawn the whole Turkish navy out of the Black Sea, and left the capital

tal exposed to the attack of a formidable Russian fleet, then in the ports of the Crim.

The empress had sent a captain Psaro to Sicily, to establish magazines for the fleet coming out under Admiral Greig, and several other persons, to furnish the Greeks with money and ammunition, and to remove the difficulties the Venetians, still unwilling to offend the porte, had thrown in their way, and the obstructions they had put to their communication by means of their port Prevasi, the nearest to Sulli. In this state of things the Greeks sent three deputies to St. Petersburg, with complaints against the persons commissioned to this service by the empress. They presented the rich armour of the pasha of Yanina's son to her imperial majesty; but were prevented, by the intrigues of those who feared an enquiry into their scandalous peculations, for several months from presenting their petition, and explaining the business of their mission; at length they succeeded in obtaining a private audience of the empress, to which they were conducted by Mr. Zoubov, the favourite. They presented a memorial in Greek, with a translation in French, of which the following are exact copies:

Τῇ ὑπολότῳ, ἐνδοξοτάτῃ, καὶ Θεοσεβεστάτῃ
 Αυτοκρατορίσῃ, καὶ Βασιλίσῃ πασῶν τῶν
 Ρωσιῶν, καὶ τα ἐξ. καὶ τα ἐξ. καὶ τα ἐξ.

ΚΑΙ τῷτο ἔπρὸς ἕτερον τὶ εἰμὲν τὸ διὰ μάκρος χρόνον,
 ματέως διηθέντες, τοῖς ὑπεργούς τῆς ὑμέτερας Αυτοκρα-
 τορικῆς Μεγαλειότητος πρὸς ἀποκρισιν, ἀναφορᾶς ἂν προ-
 χρονα αυτοῖς προσεφέρωμεν. ἐκ ἀπειτισταίμενοι δὲ, καὶ
 μάλα, ἐν ἰσχάτῃ ἀπειπισία φερόμενοι διανοῶντες τὰς
 φρικτὰς συμφορὰς, αἷς ἡ ταύτης βραδυτῆς προξενισίαν τοῖς
 ἡμετέροις συμπατριώταις, οἱ γὰρ ἐλκυσθέντες παρὰ τῶν
 προδύλων κλίσεων τῆς αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ἔφερον τὰ ὅπλα
 κατὰ τὴ κοινὴν ἰχθρὴν τῇ Χριστιανικῇ ὀνομάτῳ, ἀπειληκὴν
 ἔν νῦν ἡμᾶς προσφέρειν, τοῖς ποδοῖς τῇ υψηλῇ αὐτῆς
 θρόνῳ ὡς σημεῖον καὶ δῶρον τῆς ἡμῶν ευλάβειας, τὴν ζωὴν καὶ
 περιέσσαν αὐτῶν.

Ναὶ Βασιλεῖσα καὶ Κυρία· τῷτο ἔπρὸς τί ἕτερον ἡμὴ
 ἀπολολόντες πάσαν ἐλπίδαν μιᾶς ταχέως ἀποκρισεως,
 τολμῶμεν γόνυ κλίνοντες προσφέρειν τὴν ταπινὴν ἡμῶν,
 αναφορὰν, πρὸς τὰς πόδας τῆς αὐτῆς Αυτ. Μεγ. ὅπως
 τῆς ἐκ τῶν ἀδελφῶν ἡμῶν αἱμάτων ρυακας ξηρένῃ, οἱ ἥδη
 ἀναμφιβόλως ῥέουσιν.

Ἔτερον Ἐν ἱερὸν ὄφλημα ἡμῶν τὸ καὶ κύριον εἶδος τῆς
 ἡμῶν παραγγαιλίας, ὃν καὶ ἠρέθησε ἡμᾶς ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ
 τολμειρᾷ ἐπιχειρήσει, εἰς ὅπως ἐξαπατήσομεν, τὴν αὐτῆς
 Αυτ. Μεγ. ἐξ ὧν ἔτολμισαν ἀπατεῖν (ὡς δὲ καὶ οἱ μεγιστάνες
 αὐτῆς) ἐγνωμεν γὰρ, ὅτι ὁ ὑπεὺς Ψάρος ἀνὴρ βδελερο-
 τᾶτος ἐκ τῶν ἡμῶν ἔθνους, ἐνεκεν τῆς κραυγῆς αὐτοῦ, αἷς
 ἐξήλθεν καὶ εἰς ἂν εὕρισκείται. Ὁ γὰρ δὲ εἰς μὴ πλανῶν,
 ἀνεπισχείντως τῆς ὑπεργῆς αὐτῆς πρὸς αὐτοῖς ἑαυτὸν, ὡς
 ἄξιον μεγάλων κατορθυμάτων, αἶ ποτὲ ἐκ ἔποισε. ἔτος
 ἔν καὶ ἐτι ἐγίρεται ὡς ἄρχων καὶ ὁδηγός, τῶν ἡμῶν ἔθνους,
 καυχομεν

καύχομενος ὅτι ἐμένομεν τὴν παρῆσιν αὐτῇ ἐπὶ τῆς
 ἡμῶν γῆς, ἵνα κυρήξομεν ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀρχιστρατιγόν. καυ-
 χήσεις αἱ μόνον γράφει καὶ ἐκ ἐργαζέται. θεωρισεῖαν ἡ
 αὐτῆς Αὐτ. Μεγ. ἐν τῇ ἡμῶν αναφορᾷ τί ἔτος ἔποιησε
 ἡμῖν, ἔγνωκαμεν γὰρ ὅτι, αὐτὸς λαβὼν ἀπίστευς ποσοτήτας
 χρημάτων, φημῆζει ὅτι ἔδωκεν αὐτὰ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν. δυνα-
 μεθα πληροφορησάμενοι τὴν αὐτῆς Αὐτ. Μεγ. ὅτι ἔδωκεν αὐτὸς
 ἔδῃ τις ἄλλος ὅπῃ εἰς ἡμᾶς ἀπελθάλλη ἐκ τῶν σῶν υπερ-
 γῶν δέδωκε ἡμῖν Ἐν μόνον ῥέμπλιον. ἡ μικρὰ φλοτίγλια,
 καὶ ἔτιτε ναῦς τῇ Λάμπρῃ, κατεσκευάσθησαν καὶ ὅπλισθησαν
 διὰ τῆς τῶν ἡμῶν χρημάτων δαπάνης. εἰς μόνος ἐξ ἡμῶν
 ἔασας τὴν κρηνικὴν αὐτῇ κοίτην, ἔδωκεν αὐτῇ δέκα καὶ δύο
 χιλιάδας χρυσὰ νομίσματα ἐκ τῶν ἰδίων αὐτῇ χρημάτων,
 ὅπλίσας δύο ναῦς, ἐνεκεν τῆς οἱ Οθωμανοὶ ἀπεκτείναν τὸν
 ἀδελφὸν καὶ τὴν μητέρα αὐτῇ, τῇ ἐλεηλάτησαν τὰ ὑπαρ-
 χοντα καὶ τῇ ἐφθειραν τῆς ἀγρῆς.

Οὐκ ἔτισταμεν ποτὲ καὶ ἐκ ἐτῶμεν τῆς σῆς Θεσαύρες,
 ἐκ ἔτισταμεν εἰμὴ πυρίον κόνιν καὶ σιδήρεις σφέρας (α ἐδυ-
 ναμεθα ὀνήζειν) καὶ ἐν τῷ ὀδιγεῖν ἡμᾶς εἰς τὴν μάχην.

Ἐξ ἐναντίας ἀπεσῆλαν ἡμᾶς προσφέρειν σοὶ τὴν ζωὴν καὶ
 τὰ κλήματα αὐτῶν, καὶ ἐκ ἐτῆν τῆς σῆς Θεσαύρες.

Νεύσον, ᾧ κρατεῖα Βασιλίσσα, δόξα τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων
 πίστεως, νεύσον δέόμεθα ἀναλαινόσκειν τὴν ταπινὴν ἡμῶν ανα-
 φοράν. Ὁ Οὐρανὸς ἐφυλάξεν τὴν ἡμέραν ἀπολύτρωσιν πρὸς
 δόξαν τῆς σῆς Αὐτ. Μεγ. ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτῆς προσασίαν, προσ-
 δοκῶμεν λυτρώσαι, τὴν αὐτοκράτοριαν ἡμῶν χρωμένην, τὴν
 πατριαρχίαν καὶ ἱερὰν θρησκείαν, καταφρονήσαν καὶ κατα-
 πατιθήσαν ἐκ τῶν βεβήλων, καὶ βαρβάρων Οθωμανῶν· προσ-
 δοκῶμεν σοι, λυτρώσαι τῆς τῶν Αθηναίων, καὶ Λακαϊδεμονίων
 ἀπογόνους, τῇ τυρρανικῇ ζυγῇ, τῆς τῶν ἀγρίων, ὅφ' ὧν
 σείαζεν, Ἐν ἔθνος, καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα ἐκ ἀπεσβεσθῇ, καὶ ὁ ἱρὸς υπερ-
 πολεὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ἐκ ἐδυνήθησαν γὰρ αἱ σιδεραὶ ἀλίσαι
 τῶν βαρβάρων ἀποσβέννουν, ἔχει δὲ πρὸ τῶν αὐτῇ ὀμμάτων

τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν η̄ρωικῶν πράξεων τῶν αὐτῶ προπατέρων
ἕως νῦν.

Αἱ λαμπραὶ ἡμῶν ἡκοδομαὶ ἀναγινώσκων ἡμῖν τὴν πα-
λαιὰν ἡμῶν μεγαλίότητα· οἱ ἄπυροι λιμένας, ἡ ευφυνη τῶν
αγρῶν μας, ὁ Οὐρανὸς ὁ αἰνναὺς γελῶν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς, ἡ ἀκρα
θερμότης τὴν ἡ φύσις ἐμπνέει ἢ μόνον τοῖς νέοις ἀλλὰ,
καὶ τοῖς πεθαρεμένοις γηραλέοις ἡμῶν, λέγει ἡμῖν ὅτι μας
ἔστι πρόχειρη ὡς καὶ πρὸς τὰς προγονεὺς ἡμῶν.

Νεῦσον ἂν Κυρία διδόναι ἡμῖν σὸν ευχονα Κονσταντῖνον
διὰ ἀνάκτα ἡμῶν, τῆτο μόνον τὸ γένος ὅλον ἡμῶν ἔτι δει-
μενον· (γένος γὰρ τῶν ἡμῶν αυτοκρατορῶν ἀποσβεσθῇ) καὶ
ἔσεται ὡς τὰς προγονεὺς αὐτῶ.

Ἡμεῖς ἔκ ἐσμέν ἐκ τῶν ἀπατιλῶν οἱ τίνες ἐτόλμησαν ἀπα-
τίσαι τὴν μεγαλοψυχότερην τῶν ἀνάκτων· ἡμεῖς ἐσμέν οἱ
ἀπελγαλμένοι τῶν λαῶν τῆς Βλαδὸς προμηθευμένοι ἀπο-
λυτῶ δυνάμει, ὡς δὲ τοῖσιν προσπιπτόντες τοῖς ποσὶν
αὐτῆς ἦν μετὰ θεὸν σωτήρα ἐλπίζομεν, ὠμνύομεν δεῖ ἴσασθαι
μέχρι τελευτίας ἡμῶν ἀναπνοῆς,

Οἱ τῆς ὑμετέρας Αυτοκρατορικῆς Μεγαλιότητος
πιστότατοι δῆλοι, καὶ τα εἰς.

Πετροπολη,
Ἀπριλις, 1790.

Πανος Κρη,
Χρίστος Λαζοτλι,
Νικολαος Πάνκαλος.

Madame,

“Ce n'est, qu' après avoir sollicité long-tems en
vain, les ministres de VOTRE MAJESTÉ IMPE-
RIALE, pour une reponse au memoire, que nous
avons eu l'honneur de leur presenter, et pousés
au dernier désespoir par la reflexion des malheurs
affreux que ce retard, pourra produire à nos compa-
triotes,

triotés, qui invités, par les manifestes de V. M. I. ont pris les armes, contre l'ennemi du nom Chrétien, et nous ont député pour porter l'offre de leurs vies et de leurs biens aux pieds de votre trône imperial: ce n'est qu'après avoir perdu tout espoir d'avoir autrement une prompte réponse pour arrêter les ruisseaux du sang de nos frères, qui sans doute coulent déjà à cause de ce retard, que nous osons prosternés à ses PIEDS présenter à ELLE-MEME notre très humble mémoire.

Un autre devoir, également sacré pour nous, et qui étoit un objet principal de notre mission, nous porte à cette démarche hardie: de désabuser V. M. I. qui on ose tromper, ainsi que ses ministres: nous avons appris, avec indignation, que le chevalier Psaro, homme abhorré de notre nation, de la crapule de la quelle il est sorti *, et où il seroit resté, si, en trompant les ministres de V. M. I. avec une audace inouïe, il ne s'étoit pas fait valoir par la représentation des exploits qu'il n'a jamais faits, s'érige actuellement, en chef et conducteur de notre nation. S'il n'y auroit de mauvaises suites que pour lui, nous attendrions avec patience, qu'il se présentât dans nos contrées. — Fanfaronnade cependant, qu'il ne fera jamais que dans ses écrits. Comme, il a agi envers nous V. M. I. verra dans notre mémoire. Nous entendons qu'il a pris de sommes immenses, qu'il prétend avoir dépensé pour nous: nous assurons V. M. I. que, ni lui, ni personne de VOS officiers

* This man had been a livery servant in Petersburg.

envoyés à nous, nous ont donné un seul rouble. La flotille et les autres armemens de Lambro ont été fait à nos fraix : un de nous a abandonné son foyer paisible ; a armé à ses fraix deux vaisseaux ; a depensé 12,000 zechins pour des armemens, et les Turcs ont massacré sa mère, son frere, ont rasé ses possessions et desolé ses terres.

Nous n'avons jamais demandé Vos tresors : nous ne le les demandons pas actuellement : nous n'avons jamais demandé que de la poudre et des balles (que nous ne pouvons pas acheter) et d'être mênes en bataille. Nous sommes venus pour *offrir*, nos vies et nos biens ; pas pour *demande* des tresors.

Daignez O GRANDE IMPERATRICE ! GLOIRE DE LA FOI GRECQUE ! daignez lire notre memoire. Le ciel a reservé notre delivrance pour le regne glorieux de V. M. I. C'est sous Vos auspices que nous espérons de delivrer notre empire usurpé, et notre patriarchat, et notre sainte religion insultées, des mains des barbares Mahometans ; de delivrer les descendants d'Athenes et de Lacedemon du joug tyrannique de ces ignorans sauvages, sous lequel gemit une nation dont le genie n'est pas éteint, que l'amour de la liberté inflame, que le joug de fer des barbares n'a pas avilie ; qui a devant ses yeux, toujours présent, l'image de ses anciens heros dont l'exemple anime ses guerriers encore aujourd'hui.

Nos superbes ruines parlent à nos yeux de notre ancienne grandeur : nos ports innombrables, nos beaux païs ; le ciel qui sur nous fourit toute l'année ; l'ardeur de notre jeunesse, et de nos decrepits

decrepits vieillards mêmes, nous disent que la nature nous est aussi propice qu'elle l'étoit à nos ancêtres. Donnez nous pour souverain Votre petit-fils CONSTANTIN, c'est le vœu de notre nation (la famille de nos empereurs est éteinte) et nous ferons ce qu' étoient nos premiers ayeux.

Nous ne sommes pas de ces gens qui ont osé tromper LA PLUS MAGNANIMES DE SOUVERAINES; nous sommes les *Deputés*, munis de pleins pouvoirs et d'autres documens des peuples de la Grece; et comme tels, prosternés au pied du Trône, de CELLE, qui, après DIEU, nous regardons comme notre SAUVEUR, nous protestons d'être jusqu' à notre dernier soupir."

De V. M. I.

Le plus fideles et les plus
devoués serviteurs,

St. Peterbourg,
April, 1790.

(L. s.) PANO KIRI.

(L. s.) CHRISTO LAZZOTTI.

(L. s.) NICCOLÓ PANGALO."

TRANSLATION.

Madam,

It was not until we had long solicited in vain Your Imperial Majesty's ministers for an answer to the memorial, which we had the honour of presenting to them; it was not until, driven to the utmost despair by the reflection of the dreadful evils which this delay might produce to our countrymen, who (invited by the manifestoes of Your Imperial Majesty) have taken arms against the enemy of the Christian

tian name, and deputed us to lay the offer of their lives and their fortunes at the foot of Your imperial throne; it was not till we had lost all hopes of otherwise obtaining a speedy answer to stop those streams of the blood of our brethren, which doubtless flow already through this delay, that we have at length dared to prostrate ourselves at Your feet, and to present our humble memorial to Your Imperial Majesty in person.

Another duty equally sacred, and which was a principal object of our mission, induced us to take this daring step: it was to undeceive Y. I. M. whom (as well as Your ministers) there have been people audacious enough to mislead. We have learned with indignation, that the chevalier Pfarò now erects himself into a chief and conductor of our people; a man abhorred by our nation, out of the dregs of which he rose, and where he would have remained, if he had not with an unheard-of audaciousness deceived Your Imperial Majesty's ministers, and assumed a reputation by attributing to himself exploits he never performed. If no ill consequences would ensue but to himself, we should patiently await his appearance in our country, a boast however which he never will perform but in his writings. How he has acted towards us Y. I. M. will see in our memorial. We hear that he has received immense sums, which he pretends to have expended for us. We assure Y. I. M. that neither he, nor any of your officers sent to us, ever paid us a single rouble. The flotilla, and the other armaments of Lambro, were equipped at our own expence. One of us (deputies) abandoning his peaceful

ful home, fitted out two vessels at his own expence, and expended in armaments 12,000 zechins, whilst the Turks massacred his mother and his brother, levelled with the ground his possessions, and desolated his lands.

We never asked for Your treasures; we do not ask for them now; we only ask for powder and balls (which we cannot purchase) and to be led to battle. We are come to *offer* our lives and fortunes, not to *ask* for Your treasures.

Deign, O Great Empress! Glory of the Greek faith! deign to read our memorial. Heaven has reserved our deliverance for the glorious reign of Y. I. M. It is under Your auspices that we hope to deliver from the hands of barbarous Mahomedans our empire, which they have usurped, and our patriarchat and our holy religion, which they have insulted; to free the descendants of Athens and Lacedemon from the tyrannic yoke of ignorant savages, under which groans a nation whose genius is not extinguished; a nation which glows with the love of liberty; which the iron yoke of barbarism has not vilified; which has constantly before its eyes the images of its ancient heroes, and whose example animates its warriors even to this day.

Our superb ruins speak to our eyes, and tell us of our ancient grandeur; our innumerable ports, our beautiful country, the heavens which smile on us all the year, the ardour of our youth, and even of our decrepid elders, tell us that nature is not less propitious to us than it was to our forefathers. Give us for a sovereign Your grandson CONSTANTINE: it is the wish of our nation (the family

family of our emperors is extinct *) and we shall become what our ancestors were.

We are not persons who have dared to impose on the *most magnanimous of sovereigns*: we are the deputies of the people of Greece, furnished with full powers and other documents, and as such prostrated before the throne of HER, whom, next to GOD, we look on as our saviour; we declare that we shall be till our latest breath,

YOUR IMPERIAL MAJESTY'S

Most faithful and most

devoted servants,

St. Petersburg,
April, 1790.

(L.S.) PANO KIRI.

(L.S.) CHRISTO LAZZOTTI.

(L.S.) NICCOLO PANGOLO.

As these people are out of the reach of Turkish vengeance, I have not scrupled naming them.

THE

* In Europe we are apt to think that those who bear the names of Comnenos, Paleologos, &c. are descendants of the imperial family: the Greeks, however, themselves have no such notions; they are either Christian names given them at their baptism, or that they have taken afterwards, and they only descend to the second generation. A man is called Nicolaos Papudopulo; the former is his name received in baptism, and the latter a surname, because he was the son of a priest; his sons take the surname of Nicolopulo (son of Nicolaos) added to their Christian name, and their children the father's Christian name as a surname. Those of Fanar have, particularly lately, affected to keep

THE empress received them very graciously, and promised them the assistance they asked. They were then conducted to the apartments of her grandsons, and offering to kiss the hand of the eldest grand duke, Alexander, he pointed to his brother Constantine, telling them, it was to him that they were to address themselves; they represented to him in Greek the object of their mission, and concluded by doing homage to him as their emperor (Βασιλεὺς τῶν Ἑλλήνων.) He answered them in the same language, *Go, and let every thing be according to your wishes.*

With this memorial they presented *a plan of operation*, from which I shall extract only a few particulars:—They proposed, after the empress had furnished them with cannon, and enabled them to augment the squadron under Lambro Canziani, and sent them en-

great names in their families, which were only Christian names, or names which they have taken of themselves, or were afterwards given them by their parents, relations, or friends. The same may be said of some names in the Archipelago, particularly where the family has preserved for some generations more property than their neighbours; but their names do not add to their respect among the other Greeks, who all know the origin of them, and have not the least notion that there is any lineal descent to be traced of their ancient imperial or noble families, notwithstanding the pretensions often of some of them, who bear their names when they come to Europe.

gineers

gineers to conduct the siege of strong places, to begin their first operations by marching from Sulli, where the congress was held, and whence they had a correspondence with all Greece.—Their route was to be first to Livadia and to Athens, dividing into two corps. In their march they were to be joined at appointed places by troops from the Morea and Negroponte. To this island the fleet of Lambro was to sail. They were then to proceed in one body to Thessalia and to the city of Salonichi, where they would receive large reinforcements from Macedonia. The whole army being then assembled, they were to march to the plains of Adrianople, with (as they calculated) three hundred thousand men, to meet the Russians, and proceed to Constantinople, where they hoped the Russian fleet would be arrived from the Crim; if not, they esteemed their own force sufficient to take that city, and drive the Turks out of Europe and their islands.

In this plan the establishment and the disposition of magazines, and retreats in cases of disaster, were provided for. The force of the Turks in different parts, and the different movements to oppose them, were calculated. All their resources, and the amount of the troops each place had engaged to furnish, were plainly stated, as well as the means they

they had adopted to carry on a secret correspondence with all parts of the country, both with respect to their own allies and the movements of the Turks. To enter more into particulars would not be justifiable in me.

The empress sent them to the army in Moldavia, to Prince Potemkin, giving them 1,000 ducats for their journey thither. They left Peterburgh the 14th May 1790. In August they were sent to Greece by the way of Vienna, and Major General Tamara with them, to superintend the whole expedition, and furnish them with the assistance they required.

It merits attention, that the king of Prussia had posted an army of 50,000 men, in June 1790, on the frontier of Bohemia; that the convention of Reichenbach was signed the 27th of July. The sentiments of the court of London respecting the war, and its probable interference in as serious a way as Prussia had done, were known at St. Peterburgh. It is to these circumstances we must attribute the slowness with which the projects of the Greeks were seconded. They were assured that they should have every succour they required, and much more: money was sent, but not much of it disbursed; they were enjoined to prepare every thing, but to undertake

take nothing, till the proper moment should arrive for their acting, which, they were told, depended on many circumstances, of which they were ignorant. Lambro in the meantime acted by himself, but could undertake nothing of any consequence. Things remained thus till after the campaign was ended, and Prince Potemkin came to St. Petersburg.

The fate of the armament commanded by the gallant Lambro deserves to be mentioned.

The Greeks proved on this occasion their love of liberty, their passion for glory, and a perseverance in toils, obedience to discipline, and contempt of danger and death, worthy of the brightest pages of their history; they fought with, and conquered, very superior numbers; and when at last they were attacked with an inequality of force, as great as Leonidas had to encounter, they fought till their whole fleet was sunk, and a few only saved themselves in boats.

Lambro had only resources left to fit out one single ship: the news of a peace arrived; but boiling with indignation at the neglect he had experienced from the Russian agents, and thirsting for revenge, he sailed notwithstanding, and attacked and destroyed several Turkish vessels: he was declared a pirate, and disavowed by Russia—but he was not intimidated

timidated—at length he was again overpowered; he disdained to strike; his vessel sunk under him, and he again escaped in his boat, and took refuge in the mountains of Albania.

The conduct of the Russian agents to him was the most scandalous. The peculation of all those entrusted at a distance with the empress's money was become so glaring and common, that they looked on it as their own property. Lambro was suffered to be imprisoned for debts contracted for his armaments, and was only released by the contributions of his countrymen.

In the spring of 1791, an armament was prepared in England to sail for the Baltic, to force the empress to make peace. The king of Prussia was ready to co-operate by land. Instead of the fleet, Mr. Fawkeners arrived at Petersburg. It was still undetermined by the empress, whether she should brave England and Prussia (though from the turn affairs had taken in England, and the arrival of another ambassador, she was assured she had little to fear from our fleet, and, consequently, little from the Prussian army) or make peace with the Turks on the conditions she had consented to when she was more seriously alarmed.

In this uncertainty a courier was kept ready to depart with instructions to General Tamara. The king's envoy was informed of this circumstance, and would have learnt immediately the contents of the dispatch, which would have made him acquainted with the empress's resolution respecting the prosecution of the war, or consenting to peace. The courier, however, was not dispatched. The business was terminated with the king's joint envoys. Prince Potemkin departed for the army, and on his road learnt the victory gained by Repnin over the vizir's army, and the signing the preliminaries of peace. Secret orders had been sent to Repnin, as soon as the empress had resolved to conclude a peace, which he fortunately executed; and it is certain that he received a copy of the arrangement made with the king's ministers, before he signed the preliminaries. Impediments were thrown in the way of the departure of the messenger dispatched to Constantinople, so that he did not arrive till any interference of our ambassador could be of no effect.

It is plainly to be seen, that though the empress pretended she had of her own accord (and before the arrangement with His Majesty was known to her general) concluded a
peace,

peace, the interference of His Majesty in bringing about that event had a weighty effect.

When the news of the signing the preliminaries reached the Russian fleet, it had beaten the Turks in the Black Sea, and was pursuing them into the channel of Constantinople, where they must inevitably have been destroyed. Had the Russian admiral been a man of more experience, they might all have been taken in the engagement.

Thus ended a war, which, had it not been for the interference of Great Britain and Prussia, would have placed the empress's grandson on the throne of Constantinople; and, had not circumstances imperiously prescribed to them the part they acted, we should have had, in Russia and Greece, allies which would, long ago, have enabled his majesty and the emperor, in all human probability, to have humbled a foe, which now threatens all Europe with total subversion, and even to become the instrument of emancipating Greece from the Turkish tyranny, not to become an independent people, but to be oppressed by a worse tyranny, under the name of liberty.

The Suliotes still maintain their independence: they were often attacked by the Turks, but were as often successful; they

fought seventeen battles or skirmishes, the last of which had nearly been fatal to them, as appears by the following paper, communicated to me by a drogoman, now in the British service, which will throw much light on the character of the inhabitants of Epirus; and it contains, besides, very curious and interesting matter. The authenticity of what he relates cannot be called in question, as it very exactly agrees with every other account I have received.

In 1792, being in the French service as interpreter, I was sent from Salonico by the French consul, Mr. Cosenery, on some business regarding the consulship, to Ali Pasha, at Yanina, the capital of Epirus. I arrived there the 1st of May, and found the pasha making great preparations for war. I found also there the French consul of Prevesa, Mr. de la Sala (a descendant of the Salas, who betrayed the Morea to the Turks, when in the possession of the Venetians) and acting as commissary, not only to provide timber in Epirus for the French navy, but also for revolutionizing that country.

He communicated to me his commission, insinuating, that if I would assist him, I might expect great rewards. One day, when we were with Ali Pasha, our conversation turned upon the French revolution, which was always introduced

introduced with a view to excite him to throw off all obedience to the porte. The pasha said to us—"You will see that Ali Pasha, the successor of Piros (Pyrrhus) will surpass him in every kind of enterprize."

The pasha continued to assemble troops without making known his intentions. In July, his army consisted of 20,000 good Turkish soldiers, who were the more formidable, as they were all Albanians. He then declared, that his design was to attack the Mahomedan town of Argirocastro, situated twelve leagues distant from Yanina, which would not be governed by a person he sent for that purpose, nor anywise submit to him. With this excuse he wrote to Captain * Bogia and Captain Giavella, two of the most considerable of the chiefs of the Greek inhabitants of the mountain of Sulli, praying them to meet him with all their soldiers or companions, to assist in his expedition. His letter was in modern Greek, of which the following is a copy, which I insert, that the learned reader may see how much, or how little, it differs from the ancient.

Φίλοιμῃς Καπιτὰν Μπόζια καὶ Καπιτὰν Τζαβέλλα, ἐγὼ
ὁ Ἄλφ Πασίας σας χαιρετῶ, καὶ σας φιλῶ τὰ ματρία,
ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἐγὼ ξεύρω πολλὰ καλὰ τὴν ἀνδραγαθειάν σας

* The Greeks call their chiefs captains.

καὶ παλλικαρίαν σας μὲ φαίνεται ναχω μεγάλην χρεῖαν ἀπὸ λογέσας, λοιπὸν μὴ καμετε ἀλλέως παρακαλῶ, ἀλλ' εὐθὺς ὅπῃ λαβέτε τὴν γραφὴν μῦ, νὰ μαζοξέτε ὅλας τὰς παλλικάρια καὶ νὰ ἐλθέτε νὰ μὲ εὑρετε διανὰ παγω, να πολεμῶ τὰς ἐχθρὰς μῦ. τῆτη ἵναι ἡ ὅρα καὶ ὁ καιρὸς ὅπῃ ἔχω χρεῖαν ἀπὸ λογέσας, καὶ μένω νὰ εἰδῶ τὴν φιλιαν σας καὶ τὴν ἀγαπὴν ὅπῃ ἔχετε διὰ λογῶ μῦ· ὁ λεφισας θελεῖ ἵναι δυπλὸς ἀπ' ὅσον δίδω εἰς τὰς Ἀρβανίτας διὰ τὴν καὶ ἡ παλλικαριάσας ξεύρω πὼς ἵναι πολλὰ μεγαλότερη ἀπὸ τὴν ἐδικὴν τὰς. λοιπὸν ἐγὼ δὲν πάγω νὰ πολεμήσω πρὶν νὰ ἐλθετε ἑσεῖς, καὶ σὰς καρτερῶ ὀλλιγορά νὰ ἐλθετε. ταῦτα καὶ σὰς χαιρετῶ.

VERBAL TRANSLATION.

"My friends, Captain Bogia and Captain Giavella, I, Ali Pasha, salute you, and kiss your eyes, because I well know your courage and heroic minds. It appears to me that I have great need of you, therefore I entreat you immediately, when you receive my letter, to assemble all your heroes, and come to meet me, that I may go to fight my enemies. This is the hour and the time that I have need of you. I expect to see your friendship, and the love which you have for me. Your pay shall be double that which I give to the Albanians, because I know that your courage is greater than theirs; therefore I will not go to fight before you come, and I expect that you will come soon. This only, and I salute you."

I was present when the pasha's Greek secretary wrote this letter, and I took a copy of it,

it, it not appearing to him or to me as a matter of secrecy.

Ali Pasha is an Albanian of Tepé-dellen; he is a son of Veli Pasha, who governed a part of Albania; though a Mahomedan, he understands very little Turkish, and speaks only Greek and the Albanian language, which is a mixture of Slavonian, Turkish, Greek, and a few old French words, but perfectly unintelligible to those who understand all those languages.

On receiving this flattering letter, the chiefs held a council with their men. Captain Bogia, and the majority of the soldiers, thought the pasha's proposal was only a stratagem to get them into his power, and make himself master of their mountain. Captain Bogia, in consequence, wrote to the pasha, that he received his letter with great respect and submission, and was himself ready to obey his orders; but as he could not persuade his people to follow him, it was unnecessary for him to go alone. Captain Giavella, either through avarice or ambition, was induced to comply with the pasha's request, and went to his army, though only with seventy men. He was received with great marks of friendship. The pasha and his army marched four leagues on the road towards Argirocastro, and encamped; but he sent an advanced

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post,

post, consisting of 400 men, under a buluk-bashee, as far as the town, and the people making a fortie, a skirmish ensued. Giavelli and his men were now perfectly convinced of the pasha's design, and laid aside all suspicion; but six days afterwards they were all seized unawares, as they were dispersed in the Turkish camp, and put in heavy irons, except three, who, getting their arms, defended themselves till they were slain. The men were sent to Yanina, and imprisoned in the small island which is in the Acherusian Lake, on the banks of which Yanina stands; but Giavelli was kept in the camp. The pasha immediately turned his march towards Sulli, and arrived before the mountain the next day. The Suliotes, who are always on their guard, had notice of the pasha's approach, and of the fate of their countrymen, six hours before he arrived. They assembled, and gave the command in chief to Captain Bogia, whose abilities they knew.

The mountain of Sulli, or Caco-sulli, so called on account of the ill the Turks have experienced from them, is situated eight leagues from Santa-maura (or Leucas) in the Ionian Sea, having Prevasa (Nicomolis) to the south-west, distant ten leagues; Yanina to the east, twelve leagues; and south-east, Arta, distant eight leagues,

To

To the south, this mountain joins the Chimæra mountains, which are inhabited also by independent Greek Christians, allies of the Suliotes. On the east, at the foot of the mountain, is a fine plain of about six square leagues, which is very fertile; in it they have built four villages, for the purpose of cultivating the land; but in time of danger the inhabitants fly to the mountain. There being no water in the plain, they have sunk cisterns or reservoirs to collect the rain.

The mountain is a natural strong fortress. Three sides are perpendicular precipices to the bottom. The top of the mountain they call Tripa, which signifies a cavity. There is only one narrow steep passage to ascend to it, and it is defended by three towers, nearly a mile distant from each other, situated on eminences, where the road is most difficult. The ascent is about three miles long. In the first mile there is a village called Kapha, which signifies top or summit.

On the side towards Chimæra there is a small brook, formed by the melting of the snow of those mountains, from which, in case of need, the inhabitants of Sulli get water, by letting down sponges, as the sides are not even enough to let down any kind of bucket or other vessel; and this water cannot be cut off
by]

by the Turks, as it is defended by the heights of the mountains.

Captain Bogia ordered corn to be carried from the villages to the Tripa, for six months provisions, as it is always kept in readiness to be transported; then the four villages were evacuated; half of the inhabitants went to Kapha, and the others to Tripa, their last asylum, which will contain ten thousand men; then, having more time, he threw into the cisterns hogs and lime, and other nastiness, to prevent the Turks using the water.

The pashas encamped in the villages, and surrounded the mountain at a distance, to prevent their receiving assistance of troops from the Chimæriotes, or ammunition from St. Mara or Prevasa, whence they are always supplied. The main body of the Turkish army in the villages was commanded in person by the pasha; the corps towards Chimmæra by his son Mokhtar, pasha of Arta (of two tails) and Captain Prognio, who was a chief of the Paramathian Albanese; the side towards Prevasa, was commanded by Mamed Bey and Osman Bey his brother; that on the side of Arta, by Soliman Ciapar, another chief of the same Albanian town of Paramathia, a man of eighty-five years of age, tall, and of a fine gigantic stature, having no appearance of age but the snowy whiteness of his

his beard; he had with him eleven sons from thirty to sixty years of age, all tall and strong like their father: their bodily strength and personal courage caused them to be looked on as heroes, and gave them a remarkable superiority among their countrymen: they went together, that if one fell the others might revenge his death; for among these people it is the custom, that relations go to the war together to revenge each other's death. Those who have the greatest number of relations are the most powerful families, and the fathers of the principal families are their chiefs.

I will speak a little on the subject of those Paramathian Albanese. Their town is situated twelve leagues distant from Yafina; they possess a territory of twelve leagues in circumference, and can bring into the field 20,000 men. Their country is so mountainous and inaccessible, that they have never been conquered by the Turks. How they became Mahomedans they do not know themselves exactly; some of them say, that when the Turks first invaded these countries, they made peace, on condition of becoming Mahomedans, and procuring their independence. They speak Greek, and know no other language; they look on the Turks and other Albanians as effeminate, and hold them in
the

the utmost contempt. They have no regular government; each family or relationship (clan) administers justice among themselves. The largest clans have the most influence in the country in all public or general matters. They are careful not to kill people of another kindred, as the relations revenge his death, and when once bloodshed is thus begun, it goes on till one of the clans is extinct. They always carry their guns with them, whenever they go out of their houses, and never quit them; even at home they are not without their pistols in their girdles; at night they put them under their pillows, and lay their gun by them beside. The same precautions are observed in all these parts, except the town of Yanina. There are amongst the Paramathians, however, a considerable number of Greek Christians, who live all in the same manner. Those who are Mahomedans know little of their religion, or pay little regard to it; their women are not veiled; they drink wine, and intermarry with the Christians. It is true, indeed, that they will not eat pork; but if the husband and wife are of different religions, they make no scruple of boiling in the same pot a piece of pork and a piece of mutton.

All strangers, Turks, Europeans, Greeks, or others, who happen to pass on their territory,

tory, or are caught by them, are carried to their public market, and there sold.

Being one day at Yanina, at the Greek archbishop's house, I saw a Piedmontese priest, who, travelling in these parts, had been seized by the Paramatheans, and sold; his story, as related to me by the prelate, is as follows: Soliman Ciapar being at his house one day on a visit, told him, that he had bought a Frank for four piaftres, but that he was good for nothing, and though he beat him daily, he could not make him do so much work as his bread was worth; he would therefore, he said, when he got home, kill him as a useless beast. The archbishop offered to buy him for the four piaftres he had cost, and to pay the money immediately, if Ciapar would give security (for here no one trusts another). The bargain being settled, the Frank was sent: he proved to be a man of learning, and the archbishop established a school under his direction at Yanina, for Greek children. When I was there, he gained fifty and sixty piaftres a month, and was so pleased with his situation and the kindness of the archbishop, that he had resolved to remain in that country, and marry.

A stranger might travel into these mountains, and would be treated hospitably by the inhabitants, if, while he was in a neighbouring

bouring country, he put himself under the protection of a Paramathian, who would give security for his being brought back safe.

But to return to the pasha's expedition. The second day after the army had encamped in the plains of Sulli, the pasha caused Captain Giavella to be brought before him, and told him, that if he would inform him how he could get possession of the mountain, he would not only spare his life, but make him beluk-bashee of the province. Giavelli answered, that if he would set him at liberty, he would go to the mountain, and engage his party, and at least half the inhabitants, to submit to him, and take up arms against Bogia; that by these means he could introduce the pasha's troops into the Tripa, when the other party would also be glad to make their peace without fighting. The pasha asked him what security he would give for his performing his promises. Giavella answered, he would give him as an hostage his only son, a boy of twelve years of age, who was dearer to him than his own life, that if he deceived him he might put his son to death. Giavella accordingly called his son down from the mountain; but as soon as he got to the mountain himself, he wrote to the pasha as follows :

“ Ali

“ Ali Pasha, I am glad I have deceived a traitor ; I am here to defend my country against a thief. My son will be put to death, but I will desperately revenge him before I fall myself. Some men, like you Turks, will say I am a cruel father to sacrifice my son for my own safety. I answer, if you take the mountain, my son would have been killed, with all the rest of my family and my countrymen ; then I could not have revenged his death. If we are victorious, I may have other children, my wife is young. If my son, young as he is, is not willing to be sacrificed for his country, he is not worthy to live, or to be owned by me as my son. Advance, traitor, I am impatient to be revenged. I am your sworn enemy, Captain Giavella.”

The Greek original was :

Αλι Πασια, χαιρομαι ὅπῃ ἐγελασα ἕναν δολιον, εἶμαι
δῶ να διαφενεύσω τὴν πατριδα με ἐναντιον εἰς ευαν κλεπῆν.
ὁ γος μὲ θελει ἀποθανει ἐγὼ ὁμως ἀπὲλπισως θελω τον
ἐκδικησω πριν να ἀποθάνω. καπιοι Τυρκοι καθως εἰσενα
θελεν εἰπῆν ὅτι εἰμαι ἀσπλαχνος πατερας μετο να θυ-
σιασω, τὸν γον με διὰ τὸν ἐδικον με λιτρομον ἀποκρινομαι,
ὅτι αν εἰς παρῆς το βενὸν θελης σκοτοσης τον γον με
με το ἐπὶ λικον της φαμελειας με καὶ της συνπατριotes με,
τοτες δεν θα μπορεσω να ἐκδικησω τον θανατον τε ἀμῆ.
αν νικησωμεν θελει ἔχω ἄλλα πιδια ἢ γενεκα με ἦναι νεα.
εαν ὁ γος με νεος καθὼς ἦναι δεν μινει ευχαριστήμενος να
θυσιασῇ δια τὴν πατριδα τε, αὐτὸς δεν ἦναι ἄξιος να
ζηση καὶ να ἐγνωριζεται ὡς γος με. προχορησε ἀπίγε εἰμαι
ἀνυπομονος να ἐκδικηθω.

Εγὼ ὁ ὁμοσμενος ἐχθρος σῶ,

Καπιταν Τζιαβελλας.

The

The pasha did not think proper in his rage to put the hostage immediately to death, but sent him to Yanina, to his son Velim-bey, who governed in his absence. I was present when the boy was brought before him: he answered the question put to him with a courage and audaciousness that astonished every one. Velim-bey told him, he only waited the pasha's orders to roast him alive. I don't fear you, the boy answered; my father will do the same to your father or your brother if he takes them. He was put in a dark prison, and fed on bread and water.

The pasha attacked the village of Kapha, and was repulsed three different times with great loss, but Captain Bogia considering the disparity of numbers, as the Suliotes had only 900 men in the Tripa, resolved to abandon this post, which the Albanese took possession of the next time they attacked it, though with considerable loss, the Seliotes firing at them from among the rocks in safety.

The pasha's troops, suffering very much through want of water, which was brought to them six leagues on horses, as all those who attempted to fetch water from the brook under the Sulli mountain were killed by stones the women rolled down on them, or shot by the men, began to mutiny; the pasha there-
fore

fore determined to storm the Tripa the next day, and having assembled the principal officers, and chosen 800 Albanians, he exposed all his treasure in his tent, which consisted of Venetian ducats, and told them, it should all be distributed among them if they took Tripa; and that, besides, they should have all the immense riches which it was known were there. The next day the 800 Albanians, having at their head Mehmetember, and in the main body two sons of Soliman Chapar, and in the rear Captain Brogno, marched to the assault, and drawing their sabres, declared they would not sheathe them till they were victorious.

Captain Bogia left 400 men to garrison Tripa, and sent four hundred to lie in ambuscade in the forest on each side of the road, with orders not to attack till the signal agreed on was made from the second tower, in which he shut himself up with sixty men, and from whence, by means of signals, he commanded the movements. Giavella went with the troops into the forest like a common soldier, the better to take his meditated revenge. The ambuscade was commanded by Demetrius, Bogia's son.

The head of the Albanian column advanced without molestation as far as the second tower, which they surrounded, and summoned

moned Bogia to surrender. He replied, he could not trust himself to them, but would submit to Captain Brogno when he arrived; they therefore marched further up towards Tripa, leaving him, as they thought, a prisoner. The pasha's army, seeing the Albanese had advanced without resistance to the top of the mountain, and fearing to be deprived of a share of the plunder of Tripa, left their tents, and ran up the mountain with shouts of victory. When Bogia saw that the enemy, in number about 4,000, had advanced to the third tower, which was near the Tripa, he rang a bell, the signal for a general attack, which was a general slaughter: the ambuscade prevented any returning. They were in every part exposed to the fire of the Suliotes, who were covered by the rocks or the trees, and from the second tower Bogia made great havoc. The women from the heights rolled down great stones, which for that purpose are always piled up. The enemy defended themselves, when the Suliotes came out to meet them, with great obstinacy; they were, however, all killed, except 140, who surrendered themselves prisoners. Among them was a son of Soliman Chappa, and many officers. The Suliotes had fifty-seven killed and twenty-seven wounded. Giavella was among the slain. After shooting from the ambuscade a great number

number of the enemy, he sallied out with some of his friends, to avenge the supposed death of his son, and to fight till all the enemy were killed, or he himself fell. After making a great havoc among the enemy, into the thickest of whose ranks he had ran forward with desperate valour, he fell, covered with wounds, and surrounded by heaps of slain.

The bodies being thrown down from the rocks into the Turkish camp, struck the remainder of the army with such a panic that they fled with great precipitation towards Yanina, and abandoned the pasha. Bogia profited of their disorder to send 200 men, who, falling on the rear, cut off great numbers. The pasha himself escaped with difficulty, and killed two horses before he got back to Yanina. All the baggage, ammunition, arms, provisions, and the pasha's treasure, fell into the hands of the Suliotes, besides four large cannon, which they drew up to the Tripa, and which were a great acquisition to them.

The other corps, towards Prevasa, Arta, and Chimæra, followed the example of the main body, and reached Yanina in great haste. So great indeed was their panic, that none of them stopt till they got within the

walls of the city, thinking they were still pursued by the Suliotes.

In the mean time, the communication being opened with the Chimæriotes, the Sulian army increased in two days so much, that they found themselves strong enough to offer the pasha battle in the open plains. They marched to an estate of the pasha's near Yanina, and took possession of it, whence they sent him a letter, threatening to take him prisoner in his haram. They pursued the Paramathians into their country, where they cut down the trees, and drove away vast herds of cattle and flocks of sheep to Sulli.

The pasha, apprehensive for the safety of his capital, sent a bishop to propose peace to the Suliotes. It was concluded on the following conditions :

- 1st. That the pasha cedes to the Suliotes all the territory as far as Dervigiana (six leagues from Yanina) inclusively.

2. That all the Suliotes, who were prisoners, should be set at liberty. (Then Giavella's son returned safe to Sulli.)

3. The pasha should pay 100,000 piastras as a ransom for the prisoners the Suliotes had made.

With the Paramathians they concluded a separate

separate peace, as they are not dependent on the pasha.

The conditions were, that they should in future be allies, and that they should on all occasions succour the Suliotes, both with men, arms, and provisions, when they were at war.

Returned home to their mountain, the Suliotes divided the booty, and the 100,000 piastrs, into five parts: one was destined to the repair of churches, which the Turks had damaged, and to build a new one on the Tripa, dedicated to the holy virgin; the second part was put into the public box for the service of the community; the third was equally divided among all the inhabitants, without distinction of rank or age; the two other parts were distributed to the families of those who had lost men in battle.

This peace was soon broken by the pasha, who was twice afterwards defeated, and the Suliotes gained still greater honour.

The writer of this journal further says, that in this country there are ten Greeks to one Turk; that the Sulian army always consists of about 20,000 men, including their nearest neighbours on the Chimæra mountains. He points out how easy it would have been for them to have put in effect

what their chiefs had concerted with the Russians. But I avoid entering into particulars, as I might give information to those who would make a bad use of it.

It was afterwards discovered, that the French consul, Mr. de la Salas, had advised the pasha to get possession of Sulli and Chimæra, as then he would have nothing to fear from the porte, if he threw off all obedience; and that the French could then supply him with artillery and ammunition, &c. Mr. de la Sala was one day shot dead in the street at Prevasa by a captain of Lambro's fleet.

CHAPTER X.

*The Turkish Empire considered, with regard to
its Foreign Relations.*

THE preceding pages have shown the internal situation of the Turkish empire; they have traced the progress of a power founded in violence and rapine, growing up in tyranny and injustice, and ultimately verging to corruption and decay. But it is not enough to expose the defects of internal constitution and administration; to the politician it must be matter of serious enquiry to learn what are the foreign relations to which these domestic arrangements give birth; what rank in the scale of political importance such an empire has obtained; and how its existence has affected, and its approaching annihilation will affect the interests of other states. This view of the subject must, however, be taken with great caution.

In the system of Europe, great and important changes have taken place, and the balance of power, once a subject of so much

contention and jealousy, has received, and is daily receiving, such shocks as seem to threaten its total subversion.

In the midst of this chaos we may still, however, perceive the outlines of two grand combinations of interests dividing Europe by their mutual opposition. At the head of these confederacies may be placed the two ancient rivals in opulence and glory, Great-Britain and France; and however we may be inclined, with philosophers, to lament that there exist irreconcilable interests, or political prejudices, which sow eternal discord between nations, on account of their vicinity and power, it must be reluctantly acknowledged, that such interests and such prejudices not only do exist, but are likely to become still stronger on the part of the French republicans, who, while they preach universal liberty, fraternity, and toleration to all mankind, act with a spirit of inveterate hatred, despotism, and insufferance, which the narrowest prejudices, and the deepest depravity of human nature could only produce.

It may be observed, that these two powers, as well as most of those that rank in the first class, have nearly the same relationship of interests as heretofore; but the inferior states are mostly thrown from their balance, many of them either totally or partially annihilated,

lated, and several induced to form alliances diametrically opposite to their former principles of policy.

In order to explain the connection of Turkish politics with the general system of Europe, it will be necessary to take into consideration the particular interests of the different powers, and to show their relation to the present or any future state of that empire. Previously to this, however, a general sketch of the present situation of things may tend to elucidate our further disquisitions.

The attachment of France to Turkey is rationally founded on the great commercial advantages which she enjoys from that nation; on the use she makes of the porte to form a diversion in her favour, whenever the situation of her affairs on the continent requires it; and on her particular jealousy of Russia, which, by obtaining possession of the passage from the Black Sea, might send a naval force into the Mediterranean, to the evident diminution of the French power and commerce. The local situation of the possessions of the house of Austria has ever made it an object of jealousy to France; she has, therefore, laboured to crush, or at least to curb that power, and finds an additional bond of friendship with the Turks in their hostility to the emperor.

empêrer. Much light is thrown on this subject by the papers printed at Paris since the revolution, entitled *Politique de tous les Cabinets de l'Europe pendant les Regnes de Louis XV. et XVI.* It there plainly appears (did we want proofs to convince us) that France considers Spain, Prussia, and Turkey, as its best and most natural allies; and that whenever it was connected in bonds of amity with Austria, it never considered that alliance otherwise than as a temporary convenience, and secretly entertained sentiments hostile to the prosperity of that house; that it regarded the preservation of the Turks as a matter infinitely more important to her than Poland or Sweden; that its jealousy and hatred to Russia, even when it courted her friendship, and concluded a treaty of commerce with her, could only be equalled by its hatred and its jealousy of Great Britain. We have no reason to believe, that the republic thinks differently.

France then being by system the avowed or secret enemy of the two imperial courts, it is to her that the powers which have to dread either of those courts will naturally look for support.

Prussia, whose views of aggrandizement depend in a great measure on the ruin of the house of Austria; and Sweden and Denmark,

mark, who both look with envy or apprehension on the still growing power of the Russian empire, must be induced by such motives to attach themselves, when they dare, to France, and of consequence must be inclined to support the Ottoman power.

It is by other views of policy that the nations in the south of Europe are directed in forming their alliances with France. Most of the Italian states, by their comparative insignificance, are rendered necessarily dependent, and by their situation must be led, either through fear or policy, to court the protection of that power, while Spain, ever jealous of the British naval superiority, ever apprehensive for the fate of her colonies, sees in France alone an ally sufficiently powerful to dispel her fears and to defend her interests.

The reasons alledged for the connection of different nations with France will, in their converse, point out the motives for alliance with Britain. Among the secondary powers attached to us are Portugal and Naples; the one by long commercial habits, and a fear of its more potent and dangerous neighbour, Spain; the other, by a like apprehension of the French enmity, secret or avowed.

On the side of Austria we see an ancient ally

ally again united to us by a recent treaty, and by a similarity of interest, which must continue as long as the secret or avowed connection subsists between France, Prussia, and Turkey.

Russia, which has risen to its present importance, even more by the policy of its monarchs than by the greatness of its population or territory, vast as they are, may in some measure be considered as removed, by its northern situation, so far from the sphere of European politics, that it may occasionally, and at its option, either enter into them, or preserve a neutrality, as best suits its purpose; an advantage which no other state possesses, and of which the empress is perfectly aware, having frequently avoided taking part in those very contests which tended to promote her interests. Though Russia has not long been raised to the situation she now occupies, her army is the most formidable, and has many advantages over every other military establishment in Europe: besides a great naval force in the Baltic, she has obtained a complete superiority over the Turkish fleet in the Black Sea, both by the number and excellence of her ships, and the skill and courage of her sailors, so that she can open to herself a passage into the Mediterranean, and is now possessed of all the means, so long
and

and so perseveringly pursued from the time Peter the First took Asoph to this day, of annihilating the monstrous and unwieldy despotism of the Ottoman sceptre in Europe. The empress has also conceived the vast and generous design of delivering Greece from its bondage, and of establishing it under a prince of its own religion, as a free and independent nation. It was not long ago the policy of the British cabinet to counteract these schemes of the empress (with what reason we will not now consider); but a conviction of the similarity of her interests with our own now prevails; the Turkish clause (in all preceding treaties) was given up in the treaty of 1795, and a war between Russia and Turkey now becomes a *casus fœderis* with Great Britain, and she is justly considered as our most valuable and most natural ally.

If this general sketch of this system of Europe be just, it will afford a clue to the motives which have actuated, and are likely to actuate the conduct of different powers in their individual relations.

TO return to FRANCE.—This nation, ever versed in intrigue and fertile in politicians, has appeared under all circumstances to be best instructed with regard to the real state of Turkey, and has shown a conviction of the weakness of its ally, at the very time
when

when it was most necessary to support its importance. Thus it was, that when the Count de Vergennes (who by a long residence at the porte as ambassador, had obtained a thorough knowledge of the resources of the empire) was directed by the Duke de Choiseul to excite the Turks to war against Russia, he stated the most forcible reasons for an opposite line of conduct. These reasons, which were conclusive with the minister, were founded on the real weakness of the Ottoman empire, and the false ideas of its strength entertained by several courts in Europe, which it would have been so impolitic in France to have removed, by suffering the Turks to engage in a war destructive of their reputation. The same Count de Vergennes, when he became minister, instructed Monsieur de St. Priest, to use every argument which might induce the Turks rather to yield to the demands of Russia than to engage in a war.

The arrangement of the dispute with Russia in 1778 was attended with some singular circumstances. The Turks had, contrary to the treaty of Kainargi, appointed a new khan of the Crim, and sent him with a fleet of ships of war, in the latter end of 1777, to the port now called Sebastopolis, to support the Tatars, whom they had before excited to
rebel

rebel against their lawful khan, Shaheen-Guerrai. On these grounds a war had nearly broken out, when the porte, after holding a secret divan, suddenly resolved on peace, and notified their determination to Mr. Stachief, the Russian envoy. He applied to the English ambassador, Sir Robert Ainslie, to assist at the conference to be held, and act as mediator at the signing of the accommodation. Sir Robert, however (doubtless for good reasons) refused, and Monsieur de St. Priest was sent for, who readily accepted the office, and France appeared, on no other ground than the refusal of our ambassador, as mediatrix. From this time Monsieur Stachief was so much governed by the French ambassador, that his court thought it necessary to recal him, as the empress by his conduct plainly perceived the tendency of the French councils to support Turkey.

In 1783, when Russia found it absolutely necessary for her own safety, and the tranquillity of her subjects, who were continually exposed to the incursions of the Tatars, to take possession of the Crim, and annex it to the empire, the French still persuaded the Turks to yield for the time to necessity, and rather to give up the Crim than run the risk of losing Constantinople itself.

The late emperor Joseph had formed with
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the empress the plan of expelling the Turks from Europe, and had obtained, as he thought, the acquiescence of France; but that artful power unwilling to hazard, and at that moment unable to support an open contest in favour of the Turks, employed all its engines in secret manœuvres for their cause.

The imperial courts discovered these designs, but not before France had prevailed on Sweden to declare war against Russia, after the porte had imprudently, and contrary to their advice, done it, and had by means of M. de Choiseul-Gouffier negotiated a subsidy from Turkey to the Swedish monarch. The part too which they took, not only in acquiescing, but in urging Great Britain and Prussia to oppose the progress of Russia, and support the king of Sweden in that war, was well known to the two imperial courts.

Since that time Austria and Russia (other circumstances having intervened) turned their views to an alliance with his Britannic Majesty, and which has still been strengthened by the declaration or triple alliance signed in September 1795. Towards them, therefore, France must retain an hostile disposition, while her connections with Spain, Prussia, Sweden, and Turkey, result from mutual and natural interests, as that with other states
does

does from motives of dependence and self-preservation.

SPAIN, notwithstanding the extent of her territories, and the immensity of her resources if well managed, seems to have been degraded almost to the rank of a secondary power. Her colonial possessions, the source of her apparent splendor and of her political degeneracy, have become an object of so much apprehension to her, that, unable to rely on her own force for their preservation, she must court the alliance of a more powerful neighbour. Of the two chief naval powers, Britain excites the greater jealousy, as pretending to the command of the sea, and appearing ever intent on the extension of her commerce and foreign possessions. This antipathy is heightened, on the one hand, by the resentment with which Spain views on her own coast the British fortress of Gibraltar, as, on the other, her attachment to France has been cherished by intimacy, and by the mutual interest which they have, to keep the northern powers out of the Mediterranean.

Of the influence of political opinions (whether monarchical or republican) in consolidating the union of the different parties, I forbear at present to speak, because the principles which are here laid down as the

basis of such union apply to the countries under whatever form of government they exist. So long as different nations retain the same relations, commercial and political, which they now bear to each other, so long will the general outlines of the system of Europe, and its grand divisions of interest, remain nearly as they are here represented. Opinion may, in some instances, be a motive more forcible than the permanent distinctions of interest, as in the case of the late war between Spain and France for the re-establishment of monarchy; but these causes are merely temporary, and however the dispute may terminate, recurrence will ever be had to those principles, which, being founded on local and essential distinctions, have the greatest possible degree of permanency. The French republic have proved, that they have the same notions with respect to the alliance with Spain as the monarchy had; (the family compact was framed entirely by interest;) they look on it as "*the most essential as well as the most natural which France can form.*" Were monarchy to be re-established in France, should we have made an ally of Louis XVIII. or a friend of one single emigrant?

PRUSSIA, which has been led forward to its present eminence by a train of fortunate events,

events, must choose that ally which will best enable it, not only to preserve its situation, but pursue its never-ceasing projects of aggrandizement: it has, perhaps, sometimes to choose between France and Russia; but it cannot rely on the latter; transitory events may unite their interests for a moment, personal predilection of sovereigns may influence the option for a time, but no solid alliance can be formed: the partition of Poland has sown the seeds of discord, which, some day or other, will ripen. With France no such circumstances exist; it is the country which can procure to Prussia more advantages than any other, and in return receive more from it. From Russia and from England it has drawn occasional means of aggrandizement, but it has always, even in the moment of receiving their assistance, looked on them with a suspicious eye. Should Prussia be seriously allied with Russia, Austria must be leagued with France; and should then a quarrel take place between the two former, Prussia might not have it in its power to break the Austrian alliance, and join France in the moment of distress. It is not probable this wily cabinet will throw itself into the hands of a power, on which, from many circumstances, it can never for any length of time rely. The aggrandize-

ment of Prussia must be at the expence of the House of Austria, and the system of the cabinet of St. Peterburgh never will be to ruin that house.

Prussia will temporize with the empress, but its present and future system undoubtedly will be an alliance with France; for if Russia at any time be ill-disposed to it, it has no other resource to rely on. The jealousy of Austria, at this moment, must be excited to the highest degree, by the concurrence of Prussia with France in endeavouring to annihilate the Germanic confederacy. This conduct must leave Prussia without any other support but the directory, and, however matters terminate, will leave a deep rooted enmity in every part of Europe, which may ultimately have fatal consequences, and renew a combination against a country which has lost its tutelar genius. To preserve his dominions from his powerful neighbours required all the talents of the great Frederic, and even he with difficulty was able to save it from destruction. Such talents are not again to be expected in a sovereign. That both France and Prussia consider themselves as *the most* natural allies is obvious; that they considered themselves so, even while other alliances existed, is equally obvious. We need only to look to what has, in the latter part of
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this century, happened between France and Austria—between Russia, Austria, and Prussia—to be convinced that natural alliances will ultimately prevail over temporary systems. It would be superfluous to enter into details so well known. If the king of Prussia joined Austria in the present war, it was to secure the friendship of the monarchy, which he then thought would be restored; when he ceased to think that event practicable, he as readily allied himself with the republic; his object was the same, an alliance with *France*. Prussia by this conduct prolonged the miseries of humanity; for she caused a campaign to fail, which would have ended them, and turned a defensive war in France to an offensive war out of it, which has nearly ruined Europe. What is the fruit she has reaped? In this one campaign she lost the consequence which forty years of success had given her. The seeds of democracy and rebellion are sown in Prussia; most of the literati spread them broadly, not to say a very great portion of the officers of the army, and there is not a country in Europe more ripe for revolution. The treasures which the great Frederic left behind, and, what is still a much greater loss, that spirit in the army, that emulation of glory, that devotedness to their sovereign's

cause, which, more than its discipline, made it so formidable, have totally disappeared.

In 1791, the king of Prussia had a standing army of above 200,000 men ready to act; the people satisfied with their government, and attached to their king; the army had still the warlike spirit which the great Frederic had breathed into it, and the treasures he left were not yet dissipated; he had supplanted the empress in her influence in Poland, which was become formidable.

SWEDEN would scarcely be esteemed of any consequence in Europe, did not its local situation enable it to make a diversion in favour of Turkey, by a war with Russia; to France it, therefore, has always appeared in the light of an useful ally, and has ever been assisted by her with subsidies, and supported with all her interest; but, since its decline, the services it is able to render are thought inadequate to its burthen, and the old connection is supported, rather to prevent its forming new ones, than from the real assistance it can afford.

If Sweden would pursue a line of strict neutrality, Russia has little temptation to dismember it any further; but another war would, most probably, make the Gulph of Bothnia the frontier. It is to be hoped that

Sweden

Sweden now knows her real interest, which is, to be well with Russia, and to suffer patiently what she cannot avoid. Such a situation is humiliating; but has she resources in herself to rise above it? Certainly not, and that she has not is her own fault; a worse situation must follow from a contrary conduct; and it is doubtful whether France and Prussia united could, were they to turn all their force to support her, save her from the talons of the Russian eagle.

However humiliating this state of dependence may be to the country, it is, undoubtedly, the only security of the crown of Sweden. The people have received, by their connections with the French, during the minority of the present king particularly, such an augmentation of their former republican notions, that they are become, perhaps, more fanatic than many of the provinces of France. In the winter of 1795, the theatre at Norköping was shut up; the people obliged the music to play *ça-ira*, of which they have an excellent Swedish translation (by one of the professors of their university) which they all sung in chorus.

It may not here be an improper digression, to take a slight view of the conduct of the late king of Sweden, in declaring war against Russia, at a time when the empress

fully relied on his neutrality, and had every reason so to do, considering the interest of Sweden itself. That monarch, impelled by the common infatuation of ambitious princes, was eager to act a distinguished part on the theatre of Europe, and to imitate the quixotism of his illustrious predecessor, Charles XII. He seized the moment which appeared most favourable to his projects, when the armies of the empress were drawn down towards the south, to oppose the Turks; but this very circumstance made his aggression so glaring, even to his own subjects, that the war was universally reprobated, and the Swedish and Finland armies actually protested against it. So fully indeed had the empress relied on his neutrality, that the frontiers of her empire, on that side, were left without a force sufficient for their defence; and it afterwards appeared that the king, could he have relied on the fidelity of his armies, might have marched without opposition to St. Petersburg, and made himself master of the imperial residence by a *coup de main*. Luckily for his country he only alarmed the empress, and the report of the cannon of his fleet only shook the windows of her palace. Had he effected his plan, whoever knows the empress, knows she would never have laid down her arms till she had taken ample vengeance.

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The inconsiderate ambition of the king of Sweden appeared in the eagerness with which he attacked the Russian squadron on its way to the Mediterranean; had he suffered it to proceed to its destination, the Swedish fleet would have remained mistress of the Baltic.

It was in May 1788, that the Swedish fleet sailed from Carlscrona with sealed orders, to be opened in the latitude of Gothland, to act offensively against Russia; but the king's declaration of his motives for hostility, though dated on the 21st of July in the same year, was not published till August. These proceedings, contrary as they were in themselves to the maxims which are generally acknowledged among civilized states as the law of nations, were grounded upon reasons equally nugatory and unjust. They are conceived in the following terms: "*The declaration of war made by the sublime Ottoman Porte against Russia was a new motive for the latter to redouble its efforts in sowing confusion and trouble in the bosom of Sweden, which, united by an ancient and permanent treaty with the Ottoman Porte, concluded in 1739, and obliged by that treaty not to abandon so ancient an ally, appeared formidable to Russia, &c.*"

"*His majesty, never deviating from his pacific inclinations, is still desirous of peace, provided that the empress shall offer him an honourable*

*"nourable one, and that the king shall be assured
"of procuring for the Ottoman Porte a firm
"and permanent peace."*

The treaty of 1739, by which the king pretended that he was bound to the Turks, was not offensive, but defensive; and even this was declared null and void by the first article of the treaty of Abo, concluded with Russia in 1743, and the porte was, at that time, officially informed of its abolition and non-existence.

The late king of Sweden, guided by the same motives as the king of Prussia, was preparing to take an active part against the French republic, to secure the friendship of the re-instated monarchy. After his death, the regent, looking on the republican government as permanently fixed, pursued a different conduct, but having the same view as his brother, an alliance with France.

The conduct of Sweden during the regency has been more hostile to the allies than is consistent with the neutrality it professed; and had the allies listened to the insinuations of the empress, it would have been severely punished for its partiality. Had a war with Sweden in these circumstances taken place, in vain would Sweden have relied on the co-operation of the Danish fleet; the empress might either have prevented

ed the junction, or, with a little assistance, if not alone, have crushed their combined force. The island of Bornholm lies ready for her to seize upon; and though at present it can boast no harbour, that defect might be easily remedied. From such a station the Russian fleet would be able to go to sea six weeks earlier than the Swedish from Carlscrona, and consequently prevent their junction.

The English politician may object, that it is the interest of this country to prevent Sweden being swallowed up by Russia: be that as it may, neither this country nor France can serve Sweden more essentially, than by endeavouring to keep it well with Russia. Notwithstanding the support of the most powerful allies, the ruin of Sweden must be ultimately the result of a contest with its powerful neighbour.

DENMARK, we have seen, in the present war, which has involved the interests of all Europe, pursuing the same path of neutrality with Sweden, and united to it by a treaty; we have seen their combined fleets parading the Baltic and the North Sea, and professedly directed by the same views, not of neutrality only, but almost an open espousal of the French interest, in defiance of the allied powers, whose resentment they would have felt, had, as I have already mentioned, his
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Britannic Majesty not had more forbearance than the empress. It would have been easy to have detached a squadron from our fleet to have joined that of the empress, and put at once an end to the dispute, by annihilating the united Danish and Swedish navies. If they have escaped, the danger they have run ought to make them more prudent in future.

The conduct of Denmark to the empress has been very ungrateful as well as imprudent.

Sleswick, which in 1762 threatened to draw upon Denmark the vengeance of the Russian arms, in 1776 was, at the instance of the empress, guaranteed to that country by the two imperial courts, and since, this guarantee has become still stronger by the accession of his Britannic Majesty to it, in the triple alliance of 1795. On this subject she is, therefore, perfectly easy; but the local situation and the relative weakness of that kingdom must make it ever dependent on Great Britain and Russia. The alliance with Sweden can be but a temporary arrangement, however ardently the court of Copenhagen may wish to make it permanent, through the support of France. Small states must, in external relations, be dependent on greater: an equality of power among sovereigns is

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as visionary as among individuals. Has this levelling mania seized the kings of Denmark and Sweden as well as their subjects?

SARDINIA deserves particular consideration, as its importance seems to have been falsely estimated. To secure the passes of Italy against the inroads of the French was indeed a point of the utmost importance; but the ability of the court of Turin to second such views has long ceased, and its interests seem at present to take a contrary direction. The question is no longer whether Savoy shall be preserved; that country was disaffected long before the French revolution; it was governed with a rod of iron; the nobility and the peasantry were alike dissatisfied, and it was a general complaint, that the name of Savoyard was an insurmountable bar to promotion in every department of the state: such was its situation when it was attacked by France; and besides this internal disaffection, it had other causes of weakness, arising from preceding political events.

During the long contests between France and the House of Austria (the former wishing to gain admission into Italy, the latter to prevent it) the alliance of Sardinia was courted, as possessing the command of so strong a barrier. Hence arose the importance

ance of the court of Turin, which, in changing allies as opportunity presented itself, gained something by every treaty, and was enabled, by subsidies, to discipline and keep on foot a formidable force; but when the French resigned all pretensions to the Milanese and the grand duchy of Tuscany, the king of Sardinia, who no longer found himself courted by contending parties, neglected that military force, which he had neither motive nor ability to support, and sunk by degrees into a state of comparative insignificance. From this he was for a short time called, and enabled to act a more distinguished part, by the alliance of Austria and the subsidies of Britain; but these proving insufficient, the passes of Italy have fallen into the hands of the French. It is to be expected that Sardinia will always remain an ally, if not become a province of France, on whom it is now entirely dependent. In fact, it always was a secret enemy to Austria, and never favoured its cause, but temporarily for the sake of aggrandizement, and the aggrandizement it most coveted was at the expence of that house.

NAPLES is capable of possessing a considerable marine, and might become a naval power of no small importance in the Mediterranean. The reasons which influence
Spain

Spain to take part with France have no weight with the Neapolitan court; it has no colonies to lose, no jealousy of our trade, or of our influence in the Mediterranean. (The former situation of Naples, under the immediate influence of Spain, has no relation to its present, or to its true interest.) To it Great Britain must appear as a valuable ally. France has long been its secret enemy, and has used every exertion to prevent it from becoming a naval power. It must ever remain in a state of dependence and subjection, if England and its allies are excluded from the Mediterranean. Every augmentation of naval force in that quarter, which can cope with the fleets of France and Spain, must therefore be a desirable object to Naples, as on that alone her safety and prosperity depend. No country has so much to lose by the establishment of French influence in Italy as Naples.

AUSTRIA, the ancient, and (at least at present) the most natural ally, after Russia, to Great Britain, the natural protector of Germany and Italy, and the natural balance against France, has evinced her exertions in the present war, her firmness in support of the common interests she has with this country. The support which she derived from the finances of Great Britain was, indeed,

deed, necessary for her to make such exertions. Her armies were brave, well disciplined, and numerous; her resources in men inexhaustible; but her treasury was inadequate, and she entered upon a disastrous contest under circumstances peculiarly disadvantageous. Prussia, without being the friend, acted on this occasion as the ally of Austria. If any cause was of sufficient magnitude to have silenced their jealousies and consolidated their plans, surely it was that in which they were embarked, by an interest hitherto unknown in the annals of history, a general interest, which crushed all individual interests of nations, and which appealed no less to the passions of monarchs than to the policy of all civilized states. The sequel, alas! is too well known. The French have succeeded in dissolving the alliance, by convincing the king of Prussia that their government was unshakeable; they recurred to their old policy, *divide et impera*.

Prussia has entered into their project of separating the members of the Germanic body; the French monarchy guaranteed their union; but the aim of both was the same, the humiliation of the House of Austria. This they in part effected by the peace of Westphalia, the war preceding which, borrowing the pretext of religion, was in effect a war
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of policy; nor have they since that period neglected this grand object, either in the open exertions of war or the more subtle efforts of intrigue; hence it is, that we shall ever find the Turks in all their contests with the emperor, however unjust, strengthened by the aid and assisted by the councils of France; and hence it is, on the other hand, that the House of Austria must look with confidence to the steady support of Great Britain. Indeed we may not only with justice contend for the preservation of the emperor's present possessions, but favour their extension, for the purpose of strengthening him on the coast of the Adriatic and in European Turkey, a part of which more naturally belongs to him than to Russia or the Greeks, were the Turks driven out of Europe.

RUSSIA, the most powerful, the most natural, and the most useful of our allies, has so intimate a connection of interests with us, that the soundest policy must dictate to us an union of design and a co-operation in action. Her commerce with Great Britain is of the utmost consequence to her, as it produces a clear annual balance in her favour, from a million to a million and a half sterling. In the course of last year there entered into the port of St. Petersburg alone 533 British ships, which carried thence Russian products

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to the value of £. 2,400,000 sterling; at the same time, the greatest number of vessels employed by any other nation was eighty-six (Danish ships) and the greatest value exported was £. 80,000 sterling by the Portuguese. Yet is the Russian trade of great importance to England, as she thence draws most of her naval stores, and employs therein several hundred vessels, and many thousand seamen. Since the empress has added to her dominions the rest of those countries where hemp is produced, we are more dependent on her than heretofore; yet not so much, perhaps, as the Russian ministry imagine, for reasons which it is easy to point out, but which it would be foreign to the purpose of this treatise to specify. When the trade of France to Russia is put in comparison with this, it will be found very inconsiderable indeed. The year after their treaty of commerce, in which they had all the advantages they could wish, the French took from Russia exports only to the amount of £. 50,000 sterling. They have full liberty to extend their commerce to the Russian ports in the Black Sea, but it has been hitherto too inconsiderable to deserve notice, or to be put in comparison with the loss of trade they would sustain were the Turks driven out of Europe. Trifling however as their exports

ports are, their imports are very considerable, not only in articles which come direct from France by sea, but rich stuffs and jewels, and other articles of luxury, which go either by land, or to the German ports in the Baltic, and thence find their way into Russia, a considerable part of which are smuggled.

Russia is not our rival on the seas, nor we her's on the continent; she stands in need of our assistance at sea, and we of her's by land; her interest dictates to her the same alliances as our interest dictates to us; we are rivals in nothing; the prosperity of the one country is the increase of strength in the other; with her alliance we can protect our friends on the continent, or humiliate our enemies; with our alliance her fleets may sail in safety to all parts of the globe, and chastise those who have provoked her. Even in the trade between the two countries there is no rivalry; her products, partly manufactured and partly raw, brought by a long land carriage from distant provinces to her ports (which is in itself a beneficial branch of commerce) find in our merchants the *only* purchasers; they transport them to our ports in our own ships: neither in this is there any rivalry, for Russia has no mercantile navy; but to compensate that circumstance the balance of trade is immensely in her favour. In

short, there is no single point in which we can be rivals, except it be, which should be more arduous in cultivating the ties of friendship.

It is the interest of this country, as must appear from what has been said, that the empress should keep Sweden and Denmark in awe, as well as the Prussian ports, to prevent them from supplying France with naval stores, &c. in time of war. On the other hand, our interest requires that she should have the command in the Black Sea, in order not only to open its ports to us, but to send us succours into the Mediterranean, to oppose the formidable combination of France and Spain. Indeed it is difficult to conceive, amid the variety and discordance of political interests, the existence of two great powers, between which there are so many mutual dependencies and so few causes of jealousy.

The empress of Russia has been accused of inconstancy in her alliances, of inconsistency in her politics, and of only having had in view to profit by the circumstances of the day. It must, however, now be obvious, that though she used different means to accomplish her ends, she never deviated from the system she adopted the first year of her reign, and that, if she changed her friends,

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it was because she thought that she could no longer depend on them.

In every political connection she formed, she had constantly in view the expulsion of the Turks from Europe, and the restoration of the Greek empire. As long as the power she had allied herself with seemed to favour these projects, she was steady in her attachment to it; the instant it discovered jealousy of, or opposition to them, she sacrificed every other consideration, and became its secret enemy. Nor has the present empress alone had in view the accomplishing this vast design; Peter the Great first conceived the idea of its being some day practicable, and the cabinet of St. Petersburg have never lost sight of it during the succeeding reigns, to this day.

The empress declared unequivocally her intentions, in her manifestoes to the Greeks, during the war which took place with the Turks soon after her accession to the throne, in consequence of her interference in the affairs of Poland, which was only a preliminary step to subjugating the Turks. It was necessary to secure to herself the resources for her armies, which Poland afforded. Subsequent accidents have indeed annihilated the government and independence of that country.

The ardour with which his Britannic Majesty espoused the cause of the empress in that war, by the assistance afforded her fleet, and in forcing France and Spain to consent to its entrance into the Mediterranean, by a positive declaration that a refusal would be considered by His Majesty as an act of hostility to him, attached her so zealously to the cause of Great Britain, and fixed in her mind a predilection, not only for its government but for individuals, that nothing could shake it but an opposition to her favourite measures, which she considered as her dearest interests, and which were to crown her reign with eternal glory.

Her devotedness to Great Britain excited in the cabinet of Versailles the highest jealousy, and it laboured incessantly, by every means, to weaken the connexion. It would be an endless task to recite all the manœuvres of the French, till they unluckily succeeded: they represented our trade with Russia as a monopoly, ruinous and insulting to its subjects; they excited doubts of the sincerity of our attachment to Russia, and of our hearty co-operation in her favourite schemes; they insinuated that our views were only to keep her navy in such a state of dependence as not to be able to act without our concurrence, and to proceed in its successes only as far as
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we chose to permit it; at length they formed, at an enormous expence, a party in the empress's cabinet to counteract us.

The empress's second grandson was born in January 1779. He was named Constantine. Greek women were given him for nurses, and he sucked in with his milk the Greek language, in which he afterwards was perfected by learned Greek teachers; in short, his whole education was such as to fit him for the throne of Constantinople, and nobody then doubted the empress's design.

In this same year (1779) the empress had determined on giving his Britannic Majesty an *effective* assistance against his rebellious subjects in America, supported by the *crown of France*. Prince Potemkin, who to the last day of his life affirmed that the success of the enterprize against Turkey depended on the alliance with Great Britain, had the sole management of this business, and without the concurrence of Count Panin, the minister for foreign affairs, and the partisan of the French, who, suspecting, or having some information of what was going on, employed a Mademoiselle Guibal, governess to one of Potemkin's nieces, to steal the papers from under the prince's pillow, and after seeing the contents, to replace them so carefully that it was sometime afterwards before he discovered how

he was betrayed. Count Panin found means to retard the signing of the instrument already drawn up, and produced another project, which flattered the empress's vanity more, the *armed neutrality*, which was first conceived by the late king of Prussia. This Potemkin opposed with all his might; the argument he used was, that if the other neutral nations, who had good vessels and experienced sailors, were to enjoy the same privilege as the Russians had by the treaty with Great Britain, of carrying hemp, &c. to France in time of war, Russian ships would never be employed; but that a contrary conduct would create a Russian mercantile navy, which then did not exist. He was over-ruled. No argument could withstand the assurance Count Panin gave, that the French entered heartily into the project of the empress with respect to the Turks (whom, unable any longer to defend, they had abandoned) and that the British court never would consent to it. The conduct of the prince on this occasion was not candid: when he could not carry his point, he ranged himself with his adversaries, and received from the empress a present for his share of the labour in bringing about the armed neutrality (as was mentioned in the ukase.) He did not communicate it to Sir James Harris (who had conducted the negotiation

tiation in the most able manner) till it was signed, and a system adopted highly inimical to the interests of Great Britain. The empress soon after went to Mohilov to meet the emperor Joseph, whom Mr. de Vergennes had persuaded, that his court had given up the cause of the Turks, and he led the empress into her error, which Prince Potemkin lamented to the day of his death.

The empress, and particularly Potemkin, were very anxious to obtain from His Majesty a cession of the island of Minorca, which was intended as a station for her fleet, and a rendezvous for the Greeks. Soon after the proposal was made it was taken from us. The empress might have asked it of the king of France, had it been taken in his name, to prove the sincerity of his friendship. The time it was attacked, and the circumstance that it was so, and in the name of the king of Spain, shows that the court of France had good information from Peterburgh.

The conduct of Mr. de Vergennes (one of the most indefatigable and universally intriguing ministers, as well as most perfidious, that ever presided in a cabinet) should have opened the eyes of our coalition ministers in 1783. After he had sounded them, and found that they would not assist the Turks nor the Russians, he not only promised to the
emperor

emperor the opening of the Scheld, but the exchange of the Netherlands for Bavaria; and the empress was so hearty in his cause, that she ordered her minister at Frankfort to make a formal proposal of this exchange to the Duke of Deux Ponts. Had we then rightly understood our interest with respect to Turkey, we should have joined in the league with the two imperial courts to effectuate this exchange. The offer would have been eagerly accepted; we should have completely duped the court of Versailles, whose inability to act was perfectly well known at Vienna and Petersburg; and Mr. de Vergennes well knew, that if Prussia, Great Britain, and Holland, opposed the exchange, it would not take place, notwithstanding the serious face he might put on in the comedy he was then acting; he was not only easy on that head, but he had the satisfaction to widen the breach between his Britannic Majesty and the two imperial courts. The king of Prussia saw into the true views of the French court, and was under no apprehension of offending it ultimately, while he was pursuing with all his might his own interest, in preventing the very considerable augmentation of power which would have accrued to the House of Austria.

I have since learnt that the empress even then

then began to conceive suspicions of the sincerity of the professions of France, and never could be persuaded by the emperor, that, though their finances were in the worst state possible, they might not have lent an army to him to prevent the Dutch opposing the opening of the Scheld.

The empress, with great dexterity, on this occasion became a guarantee to the treaty of Westphalia, and by it acquired a right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Germanic empire.

From that period to the ever-memorable Russian armament in England, the cabinet of St. Peterburgh acted in the most unfriendly manner to us. France had concluded a treaty of commerce with Russia, from which great advantages were expected; but it proved that all the encouragement given to it could not increase it; on the contrary, the trade of Great Britain, oppressed in the most unjust manner, was considerably augmented. The alliance between the two imperial courts and France, and the great partiality shown to the latter; the apprehension of the Turks being driven out of Europe under circumstances highly dangerous to this country, and such an arrangement for a partition being made as would have greatly increased the power of France, and made the bonds of amity, thus
nearer

nearer drawn together, durable, were sufficient reasons with His Majesty's ministers to take that measure. The dignity as well as the interest of the country required it at that particular period, though that was not the case before, nor has it been since; and it must appear evident, that we cannot *now* reason on the principles we did *then*, and that we now must clearly see our interest both with respect to Russia and Turkey. After the fleet was fitted out, and the object declared, it became the dignity of the nation to have let it sail, and if Mr. Fawkener was to be sent, he should have gone with it,

The friends of Mr. Fox pride themselves much in having prevented the fleet's sailing; but let them be ever silent on the partition of Poland, for their measures undoubtedly occasioned it *. What might have been the event of such a war it is difficult to foresee; much conjecture may be made; I will only mention one circumstance, the naming of which is alarming, however it may be treated as romantic; the empress had firmly resolved to attempt to send an army through Bochara and Cashmeir, to place the Mogul on the

* Since this was written, the empress is dead, and I have no scruple now of declaring, that that unfortunate monarch accuses them of it; and if they doubt of it, there are those in England who can produce proofs of it.

throne of India, and drive the British out of their possessions, and there were then in Russia Frenchmen, who had been sent into those parts by Mr. de Vergennes, and who offered to conduct the army. If Mr. Fox's friend, Mr. Adair, had the interest of his country at heart, and not the removal of Mr. Pitt, why did he make no advantage of the ardent desire Prince Potemkin then had of seeing his court allied with Great Britain? In speaking with me about Mr. Adair, he expressed this desire in the strongest terms. The empress then knew the treachery of France. She made the discovery in the autumn of 1788, by the intrigues of the French at Stockholm (where she always had a strong party) and this was proved to her in a still stronger manner by the discovery that was made of the part which the Count de Choiseul-Gouffier had in the negotiating a subsidy from the porte to Sweden; yet the empress was too high spirited to confess she had been duped, though she wished secretly to change her alliance with France for one with this country. This fortunate event has at length taken place, and with no degrading circumstances to the country. His Britannic Majesty has given up the Turkish clause, and a war with Turkey is become a *casus fœderis*, a condition without which she never would sign any treaty

treaty with any power. That His Majesty's present ministry saw the real interest of the British and the Russian empires, when that clause, *sine quâ non*, of the treaty was given up, I hope must appear evidently, as well as that their conduct has been uniformly guided by the true interest of their country, which they followed as it varied, and neither lost sight of that nor of its honour, an object surely every true Briton considers as dear.

To enter into a longer detail of circumstances to prove what is here advanced would be superfluous, as it must appear so very conspicuous to every one, except to those whom no arguments can convince, and who pronounce declamatory sentences instead of investigating facts. If those who opposed the vigorous and once necessary measures of this country will please to talk of inconsistency, I am ready to meet them on that ground, and perhaps I may be able to prove more than inconsistency on their part.

Of later events I shall not now speak: the situation I have been in might involve me in a censure of breach of confidence.

How far the king of Prussia had an understanding in this business with the French court I have no documents to prove; but that he did second its views admirably well, both with respect to Austria and Turkey,
facts

facts prove. His conduct towards others needs no animadversion : he first encouraged the Poles to form their new constitution ; then he made it a crime in them to have formed it ; and lastly, he joined with the empress to overset it. The empress accuses him of being the first to insist on the final partition as a *sine qua non*, and as the price of his co-operation against France ; a circumstance not then known to his Britannic Majesty's ministers. The empress knew too well their sentiments to risk the communication of such a transaction. How completely the court of Berlin has duped all those who have been connected with it (France only excepted) not only in its engagements to his Britannic Majesty and to the empress, on this occasion, but in every other, is so striking, that it ought by this time to have convinced the courts of London and Peterburgh of the imperious necessity of cementing, by every possible tie, the present connection with the House of Austria, and making its interest their own. A deviation from such a conduct by either of the powers must obviously be the ruin of Europe.

Russia, however, in the eyes of the body politic of Europe, is a new power ; they still seem to regard her only as a huge unformed mass,

mass, giving a rude shock to the countries which her frontier touches; they do not yet seem to perceive her sliding into every transaction on the continent of Europe, and planning in the dark, and with unremitting perseverance pursuing projects which are to ripen at once, and to astonish by their effect, not on her neighbours, not in our days only, but on the most remote regions of the globe, and in future ages. Something of this lately flashed on them like lightning; they perceived that the present empress had become, they scarcely knew how, a party in the treaty of Westphalia, concluded before Russia politically existed, and that her guarantee entitles her to interfere in the affairs of the German empire. The flash, which afforded a transitory view, dazzled the eyes of some, and they seem now more blind.

The means of this sovereign are vast and incalculable, and her will can employ them without opposition: her financial resources, so far from being exhausted, are not touched*; a population of more than thirty millions, of whom not one half has been called on to contribute to the exigencies of

* I do not speak of present temporary embarrassment, but of real resources, which have not yet been recurred to, and of which I shall treat on another occasion.

the state; a peasantry looking on the monarch as a divinity, and stiling him *God of the earth* (zemnoi bog); ignorant of any government but a despotic sceptre, and of any condition but vassalage; happily deprived of all means of evil information, and secured from rebellion by the want of communication and the distance of places: a soldiery content with rye-biscuit and water, blindly obedient to discipline, and suffering privation and hardship with a patience unknown to other nations; active, and peculiarly docile, they are easily taught the use of arms; the habit of conquering inspires them with contempt of their enemies, and raises a courage naturally inherent in robust constitutions, if not to heroism, to actions worthy of heroes. If tactics have been lately neglected, it has been owing to the unskilfulness of their officers, of late promoted almost entirely by favour, and serving only to obtain rank and then retire; but this may be easily restored by a commander in chief, or a sovereign, possessed of much less military capacity than a Frederic: a nobility unable to offer the least opposition to the crown, depending on it for every honourable distinction of rank, civil or military, conferred, but not inherited; without which neither birth nor fortune give consideration, and which he who be-

flows can take away, while they who suffer must bless his name: not united by any common tie as a collective body, their interests are merely those of individuals.

There is no law but the "*express command*" of the monarch, who can debase the highest subject to the condition of a slave, or raise the lowest to the first dignity of the empire; but this autocratic sceptre exercises no despotism over the subject insulting to mankind. The Russian monarch is not, like the stupid Ottoman, seated on a throne involved in black clouds of ignorance, supported by cruelty on one hand, and by superstition on the other, at whose feet sits Terror, and below Terror, Death. No sovereign in Europe is possessed of more information, has more judgment to digest it, or in whom the result is more consummate wisdom. So far from the reign of the empress being a reign of terror, its fault is, too much lenity to her subjects, particularly to the great. No princes have received a better education than her son and grand-children, and the court which surrounds them is as brilliant and polished in manners as any in Europe.

The gloomy melancholy and solemn stupidity of the Turks is as little observable on the countenance of a Russian, as the murderous ferocity and enthusiastic fury which distorts

distorts the cadaverous physiognomy of the French brotherhood; there is a smile diffused over the face of the whole country. I appeal to all those who have travelled in Russia, whether they ever saw more hilarity in any part of the world. I do not mean to recommend for imitation such a state of things to make men happy; those who have been removed from it cannot go back again; but I affirm, that the whole mass of the people appear to be more happy (and it is a hard thing to make a man laugh when he is not pleased) than any I have seen in three parts of the globe. There is no medium in liberty with respect to the happiness of the people; to be happy a nation must be perfectly free or perfectly passive. Perfect liberty excludes licentiousness: a people cannot be said to be free where there exists a power to annoy with impunity either them or their magistrates; a little liberty, "*a little learning, is a dangerous thing,*" because it is not understood. Liberty has been no where understood (no not in Athens) but in this happy island. Here our government is founded on reason, and reason will support, or, if any part of it goes to decay, amend it; it is the glory of the human understanding; it is the pride of the most enlightened people on earth, whose happiness is its object,

ject, and it will stand for ever, if it have only reason to combat.

After having considered the external situation of **TURKEY** in various points of view, in each of which it seems little to deserve the approbation of the enlightened, or the support of the politician, we come to observe it as a member of this grand confederation of the nations of Europe, whose interests and political connections I have cursorily passed in review.

Its dominion was founded in blood ; it is upheld by systematic terror and oppression, and the tyrants themselves, enervated by the licentiousness of their rapacity, and lost in the gross ignorance of habitual despotism, are as weak and ignorant at home, as they must appear abroad contemptible and insignificant. Interested views, it is true, have caused their alliance to be courted by France, but it is by no means improbable that that country, when it finds itself unable to defend its ally, may, with its usual versatility, readily join in their destruction. Great Britain can only anticipate such an event by cultivating the friendship of Russia and of the Grecian state, which must arise from the ruins of the Turkish power. Strengthened by such an alliance, we should maintain that ascendancy in the Mediterranean, of
which

which the union of France and Spain threatens to deprive us.

That Turkey must very soon be overwhelmed by the empress, appears from a comparison of her financial resources, her army and her marine, with those of the Ottoman power. Constantinople itself cannot be considered as a tenable post; and when the disaffection of the enslaved Greeks is taken into the account, little doubt can be entertained, that the followers of Mahomet will be entirely driven from the countries in Europe which they have usurped, whether England consent or not.

How they came to decide on the late war appears very enigmatical. That their French counsellors were better informed than to have recommended such a step is certain. It has been attributed to the advice of the English ambassador; but this has been contradicted, both by his solemn denial and by the express declaration of his court, that no such instructions were given him. Among the Turks themselves it was regarded, by every man of information, as rash and impolitic; and the great captain-pasha, Gazi-Hassan, was in the highest degree offended at the proceeding. The declaration of war took place while he was absent in Egypt. His plan was, to subjugate the rebellious or dis-

affected provinces, which he wisely considered as a necessary preliminary to the engaging in any foreign contest. He began with Egypt. The vizir Yusef, and his party in the divan, hurried on the declaration of hostilities, when it was too late in the season for any hostile movement to be made, except the insignificant and ill-combined attack on Kilburn, unprepared as the Turks were. In the winter, when the Bog was frozen over, the garrison of Ochakof surprised a Russian village on its banks, and murdered all its defenceless inhabitants, consisting of above a thousand souls, *not one* of whom was spared. This wanton piece of cruelty cost them dear at the capture of that place. The Russian army, which went in the spring to besiege it, was led through the village in ashes, and the streets still stained with the blood of its harmless inhabitants. I mention this circumstance, because I was a witness of it, and because the Russians have been accused of cruelty, unjustly *at least with respect to the Turks*. Had Great Britain and Prussia not interfered, the empress would not have made peace. How far that interference was politic, *considering the situation we then stood in with the empress*, has been already explained; but I think it must be sufficiently obvious, that the existence of the
Turkish

Turkish power in Europe can *now* no longer be considered as propitious, either to the particular interests of this country, or to the general advantage of mankind.

In the conduct of the war, a very short time would have led the emperor to the gates of Constantinople, had he boldly pursued a plan of offensive operation; but Joseph, influenced by the irresolution of his character, acted solely on the defensive until he had lost the opportunity of crushing his enemies, and was himself involved in the troubles of his Hungarian dominions.

Humanity itself is disgraced by the prolongation of Turkish despotism, and justice with an imperious voice demands the liberation of the oppressed Grecians, and their re-establishment in the seat of their heroic ancestors. But it is not only on the removal of existing evils that we have to speculate; we may contemplate with proud exultation the substitution of a new system of things, founded on principles more equally just and liberal. Who can look forward without animation to the revival of learning, of arts and arms, in Greece, when the iron yoke, under which she now bows, shall be broken? A Grecian state, the free and independent ally of Britain and Russia, will form a connecting

necting link in the social bond of commerce ; will be fitted, by the favourableness of its situation and the genius of its inhabitants, for bold and successful enterprize ; and, in fine, will quickly attain a proud pre-eminence among nations. Britain is particularly interested in cherishing these hopes : her trade with Turkey is trifling and insignificant ; with Greece she will stand in the relation of a favoured ally, and her commercial connections will consequently be more intimate and extensive. The free navigation of the Mediterranean, a point which this country has so long laboured to secure, will be firmly established by a confederacy of naval powers, able to resist the domineering spirit of France and Spain. How high this object has ever ranked among the views of English politicians may be inferred from their anxiety in acquiring, and pertinacity in maintaining Gibraltar, Minorca, and various other stations in that sea ; but in the event to which we allude, the whole Archipelago will be friendly to us, and the support of our trade will be assured, not only by Russia, but Greece itself, which was ever a prolific nursery of seamen, and which at present supplies reluctantly the greater part of the Turkish marine forces.

Nor is it only to the Mediterranean that
we

we may look for an extension of our commerce: the coasts of the Black Sea present a mine of wealth, hitherto untried by the British adventurer, but from which we may derive the most solid advantages, when those countries are in the hands of free and independent states, our friends and allies. The French had, previously to the present war, a considerable trade in this sea, by their vessels sailing under Russian or Turkish colours; and this they will again enjoy on the return of peace, through the favour of their Turkish allies.

The conclusion then, which is most obvious from a view of Turkey, both in its actual state, and as it presents itself to the eye of speculation, is, that the subversion of its despotism (an event which must inevitably soon arrive, and which it requires not the gift of prophecy to foresee) will be productive of the most beneficial effect, in substituting an active and commercial power, for one immersed in sloth and barbarism. In these deductions, Britain finds herself particularly interested, from the great advantages, commercial and political, which such an event holds out to her, and which, if she does not embrace, her influence and weight in the Mediterranean, and, perhaps, in the scale of Europe, must speedily sink.

Turning

Turning our views again to the side of Italy, we shall there perceive new reasons, which dictate to Britain the necessity of allying herself most intimately with Russia, in accomplishing the liberation of Greece. The influence of France must here be almost universally predominant, and in the maritime states she will find a most prolific nursery of seamen. She has however foreseen, that the entrance of a Russian fleet into the Mediterranean will prove a most serious obstacle to the aggrandizement of her power, and has therefore endeavoured to prevent the progress of the Russian arms. The only hope that Britain can entertain in that, as in every other quarter, must be founded on her naval superiority; and this the co-operation of a Greek and Russian fleet promises most effectually to maintain. Late events have, indeed, made the danger of the French usurpations in Italy more evident and more alarming; it appears that they aim not merely at extending their influence but their empire; their conquests have been vast and rapid, and resemble in every feature those made by their allies the Turks; scarcely less striking is the terror which awaits on their name, than the devastation which follows their sword; Genoa may be considered as theirs; and even for
Venice

Venice itself no vain apprehensions may be entertained. What an accession of power is here to be acquired! By what bounds can we pretend to limit their progress?

If they succeed in Italy, they will change their politics with respect to Turkey. They are perfectly acquainted with the state of Greece, and the dispositions of its inhabitants. Turkey can be of no more use to them; they will therefore erect Greece into a republic under their protection, and derive from it infinitely more advantages than from the porte, which is unable any longer to make a diversion in their favour, without hastening the epocha of its own destruction. Russia never can submit to see such a state of things. Had the empress never before turned her thoughts to the liberating of Greece, as an object of glory, she must now do it from motives of self defence, and an interest she had not before.

The vast increase of power the French will acquire, particularly in the number of sailors, and the excellent ports of the Archipelago, will enable them to annihilate at their pleasure the Russian fleet and its establishments in the ports of the Black Sea, and shut them for ever out of the Mediterranean. All the fair views of prosperity in the southern provinces, as well Russian

as Polish, will vanish and Russia must depend solely on the pleasure of France for the exportation of its products.

Such a state of humiliation, neither the high mind of the empress nor the country at large will ever brook; it would be injustice to themselves, cruelty to the Greeks, and ruin to all Europe. Much more even might be said of the destructive consequence of suffering the French to intermeddle with the Greeks, and of not immediately seizing the opportunity of making them a free and independent nation.

POSTSCRIPT.

THESE papers, as I have said, were written nearly two years ago, though all the political part was not meant for the press; circumstances have occurred, which permit more of them being laid before the public than was at first intended.

A great event has since happened; the empress of Russia is no more! and considerable changes have taken place in the situation of several countries in Europe, but far from
weakening,

weakening, they greatly strengthen these arguments, and elucidate their deductions.

Histories and anecdotes have appeared of the life of that great princess, and the revolution which placed her on the throne. It is time that the voice of truth be heard. That contemporary sycophants and vile hirelings should have vindicated one of the most horrid transactions that stain the pages of history is not altogether to be wondered at; but indignation is raised in the breast of every honest man, to see that after the death of the empress there exist beings contemptible enough to traduce the memory of an unfortunate prince, a victim to the undesigning openness and integrity of his heart; a prince, whose answer to the precautions which were recommended to him by the late king of Prussia, was, "*I do good to all the world, and with that what have I to fear?*" a prince who was the benefactor of his country, and whose laws (those very laws which were brought in accusation against him as crimes!) have been religiously observed as models of wisdom and humanity, and without which the reign of the empress would have been less glorious, and her people less happy. That a Frenchman, that a Rulhiere, should abuse him, we need not be surprised: "*Peter the third was a friend to the English, and he*"
"dis-

“discouraged the use of the French language at his court. But can any man believe that this *vindication* of the dethroning Peter the third was the book which withstood the temptation of Catharine’s gold, and the menace of the Bastille? Whoever has been in Russia knows (or might have known) the facts, and can contradict this ridiculous misrepresentation of them—the transaction is but thirty-seven years old.

Many powerful interests were combined to bury in oblivion this horrid event; but let sovereigns and individuals learn, that TRUTH *will one day appear*. The emperor owes a duty to a father, to a sovereign, to his own security, and to that of other princes; the Russian nation owes to its own character the justification of the memory of their injured monarch, in whose catastrophe they were not implicated. The weight of the guilt will fall on a few; the lapse of time does not diminish or change the nature of the crime.

The reign of the empress was a series of successes; it was as glorious as fortunate. She extended the frontier of her empire, and augmented its force, by a great acquisition of territory and population; she created a powerful navy, and established a complete sovereignty in the Black Sea; she obtained both by sea and land such a decided superiority
over

over the Turks, that in the very next spring she could with ease have driven them into Asia. The dreadful revolution which has shaken the governments of Europe to their very foundations did not affect her; in the general madness her subjects remained uncontaminated, and by her position and undiminished strength she became the arbitress of the whole continent. The document was drawn out, the signing of which would have decided the contest; would have crowned her reign with solid and eternal glory, and have blotted out every spot in it; would have made a people, who scarcely more than a century ago were reckoned among the barbarous hordes of Tatars, the liberators of the civilized world, the restorers of order, of justice, of the government of laws, of the independence of nations, the protectors of property, of innocence, of religion, of morality, and of the dignity of mankind; the pen was in her hand, when — mysterious Heaven! — she died *.

The private character of the empress and her domestic conduct are foreign to the sub-

* That day or the next she was to have signed the document for furnishing 65,000 men immediately, which would have been only the beginning of her co-operation; she would, in all human probability, have been as successful against the Jacobins as she was against the less savage Tatars.

ject of papers wholly political. As a sovereign, she will make a great figure in history. Her information proceeded from an extensive and minute acquaintance with the present and past state of nations, their actual and relative situations, and with the personal character and private interests of sovereigns and individuals ; she was indefatigable in gaining intelligence and making partizans, and spared neither money nor means to succeed ; she was astonishingly rich in resources ; she had wonderful talents to combine and deduce, so as to foresee with certainty future events, or be prepared for such as mere accident produces ; it was thence that she was enabled to profit by every fault or misfortune of other states, as well as of what inevitably followed in the common course of things ; she was never duped, but when, through complaisance or confidence, she had relied on the knowledge of others ; her projects were always vast, their object, her own glory ; her perseverance was inexorable ; opposition or difficulty only excited greater exertions of talent ; she never gave up one single pursuit when it was known to the world that she had determined to follow it, unless it could appear that she ceded from motives of generosity, and not from compulsion or invincible obstacle ; success never dazzled, nor danger
or

or embarrassment oppressed her ; on all occasions she had equal firmness, courage, and presence of mind ; she was always great ; even in the smallest actions she was a sovereign ; sudden impressions excited sometimes in her violent anger, as it were by surprise, though never in public ; but she commanded her passions in an instant, and put on her habitual smile. She was remarkably temperate, applied indefatigably to business, and was of a healthy constitution of body. She could temporise, and use every art of political intrigue, but she had too high notions of the dignity of a sovereign to debase herself, or prostitute publicly her word, so that whenever her honour was openly concerned in fulfilling an engagement she might be relied on. When the gratification of her personal enmity or esteem coincided with her politics it was shown, when not, silenced.

She uniformly pursued one line of politics, and she never would have changed her alliance with Great Britain, had we understood them, or our own interest, sooner. We need not say how unjustifiable her conduct has been towards Poland ; but it cannot be denied, that the whole blame does not lie on her. As to the Crim, she must have the approbation of all those who do not approve a system of rapine, and plunder, and barbarous

rage wreaked on poor defenceless cottagers, whose sons, and wives, and daughters, were constantly exposed to be carried into slavery from all the neighbouring countries.

It is only in foreign politics that she appears great, and because there only she governed alone ; there her ministers were literally her secretaries ; she heard their advice sometimes, and sometimes took ideas from them, but she alone judged and decided, and no one dared propose a measure till they had first discovered her sentiments on it ; to do this was the great art of keeping in favour.

As to the internal government of the empire, it was left to the great officers. The presidents of colleges and the governors of provinces were sovereigns, and they inordinately abused their power with impunity ; hence a most scandalous negligence and corruption in the management of affairs in every department, and a general relaxation of government from Petersburg to Kamchatka. The empress rewarded with great munificence ; but merit, unless it was very conspicuous to the world, had but a little share of it ; every thing was given to favour, and what is given to favour is taken from merit : one good, however, resulted to *her*, personally, from the impunity which those in office enjoyed ; she was sure of their attachment to her

her government, as the more they abused their power, the more they dreaded a successor. She knew their conduct, but was deaf, and almost inaccessible to complaint.

Her code of legislation did not contain *laws*, but *forms* of judicature; the institution of general governments was a new burthen on the people of fifty millions of roubles more than the ancient simple regulations, a sum equal to three fourths of the whole revenue of the empire; the increase of vexation was still greater.

Her finances were ill understood, and worse managed; she got into embarrassments when she had incalculable resources, and the means used to remedy them were childish.

Years had not impaired her talents, nor cooled the ardor of her ambition; it seemed, on the contrary, to increase, as other passions gradually subsided.

She had, in short, a capacity equal to the government of a vast empire, and to give it in the world that consequence which its natural strength entitled it to. Had she paid the same attention to its internal, as she did to its political administration, her reign would have been as productive of happiness to her people as it was of glory to herself.

The empress was at length on the eve of accomplishing her great design; the Turks

were left alone, without any support; all the powers in Europe were engaged in the great contest, except the kings of Prussia and Sweden. It was not in the power of the latter to make any diversion. The French had paid to the court of Stockholm a considerable sum of money to enable them to fit out their fleet, but so low were their finances, that it was all immediately employed, except a few thousand rix-dollars, for more pressing exigencies of the state. The empress had a fleet in the Baltic, infinitely superior to the combined fleets of Sweden and Denmark; she wished, as has been said, to annihilate them; with our concurrence or consent it would have been but a single blow. As to the land forces of Sweden, they were then not in a condition to make the empress uneasy; the alarm they had occasioned in the last war had put her on her guard. She was, however, at the same time endeavouring, by a marriage of her grand-daughter with the young king of Sweden, to conciliate the interests of the two countries: though she had no apprehension on that side, yet she wished rather to avoid a quarrel, and required only a strict neutrality on the part of Sweden. As to Prussia alone, in the state it was with respect to the newly acquired provinces in Poland, and trembling at the resentment of the empress, it
certainly

certainly understood its interests too well to quarrel with her. The empress, in a war with the king of Prussia, would have found infinite resources in Poland; the king, an enemy in every subject he had acquired; almost every Pole would have taken the field against him, so much were they irritated at his past conduct. The king of Prussia had also interests in Germany to look after, which concerned him nearer; and certain it is, that he paid the most submissive court to the empress, who on her side was perfectly unapprehensive of any opposition from him; all that he might have tried to effect would have been, to obtain some little indemnification as the price of his complaisance in acquiescing in her projects.

She was now in possession of every resource she required of Poland for her army, in acting against the Turks on the European continent. The government of the acquired provinces was so firmly settled, that she had no apprehension of disturbances; her army was so formidable, that she could have marched beyond her frontiers at least three hundred thousand effective men; and she had raised 150,000 men to recruit it. Her fleet in the Black Sea was much superior to the whole Turkish navy, and there was a flotilla of small vessels built for the purpose of landing troops in

three feet water, which could have conducted, in three days, sixty thousand men within a few miles of the capital of the Turkish empire. The first blow would have been the destruction of the Ottoman fleet in its own port, and the attack of Constantinople by land at the same time. All this might have been done early last spring.

A great army had passed Derbent; an arrangement would have immediately taken place with the Persian khans, in whose quarrels, without any apparent interest, she had intermeddled; and this army would have fallen on the Turkish Asiatic provinces, the consequence of which would have been, that all the Asiatic troops, which compose the garrisons of their fortresses in Europe, would have quitted them, and fled to succour their own country, and have left the road to Constantinople defenceless.

It was a project of Prince Potemkin, in the last war, to have carried the war into Asia, and he began by taking Anapá. Had that prince not died, the war was on the point of breaking out again. I speak of this from a knowledge of the facts.

Nor would the sending an army of sixty-five thousand men to attack the French in Alsace have prevented her marching another army against the Turks. If she had any apprehensions

prehenfions of the king of Pruffia fiding with the French, this meafure would have put it in her power to have acted more offenfively againft him. However it may have been conftrued by fome, this meafure was a fure indication of her intention of attacking the Turks in the fpring; for as long as fhe was not certain of meeting no oppofition to that meafure, fhe constantly declined taking an active part by land againft the French.

In fhort, every preparation was made, and every obftacle removed; we did not want the publication of a manifefto to be informed of her intentions; and indeed the intentions of fovereigns are better known by the ftate and movements of their armies, or the preparations for their movements, by a knowledge of their interefts, and the difficulties they have to encounter in the execution of their projects, than by manifeftoes, or by the language of their courtiers.

It is worthy of recording, that the empress declared, that though His Majefty and the Emperor of Germany made peace with the French, fhe never would, nor acknowledge the French republic, or any ftate that had rebelled againft its fovereign. She never would acknowledge America to the laft, though fhe permitted fhips coming from America, under American colours, to enter her ports, and

trade on the same footing as other nations having no treaty.

The president of the congress, not knowing this circumstance, appointed a consul, in 1795, to reside in St. Petersburg; on his arrival he requested an audience of the vice-chancellor, to deliver his credentials; but the next day he was told, the empress did not know of any such power as the United States of America.

Since it has appeared, that His Majesty's consenting to at least, if not co-operating with the empress's projects against Turkey, was the *sine qua non* of an alliance with her, and of her taking an active part in the war against France, the public has shown great anxiety to learn why she did not come forward immediately after signing the treaty in February 1795, in which a war with Turkey is a *casus fœderis*, and what measures had removed the impediment, which kept her back two years, and induced her to come forwards at last; but these events are too recent to be spoken of.

Whilst I am writing this Postscript, another great event has taken place.

The emperor of Germany has made peace; the emperor of Russia has lost a glorious opportunity to immortalize his name; it might have been said to him:

Sire,

Sire,

You have ascended the throne of the greatest empire in the world, under such auspices as never attended any monarch before you.

A glory is reserved for you, Sire, such as never yet shone round the throne of any sovereign on earth.

You may be the benefactor, not of Russia only, but of all Europe.—History shall say, Alexander conquered a world, Paul saved a world.

You have begun your reign by acts which bespeak your wisdom, your justice, your humanity—
YOU HEAR EVERY ONE *.

You have felt with indignation the unnecessary apostacy of the court of Berlin; its alliance with regicides to dismember the German empire.

You are called on, Sire, to crush with the irresistible weight of your armies the enemies of religion, morality, and social order.

Peace with them will be more dangerous than war. Their doctrines will have freer course; and their doctrines have done more than their armies. They have subverted the order, and confounded even the names of things. Virtues

* Every person in the empire may now write to their sovereign, and if they receive no answer, may address themselves personally to him.

have

have the appellations of vices, and vices the appellations of virtues.

Can Russia, in all its extended provinces, when every foreign contact will be poison; when every breath, except from the frozen ocean, will be full of miasma, escape the contagion? None will escape but the elder brethren of Jacobinism, the Turks, whose equally monstrous, though less dangerous tyranny, has for so many centuries insulted mankind, trodden underfoot the laws of nations, and blasphemed Christianity; who, unprovoked, attacked, conquered, and slaughtered nations without number, murdered their sovereigns, and spilt every drop of royal blood, massacred their priests at the altar, extirpated nobility, plundered the opulent, and bound the wretched remains of the people in fetters of perpetual and hereditary slavery. They alone, till the reign of Jacobinism had made property a crime, the violation of property a legal resource of government, and the lives and possessions of men the right of tyranny; they alone had hitherto confounded the hereditary ranks among mankind; had depressed genius, learning, and the Christian religion, and governed their barbarous empire by slaves and assassins. Like the Jacobins, they taught Christian children to fight against their fathers and their father's God;*

* See the institution of the Janizaries, who were originally Christian children.

they

they too hold it lawful to murder prisoners in cold blood; they too possess a claim to every country in the universe, and a sacred right to subject all people to their law; they too hold all other sovereigns as usurpers, and dethroning them as the highest merit. But still the Turks have a religion, and though it permits them numberless enormities to their own sect, and all enormities to others, they acknowledge a God, and many moral duties. Not the contagion of their doctrine was to be feared, but their cruel sword, which once threatened the conquest of the universe, and the extinction of all virtue, dignity, and science in the world; yet was not this first monster so tremendous, in the insolence of his power, as an enemy, as is this second monster, in the insolence of his successes, as a brother.

To you, Sire, kings lift up their hands, and bow their anointed heads; to you, Sire, the priests of God, to you orphans of murdered nobles, to you violated virgins, despoiled possessors, enslaved nations stretch out their arms, and implore your aid; the spirits of martyred royalty call to you from above for vengeance.

The noble project of your glorious ancestor, Peter the Great, was nearly consummated when you mounted his throne; it was reserved for his nephew to accomplish the liberating of a Christian people from the most infamous bondage. It is worthy of the justice and humanity which
mark

mark the beginning of a reign, on which more true glory awaits than ever was reserved for any sovereign in the records of history.

This might with truth have been said to him.

In August 1796, Prussia concluded with the French secret articles for the dismemberment of Germany. The late king of Prussia had assured the empress, "*on his word of honour,*" and "*on the word of a sovereign,*" that no such articles existed. On the accession of his present imperial majesty to the throne of Russia, the king sent Count de Brühl to compliment the emperor on the occasion. This nobleman had the honour of being personally known to his imperial majesty, and, it was believed, was much esteemed by him.

The court of Berlin, soon imagining that the emperor Paul was blindly attached to its interests, ventured to give a copy of these articles. That subtle cabinet was for once mistaken. The emperor felt the indignity of the action, and, himself a man of honour, and a monarch respectful of the sacredness of a sovereign's word, he answered the communication as became the nephew of Peter the Great. Prussia submitted, and the project was abandoned. Russia was actually preparing to assist Austria effectually, when

Austria

Austria made peace with France! I shall make no comment on this event, which no one had reason to expect. The emperor of Russia was greatly and justly offended. If he have any predilection for Prussia, certain it is that he is incapable of entering into measures iniquitous in themselves and baneful in their consequences, tending to the dismemberment of Germany; and the only obstacle which now seems to prevent his stepping forward with that vast weight of power he commands, is the uncertainty of the political system adopted by the young king of Prussia. While the old ministers continue in office, can it be presumed that their system is not that which the king approves? Is it to be expected that a young prince has energy of mind, and knowledge of affairs sufficient, by his arguments, to convert or to over-rule the opinions of a whole cabinet? We must judge of the system of a prince by the known system of his ministers in office.

If, however, because the emperor has made peace, we make peace, and such a peace as the bloated insolence of the enemy dictates to us, we shall be shut out of every port, from the Elbe to the coast of Africa; we shall soon be driven out of India. France, and its allies, will soon have a naval power superior to that of Great Britain, and, *qui mare teneat*

eum

eum necesse rerum potiri. Cic. Without our trade how is our navy to exist? how are our funds to be raised? If we disband our armies, we shall be attacked unprepared; if we do not, what œconomy will there be in a peace?

It now remains, therefore, to be seen, whether the love of our country and of liberty, which fired the breasts of our ancestors, and led them on to those glorious exertions which procured us our happy and *free constitution*, be transmitted to their descendants; and whether we will spill our blood to defend what they spilt their blood to purchase for us. It remains to be seen whether we are still free Britons, or humiliated slaves, ready to receive with open arms the deathful hug of French fraternity, and submit to the despotic five-handed sceptre of French liberty.

February 1798.

CHAPTER XI.

Of the British Trade with Turkey.

FORMERLY the trade to Turkey was of considerable importance to this country, but of late years it had been languishing, and at last dwindled into a state of insignificancy, when the present war entirely put a stop to all communication with the ports of the Levant.

As this trade will be again opened when a peace takes place, an investigation of the causes of its decline, and the means to give it its ancient extension, may not, in the mean time, be unimportant to the government and to the merchants of this country.

The causes of its gradual decline are, 1st, the rivalship of other European nations; 2dly, the diminution of the consumption of our manufactures in Turkey, by the impoverished state of the country; 3dly, some branches of trade being got into other channels; and 4thly, the monopoly of the Levant company in London.

With respect to the rivalship of other nations, that cause will be considered when I speak

speaking of the Levant company. As to the impoverished state of Turkey, it must affect the trade of other European nations as well as our own; if we are not, therefore, to expect to see it again in that flourishing state it was in, when there were forty English houses of trade at Aleppo (at present there is but one) we may expect to have the same *proportion* of it as we then had; and if we acquire only this, our trade to the Levant will still be a national object. Some branches of trade are got into other channels; this regards principally certain imports from Turkey, and particularly of silk from Aleppo, whence formerly larger quantities of Persian silk came, which is not now brought thither, but the East India Company supply our market cheaper and more abundantly. Considerable quantities of cotton and drugs come from Holland and from Italy, which formerly came direct. This will also be accounted for in the next consideration, the monopoly of the Levant company.

It is often necessary, and it is just, where merchants undertake to open to the country a new branch of trade, and where the expence and risk is great, to grant them exclusive privileges, or monopolies, for a certain limited time, to prevent others from reaping the harvest they had sown, and to
secure

secure their laudable industry as far as possible from risk ; but when that risk exists no more, and when they have reaped their harvest over and over again, and have had a full compensation for their risk, their industry, and their expence, the country at large has a right to a participation of the trade. There may, indeed, sometimes exist circumstances of a peculiar nature, which give them a claim to a longer indulgence in their monopoly, particularly where that monopoly is not injurious, but, on the contrary, beneficial to the country in general (and such is the case of the East India company ;) but in a trade where the merchants have no *common stock*, and can urge none of the above reasons in defence of their monopoly ; where they cannot prove that *any particular loss* would accrue to them by abolishing it ; where it has operated as a restraint on the trade, confining it to narrow bounds, and giving a decided superiority to their rivals of other nations, to the almost total exclusion of the products and manufactures of their country from that to which their privilege exclusively permits them to trade, ought in common sense such a monopoly to exist ? The Levant company is truly become the *dog in the manger* ; it does not operate so much to

the profit of the company, as to the loss of the country.

This monopoly is of a singular nature: it has none of the advantages of a common stock, in which many individuals risk small sums, but which in the aggregate amount to a larger capital than any one merchant or set of merchants possess, or would choose to risk; a common stock to which any one may contribute, and which thereby, strictly speaking, ceases to be a monopoly; it is a privilege granted to *certain persons only* to trade to Turkey, each with his own capital, and for his own particular account and risk, without any assignable reason why they should be preferred to others his majesty's subjects; it has all the disadvantages of other monopolies; it has not one of their advantages.

In speaking thus freely of the company, I solemnly declare that I have no private motive, no rancour against any individual, and have no motive for writing on this subject but the advantage of the country. The few members of the company with whom I am acquainted I personally respect and highly esteem: on this subject they must differ with me; they are bound by oath to support the interests of their body.

The trade of every other nation to Turkey
is

is free, and they have experienced the advantage of being liberated from the fetters of exclusive privileges. Let every obstacle be removed in this country to an equally free commerce, and the superior industry, skill, and riches of our manufacturers, our traders, and our navigators, will again restore to us our lost Turkey trade.

It may be said, that at present the Levant company is not a monopoly, as any one, by paying twenty pounds, may become a member of it. When the trade was already ruined, it was imagined that this regulation was equivalent to laying the trade open (a proof that government have thought it necessary to abolish the monopoly) but the bye-laws of the company, and the power to enforce them, were permitted to exist, and these so fetter the trade to *new adventurers*, that few have found their account in pursuing it, and the trade still remains a monopoly in favor of the old houses.

It will be necessary to pass in review these bye-laws, which have operated so injuriously to the trade in general, and to show how they have gradually effected the ruin of the trade, and the introduction of rivals, who have gotten possession of what we have lost.

By one of the bye-laws, for instance, it was enacted, that all merchandize brought

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from

from Turkey, and imported into England, should be the produce of goods exported from England to Turkey. The following are the words of the bye-law :

“ That upon entering goods received in
“ *England from Turkey or Egypt*, every mem-
“ ber shall in like manner subscribe the fol-
“ lowing affirmation ; *videlicet* :

“ *I affirm, by the oath I have taken to the*
“ *Levant company, that the goods above men-*
“ *tioned are for account of myself, or others*
“ *free of the said company, or of such as now*
“ *have their licence to trade, and are beyond*
“ *the seas ; and that the said goods, nor any*
“ *part of them, are not, to the best of my*
“ *knowledge, the produce of gold or silver,*
“ *either in coin or bullion, sent into Turkey ;*
“ *but that the said goods are purchased by*
“ *merchandise, or monies arising or to arise*
“ *from the sale of merchandise sent into Turkey*
“ *or Egypt, from Europe, or from the British*
“ *settlements in America, on account of freemen*
“ *of the Levant company, or such as have their*
“ *licence to trade, and of which regular entries*
“ *have been made with the company, or are*
“ *purchased by freight received in Turkey or*
“ *Egypt, by ships navigated according to law,*
“ *which freight is entirely the property of*
“ *members of the company, or such as have*
“ *their licence to trade.*”

And every merchant or factor in Turkey

or Egypt is required to make a similar affidavit, on exporting goods from Turkey for England, and to give, on oath, an exact account of every kind of transaction or business, direct or indirect, so that all his affairs become known.

The object of this law is evidently to encourage the exportation of cloth; and when we had no rivals, it produced no bad effects; but it soon produced rivals, *and it continued in force till they had nearly got possession of the whole cloth trade.* Such a law, indeed, was sufficient to ruin any trade. One house may deal in exports, another in imports; one may combine its Italian with its Turkey trade; another may send vessels for the carrying trade; but if every individual house be obliged to keep an exact register on oath, and under a penalty of 20 per cent, called "*a broke*," of all its exports and imports, and to balance them exactly, how is such a trade to prosper, where the profits are reduced by the rivalry of foreign nations? This bye-law at length, when it had produced the full effect of its ill tendency, was repealed; but the trade was not revived; so difficult is it to turn back commerce from channels into which it has run.

It will be asked then, what are the restraints which now lie on the trade?

The subjection to the control of the company ; the necessity of making entries with it of all their transactions on oath, and not being able to be concerned in anywise with others not free of the company, or foreigners ; the power in the company, for the least violation of their rules, to inflict a penalty of 20 per cent. ; the idea of restraint, and the apprehension of violating a solemn oath, have made many determine to trade with Turkey through foreign and circuitous channels, without becoming free of the company ; witness the very large quantities of cottons and drugs, &c. which come from Holland and Italy, as the custom-house books prove. This was the case till our trade to Holland and the Mediterranean was stopped by the war, and in that same situation we shall be when a peace takes place.

The drugs, &c. which are imported from Italy, were carried thither from Turkey ; they had already given a profit to the Italian merchant in Turkey, to the importer, and to the purchaser in Italy, who cleans, assort, repacks, and often adulterates them ; to the commissioner, who purchases them for his correspondent in England ; to which add charges, and interest of money for so long a disbursement, which the different people through whose hands the merchandize has
gone

gone have all calculated, as well as their profits, double freights, and loading and unloading, &c. &c.

Cottons are imported from Holland, because the company cannot import themselves enough for the consumption; and the reason why they do not is, because the old members, who are under no apprehensions of the bye-laws, *find other articles enough to employ their whole capital, and beyond that the trade cannot increase.* This is the reason, as will be seen hereafter more fully, why the trade in exports as well as imports is confined within such narrow bounds.

The British merchants in Italy and other foreign countries, not being members of the company (and to become free of the company they must come to England) cannot trade with British houses in Turkey, and these, if they will trade to Italy, must trade with foreigners: thus all combinations of the trades are prevented. English vessels in the Mediterranean might often make a voyage to Turkey, instead of lying in an Italian port, and return time enough to take in their cargoes for England.

The great preference given to British vessels in the Mediterranean would assure them an employment whenever they want freights. This carrying or caravan trade is so exten-

five, that besides the French, the little state of Ragusa has no less than 400 vessels in it.

Were the *masters of ships, their owners,* and the *English merchants in Italy and Turkey*, under no restraint in regard to the Levant company, people would risk more readily the sending their vessels to the Mediterranean to get employment in this carrying business, and their speculation in trade being free, they would find means to employ their vessels in the intervals of their being without freights; the masters, owners, and correspondents might combine their *own speculations* in merchandize with their carrying business, and thus keep them constantly employed. It is the want of these resources to our ships, that prevents English owners from sending their ships into the Mediterranean to seek freights, and prevent the few which do go thither from profiting so much by it as those of other nations, whose houses of trade are nearer.

Had the Turkey trade in England never been a monopoly, the French would never have got possession of almost all the cloth trade, and the laying it open will be the only means of our coming in again for any considerable share of it. There is a greater demand in Turkey for the light Languedoc cloths, than for any other sort. The Turks clothe their servants twice a year,

year, and the French cloth, made into loose garments (which last much longer than the tight European dress) is strong enough for their purpose, and its cheapness makes it preferable; poorer people, who form the great body of consumers, buy it also for economical reasons. English broad cloth, called mahoot (of a light quality, made purposely for the Turkey market) is only worn by those in easier circumstances. Considerable quantities of cloth have also of late years come to Turkey *from Germany*.

It is the opinion of many people well acquainted with these matters, that the English manufactories might make the same sort of cloth as the Languedoc, and as cheap as the French; but as long as the Levant company exists, who is to undertake it? Were the trade laid entirely open, it is probable that all kinds of English manufacturers would send people (called riders) to Turkey to seek for commissions, as they do to all parts of Europe. This practice, *though not very agreeable to English merchants* (which however may not be the case in Turkey, as they may find the mediation of merchants necessary) would greatly increase the vent of English commodities, and these industrious people might possibly be the means of our regaining the cloth trade,

The few merchants who are in the true secret of the Levant trade, can employ in it their WHOLE CAPITAL advantageously, and therefore do not seek for new branches, or how to recover old ones which are lost.—This is the great secret.

The French do not get their wool cheaper than we do; the price of labour may be less; but will not superior skill and industry, with larger capitals, compensate this single circumstance against us? Experience in other articles shews it, as in the manufactures of Manchester, Sheffield, and Birmingham.

It is very worthy of attention, that the French cannot make so cheap as we can the same kinds of cloth, which our people bring to the Turkey market; it is not that they cannot make them *so fine*, for they make in France much finer cloth than that kind of broad cloth made in England purposely for the Turkey market. There is also a coarse strong cloth brought to Turkey from England, called *londras*; these the French cannot make *so cheap* neither; nor are their *shalloons* *so cheap*. In short, there is no sort of woollen stuff made in the two countries, of the same quality, which the English do not sell cheaper than the French. The fact seems to be, that the French invented a kind of cloth more proper for the general consumption

consumption of Turkey than that which the English had brought thither, and the English never attempted to follow their example, but continued carrying to the market a sort of cloth, which at last got almost out of use. *Whenever the English shall have made and brought to Turkey the same kind of cloth as the French, and cannot afford it so cheap, then with certainty we may conclude that the French have an advantage over us*; but till then it ought to be doubted, and certainly it merits the trial; but a fair trial never can be made till the Levant trade is entirely free.

But even supposing that we cannot regain the cloth trade, there are very many other objects worth attending to, and *which may be of greater national advantage*.

The Manchester stuffs would find a great vent in all parts of Turkey. The manufactories of Aleppo and Damascus are almost ruined, and if the Manchester people were to imitate the Turkish patterns of their stuffs, they could certainly afford them cheaper. Imitations of the Surat and Bengal goods of silk and cotton, which are enormously dear, would find also a ready sale in Turkey, and cotton velvets, velverets, &c. Birmingham and Sheffield wares would be articles of importance. The Turks, both in
Europe

Europe and Asia, have a great partiality for all these kinds of English manufactures, and in general the epithet English is synonymous with excellent.

These articles at present are not attended to; but the masters of ships, who bring out their *little ventures* to Turkey in a contraband manner, in these kind of things, make great profits; they can, however, bring only small quantities, lest the Levant company should take umbrage at it. A few of these goods also find their way to Turkey from Italy, but greatly enhanced in their price from the many hands they go through, and therefore this channel does not afford a great vent for them. Linen may likewise be an article of exportation for Turkey. The Turks wear linen of a hard twisted thread, very open and unbleached, which comes mostly from Egypt, and is exceedingly dear, but is the most pleasant kind to wear in hot weather. No European nation has yet undertaken to imitate it, but it is probable it might be made in Ireland infinitely cheaper than in Egypt: if this was the case, it would be of great importance. The German linens begin to be sold in considerable quantities in Turkey, but they never will supply the place of the Egyptian, on account of their quality. Vast quantities of the above mentioned articles
come

come from Venice and Germany, where they are dearer, and of worse quality, than those manufactured in England.

Were I to enter into an enumeration of all the English manufactures that would find a vent in Turkey, and particularly in the interior parts of Asia, and point out the different ports to which they might be sent, the detail would be too long for a general representation; but collectively it must be very obvious to every person acquainted but generally with the trade of Turkey, that our exportations to that country must become of great importance in a few years, were the monopoly removed, and the agents of the manufacturers sent to travel through the country, and get certain information of the state of its trade and manufactories.

Salt fish, could the Newfoundland ships, &c. go directly to Turkey as they go to Italy, would be a very important branch.

The East India company could supply the Turkey market with muslins much cheaper than they are brought by the way of Bassora, of Gidda, and Suez, which trade is entirely in the hands of their servants: the trial has been successfully made; but the company have other articles enough in which to invest their whole capitals. Other nations now bring large quantities of muslins to
Turkey.

Turkey. The British muslins also sell to considerable profit.

Let all this be mere supposition, is not the object of importance enough to give it a fair trial? and does not common sense say, that a trade freed from obstacles must flourish more than when clogged with the most unsupportable shackles? May it not be asked, what just right have the members of the Levant company to lay restraints on this trade by their bye-laws? I have heard this subject discussed in Turkey, where people certainly understand the trade of the country better than in England, and I never heard one plausible reason alledged in favour of the company. Sophistical arguments may be produced in London, which may appear plausible to those who are not informed of the real state of matters in Turkey.

To show what little efforts have been made by the company to extend the trade, and how little they deviate from the footsteps of their forefathers, I will cite two striking instances:

Mr. John Humphrys, of Constantinople, was the first, who, a few years ago, imagined that English shalloons might be sold in Constantinople, and they soon became a very important article for exportation to Turkey. The French have not been able to make them so cheap.

Mr.

Mr. Peter Took, of Constantinople, only about twenty years ago, discovered that he might buy raw silk in Brusa (the hills behind which are visible from their houses in Constantinople) from the first hands, and thus make his returns direct to England. Before that period, from the first existence of the company, the merchants of Constantinople had always sent their money to Smyrna to be invested in silk, which the Turks and Jews of Smyrna bought at Brusa.

There is a great demand in Turkey for Staffordshire earthen-ware, which would become a very important article of commerce.

Perhaps the greatest importation of British articles in Turkey would be by foreigners, or natives of the Turkish provinces, as is the case in many branches of our commerce, where such restraints on foreigners do not exist; for instance, every one knows that not one-tenth part of our exports to Russia are on account of the Russia company in London, or the British factory in Russia. These articles are sent to Russia for account of foreigners settled in Russia, or Russians, and some part for account of our manufacturers. With respect to Germany this is still more the case.

The Levant company exact a duty on all merchandize exported to and imported from
Turkey,

Turkey, besides a consulage in the ports of Turkey on all the exports and imports in British vessels. This consulage is a very heavy burthen on our trade, and particularly when it is considered that some other nations pay none. The following are the words of the company's bye-law :

" At a general court, &c. the following orders were established as proper and expedient for the SUPPORT OF THE COMPANY'S AFFAIRS, and for the government of the trade ; and they were confirmed at a general court, held 3d of March 1775.

" It was resolved and ordered, That all goods exported from Turkey or Egypt for Great Britain shall pay three consulages and one-half, or seven in the hundred, according to the rates of the company's tarif, in such species of the grand seignior's coin as his officers receive for customs ; which consulage shall be paid, one-half in thirty days, and the other half in sixty days after the departure of the ship, &c. ; and the company's treasurers are not to take any notes or obligations for the payments of consulages, but they are to insist upon being paid in money when it is due.

" That all goods imported, &c. into Great Britain, shall pay one imposition according to the company's rates, &c. except cotton and emery stones, &c.

" That

"That all goods imported into Turkey or Egypt, from Leghorn, or any other Port or Ports of Christendom, BY BRITISH SUBJECTS OR BRITISH SHIPS, FOR ACCOUNT OF FOREIGNERS, shall pay a consulage of TWO in the hundred, &c."

"That all goods exported from Constantinople, Smyrna, and Aleppo, to Leghorn, or any other foreign port or ports of Christendom, by British subjects, ON FOREIGN SHIPS, on account of British subjects, shall pay a consulage of ONE in the hundred, &c."

"That all goods imported into Turkey or Egypt, by strangers, upon British ships, from any foreign port, &c. shall pay two in the hundred, &c. and in like manner exported, TWO in the hundred, &c." and several other regulations for the paying of consulage, of lesser importance, which I omit for brevity.

"April 29th, 1785. It is resolved and ordered, &c."

"That all goods, excepting raw silk, mohair yarn, and drugs, exported from Turkey and Egypt, in the time of the plague, to Malta, Ancona, Venice, Messina, Leghorn, Genoa, or Marseilles, for the purpose of performing quarantine, and which are to be re-shipped on the same ship for Great Britain or Ireland, shall pay a consulage of two in the hundred only."

Besides this revenue, the company have for many years received an assistance from government of five thousand pounds a year. All these sums are expended for paying a part of the salary of the ambassadors at Constantinople, the consuls at the several ports in Turkey, the chancellors and drogomans (or interpreters) and for defraying of the expences attending visits from the ambassador to the porte, and of the consuls to pashas, besides extraordinary presents made at the first audience of a new ambassador and of a consul; for paying *avantias* (or money extorted by false accusations) and public entries of consuls, which were formerly very costly; and finally, for the expences of the company and its officers at home.

Were our trade put on the same footing as the Russian, a very little (perhaps five hundred pounds) more than the five thousand pounds government now pays, would suffice for all the expences which then would be necessary. The Russian trade to Turkey is free to every one; there is no tax on it, either under the appellation of consulship or otherwise; no fee is taken at any ambassador's, consul's, or chancellor's office, for documents necessary for the dispatch of trade; no presents are made by consuls to pashas or other officers; no *avania* is submitted to.

A consul

A consul at Smyrna only is necessary. Vice-consuls in the other ports would answer every purpose for the protection of trade; and there would be found merchants enow, who would be glad of the office without pay, for the honour of it, which in Turkey is considerable. There is at this day no necessity for consuls living in such great state as they did a few years ago. The foreign ministers at Constantinople have very considerably retrenched their expences.

The power of an ambassador and of a consul in Turkey is very great; it extends even to life and death. By one of the articles of the *capitulations* (or treaty with the porte) it is stipulated, that in all criminal cases wherein subjects of the porte are not concerned, ambassadors or consuls shall punish the criminal according to the laws of their country. In the Dutch capitulations this is expressed still stronger. As crimes committed in a state are crimes immediately against that state, the cognizance of them belongs to it alone. The sultan delegates his power to the ambassadors and consuls; and if in punishing the criminal they exceed the rule prescribed by the laws of their own country, they are only answerable for their conduct to the sultan; but the sultan takes no cognizance of it, therefore they are without control, and their

power is despotic. It is indeed true, that they generally send such offenders home to their country; there have, however, with other nations, been examples where an European has killed a subject of the porte, and justice being demanded, the ambassador or consul has put the criminal to death. Should it happen that an Englishman killed a Turk, it would certainly be better that the ambassador or consul caused him to be hanged, than to deliver him up to the Turks, for justice being demanded, there is no other alternative; if he escaped, the consequence might be a general massacre; we have lately had an example at Smyrna exactly of this nature, which cost the lives of many hundreds, and caused the European quarter to be reduced to ashes. There is no possibility of sending the criminal home if the populace demand justice.

The company have given also another power to the ambassadors and consuls over merchants, which free traders may not approve of. Their bye-law is, "*If any factor or factors shall have any dealings with any person battulated by the lord ambassador, or the consul of any of the Scales (ports, Scala Italian) in Turkey, with the advice of the respective factories, such factor or factors shall pay a fine for every offence to the amount of*"

I

"three

“three consulages upon the value of the transaction by or with such battulated person, without appeal, &c.” Battulation with them signifies interdiction of all commerce with the person *battulated*. The intention was to prevent the factors or merchants having dealings with litigious persons of the country; but this power has been abused.

The ambassador formerly had a considerable revenue from protections granted to subjects of the porte; but this protection having been totally disregarded by the present sultan, both that income and that source of constant litigation with the porte are done away. It were to be wished that this privilege was wholly abolished. The French several times proposed giving it up, and at a time when it was respected, and lucrative to their ambassadors.

The French also, on the representation of their ambassador, M. de St. Prieste, laid the Levant trade open; the consequence was, that immense quantities of French goods were carried to Turkey by subjects of the porte; but the company at Marseilles found means to get their exclusive privilege renewed; they had suffered, but the country had gained. At present every one has liberty to trade, and since our fleet has left the Mediterranean, their commerce is revived, and, except the trade to Great Britain be equally

free when a peace takes place, we shall have little chance of being able to rival them ; but we must not wait till that period to lay our trade open ; it must be done immediately.

As all communication with the Levant by sea is cut off, there remains no resource to our merchants, but to carry on their trade through Russia ; and though this be a circuitous way, it is by far not so expensive as might be imagined. The freights to the Baltic are very low, as half the ships go out empty. The carriage from Riga to Cherson, or Niccolai on the Bog, is mostly by water, and the land carriage in Russia is not one fourth of the price it is in Germany. The expence on cloth would be trifling, and on cheap and bulky goods even would not be equal to the enormous price of insurance paid for armed ships, which *run the voyage* at present, and which is not equal to the risk ; it is indeed so great, that government should, perhaps, interfere. At Cherson there are good vessels to be found, which in three days may carry the goods to Constantinople at a reasonable freight.

But in order to open such a communication, liberty must be obtained of the emperor of Russia to send merchandize in *transito* (without paying duty) across Russia ; and there is no doubt but that sovereign, who has studied

Adam

Adam Smith's book on the Wealth of Nations, and who is perfectly acquainted with the principles of commerce and navigation, would see the very great advantage which would accrue to Russia by such a trade, both on account of the sums which would remain in the country for expences of carriage, the employment of a number of people, and also the encouragement it would be to the Russian navigation in the Black Sea; but he never would *grant* such a privilege to a part of the British nation exclusively, and shut out from it the Russia merchants, who carry on a branch of commerce so advantageous to his empire, nor exclude his own subjects from it. Before this can be done, the Turkey company must be abolished.

At present a few goods, I am informed, have been sent to Hamburgh, thence to Vienna, and down the Danube, where they are shipped for Constantinople. The freight to Hamburgh is dearer than it is to Riga; the charges across Germany ten times as much as across Russia. At the mouth of the Danube there are only bad Turkish or Greek vessels to be freighted, on which no regular insurance can be made. At Cherson there are some hundreds of vessels, among which many equal those to be found in the ports of other

seas; and a reasonable insurance may be made by safe underwriters ; but the route through Germany does not necessitate an abolition of the Levant company.

Respecting the Inefficacy of the Quarantine Regulations in GREAT BRITAIN.

IT may be said, if every kind of vessel have leave to go to the Levant, we shall run a greater risk of having the plague imported, than while the company exists. "In the latter case there are fewer vessels, and those vessels belonging to the company, who having an interest that they perform the voyages prescribed to them, it can always be known where they have been, and under what circumstances, and such vessels being addressed to factors in Turkey, members of the company, and under its direction and the control of the consuls, they cannot in an irregular manner leave Turkey without their destination being known, and with attestations from the consuls, showing the state of the health of the port of the Levant they sailed from."

In

In answer to this it may be observed, that in the ports of the Mediterranean, not only vessels of the country, but of all other nations, arrive without any previous notice to perform quarantine, and the length of their quarantine is regulated by the bills of health which they bring, and the knowledge which the officers of the health offices have of the state of the plague in every part of Turkey.

Can it be supposed that vessels can arrive in the ports of Great Britain, without its being known whence they came? The regulations of the quarantine and the custom-house, as they now exist, are sufficient to put this beyond doubt; besides, free vessels must bring from the Levant the same papers, showing the state of the country with respect to health, as are now required of the company's ships; the risk will not therefore be augmented by laying the trade open.

But it may be necessary to examine a little more narrowly how far our quarantine regulations secure us at present from the plague. After all that has been said by Dr. Ruffel, it may appear indeed superfluous to touch this subject again, but since his excellent treatise has produced no amelioration of these regulations, his arguments cannot be too

too much enforced *. I affirm, not only from my own knowledge of the nature of lazarettos, but from the opinion of officers of the health offices at Malta, Leghorn, and Marseilles, whom I consulted on the subject, THAT OUR QUARANTINE REGULATIONS ARE WHOLLY INEFFECTUAL, AND THAT WE ARE CONSTANTLY EXPOSED TO THE DANGER OF HAVING THE PLAGUE IMPORTED FROM TURKEY, BY EVERY VESSEL WHICH COMES DIRECTLY FROM THAT COUNTRY.

1st. It is beyond all doubt established, that the miasm, effluvia, or whatever it may be called, which produces the plague, may remain in an active state, so as to occasion infection, for a much longer time than is required for a vessel to load in Turkey, make her voyage, and perform quarantine in Great Britain.

2. It is equally certain that these fomites, or the impregnation of substances with pestilential miasmata, cannot be destroyed but by

* Dr. Miltzer, a physician of Moscow, has written in German a large book on the plague, which contains a great number of cases which came under his observation; but as they all tend to support a system he has adopted, it is to be feared that the power of prepossession in favour of his system has often misled his judgment.

airing

airing a certain time, by fumigating, by washing, by moistening with such liquors as are anti-peffilential, or by expofing to a fevere cold. Some of thefe deftroy the miasm in a fhort time, fome require a longer.

3. It appears from Dr. Ruffel's remarks (and he has been delicate on this fubject too) that notwithstanding all the fidelity and diligence of confuls, infected goods may be fhipped for Britain, and the fhip which carries them have a *fair bill of health*.

Now as merchandize performing quarantine in Britain and in Holland (where the regulations are ftill worfe) are never opened and properly aired, it follows that fuch quarantines are not fufficient to deftroy the fomites; nor are thefe quarantines fafe with regard to other circumftances; for communication with thofe who fupply the paffengers and fhip's crew with provifions, &c. is not fufficiently guarded, and the paffengers and the crew, though they were not infected in Turkey, are liable every day, by touching the cargo or their effects, to catch the plague, and to communicate it to others; nor is fmuggling impoffible as the lazarettos now are eftablifhed.

It does not appear that the laws of this country will permit fuch a police to be obferved

served in lazarettos as is indispensably necessary to secure the country from the plague.

The officers of health have, in the Mediterranean, a power of putting to death immediately all those who violate the laws of the quarantine in such a manner as that contagion may be communicated, and their power is independent of the civil magistrate or any other authority. For the most trifling thing smuggled, or endeavoured to be smuggled, out of the lazaretto, the offenders are shot dead the instant they are detected. A person escaping from the lazaretto, were it one hour before the expiration of the quarantine, is equally punished with immediate death, &c. &c. &c. *

There are neither proper places, nor buildings, nor regulations, for performing quarantine in safety in Great Britain, nor is the nature of quarantine understood in our lazarettos.

It may be asked, how have we escaped the plague since the year 1666, when the last plague in London entirely ceased. I answer, chiefly by not admitting ships with foul bills

* The humane Leopold, when Grand Duke of Tuscany, though he would not suffer a murderer to be put to death, did not alter the quarantine laws.

of health from the Levant, and obliging them to perform quarantine in the Mediterranean since that regulation took place, and by God's mercy only that vessels with clean bills of health have not brought it.

What are we to do to be more secure in future, will then be asked. The answer is very short and obvious; to oblige all vessels coming from the Levant, whether with *fair* or with *foul bills of health*, to perform quarantine in Malta, in Leghorn, or in Marseilles, &c. and then with the proper attestations of the health officers, signed also by His Majesty's consuls in other ports, to admit them into Great Britain without performing a second and useless quarantine.

Trade would gain by this regulation, and we should be under no apprehension of the plague. The charges are small in the Mediterranean, and not more for us than for our rivals in trade.

Malta is by far the best port to perform quarantine in; the regulations are even more to be relied on than at Leghorn, as they are in some respects more scrupulous; it lies more in the road of vessels coming home from any part of Turkey. It is true that masters of vessels, for many private reasons, which do not benefit their owners or the freighters,
prefer

prefer Leghorn; but it is considerably out of the track of their voyage.

With respect to Holland, most certainly, Turkey goods, and cottons in particular, ought not to be admitted thence till they have been well aired; nor need we ever have imported such vast quantities, or any quantity at all from Holland or any other place, had the Turkey trade been free in Britain.

APPENDIX.

MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS.

THESE fragments are extracts and translations from original documents; they will serve to elucidate and confirm some passages in the preceding pages.

Of EGYPT.

THE French have it in their power either to seize Egypt, or to make such an alliance with the begs as will open to them a communication with India.

The begs would eagerly embrace any offer which would secure to them a perfect independence of the Ottoman porte; or they would even become tributary to any other sovereign or state, who would maintain them in their separate governments, and protect the one against the other, and the whole country against the Turks.

Had not the domestic affairs of France engaged all the attention of that cabinet, the effects of M. de Truguet's mission to Cairo would, long ago, have been visible.

Were the Turks driven out of Europe, their force would be more concentrated; they would be stronger, and more able than they are now, to reduce to obedience those provinces, which at present are either in a state of open rebellion or virtual independence, and from which the porte draws neither troops nor money; they would then be able to reduce Egypt, and to defend it against the French. In
such

such a state of affairs, the French would easily obtain from the Turks a communication through Egypt to India, which then would be attended with less risk, though not with much less expence than it now is. It is not, however, probable that the porte would, so readily as the begs, permit troops to be sent across Egypt*.

Volney says, that memorials have been laid before the French cabinet, on the expediency of obtaining possession of Egypt. These memorials are now no secret.

The principal force of Egypt consists in 8,000 horse; the janizaries are not to be estimated as soldiers. There are not four cannons to defend the Pharos of Alexandria, which, according to the regulations, should be garrisoned by 500 janizaries, but there are never half the number. A single frigate might beat down these fortifications. The greatest difficulty a foreign army would have to encounter in keeping possession of Alexandria, is the want of water; this city has none but what is brought in canals to their cisterns when the Nile overflows; it would, therefore, be necessary to make a conquest of the country, at least as far as the river.

The revenues of the begs consist in a tax on land and the customs, which produce about two millions sterling, of which the porte receives very little. Uncertain revenues are extortions under various pretexts, and these are not inconsiderable.

Suez is a most miserable and defenceless place; it has no

* Abolishing the Levant company in England, and supplying, by means of the East India company, all parts of the Turkish empire with India goods (as some of the foreign India companies do in part) would put an end to the clandestine trade of the company's servants, and to the commercial speculations of the French, except so far as regard their own consumption; because the English East India company is able to send from London, and sell in Turkey, these goods at a cheaper rate than they can be brought by the Red Sea or the Persian Gulph, which always must be attended with much expence and considerable risk.

When Great Britain is at war with France, this communication may easily be stopped, and the necessary steps may be taken during a peace. The extraordinary expence would not be great.

water

water nearer than ten miles, and that is very brackish, and drawn from a well. No ships can approach Suez nearer than three miles.

Egypt produces a considerable quantity of sugar of a very good grain. Were that country under a better government, it might supply Europe with a great quantity. The sugar cane grows also very well in Candia and in Sicily, where, if the inhabitants were more industrious, or were there enterprising people of capital among them, this would become a product of great consequence. The same may be said of a great part of the coast of Barbary.

There is a coffee tree growing in the open air at Malta, in the garden of the French minister, and the fruit ripens perfectly. The French have tried the experiment in Candia, and it succeeded; probably it would grow in Sicily. It is thought that it would become more hardy, and ripen earlier, were it engrafted on other trees or shrubs, and that it might be naturalized to climates less warm than those in which it is now produced in the greatest perfection. We know that re-production has made many plants resist a colder climate better than when the parent plant was first imported. There can be no doubt of the coffee tree's growing in Egypt. Egypt also produces excellent flax and hemp.

Indigo has been cultivated with success on the eastern coast of the Adriatic, near Zante, till the planter, it is not known by whom or for what reason, was assassinated. Were the French possessed of Egypt, they might abandon their West India islands.

The French court, a very few years ago, paid much attention to these speculations.

1st. Respecting PERSIA.

THE internal disorders of Persia are favourable to Great Britain, and to assist any party, so that it should gain a preponderance, which might end in a subjugation of the whole

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country,

country, is acting contrary to the English interest. The weakness of Persia is the security of India.

The Agwans (or Afgans) and Abdali, being of the sect of Omar, are enemies to the other Persians, who are followers of Ali; they are now distinct nations, and have their own independent sovereigns. They are not concerned in the civil wars in Persia. They are powerful enough to impede the marching of a Russian army through Bochara to India, or the Persians from crossing the Indus. They themselves may, however, be dangerous, acting in concert with any Indian power. England should avoid quarrelling with them; but prevent, as much as possible, their having any connection with India, or receiving artillery from any quarter.

While Great Britain is firmly allied with Russia, she need not fear either the Persians, Afgans, or Abdali. A diversion made by Russia would prevent, at all times, their sending an army to India, or meddling with the disputes in that country.

A war with these Asiatic nations should be a *casus fœderis* in the treaty with Russia. At present it is an exception.

2d. Respecting PERSIA.

THERE are three Persian ambassadors in Russia: one from the khan of Ghilan, one from the khan of Derbent, and one from Jaseer, khan of Ispahan.

These two last came to Kremenchuk, in the summer of 1787, after the departure of the empress, and had a pompous public audience of Prince Potemkin. The minister of the khan of Derbent was exceedingly well received by the prince; but the other, not conforming entirely to an etiquette, which he thought was to be observed only in an audience of the empress herself, was received, and afterwards treated with great coolness. The minister from the khan of Ghilan did not obtain permission from the prince to come

to him, or to go to Petersburg, till a little time before his death, when he sent for him to Yassy; but on the road, hearing of the prince's death, he stopt, and obtained leave of the empress to go to Petersburg.

The object of the mission of all these ministers was, to solicit the assistance of the empress for the party of their masters, *on her own conditions*. Probably the prince kept them in suspense till he saw which party would prevail. That of Derbent will be always of importance on account of the pass it commands, and which is the only one on that side of the Caspian by land.

Almost every governor of a province in Persia has set up for himself, and refuses to take part in the quarrel, which has greatly lessened the power of the two great competitors, Mahomed Khan (son of Hassan Khan) of Mazanderan, and Jaseer Khan, in the south, and who resides at Ispahan. Mahamud Khan is of the race of the ancient family of the Shahs, but was made an eunuch by the late Karim Khan, regent of Persia.

Since the death of Achmet Shah, of the Afgans, the country is much weakened by the partition he made of it among his three sons. Prince Nassau and Mr. de St. Genie proposed to gain over the Afgans to the interest of Russia, in 1791, during the dispute with Great Britain, and they proposed to the empress to send an army through Bochara to the north of India.

They want artillery very much in Persia, and the Russians refuse selling them any at Astrakan.

Tibet Shah, of the Abdali, near Bochara, asked a train of artillery of the English East India company, about the time that Count Ferrieres was sent into Persia by Mr. de Vergennes. He intended to employ it against the Bocharians, who, doubtless, would have been assisted by Russia. He offered to the English a body of 25,000 cavalry to act against the Mahrattas. This cavalry is excellent, and 15,000 beat near 200,000 Mahrattas in a pitched battle some years ago.

The French offered, by Mr. de Ferrieres, a large train

of artillery to Jafir, khan, of Ispahan, to secure his friendship. A small French fleet did actually come up the Persian gulf, in June 1781, with a considerable number of cannon on board, but Ferrieres, for want of address, did not succeed in his mission, which was as hostile to Russia as Britain.

Bochara, at present, is divided into almost as many sovereignties as there are villages, and there is no union among them. It is a country without strength, except some enemy were to attack them in such a manner as to oblige them to unite.

The friendship of this Tibet Shah may be of consequence to the English to cultivate, as the most effectual check on the Bocharians, or on those who would pass through their country to invade India.

The Persians, distracted as their state is, still remember that they have conquered India. Timur entered India in 1398, Nadir Shah in 1738, Abdallah several times from 1748 to 1765.

3d. Respecting PERSIA.

IN 1780, Prince Potemkin framed a project of opening a trade through Persia to Bender-Bushier, and India. Count Mark Wainovich failed in July 1781, with a squadron of four frigates and two armed sloops from Astrakan. He stopped and examined the islands of Shiloy and Oguzzin, but found them barren spots; he proceeded to Asterabad; the commodiousness of the harbour and the fruitfulness of the country, induced him to enter into a negociation with the khan of Asterabad, who deceived him. The Russians, however, erected, to defend the harbour, a small fort about fifty miles from the city of Asterabad. The caravans from Bochara, Tibet, and India, pass through Meshd. The fleet wintered there, and returning, surveyed the bay of Bulkan, and the inlet of Karabogas.

The death of the regent (Vakiel) Karim Khan, having thrown Persia into such a disorderly state, that the prince abandoned

abandoned his project, but there still exists a Russian fortress at Zinzeli, with a small but sufficient garrison to defend it. A consul resides there, who is the commandant.

*Of a PROJECT, which the EMPRESS of
RUSSIA had formed to attack the ENGLISH
in INDIA.*

WHEN the British fleet was about to sail for the Baltic, to force the empress to make peace, Prince Nassau, who was then in favour with her imperial majesty, presented a project of sending an army through Bochara to Cashmir, and thence to Bengal, to drive the English out of India. This project was conceived and drawn up by a Monsieur de St. Genie (the person whose agents set fire to the Dutch arsenal, &c. and had formed a similar project for destroying the British dock-yards and ships, &c.)

By a manifesto to be published, the empress declared that she sent the army to re-establish the mogul on the throne of India.

Little difficulty was foreseen in passing through Bochara; it was even hoped, seeing the object was to re-establish on the throne of India a prince of their religion, that they would be friendly to the enterprize: however, were they not, little apprehension was entertained of a people so divided among themselves, and who tremble at the name of Russia.

St. Genie pretended, that there were passes through the mountains, and that he had people who had been in the country, sent by Mr. de Vergennes. He presented with his project a map, and a *marche-route* for the army.

The empress highly approved the plan: Prince Potemkin turned it into ridicule. Had a war taken place, it is difficult to say what the empress might not have undertaken, if not effectuated, at that period.

They counted on being joined in the north of India by the discontented from all parts.

*Respecting some PROJECTS of the RUSSIANS
on CHINA and JAPAN.*

1st PAPER.

CAPTAIN BILLINGS, who was formerly with captain Cook round the world is returned to St. Petersburg, from the north-east part of Russia, and the continent of America, whither the empress sent him nine years ago.

One of his instructions was, to find a port for establishing an admiralty; *i. e.* a port for building, putting into dock, and stationing ships of war and other vessels.

A captain of the navy was also sent to join him in 1787, and to examine the coast as far as the mouth of the river Amur, and to fix on a port. Oud, not far from the mouth of the Amur, was fixed on. Also, 200 wersts to the south of Oud, they found a very fine port beyond the Chinese frontier. At length, it was determined to fix the admiralty on the American coast, either at Prince William's Sound, or Comptroller's Bay. They also found many other very fine harbours on the American coast. The empress wrote, in 1787, to these captains, and to the commander of the Russian fortresses, that she had sent six ships from the Baltic to Kamchatka, to co-operate with a powerful army that was to go down the Amur, and take possession of its banks to its mouth, and all the country to the left.

A great saving would accrue to the Russians by sending by water provisions for their settlements, which now go by land to Kamchatka, &c. at a great expence, and two thirds of them are often spoiled. Besides, they propose to open this way a trade with Japan, China, and India, and to have in those seas a naval force sufficient to make themselves respected.

Two small squadrons were fitted out at Cronstadt, for Kamchatka, but were prevented from sailing by the Swedish war. One of them was commanded by captain Trevanion, an Englishman, and was to go round Cape Horn; the other
by

by captain Malofskoi, who was to go round the Cape of Good Hope.

The empress acted in conjunction with the court of Spain, it seems, for Malofskoi was to go to the Philippines, and to purchase large vessels from the Spaniards.

The Russians claim the coast of America to a considerable distance south; they have not themselves determined how far; this probably will be fixed by the utility the claimed country may promise to be of.

2d PAPER.

IN August 1792, Professor Laxman conducted to St. Petersburg, a Japanese master of a vessel, that had some years ago been shipwrecked on the Russian coast; they were in all sixteen sailors and the master; five of the sailors only are now alive. It was not thought proper to send them back till they had learned enough of the Russian language to communicate what knowledge of their own country they were possessed of. The master is a very intelligent man, but it is only by stealth that he can be spoken with, as the government is very watchful over him. He has brought with him a chart of the coast of Japan, which widely differs from those made in Europe.

3d PAPER.

THE empress has appointed the son of Professor Laxman to conduct the Japanese, in a Russian ship, back to their own country, and to reside there as her chargé d'affaires, if he is received. He has considerable presents with him, and is accompanied by several engineers.

4th PAPER.

THE chargé d'affaires is returned from Japan, and has obtained leave for the Russians to send a vessel every year, to trade with the natives under the same restrictions as the Dutch.

The islands on which the Russians have possessions extend within 300 miles of Japan. They think *some day or other* they may be masters of the islands of Japan also (for Japan is not one, but two large islands) as they conceive the force they could bring could not be withstood by such a people.

With respect to China, an attack was much nearer; preparations were actually making for taking possession of the Amur at Narshinsk, where the Russian gold and silver mines are; the chief difficulty was want of timber. The death of Prince Potemkin put a stop to this expedition:—when it will be resumed is not known; it is supposed that 10,000 Russians could march through China*.

A PROJECT of the late PRINCE PÔTEMKIN'S,
of purchasing from a private proprietor the
Islands of LAMPEDOSA and LINOSA, in
the Mediterranean, and obtaining the Suze-
rainity of the Court of NAPLES.

WHETHER any overture was made to the court of Naples respecting this object I do not know. The project was drawn up, some time after Minorca was taken by the French, and was much approved of by Prince Potemkin, as well as by the empress. The following particulars were extracted from the original paper in his possession. It probably was laid aside when the king of Naples consented to receive the Russian fleet into his ports in Sicily.

It was proposed to establish an order of knighthood, similar to that of Malta, for Russians and Greeks, but proofs of ancient nobility were not to be required. The particular institution of the order I never saw; but the empress was to be the grand master, and the governor of the island for the time being her deputy.

* A particular account of all these matters, and a description of the countries here alluded to, from original documents, will shortly be published by Mr. Arrowsmith, with valuable maps, charts, &c.

DESCRIPTION

DESCRIPTION of *the Island of* LAMPEDOSA.

THIS island is in Africa, in 35 degrees and 30 min. latitude; it is about twelve miles long and five to eight broad; it is flat, exceedingly fertile, and has plenty of water; the sea on the south side is not very deep, and a vessel may anchor at a considerable distance from land; to the north it is deep all round, and the shore very bold. There is a rock a league from the W. S. W. point, but it is easily known, and may be marked: a ship may sail safely between it and the land. Three leagues off there is a high great round rock in the sea, which is a good mark. To the south there is an exceedingly fine bay, where vessels may anchor in fifteen to eighteen fathoms water, shut in from all winds except the south and south-west; the bottom is a soft sand. There is a great abundance of fish in this bay.

The shore may be easily defended all round by forts and entrenchments. At the bottom of the bay is a creek, which is capable of being made a very fine harbour, and at a small expence, nature having already done the greatest part of the work. The entrance is from the S. S. W. There is fifteen fathoms water at its mouth, ten in the middle, which gradually decreases to six, and at the extremity there is only one fathom. To the left, halfway up the creek, there is a point which projects half across it, behind which small vessels may anchor with safety, when the wind blows strong directly into the harbour, at which time there is a great swell in other parts of it. To the left, from the entrance to the part where there is ten fathoms water, there is a shallow bay, land-locked, in which there is only three to five feet water, with a soft sandy bottom: this bay may be shut up with a temporary wall, and the bay sunk to any depth, at a small expence, and continued a great way into the island, so as to form a large port for ships of any draught of water, the land being but a little above the surface of the water, and of a proper kind to admit of digging. Docks may also be formed by

by simply excavating the earth. The surface of this bay is never ruffled by the most violent gales of wind.

The entrance of the creek or port is ninety fathoms broad, and half a mile in length; the right hand shore is a rock, and near it is a hill of stone with a church on it; this being fortified, would defend the harbour and command the land.

Vessels may anchor in the bay all the summer; and in winter, when too violent a storm comes on from the south or south west, they may go to the north, round the island, and keep in as close under shore as they please; when the port is fit to receive them, they may safely run in; they may also bear away for Linosa, about twenty miles distant, and which lies exactly in the direction these winds blow. The coast of Linosa is so bold, that ships may fasten on shore; large vessels are, however, not more exposed at Lampidosa than in the road of Leghorn.

There are only ten or fifteen inhabitants on the island: they are Maltese; one of them is a priest, and they have a passport of protection from France. The Barbary cruizers go often into this port as well as the Maltese vessels, and ships which come from Turkey with the plague on board, till the sickness has ceased, when they return to Turkey, and thus save their ship and cargo from being burnt, which would be the case were they to go into any harbour where there is a quarantine.

The situation of Lampidosa is the most advantageous possible; it is 100 miles from Susa in Barbary, from Giorgenti in Sicily, and from the great port of Malta; 600 from Toulon, from Algiers, and the entrance into the Archipelago; from Gibraltar, Alexandria, and Constantinople, 950; from Tripoli, Tunis, and the south point of Sicily, 160 miles.

ADVANTAGES *to RUSSIA, in possessing this Island.*

IT is the best situation of any in the Mediterranean; in that respect it has all the advantages of Malta for the station
of

of a fleet in time of peace or war; Leghorn is quite out of the way; every thing is exceedingly dear there, and the motions of the fleet are almost immediately known in Italy and France. It is farther from France than from the Archipelago, and is in the passage of all vessels that go to or come from the Levant.

In time of war, if the island should be in danger of an invasion, and being attacked by a superior fleet, the vessels stationed there may retire to Malta or Sicily, &c. however, a fleet drawn up near the shore may be protected by the land batteries.

It is the best station for protecting trade. Vessels coming either from the straits of Gibraltar or from the Levant may be met by frigates, this island being in the midway.

Magazines of naval stores may be formed here from the Black Sea, instead of purchasing them at enormous prices in Italy, in war time.

Provisions will be produced in the island, but till that is the case, they may be had from Sicily or the coast of Barbary, even in time of war, as Malta is supplied thence, and more than two thirds of the cost at Leghorn saved.

The Barbary powers will be kept in great awe by its vicinity, and prevented from ever daring to commit hostilities against Russia: their ports may be kept blocked up. If Malta would cruize *seriously* against these states in conjunction with the Russians, the Algerine cruizers could never pass beyond these islands, and Tunis and Tripoli may be continually blocked up.

It is also the best situation for an emporium for Russian products brought from the Black Sea, for supplying the Mediterranean, and for collecting articles of return.

A lazaretto must be built, and thereby the expences of quarantine will be saved to Russia.

Maxims of Government to be observed.

A colony and a province of the empire are to be governed by opposite maxims.

I. The

1. The colony must manufacture nothing that can be manufactured in Russia, not even the raw products of the colony.
2. The colony must produce only raw articles, which Russia does not produce, or such as Russia is in need of, or its vessels.
3. The colony must take from Russia every thing it wants, if Russia can furnish them.
4. The colony must trade with no other country. Russia must receive its products, and either consume them or send them to other nations, and must reap the advantage of exportation and navigation.
5. The inhabitants must be drawn as much as possible from other countries, not to diminish the population of the mother country.
6. A colony must be distant enough from the mother country to become a nursery for seamen, but not so far off as that the voyage may injure their health; its climate must be healthy, that its advantages may not be counterbalanced by the loss of those of the mother country who visit it. It must be in a different climate than the mother country, or these maxims will be oppressive.

Laws for the Colony.

IN establishing the government, regard must be had to the genius, customs, and morals of the neighbouring Christian nations.

1. No duty whatever shall be paid, neither on importation nor exportation of any kind of merchandize. Duty is to be paid in the Russian ports as now, or with such diminutions as shall be judged necessary.
2. It is prohibited to make use of, or to have any utensil or instrument of iron, brass, &c. or any cloth, linen, or sail cloth, not made and imported from Russia, with the exception of silks and other merchandize not produced or manufactured in Russia, which may be had from the neighbouring countries, of which a list shall be made.

3. No

3. No foreign vessel (except in time of war and by stress of weather) shall be permitted to enter the port, except it be empty of all kind of merchandize, and then it shall have no communication with the colonists, till after it has been visited. Vessels loaded, in need of assistance, shall receive it, but they shall be considered as in quarantine as long as they stay. Passengers, after the quarantine has been performed, according to the place they came from, may land with their baggage, but not with merchandize.

4. Foreigners may purchase merchandize in the island, except the products of the islands, and export them in their own vessels, which arrived empty.

5. Foreigners or Russians may import into Lampidosa merchandize from Russia or elsewhere, only in Russian vessels.

6. Only Russian vessels may export products to Russia. The cargo unloaded in Russia must correspond to the note of the cargo given by the government of the island, and they must not carry it elsewhere, nor sell any to pay charges in ports they may by distress put into, but they may mortgage the produce of the sale in Russia.

7. The products of the island must be registered before the harvest, or the bringing them into warehouses from the fields.

8. Any person, of whatever nation or religion, may become an inhabitant of the island, and leave it when he thinks proper; but his residence in it shall not give him a right to have the Russian flag for a vessel, large or small.

9. Every individual, who shall be possessed of a house, or land cultivated, to the value of five hundred roubles, shall be entitled to have the Russian flag for one vessel of forty tons; if he possess house or land to the value of 1,000 roubles, one of eighty tons; and for larger possessions, one or more vessels in the same proportion. Who lends his name to others shall forfeit the value, and the borrower shall forfeit the vessel. Property, which has given a right to have the flag, shall not be sold before the passports of the vessels have been delivered up to the government, and the vessels return

to the port of the island. No proprietor of a vessel is obliged to go himself to sea with his vessel.

10. He who shall send his family to Russia, or another family in its stead, consisting of a male under thirty-five years of age and a woman under twenty-five, or a man of any age and a woman under thirty years of age and one child, or of thirty-five with two children, or the man and woman of any age with three children, who shall become naturalized subjects of the empress, and shall buy in Russia immoveable property for 500 roubles, under the same restrictions as property in the island with respect to the sale, such sender shall have the Russian flag for a vessel of any size under 200 tons, and for a larger vessel in proportion, or for several. Neither the persons sent to Russia shall be answerable for the conduct of the sender, nor the sender for the conduct of the sent.

In the year 1779, a project of a peace with the Barbary States, was presented to the empress by Prince Potemkin, who was at that time very ardent in promoting the trade of the Black Sea to the Mediterranean in Russian vessels. There were no humiliating conditions in this arrangement, as there are in most of the treaties of other nations. The empress gave for answer, that she would never make any arrangement whatever with those powers; that if they took her mercantile vessels she would know how to force the porte to oblige them to observe the stipulations of the treaty of peace; and that rather than send a negotiator to them, she would send a fleet of frigates.

The number of sailors in the different ports of Italy is much greater than is generally imagined; there are above 10,000 in the two Sicilies. Malta generally furnishes to Spain 6,000 excellent seamen.

From the coast of the Adriatic, about Ragusa, Prevasa, &c. the French have for many years imported a great quantity of the most excellent oak timber; there is, indeed, no finer timber any where to be found for the purpose of ship building, than that which grows in those parts in great abundance.

*A PLAN for attacking the TURKISH FLEET
in the Port of CONSTANTINOPLE.*

IT will serve no good end to publish the details of the intended operations of the Russian fleet in the last war. The following particulars will sufficiently show the probability there was of their being crowned with success.

The channel of Constantinople is of different breadths, from about one to three miles, and runs between high hills, at the foot of which are batteries, from the entrance at the Black Sea to Serrieri (a village near Buyukderé.) The north and north east winds blow down the channel nine or ten months in the year. The southerly winds, which blow up the channel when they reign, seldom last more than two or three days at a time; the north and north east winds, on the contrary, are generally constant for two or three months, so that a fleet coming from the Black Sea at the proper season is almost certain of a fair wind to enter the channel and the port of Constantinople.

The current is very strong from the Black Sea, except when the wind has blown two or three days from the south, when there is a current from the sea of Marmora. The stream divides at the point of the seraglio; a part of the water runs into the sea of Marmora, and a part is forced into the port, making, on the Constantinople side, a tolerably strong current, which runs towards the bottom of the port, and coming out again on the Galata side, and by an under current, occasions an eddy or still water in the middle; hence it is, that ships cannot sail at once from the port, but must be towed or warped in the still water close to the shore of Tophana, till they are so far up the stream (that is, to the northward) that they can make sail without danger of being carried against the seraglio point (as has sometimes happened) and where there is a perfect torrent.

From this description it is evident, that a fleet coming from the Black Sea down the channel of Constantinople, with the wind and current in its favour, could with ease
sail

fail straight into the port; that the Turkish fleet in the port cannot go out to meet it in the middle of the channel; but by towing slowly up the shore, while the enemy's fleet coming down will have, within a few fathoms of it, the wind and current in its favour, and will be able to cast anchor, and form in whatever manner the commander may judge most advantageous.

If the Turkish fleet is not in the port, but lies in the channel in the stream, where it usually is stationed before it sails in the spring for the Archipelago, three or four miles above the port, the Russian fleet may anchor at what distance it pleases from it, either to attack or not, while the Turkish ships cannot possibly advance against the current, not even by warping. In such a situation they are exposed to fire-ships, and if any part slip their anchors to avoid being burnt, they cannot again get into the line; the rest must follow them if they will preserve their line.

As to the batteries on the two shores, they may be passed so rapidly, and at such a distance, that nothing is to be feared from them; but as the water is deep enough to admit line-of-battle ships to lie quite close to them, and the shore is perfectly clean, they may be soon silenced, and particularly as only one or two guns in the flanks can bear on a ship before it comes opposite to them. The stones of which they are built are hard and exceedingly brittle; they are also so low and so exposed, that a ship with grape-shot may soon drive out the gunners.

In the first winter of the last war, a Russian sixty-four gun ship was dismasted in a violent storm in the Black Sea, and the officers being ignorant of the Turkish ports on the coast of Anatolia, saw no other means of saving their lives than by running into the channel of Constantinople. The ship entered it with a fair wind, but having only jury-masts, she sailed very slowly, yet the Turkish batteries, though they kept up a constant fire on her, did her not the least injury; when she had run by all the batteries, she cast anchor in the bay of Buyukderé, and surrendered herself. The captain was afterwards blamed for not sailing by Constanti-
nople,

nople, and attempting to run between the forts of the Dardanelles, and get into the Archipelago.

This example puts the matter beyond doubt, as to the possibility of a fleet's failing by these batteries, reputed so tremendous.

STATE of the RUSSIAN ARMY, January 1795,
according to the Registers of the College
of War, from the Reports of the different
Corps.

Regiments.	Number of Men in pay.
19 of artillery	38,110
11 grenadiers, of 4,075 men each	51,048
3 grenadiers, of 1,000 to 3,000 men each	
51 musketeers, composed of 10 companies of musketeers and 2 companies of grenadiers, each regiment being composed of 2,424 men	139,592
7 musketeers without grenadiers	
1 musketeers, of 4 battalions, 4,143 men	5,879
New arquebusiers, so called	
12 battalions of musqueteers, of 1,019 men	16,653
3 battalions of musqueteers, of 1,475 men	
48 battalions, infantry in garrison on the fron- tiers	82,393
10 in the country	
9 corps of chasseurs (jäger) of 4 battalions of 998 men, each 3,992	35,928
3 battalions of chasseurs	2,994
5 cuirassiers (of 6 squadrons) of 1,106 and 1,125 men	5,490
10 dragoons (of 10 squadrons) of 1,882 men	23,573
2 with hussars and grenadiers mounted	
8 carabiniers (of 6 squadrons) of 1,106 men	16,352
8 carabiniers (of 5 squadrons) of 938 men	
L 1	2 hussars

Regiments.	Number of Men in pay.
2 hussars of 1,119 men - - -	} 2,722
3 squadron hussars - - -	
1 squadron hussars de corps - -	
4 regiments chasseurs à cheval, of 1,838 men -	7,352
5 light horse (of 6 squadrons) of 1,047 men -	5,235
6 cavalry of the Ukraine, of 1,047 men - -	6,282
16 regular Cossack cavalry - - -	30,883
Troops to guard the country (marechaussée)	22,216

In the new provinces acquired from Poland at the first partition, viz.

6 brigades of 1,819 men - - -	} 23,360
5 brigades light horse, of 1,098 men - -	
4 of infantry, of 1,447, &c. in all - -	
Invalids in garrison - - -	3,864
Soldiers sons at school for service - -	16,816
Troops to assist the commissaries, &c. - -	1,258

Total regular troops - - Men	541,731
Irregular Cossaks cavalry - - 21,625	} 46,601
Irregular troops of the Don Cossaks cavalry, all in actual service - 24,976	
A great number of other irregular troops, all cavalry, as Calmuks, Baskirs, &c. &c. not enrolled, but ready when called out; they receive no pay; at least - -	} 100,000
Men -	688,332

Of the regular troops there are about 300,000 men, which may be spared for foreign service.

The cavalry is never complete, and particularly those in Poland.

The irregulars are generally over-complete in time of war.

In 1796, there were 150,000 recruits raised for the infantry.

A very

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A very great part of the empire has not yet contributed in furnishing troops for the army, so that the number of regular troops may be greatly increased, whenever a still more formidable military establishment may be necessary.

LIST of the RUSSIAN FLEET, fitted out at Cronstadt, to cruize in the Baltic, in 1795.

100 gun ships,	74 gun ships.
Evsevie.	Pobedoslav.
Vladimir.	Prince Gustaf (Swedish)
Saint Nicholaj,	Boris.
Saratov.	Sophia Magdalena (Swedish)
Rastislav.	Vseislav.
Ire Erarkov.	Jaroslav.
74 gun ships,	66 gun ships.
Maksim Izpovednik.	Omgeten (Swedish)
Sifoi Velikoi.	Proxor.
Constantine.	Pobedonocets (hospital ship)
Saint Peter.	

FRIGATES.

Archangel Gabriel.	Pomoshnoi.
Simeon.	Raphael.
Patrick.	Venus.
2 cutters, Volkov and Sokole.	

A LIST of the AUXILIARY FLEET, which the Empress of Russia sent to England, in 1795.

74 guns.	66 guns.
Parnit Estafei.	Jona.
Kleb.	Philip.
Peter.	Pimen.
Helena.	Parmen.
66 guns.	Nikonor.
No. 82 (so called)	Revifan (Swedish ship) of
Graf Orloff.	oak.

FRIGATES.

FRIGATES.

The Archangel Michael	The Narva
The Reval	The Archipelago
The Riga	The Cronstadt

CUTTERS.

Mercury	Lefuchie
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STATE of the RUSSIAN FLEET at Sebastopolis, in the Spring of 1796, all the old vessels being condemned.

	Number of guns.
1 ship of 90 guns	90
1 ship of 80	80
3 ships of 74	222
6 — 64	384
11 ships of the line	776
8 large frigates	362
19	1,138 guns.

Besides those on the stocks, which are now finished.
The flotilla at Odessa, or Khogia-bay.

Twenty-five very large and sixty smaller vessels to transport troops.

They are sixty-four to seventy feet long, draw six feet water when loaded, and carry one very large gun. They have a latine main sail and gib, and twenty-four oars; besides these, there are a great number of other transports, bomb vessels, &c.

F I N I S.

